Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved.

http://www.state.gov/s/p/

The Policy Planning Staff''s mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values.

http://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do

The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for representing the United States abroad.

Recommended reading

http://americasotherarmy.com/

[CrowBat]

The Department of State is the principal producer of most foreign policies, many of which are rubber stamped. Not all foreign policies are rubber stamped and there will be a number of actors involved.

...but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

[Dayuhan]

...but crucial ones - like Syria - are, and that's what eventually matters.

If, for example, Obama convinces himself 'Syrian insurgents are a bunch of doctors, farmers etc., with whom one can't cooperate', then that's it and the DOS could turn upside down and walk on its hair - but it's not going to change his opinion.

More likley CIA, DoD, DoS and a few others did a detailed breakdown on the opposition groups, what might be done to help them, and what the probable and possible consequences would be, and the conclusion at the end of the process was that there were no suitable candidates for proxy war and that the risk/reward balance on a proxy war was not attractive.

Believe it or not, they aren't stupid... and your disagreement with their decision doesn't make it wrong.

[AmericanPride]

Bill,

This article discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.

What does this mean for the progressive forces in the Arab World? It seems to me that the current dynamic will only serve to sideline those demanding genuine change. The security narrative of the conservative regimes is overpowering the demand for greater freedoms as the call for democracy is becoming smothered under the need to “combat terrorism”. There is also deliberate mixing of moderate and radical forms of Islamism. In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.

But as living conditions deteriorate and the level of suppression increases, radicalism is becoming more attractive to the millions of disenfranchised Arab youth, leading to a cycle of suppression and radicalism that seems to have no end in sight. It seems that this cycle can only come to an end in the long term, when the failures of both parties leave space for a well-organised, ideologically motivated revolutionary movement capable of exploiting both forces, namely Islamism and conservatism.

The illusion that we can settle another countrys internal disputes or persuade people to accept a government they detest just by spreading aid money around may be attractive, but it's illusory. The idea that we can persuade or compel bitter enemies to sit down and accept "inclusive government" because we want them to is attractive, but illusory.

It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial. The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.

That's true, and I think it often comes down to taking on goals that we have no realistic or practical means to accomplish ("nation building", among others), then dumping them on the military for want of other options. Hopefully we've learned a thing or two about that.

Pluralist reform and "nation-building" are two distinct activities. The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.

The world is a much more multipolar place than it once was, and whatever another country needs, be it arms, technology, or credit, the US is not the only place to get it. That limits the carrots, just as domestic politics limits the sticks: using threats to force others to do our will is always an appealing prospect to those fond of bluster, but there's no assurance at all that it will work, especially when the electorate is in no mood to back the threats up.

This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy. When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power? It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

[Dayuhan]

This going well off topic and probably should be moved elsewhere, but I'll leave that to David...

It's not an either/or proposition. Depending on the context (the country, the U.S. relationship with said country, the principal actors involved on both sides, the issue, etc) the U.S. exercises a range of influence over other countries. The American ability to influence regime decisions in North Korea, in Mexico, and in Saudi Arabia are unique to the conditions around those relationships. The U.S. has and will influence countries on behalf of priviate commercial interests, strategic political aims, and other reasons - some substantial, some trivial.

Influence in any given case depends on the extent and credibility of the incentives and penalties that the influencing power can deploy, and extent of resistance in the target of the influence. The second factor is key. Commercial concessions are generally not difficult, especially if there's something in it for those who rule. When we start talking about applying influence to force reforms that many ruling elites will see as immediate threats to their own positions, prerogatives, and even survival, resistance is very high. The response may be an outright refusal or an attempt to feign compliance with a charade of pseudo-reforms, but ruling elites in other countries are not going to simply surrender their power and perks because we want them to.

The U.S. simply does not prioritize developing and exercising this kind of influence for the purposes of facilitating pluralist government.

What's the basis for that statement? I think the US has placed a fairly high priority on efforts like "democracy promotion", reducing corruption, etc. The efforts just haven't been very productive, largely because nobody has any clear or convincing idea of how to do it.

The U.S. had no problems in 'facilitating' changes in 'communist' regimes for 50 years - why is the U.S. suddenly powerless in influencing positive reform in authoritarian regimes? I don't think it's a question of what's possible; it's one of preference and willingness.

When did the US ever effectively facilitate reform in Communist countries, up until the point where Communism collapsed from the inside? To put it simply, the US is generally powerless to force reform in authoritarian regimes because the penalties and incentives we are effectively able to deploy are not sufficient to overcome the very high level of resistance to reform in the target countries.

This is true, but only to an extent - and we witnessed that during the Cold War when the national liberation movements flocked to the 'communist' banner after the U.S. refused to support their bids for independence and in many cases, democracy.

I agree that this was a huge mistake and one that greatly strengthened our opponents in the Cold War. The extent to which that's analogous to current circumstances is very debatable.

When the U.S. does not strengthen democratic governance, what and who remains in power?

You can't strengthen something that isn't there, and outside attempts to create democratic governance have generally not been very successful.

It's not helped by the total absence of any long-term strategy for U.S. foreign policy. An interesting case study is Yemen's Saleh's exploitation of U.S. desperation for Arab counter-terrorism allies to fund and arm his government - which ended with predictable results when his regime imploded, leaving the Yemen terrorism problem unresolved. Ditto Somalia since 2001.

What were the alternatives in Yemen or Somalia? Certainly strengthening democratic governance wasn't an option, as there wasn't any to strengthen.

A better example might be the US effort to get Bahrain to respond to its Arab Spring with accommodation and reform, which clearly demonstrates the limits of US influence.

This debate tends to come back to the debate between realism and idealism: do you deal with what exists and try to make the most of it, or do you try to replace it, with a huge variety of potential unintended consequences, many of them very unattractive?

Since the unspoken focus of these generic discussions is so often Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, it might be useful to look specifically at the elephant in the drawing room. What specific policy reforms would we want to promote, what means could we adopt to promote them, and what would the probable outcomes be?

[AmericanPride]

Since the unspoken focus of these generic discussions is so often Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, it might be useful to look specifically at the elephant in the drawing room. What specific policy reforms would we want to promote, what means could we adopt to promote them, and what would the probable outcomes be?

First let it be said without reservation that Saudi Arabia is a police state. There are some exemptions depending on one's proximity to the royal family, but at the end of the day, everything is subordinated to the security of the House of Saud. Saudi Arabia actually has a fairly rich and active underground democratic movement that enjoys both popular support and a measure of patronage from some leading families of the country that are not content with the country's policies. The kingdom has on and off implemented incremental and sometimes only symbolic reforms but there is a recognition from the royal family that there is a strong democratic opposition (at least in sentiment if not in organization). The problem in Saudi Arabia (and Egypt, and other security-obessed states) is that in the havoc of the War on Terrorism, these movements are marginalized to the extent that the only alternative to the clearly repressive status quo is Islamic fundamentalism.

The U.S. plays a significant role in this because it's the U.S. that often reinforces the status quo. The U.S. has a special deference towards the political stability of the House of Saud that it does not show elsewhere - i.e. Yanukovych's Ukraine. Unfortunately, our policies have placed us in a position to choose between economic security and national security. Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the repressive conditions in these states, the perception that the U.S. is a major patron of these states, and the marginalization and violence inflicted upon the general populations by these regimes (and at times by the U.S.). Fifty years ago when it took an army to do any serious damage that was not a major problem. But now that one man can become a walking weapon of mass destruction, that changes the calculus.

The first step in reform is loosening the controls of the police state. For Saudi Arabia, that means disbanding the vice police, marginalizing the National Guard, and constraining domestic intelligence. It also means challenging who controls the mechanisms of power, namely the management and distribution of the country's oil wealth. Gradual political agitation and reform is preferable - the dilemma is that when authoritarian regime's recognize they're not as popular as they believed, they cease the reforms out of fear of losing power. The consequence is an escalation in the opposition's radicalism. At this point, the spigot that produces Islamic fundamentalism won't be turned off any time soon so that will be a problem for many years.

The issue for the U.S. is that it's going 'mainstream' and becoming better organized as a consequence of war and the lack of alternatives. Where the tipping point is, and what will trigger it, remains to be seen at least in Saudi Arabia. I think in Iraq and in some extent Syria that tipping point has been crossed with ISIS, which will make such movements far more difficult to uproot. This is no longer a simple counter-terrorism program where the aim is to dismantle an organization. We can destroy the organizations but now more will appear to replace them. The U.S. needs to start attacking the root of the problem - and that's the repressive and elitist political economies of Arab states (where are the Turkish, Indonesian, and other terrorist groups in Muslim-majority democratic states?).

And just a thought - it might be worthwhile to consider a transition period that includes a reform-minded strong-man to be followed by the implementation of democratic governance. The strong-man could provide the stability necessary to actually implement reforms and challenge the old guard while also preventing the mob from essentially wrecking the whole project. There are a couple of post-Cold War examples of something similar occurring.

[davidbfpo]

Dayuhan posted:

This (thread is) going well off topic and probably should be moved elsewhere, but I'll leave that to David...

Agreed. I shall see if there is a suitable thread or create one.

The dilemma for the USA (and others) has always been akin to "draining the swamp by reform" or "suppression is best for stability".

[Dayuhan]

First let it be said without reservation that Saudi Arabia is a police state.

I don't think anyone seriously disputes that.

Saudi Arabia actually has a fairly rich and active underground democratic movement that enjoys both popular support and a measure of patronage from some leading families of the country that are not content with the country's policies.

There's also a great deal of skepticism and concern that a move toward democracy could result in chaos and collapse. A lot of the support for the regime is driven not by affection for the regime, but fear that a transition would become violent and that a weak successor would be unable to hold the country together. Saudis are acutely aware that they sit on top of something lots of people want, and concerned that political distuption could expose the country to dismemberment.

Iraq hasn't helped: American neocons hoped to hold up Iraq as an example of what democracy can bring to the Middle East, and they have unfortunately succeeded, though not in the way they hoped to.

The U.S. plays a significant role in this because it's the U.S. that often reinforces the status quo. The U.S. has a special deference towards the political stability of the House of Saud that it does not show elsewhere - i.e. Yanukovych's Ukraine.

I think you overrate the importance of the US in maintaining Saudi internal security. They are quite capable of doing that on their ownm, and American suggestions are generally ignored. They do not need our support to stay in power and they do not take instructions from us.

Islamic fundamentalism is a response to the repressive conditions in these states, the perception that the U.S. is a major patron of these states, and the marginalization and violence inflicted upon the general populations by these regimes (and at times by the U.S.).

That seems considerably oversimplified

The first step in reform is loosening the controls of the police state. For Saudi Arabia, that means disbanding the vice police, marginalizing the National Guard, and constraining domestic intelligence. It also means challenging who controls the mechanisms of power, namely the management and distribution of the country's oil wealth.

Possibly true, but do you expect Americans to be the ones to do this? If so, how, and how exactly is it our business?

The U.S. needs to start attacking the root of the problem - and that's the repressive and elitist political economies of Arab states (where are the Turkish, Indonesian, and other terrorist groups in Muslim-majority democratic states?).

Again, how do you propose that the US do this? Do you really think we know best how other countries should be governed, and that we can simply wade into other countries trying to change governance without blowback and a heinous range of unintended consequences?

And just a thought - it might be worthwhile to consider a transition period that includes a reform-minded strong-man to be followed by the implementation of democratic governance. The strong-man could provide the stability necessary to actually implement reforms and challenge the old guard while also preventing the mob from essentially wrecking the whole project.

I can't find the "bang head against wall" emoticon, so the will have to do. Or maybe just a big WTF?

[CrowBat]

Further to following post by AP:

...
This article discusses in some more detail the problem that Crowbat and I raised.

...

...In other words, in the minds of many Arabs the Muslim Brotherhood has become synonymous with ISIS, and the opposition to the current regimes has become equivalent to the support of terrorism. This naturally feeds into the hands of Islamists, who are becoming radicalised due to severe repression.
...

The same can be said for a mass of observers in the West, who are liberally bunching all Syrian insurgents, no matter what group, under 'extremist Islamists' and 'ISIS' - which they are not. ISIS is not 'Syrian', and except in Dayr az-Zawr area where it forced all of insurgents into submission through cutting off their supply links and connections to the outside world and sandwiching them between itself and regime-held areas, it contains actually very few Syrians (and most of these were forced into submission too).

Another extremist group, the JAN - and which is predominantly Salafist, not Wahabist - ended at the list of terrorist organizations because it declared itself allied with AQ, and some of its bosses are maintaining corresponding ties (no doubt about this), but despite clearly stating it does not intend to launch a 'Jihad' against anybody outside Syria (i.e. against anybody except the regime).

...and the entire conflict is seen completely through the prism of 'that's an uprising of Islamist extremists', and 'if it's interesting then only because of the ISIS' - which is why that topic is discussed most of the time on this forum, and why this thread is going off topic.

Anyway, against better advice from its IRGC-QF advisers, and against increasing resistance from within its own military, instead of rushing it to support its counteroffensive against the IF and FSyA north of Hama, or into counterattacks on insurgents advancing in southern Syria, the regime is dispatching the SyAAF (it's air force) into more show attacks on Raqqa, Tabqa and Dayr az-Zawr. It's claiming scores of ISIS as KIA and hundreds of its vehicles as destroyed. Even one of 'Scuds' paraded by the ISIS through Raqqa recently should have been destroyed.

Nothing of this can be independently verified, except the following:

- even MiG-21s are deployed for this purpose, although they are hopelessly useless for this purpose and operating at the very edge of their endurance when flying missions against targets in Raqqa area, as can be seen from this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHWMDrJkcpQ

- and they get shot down by the ISIS, then this has better air defences than most of insurgents, as can be seen from this video and the still attached below (the MiG in question was hit earlier today and crashed into a house, killing eight civilians in Raqqa, fate of pilot remains unknown):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWcon4di26s

So, it seems the regime is very eager to catch as much attention as possible in performing the role of 'good' one in the anti-ISIS campaign...

The photo below is showing the upper side of the left stabilizer of the MiG-21 shot down by the ISIS over Raqqa today.

[Dayuhan]

The same can be said for a mass of observers in the West, who are liberally bunching all Syrian insurgents, no matter what group, under 'extremist Islamists' and 'ISIS'

Who exactly is saying this, and where?