MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Fuchs]

Since you're making the assertion that we are tactically inept, and I am out here daily generally seeing the opposite, I think the onus is on you to prove it.

Define "a powerful opponent" - enfilading fire from a PKM kills, regardless of what the guy firing it is wearing.

Don't try to nail me on something that I didn't write.
I wrote "The behaviour observed in AFG is outright suicidal in modern army-on-army warfare."

A patrol moves out in several lightly armoured vehicles in terrain where it's visible beyond 1,000 m and often the convoy is even moving through a valley while surrounding mountain or hill tops are not secured.
A modern army would kill the whole convoy with ease.

An infantry squad comes in contact with the enemy, is pinned down by small arms fire and calls CAS for help.
In high end warfare, it would have been suppressed in the kill zone for 30-120 sec before being killed by mortar fire.


An outpost is established in company strength.
An army opponent would have destroyed it with artillery before its completion.

A civil engineering project is being guarded by infantry and light AFVs in an agricultural area.
Again, arty & good bye.

A patrol conducts a presence patrol.
To show yourself in army-on-army war = suicide. Even 20km deep in the division rear area.

An infantry-on-infantry contact in hilly terrain. One part of the small unit fixes, the other attempts to flank.
Competent armies have a security element in their flanks to stall flanking attempts - a two-man team with LMG suffices.

A house/compound is being assaulted. Suppressive fires + assault.
Again,a competent enemy would defend from more than one position, providing kill zones around the house from detached security elements or other fortified positions.

Infantry calls for helicopters or a Reaper drone for support.
Reaper is an easy target drone for modern battlefield air defences. Helicopters couldn't dare to fly high, much less over enemy-controlled terrain if they faced a modern opponent.

Infantry patrols without (near)permanent concealment or cover.
A sniper pair with a heavy rifle and actual AP cartridges kills them off one by one until they reach cover or concealment. Their vest plates are being penetrated at 500+ m.

A fortified position is being assaulted by TB infantry. The defenders shoot back.
Everyone looking over the wall instead of through a tiny slit or periscope would be shot by snipers. Every position without overhead cover would be a mortar kill zone. Every fortified position that has been identified a few minutes or more ago would already be a death trap, a mere firing mission for the enemy artillery with later mopping up by infantry.

Infantry is carrying M136s on patrol through a barren environment.
An enemy IFV arrives and accepts their surrender.


NATO soldiers expected to die within weeks of WW3 even without any nuclear attacks.
Today ISAF/OEF-A endure a lower attrition rate than a per cent per year.

Any attempt to claim that ISAF/OEF-A meet the survivability demands of modern high end warfare is utterly hopeless. The threat is marginal by comparison. Look at the South Ossetia conflict. More dead than in a year in Afghanistan - in a matter of days. The forces involved were much smaller.
A marginal threat does certainly not lead to the amount of carefulness as necessary in army-on-army warfare.


I know that these statements are not capable of comforting those who serve(d) in AFG, but they're the harsh truth.

Let me refer to this for further explanation.
The TB are far more permissive than an opposing army would be. Naturally, the Western troops use this freedom of action and use tactics that would not be acceptable against a less permissive opponent.

[Infanteer]

Don't try to nail me on something that I didn't write.
I wrote "The behaviour observed in AFG is outright suicidal in modern army-on-army warfare."

Well, I'd argue that the behaviour in Afghanistan is simply an adjustment of our own TTPs to the enemy. Has anyone seriously argued that we should fight the Warsaw Pact like we'd fight bandits? I don't think anyone would disagree with the point that Ken White raises with the insurgencies and skirmishes.

We were talking about small arms ammunition and what kills in a small-unit engagement. I don't get how a rifle platoon guarding a development project and getting flattened by a brigade of enemy artillery is related to it. I guess I failed to read the intent of your change in topic - mea culpa.

The fact of the matter remains that small unit firefights of 10-40 guys in Afghanistan are much the same as they would be against a regular foe anywhere else. Small groups of guys trying to shoot, move and communicate to kill each other with crew-served weapons doing most of the killing. For me to do so, I still like light rifles, MGs and light mortars (and other HE-senders). Arty or air are just add-ons for either side; having neither air defence nor effective indirect fire is not a characteristic unique to either Afghan insurgents or irregular foes in general and CAS and indirect are not ubiquitous in Afghanistan.

[Fuchs]

The fact of the matter remains that small unit firefights of 10-40 guys in Afghanistan are much the same as they would be against a regular foe anywhere else. Small groups of guys trying to shoot, move and communicate to kill each other with crew-served weapons doing most of the killing. For me to do so, I still like light rifles, MGs and light mortars. Arty or air are just add-ons for either side; having neither air defence nor effective indirect fire is not a characteristic unique to either Afghan insurgents or irregular foes in general and CAS and indirect are not ubiquitous in Afghanistan.

OK, let's try it this way:

a) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. Your Plt is in combat with an enemy who's using agricultural walls for cover 400 m ahead of your position. You can call for mortar support.

b) You lead a TB warband in AFG. Your warband has fixed a Canadian patrol 400 m ahead, behind a wall. You have 20 minutes left till enemy air can be expected to intervene. You do not have mortar support available.

c) You are Inf Plt leader in AFG. Your Plt is in combat and fixed behind a wall. You have 20-40 minutes left till air will intervene.

d) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. You are in combat and fixed behind a wall. The Bn main fight is elsewhere and the Bde main fight isn't in your Bn area. You get no support, but you've got a couple SMK grenades and a large area with much concealment is just 100m to your south. You expect a red mortar attack ion less than two minutes.


Do you get where I see the difference?

Arty and mortars are not "add-ons". They're essential combined arms combat components. The can eradicate your small unit in minutes, something the TB didn't achieve EVER against ANY Western small unit in YEARS of warfare.

Facing such a threat and not being sure that enemy comm is interrupted, you have little other choice than to keep contacts brief and move (disappear) often - while you could sit safely behind the very same cover for hours if in combat against TB.

[kaur]

Sorry for spoiling, but I'd like to add 1 table to Ken White's comment.

It is simply a matter of scale. It is also a matter of opponent mass and capability.

Wilf, said:

I would dare, SUGGEST and without blinking. - Suggest means go work it out, do the trials and do the training. IF it does not work well, DO NOT DO IT!

Has any Red Team ever dared to test this idea?

[William F. Owen]

Has any Red Team ever dared to test this idea?

No but armies running around with STENs, MP-40's and PPSH have pretty much done a useful level of empirical testing. MP-7 is actually deployed in A'Stan, but I don't know in what form or scale.
The IDF of 1948 had predominantly STEN Guns and MG-34/BRENs and very few rifles. The Arabs in contrast had mostly rifles. Not proof in and of itself but food for thought!

....and as I said, I'd want a lot of testing before being more than provocative with such ideas

[Firn]

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Some general thoughts on automatic weapons and support weapons. The machine pistol has just as a rifle a specific set of advantages and disadvantages. One decisive factor in the far greater use and need for MPs in WWII might have been among other ones that it could greatly ease the suppression of the enemy and the employement of the crew-served weapons, tanks or hand-grenades. Soldiers mostly armed with bolt-rifles had a far harder time to suppress and silence under similar situations and had great disadvantag in many combat settings against troops with a high ratio of automatic weapons. Thus they sought to get their hands on automatic weapons. With this kind of "positive feedback" going on, the generally observed trend to increase their ratio seen in pretty much every war in the last 90 years is quite understandable. On the other hand specialists like sipers would try to shield themselve from enemy suppression by cunning, training and camouflage. (Sound suppressors on the "long range" rifles coupled with good training and tactics should lower the suppression of the sharpshooters and thus increase their effectiveness.)

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While it seems to me that the article by the MAJ outlined the current situation well, I think there could have been a greater focus on the problems of finding and Identifying the enemy at long ranges. The specific terrain and the part of the enemy tactics might favor the (greater) use the low-level use of spotting scopes, binoculars, high-powered scopes, and perhaps periscopes. Better finding and identifiying should lead to better fixing and easier destruction by the support weapons like mortars, grenades, artillery or CAS.


Firn

[Fuchs]

A bit small arms history background:

Submachineguns were an stopgap.
Semi-auto rifles and even mroe so automatic rifles weren't reliable until the 1930's (M1 Garand and Vollmer Maschinenkarabiner; the first assault rifle).
This meant that the best way to improve close combat firepower over carbines/rifles were shotguns, hand grenades, pistols and submachineguns.

Today we can easily produce automatic rifles (~M14), automatic carbines (~M4), subcarbines (rarely in military), assault rifles (~AKM) and semi-auto sniper rifles (~Dragunov).

Submachineguns are about as heavy and clumsy as assault rifles, yet vastly inferior in effective range and typically also so in regard to penetration. We don't need this stopgap anymore.

Machine pistols are even more inferior in accuracy and range, yet at least they're light and compact. Nevertheless, they're inferior to some PDWs that offer a much higher velocity bullet.


I'd treat the latter as PDWs, never as a front line infantry primary weapon. A Javelin operator, MG gunner or driver may be issued such a small weapon. They should also be issued a full weapon, such as an assault rifle (to be stored in a vehicle if not needed at the moment).

The firepower in forests and inside buildings is too weak with machine pistols and PDWs.



I'm generally OK with an assault rifle concept that's focused on 200 or 300m combat range with only tripod machine guns, AT weapons and scoped rifles shooting farther. The assault rifle / carbine should be a trust-inspiring and well-selected design, though. I consider the personal weapon to be quite important for the confidence of the individual soldier. That's why I would also consider issuing a light AT weapon and at least one hand and one smoke grenade to every soldier who doesn't use some heavy weapon.
I don't only think of infantry here!

[carl]

The article calls as strongly for better training as it does for a new infantry rifle or calibre. Without the training no hits will be made at extended ranges no matter what kind of rifle. And improved training will improve the effectiveness of what we have now. Everybody wins, but as I have gathered from reading SWJ over the years, that might be harder to do than getting new equipment.

Also, could the XM-25, if successfully fielded, do a lot to fix the problem? Could the problem also be addressed by increasing the number of GPMGs carried (per Kaur) or 51mm type mortars or even using the M203 for indirect fire?

The above questions are actually questions, not opinions in disguise.

[Firn]

The above questions are actually questions, not opinions in disguise.

IMHO the biggest nut to crack for a dismounted patrol is to suppress the enemy mortars and their observers when they are used in competent fashion in difficult alpine terrain and if the enemy holds the high ground. A mortar hidden in a ravine or shielded by a crest is pretty much impossible to silence by patrols down in the valley or on the slopes - especially if they get also hit by suppressive AKM and RPG fire. Observers and some boys could shout corrections back to the mortar and avoid so radio chatter. The returning observation and fire effort will almost entirely be directed at the sources of direct fire! With good dispersion chances are high that the (distant) observer (higher up or on the flanks) can keep doing unhindered his job. This reverse slope harassing is easily set up in many regions of Afghanistan. I wonder how often the "reverse slope" is a hamlet.

Mortar bombs and other ammunition and weapons transported by small groups, boys with goats, etc over a long time could have been stashed in suitable places and collected at notice by the shadowing spies and observers. With enough bombs and time to fire them even lesser skilled mortar crews can be very dangerous. If done well, this tactic is, without a lot of resources, hard to tackle.

@Fuchs: I just used the machine pistols as a historic starting point for this very observed "co-evolution".


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Without the training no hits will be made at extended ranges no matter what kind of rifle. And improved training will improve the effectiveness of what we have now. Everybody wins, but as I have gathered from reading SWJ over the years, that might be harder to do than getting new equipment.

There are real limits to what you can train people to do when it comes to "skills". Some can shoot, some cannot, and some never improve. Plus almost all training is a function of quantity and quality and both of those cost money, so are the first things to get cut.

Could the problem also be addressed by increasing the number of GPMGs carried (per Kaur) or 51mm type mortars or even using the M203 for indirect fire?

If your Platoon has 2-3 GPMG, a 60mm hand-held mortar and some 6-8 M203, I cannot really think what else you can reasonably ask for, bar perhaps 66mm M72s and maybe some ATGM, dependant on need.
The simpler you make the equipment, the easier you make the training reach a higher standard.

[Bob's World]

OK, let's try it this way:

a) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. Your Plt is in combat with an enemy who's using agricultural walls for cover 400 m ahead of your position. You can call for mortar support.

b) You lead a TB warband in AFG. Your warband has fixed a Canadian patrol 400 m ahead, behind a wall. You have 20 minutes left till enemy air can be expected to intervene. You do not have mortar support available.

c) You are Inf Plt leader in AFG. Your Plt is in combat and fixed behind a wall. You have 20-40 minutes left till air will intervene.

d) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. You are in combat and fixed behind a wall. The Bn main fight is elsewhere and the Bde main fight isn't in your Bn area. You get no support, but you've got a couple SMK grenades and a large area with much concealment is just 100m to your south. You expect a red mortar attack ion less than two minutes.


Do you get where I see the difference?

Arty and mortars are not "add-ons". They're essential combined arms combat components. The can eradicate your small unit in minutes, something the TB didn't achieve EVER against ANY Western small unit in YEARS of warfare.

Facing such a threat and not being sure that enemy comm is interrupted, you have little other choice than to keep contacts brief and move (disappear) often - while you could sit safely behind the very same cover for hours if in combat against TB.

Such as the Canadian force fixed by the TB force is not authorized to employ CAS or indirect fires due to the Civilian (innocent) populace in and among the civilian (insurgent) populace he is fixed by. The location has a high number of IEDs limiting his freedom of maneuver, but they are known by his opponent so do not affect his maneuver; and because there are no front lines, he can hear over the ICOM radios being used by the insurgent that a complex attack is being pulled together that will likely have him taking fire from 270 degrees on his position with the next 15-20 minutes.

Aerial evacuation is possible, but not until sometime after sunset which is some 7 hours away. All ISR has been pulled to support higher priority operations elsewhere. Nearest QRF is 15 KM away, but will have to clear IEDs and deal with a continuous TIC to get to your location.

Meanwhile your commander is expecting you to "clear" the compounds to your front, while the compounds you "cleared" yesterday to your rear are now reoccupied by insurgents, as well as the innocent civilians who live there.

Oh yes, and your mission is not to defeat the insurgent, but to protect the populace.

It may not be graduate level war, but you better at least have your GED.

[Fuchs]

Well, we don't seem to argue about the degree of difficulty and whether the same behaviour would be suicidal in a great war anymore (my original points).

You seem to pile on points that need to be considered by a small unit leader instead, and that's really an endless game because - and I think you understand that - it would be no problem to me to add one or two forum pages of things that should be considered (but cannot all be considered) by a small unit leader in a great war.

There would be many things included that are not necessary - at times even contraproductive - in a small war environment. Like minimising the exposure to airborne sensors, radio silence, jammed radio links or being enticed to survive the war by simply becoming a POW.

[reed11b]

An infantry squad comes in contact with the enemy, is pinned down by small arms fire and calls CAS for help.
In high end warfare, it would have been suppressed in the kill zone for 30-120 sec before being killed by mortar fire.


An outpost is established in company strength.
An army opponent would have destroyed it with artillery before its completion.

A civil engineering project is being guarded by infantry and light AFVs in an agricultural area.
Again, arty & good bye.

Sorry Fuchs, but I have read many many AARs that suggest that the "lethality" of arty is not even close to what the manual says. Tima and again, troops that have gone to the ground have survived arty and gotten back in the fight. Example: the actual impact area of an arty round is small and most of the blast energy goes up and is dispersed.

An infantry-on-infantry contact in hilly terrain. One part of the small unit fixes, the other attempts to flank.
Competent armies have a security element in their flanks to stall flanking attempts - a two-man team with LMG suffices.

A house/compound is being assaulted. Suppressive fires + assault.
Again,a competent enemy would defend from more than one position, providing kill zones around the house from detached security elements or other fortified positions.

I actually agree almost 100% on this one. See Wilf's fire team concept for what I would do about it (i.e tactic and training based solutions, not equipment) and add some improved organic HE direct fire capability.

Infantry patrols without (near)permanent concealment or cover.
A sniper pair with a heavy rifle and actual AP cartridges kills them off one by one until they reach cover or concealment. Their vest plates are being penetrated at 500+ m.

A fortified position is being assaulted by TB infantry. The defenders shoot back.
Everyone looking over the wall instead of through a tiny slit or periscope would be shot by snipers. Every position without overhead cover would be a mortar kill zone. Every fortified position that has been identified a few minutes or more ago would already be a death trap, a mere firing mission for the enemy artillery with later mopping up by infantry.

WOW, where do these mega soldiers live and how do we recruit them!
Seriously now, your concept of lethality is not shared by historic or modern AARs.

Infantry is carrying M136s on patrol through a barren environment.
An enemy IFV arrives and accepts their surrender.

or not.
Reed

[Fuchs]

Sorry Fuchs, but I have read many many AARs that suggest that the "lethality" of arty is not even close to what the manual says. Tima and again, troops that have gone to the ground have survived arty and gotten back in the fight. Example: the actual impact area of an arty round is small and most of the blast energy goes up and is dispersed.

You're writing about HE with PD fuse. In other words; you're late by 40-60 years.

Today's arty shells detonate before impact, the effect goes downwards and sidewards.This was first done with 90mm AAA shells in late 1944 Ardennes offensive.

ICM shells (1970's and later tech) lack even the dispersal pattern weakness of HE shells (which left forward and rear quite untouched by fragments).

Your statement sounds as if someone told others in 1914 that arty is harmless based on Crimean War experiences.

Seriously now, your concept of lethality is not shared by historic or modern AARs.

Maybe you should read AARs of armies that did more than mere strategic mopping up or beating up Third World forces during the 20th century.

My concept of lethality fits easily to experiences like the one that the average remaining life expectancy of a newly promoted German Panzergrenadier 2nd Lieutenant was measured in mere weeks (single digit!) during 1943-1945.

And let's not forget that dead people rarely write AARs.

[Ken White]

Sorry Fuchs, but I have read many many AARs that suggest that the "lethality" of arty is not even close to what the manual says.

Sorta make one wonder why the 'manual' would say something different...

Tima and again, troops that have gone to the ground have survived arty and gotten back in the fight.

Now that's true. Done it myself. Also have just charged right through it and survived. Unfortunately, I had a number of friends who weren't so lucky.

Combat is weird -- you can find examples to prove almost anything. I saw a guy in Korea take a 76mm round that passed through his stomach, you could literally see through him -- he was back to duty in about six weeks...

Saw a Viet Namese with an undetonated 40mm Grenade HE round in his thorax, the Medics removed it. Wuithout blowing him or themselves up...

On balance, Artillery was the biggest killer in WW I and WW II, averages generally running between 65 and 80% if Artillery was involved in the action. There's this:

""The cause of wounds suffered by soldiers varied widely depending on specific circumstances. A British Corps reported 42.8% wounds caused by bullets during the El Alamein offensive. However the percentage of battle wounds to british soldiers by weapon 1939-45 overall was:

Mortar, grenade, bomb, shell ...........75%
Bullet, AT mine................................10%
mine & booby trap...........................10%
Blast and crush.................................2%
Chemical.......................................... 2%
other............................................. ...1%

from J Ellis WWII Databook table 57 p257""

Recall also that those figures and the ones of which the 'manual' cued were based on those who received medical treatment; in a war, no one does autopsies to determine what killed Johnny. Nor do they do memorial services or ramp ceremonies -- too many casualties for all that stuff.

Example: the actual impact area of an arty round is small and most of the blast energy goes up and is dispersed.

Uh, yeah -- unless they're using VT or Proximity fuzes. Then, as Fuchs said, they pop overhead and rain down. Also, don't discount the damage of fragements deflected from that upward dispersion -- or from the rocks and dirt thrown out of the crater at high speed. I've still got little pebbles and flecks of steel that pop out of my bod from Korea. The piece of steel under my kneecap is a handy weather predictor....

WOW, where do these mega soldiers live and how do we recruit them!

No mega bods required. Presented with the opportunity, you'd do it...

Seriously now, your concept of lethality is not shared by historic or modern AARs.

If you mean AARs from Afghanistan or Iraq (IIRC, 44% of Medevacs in Iraq during 2003-06 were for disease or accidents) or even Viet Nam, they don't really count cause the bad guys didn't really have much in the way of HE support and were generally outnumbered heavily by us (though one could say that their IEDs are poor mans artillery...). Perhaps you can find me some from Korea or WW II that corroborate what you say?

As UBoat 509 said the other day, anyone who thinks the 60mm mortar isn't dangerous hasn't been on the receiving end.