How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[JMA]

'Command' in a course setting is not the same as doing it in combat or in a working unit on exercises. I know you know that, just stating the obvious so no one misses that critical point.???

No, that’s not the whole story. On officers course the cadet has no unit to exercise with … other than where a course will exercise with a trained unit (battalion/company) so as to provide the necessary command opportunities. In war time units cannot be spared from operations for this purpose. Cadet therefore need to rely on exercising with the ‘demonstration troops’ available at their school. Rhodesia could only muster/spare a company of such troops at the School of Infantry to firstly, demonstrate tactical actions up to company level to successive cadet courses and also to provide the troops to command in field exercises. In my year and in the years I was an instructor at the ‘School’ we exercised so regularly and often with these troops that we got to know most by name. (In fact one of my tasks when an instructor was to deploy the Dem Company on operations to clear gooks from one of our training areas because their presence was starting to interfere with our training schedules -bloody cheeky of them!)

On arrival in their units the newly commissioned officers normally joined their company in the field. No time to exercise prior to operational deployment. Two options on arrival. One, where a suitably experienced platoon sergeant existed the young officer would be thrown directly in the deep end. Two, if there were any doubts the new officer would be placed as a side kick rifleman with the most experienced platoon commander until considered ‘safe’ to let him take over his own platoon.

During (ultra boring) peacetime one imagines there would be plenty of opportunities to exercise with his unit of which he is a platoon commander.

So to repeat my earlier point… if a commissioned officer needs to be exercised commanding squads/sections then you need to go find his course officer and administer the coup de grace.

.Yes -- However, in a full up war ala WW II or some parts of Korea, casualties and other things, the size of the Army, will entail a personnel turnover rate sometimes reaching 15 to 30% of a unit in a month. The unit cannot quit, it will receive replacements and Officers and NCO will be moved within Bns, even Bdes to replace combat losses -- one WILL deal with 'unknown persons.'

Korea was 1950-53 so we have not seen a ‘full up’ war for 60 years. Lets stick to the small wars then, shall we?

Talking of ‘replacements’ not sure how it worked in Korea and even Vietnam but (if you read Ambrose and Keegan on) the post D-Day period was a real shambles as far as the US forces were concerned. Depending on who the replacements are the ‘trust thing’ works in all directions. Best to withdraw hard hit units to refit and retrain before being once again inserted into the line, yes?

Totally true but in heavy combat, that much time will absolutely not be afforded. In Korea, I had three Co Cdrs in a month, I cannot even recall the name of the second who was there for three or four days. In Viet Nam, we got in a new Bn Cdr, he got a DSC, wounded, evacuated and replaced three weeks later. The new guy was there for three months and then moved to be the Bde S3. Another LTC came in and I left a couple of weeks after that. The point is that rotations and personnel turbulence entail a lack of trust of persons one does not personally know if one knows that the training of one's forces are not as good as they should or could be so one needs to learn that even marginal training is, in fact, overcome by most people. Best way to learn that is by exposure to many persons in many units and sub-units.

High casualty rates are surely exceptional and should be dealt with as such? There is more to it than trusting the new officers, there is the matter of the impact of the casualties on the morale of the troops. To them the loss of the CO might have less impact than that of their best friend.

Not sure that is a good reason to utilise ‘butterfly’ postings for officers. Better to gave them a solid grounding in their first three years so that they are able to handle such situations with maturity should they arise later?

You mention troops trusting Officers, yes, it is important that they do that -- it is even more critical that seniors trust juniors; else those seniors will be reluctant to grant the independence of action and give mission orders instead of detailed instructions...

Trust is earned and works in all directions.

To your second point… if the junior commanders prove they are competent they can be allowed more latitude in this regard. Not sure how that can be earned within the 6-12 months US officers spend as platoon commanders.

Yes but my point was that your experience in a unit was only a year or a bit less; initial entry training is important and counts for a lot -- but it is not the same as experience IN a unit.

My personal experience may not have been optimal but I fail to see why three years in the ranks followed by 12 month officer training is required prior to commanding a platoon for 12 months or less (unless that is an admission of the demise of the ‘hairy ass’d platoon sergeant of old? – Sgt Rock in the comics I read as a kid.). My point is that it is a maximum beyond which the person will have to wait for the second window of opportunity to commissioning being one step beyond platoon sergeant.

The problem is that in large Armies (and in peacetime) every LT will not have a decent, much less an expereienced Sergeant...

That’s a problem with the NCO structure which should be addressed, surely?

Not 'my' one year, that's a wartime minimum. I opted for three years (meaning peacetime and in these little wars).

Snap.

Agree on the Staff jobs but it's a matter of time and experience. As an aside, I don't particularly agree with the excessive number of ranks we currently have, officer or NCO. Just LT instead of 2LT and 1LT. Three years as a LT, then to the Captains course, thence to a staff job then to the Co XO / 2iC job...

My system was 4 years to acting-captain but… but a full 9-10 before you got full command of a company. Company 2IC was also for a senior captain (7-8 years commissioned service) - most certainly not a step up for a Lt who has only the experience of 12 months as a platoon commander.

Substitute 'as a Company Offcier in a line organization' for "with a Platoon" and I agree.

‘With’? Why not… ‘In command of a platoon’?

Right now (and during the Viet Nam fracas) we make 'em 1LTs and put them on a Staff.

In the staff doing what? Folding maps? Sticking pins in maps? Making tea?

As I noted before, you and I don't differ that much...

OK, lets go find a couple of hundred bright eyed and bushy tailed youngsters with woodsman’s skills and turn them into ‘steely eyed trained killers’.

[Ken White]

In my year and in the years I was an instructor at the ‘School’ we exercised so regularly and often with these troops that we got to know most by name...
During (ultra boring) peacetime one imagines there would be plenty of opportunities to exercise with his unit of which he is a platoon commander.

And to most of the rest; different strokes...

Korea was 1950-53 so we have not seen a ‘full up’ war for 60 years. Lets stick to the small wars then, shall we?

To this, OTH -- you can do that if you wish; the US does not have the option of being unprepared for a major war. As has ben said many times, we can afford to lose small wars -- we cannot afford to lose a big one. Hopefully there'll be no more -- but I sure wouldn't bet tghe Farm on it...

Talking of ‘replacements’ not sure how it worked in Korea and even Vietnam but (if you read Ambrose and Keegan on) the post D-Day period was a real shambles as far as the US forces were concerned. Depending on who the replacements are the ‘trust thing’ works in all directions. Best to withdraw hard hit units to refit and retrain before being once again inserted into the line, yes?

Yes to all. On the last item, ideally but not always possible...

[JMA]

To this, OTH -- you can do that if you wish; the US does not have the option of being unprepared for a major war. As has ben said many times, we can afford to lose small wars -- we cannot afford to lose a big one. Hopefully there'll be no more -- but I sure wouldn't bet tghe Farm on it...

How prepared is the US for a major war?

If the US has difficulty with two simultaneous small wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and the earlier Vietnam surely that should start warning lights flashing?

[Fuchs]

Which country was ever well-prepared for major war since the 1880's?

I can identify examples for the early and mid 19th century, but none later.
Maybe my expectations are just really high, but judging by your question yours aren't exactly low either.

[JMA]

Which country was ever well-prepared for major war since the 1880's?

I can identify examples for the early and mid 19th century, but none later.
Maybe my expectations are just really high, but judging by your question yours aren't exactly low either.

Took me immediately to the words of your Von Schell circa 1930.

Quite rightly he noted that the US homeland had no real threat of sudden invasion from anyone. They could therefore take their time to prepare for any war (WW1 and WW2) and enter it at a time and place of their choosing when ready. They then have time to start up those massive (and effective) Henry Ford style industrial and manpower production lines in their build up to a major war.

As such US forces can remain dispersed in their various 'camps and forts' to cater for any future sudden uprising of the indigenous Indian population.

[motorfirebox]

This article seems related, albeit unintentionally on the part of the author. It really seems like this is putting the cart before the horse. You have soldiers being stretched thin on repeated deployments to theater where the rules are muddy at best, against an enemy that camouflages itself as the population that the soldiers are nominally in place to protect. When the stress starts to fray the soldiers, you medicate them to deal with that damage. And then when a soldier malfunctions... you blame the meds? Are these people stupid or just retarded?

[davidbfpo]

Motorfirefox,

The issues around the prescription and or use of drugs by the US military, based on a similar news story (from the UK) was posted on the thread concerning Sgt. Bales alleged murder in Afghanistan, Post 147 onwards:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=15273&page=8

We don't know how his court-martial will go, but one suspects that his defence may include the use or misuse of drugs and that may finally get sustained attention to the issues. It would be ironic if a murder trial did that and we know that trials, coroners inquests, leaks and non-official action often do better than officialdom in challenging procedures.

There is a plea from the heart on the thread by Mike Few 'White Paper: PTSD and mTBI' which IMO takes a stark look at how soldiers deal with the job of killing and far more - mainly written in 2009:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7069

[JMA]

And to most of the rest; different strokes...

Interesting discussion over the last week or so (which properly belongs in the Initial Officer Selection thread).

There seems to be competitive demands on time between what we seem to have come to some agreement on and that which is happening on the ground.

We agree basically that the best entry route for an officer is first as an enlisted man for between 18 months to three years, then officers course for a year.

The US military demands that an officer is in possession of a degree before reaching the rank of captain which effectively takes another (minimum) three year bite out of time before reaching the rank of captain (being training time plus four years).

Looking at it then from the age of 18 we would have, three years enlisted service, one year officer training, a three year degree, and four years from commissioning to captain = 11 years or the age of 29 - during which of these 11 years only four have been productive as an officer.

To this we then add the five years from captain to major and we have officers attaining the rank of major at 34. Then another seven years to half colonel = 41, then another six years to full colonel = 47. Too old for two reasons.

This projects even older ages onto general staff who will be physically older and less able to function in a wartime setting and will be found deeper into the 'cognitive decline' range which has an onset commencement from the age of 45.

Something has to give.