The British In Iraq (merged thread)

[SJPONeill]

Not withstanding the info above, I think it may have been quite simple.

After the end of the official warfighting phase of OIF and then the start of the insurgency, the British sincerely believed that they were on top of the COIN campaign due to their decades of experience in Northern Ireland and previous success in Malaya and Kenya. What they didn't pick up on and which took some years for the penny to drop is that COIN truisms don't translate easily between environment and that the UK approach of treating the Iraqi insurgency as they would one in a Commonwealth or Western-oriented nation was doomed from the start.

To make matters worse, a number of Brits, mainly at quite senior levels, felt that they had some form of almost God-given superiority over the US (small nation syndrome) and this attitude was probably a major factor in the long period it took the UK to realise they had gotten it wrong and adapting accordingly - had the attitude being more of learning from others had been, perhaps the case for more troops earlier could have successfully been made?

Nowhere have I heard it summed up better than senior UK officer last year "...really..instead of sniping at the Americans from the sidelines of our own superiority, we should have been following them around with our notebooks open, furiously taking notes..."

[Red Rat]

There was certainly an embarrassing degree of hubris mixed with schadenfreude in the early days.

Both the US and the UK got it wrong in Iraq to begin with. The US learned, adapted and persevered. It took longer for the chickens to come home to roost in the Brit AO, but we certainly failed to learn and adapt as quickly or as effectively as the US. We also singularly failed to resource effectively.

To make matters worse, a number of Brits, mainly at quite senior levels, felt that they had some form of almost God-given superiority over the US (small nation syndrome) and this attitude was probably a major factor in the long period it took the UK to realise they had gotten it wrong and adapting accordingly - had the attitude being more of learning from others had been, perhaps the case for more troops earlier could have successfully been made?

Hmmm. All the Post Operational Interviews I have read of Brit senior officers (2 stars and above) are highly complimentary of US efforts from 2005 onwards. I am not as well versed in views prior to 2005, but I am aware that it was always recognised that the US forces were involved in a very different war in the north.

One reason it took the UK longer to adapt is that violence levels never really picked up in the south until the end of 2005 and into 2006. That made it appear that the Brit approach was working - as well reinforcing our smug assumptions of superiority

It is true that the British Army thought that it had COIN in its DNA, whereas while senior officers were well educated and experienced in COIN junior officers (up to Lt Col) were less so. Northern Ireland (as a campaign) had settled down by the mid 1980s and we stopped formally teaching COIN in the late 90s. So while many officers and commanders had Northern Ireland experience they had actually learnt very little from their time there beyond low level TTPs. The history of the campaign and the hard learnt lessons therin were not widely known. We took most of the processes, especially with regards to ISTAR, targeting and the use of SF for granted. We had excellent COIN doctrine which was certainly fit for purpose, but we never taught it, read it or applied it...

The case for more troops is an interesting one. I do not think we would have been able to make a case for more troops until the violence levels rose. By then it was clear that UK domestic politics would prevent any significant rise in troop levels. Strategic direction was clear, 'get out'. Afghanistan provided the excuse.

[davidbfpo]

A long article today, based on a new book and sub-titled:

Capt Richard Holmes's bridge-building approach helped set the template for a new military strategy in Iraq. But he was betrayed by the very people whose trust he worked so hard to win.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-to-help.html

The book is 'A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9’ by Jack Fairweather and published by Jonathan Cape, £20.

Link:http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Choice-B.../dp/0224089587