Sanctuary or Ungoverned Spaces:identification, symptoms and responses

[Bob's World]

Carl,

I offer what I think will work. What you offer can't work IMO. It's really that simple.

But when you want to paint the PAK Army and the ISI (and for some bizarre reason hold the government of Pakistan harmless) to task for deaths in Afghanistan, you don't want to forget the farmers smoked by a hellfire missile fired by some Kiowa pilot who swore it was Taliban planting IEDs; or that bus of civilians lit up with a Ma Deuce by a nervous E-4 because he was the gunner on the trail vehicle and felt it was following too close, etc, etc.

It is a matter of historical fact that the Northern Alliance was working with Russian support and that the Russians helped facilitate our relationship to conduct UW with them against the Taliban. It is also a historical fact that many of the Northern Alliance were affiliated with the Soviets during their invasion. This is not rhetoric, I only point it out because it is true, and because it highlights the facts that it is our interests that our enduring, not who we work through to address them.

But I'm not here to argue, merely to present an informed opinion. I don't expect everyone to agree.

We've let ourselves get detached from our true interests in the region, and subsequently attached to a particular party that has their own interests and that is taking us down a path away from what is important in the long run to the U.S. We need to stay focused. To leave or to facilitate a reconciliation is not to abandon Mr. Karzai; rather it is to recognize that he has abandoned us. Once we make it clear that we will not write a blank check and offer blind loyalty, I suspect he will adjust his position. If not, I also suspect that we will find that we have not given up much in terms of our national security by not being there.

[carl]

Robert C. Jones:

Farmers killed by Hellfires, civilians killed by nervous troops-nightmarish disasters caused by poor discipline, bad leadership, lousy training and horrible luck; not to mention our tendency in the past to blow Karzai off when he complained about these things. The Pak Army/ISI contributions to the dystopia are the result of conscious policy decisions that have been followed for years and years. A bit of a moral distinction there don't you think, a matter of mens rea Councilor.

When the civilian leader of Pakistan can pick up the phone and dismiss the head of GHQ or the head of the ISI and make it stick, then I will stop seeing the Pak Army/ISI as the actual government of Pakistan.

When you use the phrase "the old Soviet team" it is a rhetorical tool used to discredit. When you provide a more detailed lineup of the players and their histories, it is not. Just trying to be precise.

You think our bugging out won't result in much. Fair enough. I think it will be bad beyond our imagining. Just imagine what the takfiris would do after that victory. And, I keep thinking of that 12 year old girl in Naw Zad.

[Bob's World]

(Ok, I hope you can laugh at the irony of accusing me of using rhetoric to discredit a particular position, followed by your calling a decision by the US. to withdraw from the current situation as "bugging out.")

But this is indeed an emotional issue down on the ground. This is a country that has endured more than its share of human tragedy over the past 30 years alone, and the U.S. has had a hand in a lot of that. There's no crying in baseball, and there is no crying in superpower geo-politics either. Hard calculations of national interests, relative cost/benefit analysis, and pragmatic assessments of cause and effect must shape decisions.

The US gets a bum rap for leaving when the going gets tough. Typically that follows our being far too lenient with the government we had signed up to support to begin with, and allowing them to then drag us into positions we would have never taken on our own, and that are clearly counter to our interests. Diem and his successors did that to us in Nam; Mubarak, the Saudi family, Ben Ali, Ali Abdullah Saleh, etc are doing it to us across the Middle East; and Karzai is doing it to us in Afghanistan. We did not, and are not abandoning these "allies." These are men who grew drunk and corrupt with power and wealth behind the security of the United States, men who created growing discontent and conditions of insurgency across their populaces as they became emboldened by that blind support and acted with ever growing impunity.

No, we do not abandon these allies. We allowed them free will, they exercised that free will, and they have abandoned us. There should be consequences for such behavior, and we have been training these guys that they can get away with far too much once in league with the United States. It's time to turn that around before it drags us down. That is not "bugging out," that is simply taking care of the cold hard business of the United States of America and getting straight with our own values and principles in the process.

[Cole]

Bill

The "experts" are just as loud today, though the metrics coming back from the surge efforts are making them nervous. The "Biden Plan" is beginning to take on new life. If I was gambling man, and asked what the most likely friendly COA currently is, my money would be on "Create a 'decent interval' with the surge, then shift to the Biden Plan and withdraw."

Where would we base our Biden Plan assets? Just Kandahar and Bagram? Would Pakistan, now in the cat bird seat, continue to allow drone flights? Cede the rest of the country to premature ANA control, the resulting chaos, and SOF QRF raid responses?

If I were asked if I thought that was a viable plan, I would have to say "No." It may well save our bacon, but it only delays a likely replay that could look a lot like the final days of South Vietnam, or more accurately, the final days of Afghan communists following the Soviet withdrawal.

Because neither the South Vietnamese then or the ANA now are ready. Plus the last time the Taliban took over they did it with "45,000 Pakistani, Taliban and al Qaeda soldiers fighting against forces of Massoud, only 14,000 of which were Afghan (Taliban)."

There is no need to run out on our friends to make true change, in fact, we actually put our friends in a much better spot by making true change now, rather than by forcing them to stay on the current ride to its inevitable finale.

Which are our true friends, the Tajik part of the Northern Alliance which has no history of human/women rights abuses and their partner Uzbeks (Dostum & company excluded), Hazaras, Aimaks, and Turkmen...or the Taliban?

The Northern Alliance and the minority populaces they represent will be far better served by a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and the Pashtuns that leads to a new constitution and more balanced and equitable governance than the current model, than they are by leaving them to their own devices and years of violence. The violence will likely increase and potentially end in the Northern Alliance fleeing for their lives. The US and our influence and reputation is far better served by designing and overseeing the former rather than the latter as well.

Huh, since when is 58% the minority and 42% is the majority? And that does not even include those Pashtuns tired of the Taliban B.S.

[Cole]

Carl,

But when you want to paint the PAK Army and the ISI (and for some bizarre reason hold the government of Pakistan harmless) to task for deaths in Afghanistan, you don't want to forget the farmers smoked by a hellfire missile fired by some Kiowa pilot who swore it was Taliban planting IEDs; or that bus of civilians lit up with a Ma Deuce by a nervous E-4 because he was the gunner on the trail vehicle and felt it was following too close, etc, etc.

And this is solved by flying drones out of National Guard bases in the U.S. with no ground troops to coordinate with? IIRC, it was OH-58D Hellfires together with USAF Predators and SOF supervision that followed 3 vans for hours, swore they were Taliban, then engaged women and children...even though they were traveling from a Hazara province north of Oruzgon not known for Taliban activity.

It is a matter of historical fact that the Northern Alliance was working with Russian support and that the Russians helped facilitate our relationship to conduct UW with them against the Taliban.

Perhaps because they were protecting their spheres of influence consisting of "stan" countries north of Afghanistan...and did not like all the heroine ending up in Russia.

It is also a historical fact that many of the Northern Alliance were affiliated with the Soviets during their invasion. This is not rhetoric, I only point it out because it is true, and because it highlights the facts that it is our interests that our enduring, not who we work through to address them.

Massoud was killed two days before 9/11 and his funeral in an obscure location was attended by hundreds of thousands. Massoud and Abdullah Abdullah stood for democratic institutions and women's rights. Do those sound like Soviet or Pashtun tenets? Was Ismail Khan buddy buddy with the Soviets when he took on the Afghan communist government in Herat, killed Soviet advisors, and then incurred the wrath or Soviet bombers that killed 24,000 in less than a week and precipitated the Soviet invasion?

We've let ourselves get detached from our true interests in the region, and subsequently attached to a particular party that has their own interests and that is taking us down a path away from what is important in the long run to the U.S. We need to stay focused. To leave or to facilitate a reconciliation is not to abandon Mr. Karzai; rather it is to recognize that he has abandoned us. Once we make it clear that we will not write a blank check and offer blind loyalty, I suspect he will adjust his position. If not, I also suspect that we will find that we have not given up much in terms of our national security by not being there.

Perhaps we agree about Karzai being a marginal partner. What about the parliament? Can we work with them to get better results? Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other opportunists will not go away just because we leave. Last time we left, Kabul got leveled with help from Pakistan and the ISI providing rockets and support to Hekmatyar and the Taliban. What changes when we leave prematurely again this time?

[Bob's World]

Cole, you miss my point. This is not about who is on what team today or yesterday; this is about interests and the various parties who have conflicting interests that all converge in Afghanistan. Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, China, Pakistan all conduct UW even now to work to shape situations to there benefit. As we should expect them to, as they all have far greater interests here than the US does.

There are no clean hands. The US has as much blood on our hands as anyone as we work to shape things to what we see as being best for our interests. It is my position that the intel guys and the ideologues have mischaracterized the situation in a manner that has us working toward a goal that actually puts our vital interests at greater rather than lesser risk.

As to the events in Uruzgan, that was indeed a tragedy that I am intimately familiar with. Mistakes were made. There are not many who can appreciate the position of the ODA commander, deep in Taliban sanctuary with a small team and a handful of contract security and ANSF, conducting an operation in an unfriendly village far from any fire support. Yes, the occupants turned out to be Hazara, but the area they were in was in no way a Hazara area. This was an experienced ODA on their second tour in this same area, and they knew full well how fast insurgent fighters can gather and mass once the word goes out. The reports the team leader had translated to him painted a picture of a force building that far exceeded the size of his own and a decision window to act and prevent being surrounded was closing fast when he made his fateful decision. The reports from the Pred and the pilots who had eyes on the convoy looked damming in cold calm analysis long after the fact by senior leaders sitting safely in their FOBs; but we'll never know what exactly was communicated to the one leader who actually had command on the ground.

Afghanistan will always be at the confluence of powerful forces with divergent interests. Adding our own inflated and I believe misguided perspective of our interests there is not helping.

[Cole]

Cole, you miss my point. This is not about who is on what team today or yesterday; this is about interests and the various parties who have conflicting interests that all converge in Afghanistan. Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, China, Pakistan all conduct UW even now to work to shape situations to there benefit. As we should expect them to, as they all have far greater interests here than the US does.

There are no clean hands. The US has as much blood on our hands as anyone as we work to shape things to what we see as being best for our interests. It is my position that the intel guys and the ideologues have mischaracterized the situation in a manner that has us working toward a goal that actually puts our vital interests at greater rather than lesser risk.

As to the events in Uruzgan, that was indeed a tragedy that I am intimately familiar with. Mistakes were made. There are not many who can appreciate the position of the ODA commander, deep in Taliban sanctuary with a small team and a handful of contract security and ANSF, conducting an operation in an unfriendly village far from any fire support. Yes, the occupants turned out to be Hazara, but the area they were in was in no way a Hazara area. This was an experienced ODA on their second tour in this same area, and they knew full well how fast insurgent fighters can gather and mass once the word goes out. The reports the team leader had translated to him painted a picture of a force building that far exceeded the size of his own and a decision window to act and prevent being surrounded was closing fast when he made his fateful decision. The reports from the Pred and the pilots who had eyes on the convoy looked damming in cold calm analysis long after the fact by senior leaders sitting safely in their FOBs; but we'll never know what exactly was communicated to the one leader who actually had command on the ground.

Afghanistan will always be at the confluence of powerful forces with divergent interests. Adding our own inflated and I believe misguided perspective of our interests there is not helping.

Guess my point is from news reports, even this informed civilian who has never been to Afghanistan, knew back when this happened that if the vehicles were coming out of Daikundi province (4th paragraph from end of article), they were probably Hazaras.

Oruzgan/Urozgan troops on the ground like the Dutch previously, and Marines now would know that as well. Shorter term SOF and those not semi- permanently occupying that ground would be less likely to know that. A Predator pilot separated from ground tactical MI and stateside DCGS would be less likely to know that, as well, particularly if he is National Guard. The assumption that a stateside NG officer Predator pilot is superior to an Army enlisted Gray Eagle operator who is actually in theater next to local tactical MI and operations staff/leaders, is possibly flawed.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...ystal_030910w/

With an Army ground control station in theater near the SOF command post, the unit would not have needed to rely exclusively on the absent or short-numbered ROVER system and missing JTAC.

In that context, the ideas behind the Biden Plan and Secretary Gates recent West Point speech that downplays the need for future ground troops in theater, does not look overly valid. In addition as I was pointing out, SOF forces as tough as their mission is and as good as they are...appear to have high incidences of collateral damage on their resumes. Just my opinion, humbled by those like you actually on the ground repeatedly in dangerous places.

[Dayuhan]

Those bone heads may continue to play their game but why do we have to pay for it, why do we have to pretend it doesn't hurt us and why can't we oppose their destructiveness?

Because we can't supply our forces in Afghanistan without crossing Pakistani territory. The size of our presence in Afghanistan cripples us in negotiation with Pakistan: we need their ports and their roads, and they know it. If we weren't in Afghanistan we'd have a lot more leverage: we could threaten to withdraw aid, and there'd be a lot less they could do about it.

Remove the Pak Army/ISI from the equation and Taliban & company very well could wither on the vine or talk serious.

True, but we have no way to remove them from the equation. We can't even seriously threaten them as long as our supply line is in their hands.

What you are talking about is bad government. The solution to the problem of bad government is good government, not its substitution with a different kind of bad government under a different set of bad governors.

Also true, but we don't have the capacity to provide Afghanistan, or Pakistan, with good government.

The US gets a bum rap for leaving when the going gets tough. Typically that follows our being far too lenient with the government we had signed up to support to begin with, and allowing them to then drag us into positions we would have never taken on our own, and that are clearly counter to our interests.

We didn't sign up to support the Karzai government. We signed up to remove the Taliban. Then we created the Karzai government, and now we're all upset that he's governing like an Afghan. What did we expect him to do?

If failure is inability to achieve one's goals, the surest road to failure is to pursue goals you haven't the capacity to achieve. Bringing good governance to Afghanistan is a goal we haven't the capacity to achieve. We cannot govern Afghanistan, and any Afghan government we install will govern like Afghans, which will produce insurgency and which will be unsatisfactory to us.

It would be great if Karzai would do this of his own volition. Perhaps if we stopped protecting him and began to draw down next year as the President originally established he would.

Maybe if we left Karzai would try to build the Taliban into an inclusive government with constitutional protections. Or maybe he'd use patronage, bribe who he could, hand out lucrative territories and businesses to trusted allies, try to co-opt who he could and suppress who he couldn't, and cling to power as hard as he could. Which of these do you think is more likely? And even in the unlikely event that he opted for inclusion, do you think the Taliban would simply settle for that? Or would they try to drive him out and seize power themselves? Based on the way business is typically conducted in that part of the world, what would you reasonably expect?

How does one overcome self-destructive culture? How does one create trust and proper behavior in a culture where there is neither? By bringing all the parties together, the winners AND the losers, and crafting a constitution that creates guarantees and obstacles to the abuses that naturally occur.

Cart before horse. Constitutions don't create trust and consensus, they codify existing trust and consensus. If there's no trust and no consensus, there's nothing to codify and a Constitution will be ignored. Why do you think Constitutions come and go so easily in these places?

The question is not "how does one overcome self-destructive culture?" The question is "how does one overcome somebody else's self-destructive culture? The answer is that one doesn't. One acknowledges what is, and deals with it. We cannot change Afghan culture.

Where we screwed up is that we put too much faith in Karzai and allowed him and his team to craft a constitution that actually codified the historic system of abuse and exclusion and made it worse.

Where we screwed up is in thinking Karzai - or anybody else we could have installed - was not going to govern Afghanistan as an Afghan and in a manner consistent with Afghan political culture. Afghans will be Afghans, no matter what Constitution we give them. Their political culture will evolve, over time and in its own way, but we can't evolve it at our bidding.

I think we need to tear down the sanctuary we have created around GIRoA and force the issue of bringing the parties together, scrapping the current abomination of a constitution, and starting over.

And we are going to do this... how? By decree? We simply declare the Constitution scrapped, and tell the Afghans we say they have to start over and this time they have to do it the way we think it should be done? In what capacity, exactly, are we acting here?

Pakistan will see an opportunity in this to reestablish an acceptable degree of influence, so they should go along. The Pashtuns will see an opportunity to regain what they see as their rightful role in this society (and the Taliban will likely someday be little more than a political party once legal politics become effective and illegal politics are no longer the only option for change).

Given existing political culture and tradition, and the history of violence among the contending parties, what's the basis for these predictions? What if "an acceptable degree of influence" for Pakistan is control? What if what the Pashtuns see as "their rightful role in this society" is on top, with their boot on the other guy's throat and their hand in his pocket? And really, what basis have we to assume that a mere Constitution would make "legal politics" more "effective' than the traditional politics of force?

Our challenge will be to establish and maintain the right degree of invasiveness. Always tricky, and not something Americans have shown much flare for.

If we're going to start by unilaterally removing the existing Constitution and initiating a process that we declare will result in balanced equitable sharing of power, there's no longer any basis to speak of "the right degree of invasiveness". At that point we have already declared ourselves absolute rulers with final veto power over the decisions of any Afghan government. There is no higher degree of invasiveness

We lack the patience and are far too sure of the rightness of how we see things (yes, I am an American).

Agreed, on all counts. QED, possibly

We need to just create the environment that brings them together, the force to make them come together, and the broad guidelines of what a constitution is supposed to do; and then allow them to self-determine what that all then produces.

Is there any indication that they want to come together? If they don't, what's the chance that forcing them together is going to produce what you want it to produce?

The only way the outcome is going to even vaguely resemble what you suggest is if we control the outcome. If we allow the parties to self-determine the outcome, it's not likely to be anything but a big fight, with the winners stomping the losers into the ground.

This is the fundamental dissonance here: if we control the outcome, it's irrelevant by definition. If we don't control the outcome, it's not going to be the outcome we want.

Or go home.

Should have done that when we were on top, and people were still afraid of us.

We already tried to bring "good governance" to Afghanistan. We didn't fail just because we did it wrong, and we won't succeed if we do it better next time. We failed because it's something we don't have the ability to do, no matter how many times we try. They may someday find their own model of "good governance", but we are not going to do it for them.

[Bob's World]

constitutions come and go because they are typically either written by the winner to solidify their gains; or because they are shaped by some external/colonial power to solidify their interests.

I am suggesting neither. I don't know if this will work either, but of all the things we are throwing ourselves at that have little to no chance to work; I find it odd that the one thing that has the best chance we pointedly ignore. If I was a conspiracy theorist....

[Entropy]

Guess my point is from news reports, even this informed civilian who has never been to Afghanistan, knew back when this happened that if the vehicles were coming out of Daikundi province (4th paragraph from end of article), they were probably Hazaras.

Oruzgan/Urozgan troops on the ground like the Dutch previously, and Marines now would know that as well. Shorter term SOF and those not semi- permanently occupying that ground would be less likely to know that. A Predator pilot separated from ground tactical MI and stateside DCGS would be less likely to know that, as well, particularly if he is National Guard. The assumption that a stateside NG officer Predator pilot is superior to an Army enlisted Gray Eagle operator who is actually in theater next to local tactical MI and operations staff/leaders, is possibly flawed.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...ystal_030910w/

With an Army ground control station in theater near the SOF command post, the unit would not have needed to rely exclusively on the absent or short-numbered ROVER system and missing JTAC.

I guess I should comment since I'm one of those NG guys working with Predator.

The problem with that incident wasn't that the personnel involved were National Guard - rather it demonstrates a problem with how the DCGS system works. DCGS is a distributed system, meaning that the people flying the plane are in one location, the analysts exploiting the video feed are in another location, and the aircraft and supported unit are in a third location. This distributed system brings a lot of advantages, but some downsides as well. One of the biggest downsides is that communication becomes critical in order to ensure there are no screwups since the various players are not co-located. In this particular case, the guys flying the plane had comms with the guys on the ground, but the imagery analysts at the DGS did not. The imagery analysts correctly identified women and children in the vehicles, but the crew failed to pass that information along.

This incident prompted several changes in within the DCGS community.

Secondly, most of the NG people who do this mission are very experienced. At my unit (which is on the exploitation side of the system) most of the people working these missions have been doing it for the last 2-3 years nonstop on title 10 orders.

Third, DGS analysts aren't supposed to be local area experts - in fact, they can't be given the reality that we have to support missions anywhere in Iraq and Afghanistan. We literally could be supporting a mission in Afghanistan for a few hours and then support a mission in Iraq immediately afterward. Therefore, what the analysts do is pretty much limited to interpreting what is happening on the video feed and providing any products the supported unit requires. Most people working at a DGS are imagery analysts and would not be expected to be area experts regardless. The units we support on the ground do not expect us to be experts on their AO and they realize that we can't be such experts though we do endeavor to provide any information we can as well as coordinate cross-cuing of other intelligence assets. Mainly we are a reconnaissance asset and are treated as such, though we do have the capability to do higher-level and longer-term analysis if required.

[carl]

Because we can't supply our forces in Afghanistan without crossing Pakistani territory. The size of our presence in Afghanistan cripples us in negotiation with Pakistan: we need their ports and their roads, and they know it. If we weren't in Afghanistan we'd have a lot more leverage: we could threaten to withdraw aid, and there'd be a lot less they could do about it.

If we were to reduce our force size to that which could be supplied via the northern route and air (and maybe even quietly quietly through Iran), wouldn't we have even more leverage because we would still be there and could actually stop the money flow to the General sahibs and their buddies? It might be a radical step to give up the Karachi supply route and live on what comes through other routes given our history, but the current arrangement ain't working. We gotta do something else.

Entropy: Do you think the way the Army runs their Pred ops (Warriors), with everybody in theatre at I think the same place, is better, worse or six of one and six of the other?

Thanks for the explanation. Those details make a of difference and it is good to know some of them.

[Bob's World]

Guess my point is from news reports, even this informed civilian who has never been to Afghanistan, knew back when this happened that if the vehicles were coming out of Daikundi province (4th paragraph from end of article), they were probably Hazaras.

Oruzgan/Urozgan troops on the ground like the Dutch previously, and Marines now would know that as well. Shorter term SOF and those not semi- permanently occupying that ground would be less likely to know that. A Predator pilot separated from ground tactical MI and stateside DCGS would be less likely to know that, as well, particularly if he is National Guard. The assumption that a stateside NG officer Predator pilot is superior to an Army enlisted Gray Eagle operator who is actually in theater next to local tactical MI and operations staff/leaders, is possibly flawed.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/0...ystal_030910w/

With an Army ground control station in theater near the SOF command post, the unit would not have needed to rely exclusively on the absent or short-numbered ROVER system and missing JTAC.

In that context, the ideas behind the Biden Plan and Secretary Gates recent West Point speech that downplays the need for future ground troops in theater, does not look overly valid. In addition as I was pointing out, SOF forces as tough as their mission is and as good as they are...appear to have high incidences of collateral damage on their resumes. Just my opinion, humbled by those like you actually on the ground repeatedly in dangerous places.

Carl,

With all due respect, you are smoking some hardcore crack here.

Conventional ground forces had CIVCAS incidents almost daily while I was in Afghanistan. Typically some lower enlisted guy pulling security on a convoy or at some outpost faced with an urgent decision about what to do when a guy on a motorcycle races toward his position without responding to hand signals or flashing lights; or what to do when similarly a vehicle closed too close to the convoy. Default answer was to use their assigned weapon and stop the person. Next on the list was attack helicopters, who typically were held blameless for their actions. The conventional forces compressed their battle space to the ring road, the hwy to Quetta, and a few relative small bulges around major population centers. The remainder (and vast majority) of RC South was abandoned to a a handful of SF and SEAL and Coalition SOF outposts as permanent presence, and sporadic raiding by other SOF.

SOF events were and are rare, but they are sometimes dramatic when they do occur.

All too often, pilots with eyes on the target would call the nearest ground commander (some SOF commander in a post isolated from any external support deep in Indian country) and describe a major threat and ask for permission to engage. When later it turned out that the target was a group of kids or women the lion's share of the blame would fall upon that SOF commander.

Yes, after the fact, in the incident you describe it was determined that the vehicles contained a Hazara group traveling south from Dai Kundai down to Kandahar. To a ground commander listening to Taliban forces coordinating an attack on his small team in an isolated village far from his own base or any conventional support they were described to him as three vehicles full of armed men, accompanied by a large number of dismounts. He obviously could not see the target, he could only incorporate what he was being told into the totality of his circumstances there on the ground. The two pilots who came on station had no such concerns or hindrances. They knew that they faced little threat of effective air defense fire (unless coming within PKM and RPG range); and had eyes on with high tech optics and flew around the target vehicles several times before receiving the ground force commander's authorization to engage. They never told the ground the commander that this was not a Taliban force, they never closed to confirm their doubts, they just lit it up and flew back to base. Like I said, it was a tragedy, and those who dished out punishments or wrote condemning articles did so with full access to dozens of written statements, video and audios available for their review. The commander had none of that.

Regardless, your stated assumption that the Dutch (who largely stayed in the narrow confines of their base and equally narrow surrounding battle space) conventional forces or the Marines (didn't realize Marines had been sent up to Uruzgan, so I question that) somehow have better situational awayness over this region than the US and coalition SOF (USSF, Aussie and Dutch SOF) who have been out and among the people (friendly and unfriendly) out in the rural areas since 2001 is just flat wrong.

But key to remember is that they are all civilians. Be one a hardcore Taliban fighter or a small girl. The whole term "CIVCAS" is a bit ridiculous as it drives decisions based on ones age or gender rather than upon their action or associations. If those vehicles had contained 15 fighters and 12 women and children would that be "CIVCAS"? Under our current rules, yes. Yet are all are equally liable either directly or as accomplices. Our operational laws we employ are broken in my opinion; as are our procedures for clearing fires and assessing blame. But that does not make a good story, SOF guys killing civilians does, so that is what makes the news.

One sure way to reduce the number of civilians killed by the US in Afghanistan is to stop promoting the success of current government and to take a more neutral role. Victory should not be measured in the survival of the Karzai regime, but rather in attaining a relatively stable situation. The real problem is that our Means and our Ways do not match our Ends:

MEANS: ISAF

WAYS: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. ISAF Mission Statement

ENDS: “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”
President Barack Obama, 2010

We either need to change the Ends, or adjust the Ways and Means. Probably a good bit of all three.

Then we could evolve past arguing over "who shot john," and focus on helping John attain a government designed, and manned by those with the intention, to serve the entire populace

[omarali50]

Carl, as you know, I wrote a piece about the Davis imbroglio yesterday (http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...-ali.html#more) and have heard from friends since then; the consensus among middle class Pakistanis (these are not official sources, just ordinary middle class Paksitanis) seems to be that we are past the hump. Not only can the US do nothing to Pakistan while Pakistan controls supplies, thanks to 200 nukes, there is nothing the US can do even if they leave Afghanistan. The US has provided bridge financing for 9 years and now the crisis is past. China and Saudi Arabia will take care of the future and 200 nukes will ensure compliance from the world bank and others. US aid is no longer critical. And the reconquest of Afghanistan is a matter of when, not if. And India is already running to see what they can do to avoid a new round of Jihadi warfare. They too will pay and pay on time. We are, in short, past the hump in every respect.
I am not convinced myself, but I am reporting what I hear from friends (most of whom do not consider themselves Taliban supporters).

[carl]

Omar:

That sounds a lot like a middleweight who has been successful in his weight class and has decided to move up to heavyweight. The confidence may be unjustified.

If you have a chance, ask those guys what they think will happen when, not if, the next Mumbai occurs and if, maybe even when, a successful attack with a Pakistan link occurs in the United States. I would be interested in their answer.

That was a nice piece in 3quarks, almost a reference work on how the deep state thinks.

[Surferbeetle]

Omar,

Wow!

LOVERS TIFF, IMPENDING DIVORCE OR TRIAL SEPARATION?

Meanwhile, when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything is a nail. So I expect the state department to pass out more money to GHQ, I expect the CIA to fund some new insane lunatic fringe to counter their last lunatic fringe, I expect the Pentagon to ask for more money for weapons and a good hard "shock and awe campaign", I expect professors in San Francisco to blame colonialism, and I expect Islamists to blow themselves up with even greater devotion. May Allah protect us from anything worse.

Indeed

Steve

[Ken White]

SOF events were and are rare, but they are sometimes dramatic when they do occur.

At the risk of starting another definition conflict, my conversations with folks having multiple SF tours over the past nine years indicate that may not be not totally correct with respect to rairity (or making the news...). It may for your tour but for the whole period 2002-2011, it's quite doubtful.

That said, arguing its viability is probably pointless and unprovable in this forum and other than for parochial benefit, it's probably irrelevant in any event.

From the same sources and even more GPF folks who have gotten out of camps and well off the roads, this, though, seems correct:

Next on the list was attack helicopters, who typically were held blameless for their actions.

That has long been true and needs to corrected.

All too often...When later it turned out that the target was a group of kids or women the lion's share of the blame would fall upon that SOF commander.

As he should if he gave 'permission' without accurate knowledge. Though as you said, holding Aircrew blameless is long overdue for change.

Regardless, your stated assumption ... somehow have better situational awayness over this region than the US and coalition SOF (USSF, Aussie and Dutch SOF) who have been out and among the people (friendly and unfriendly) out in the rural areas since 2001 is just flat wrong.

Perhaps, perhaps not. Neither all SOF or all GPF are created equal. Good people and units have good SA, poor ones do not. That's a situational variable that IMO can never rate a "flat wrong" especially on a purely parochial, unit-type basis. YMMV obviously and that's okay even if it is wrong... .

...But that does not make a good story, SOF guys killing civilians does, so that is what makes the news.

Proving that some things never change...

[Bob's World]

Ken,,

No clean hands. This is the great challenge of going to a foreign land and taking a side in such an internal dispute. Both the government and the insurgent emerge from the populace to compete for dominance, and it is the populace that bears the brunt of such competitions.

All the more reason to first ask if the populace has trusted, certain and legal means available to them to challenge the current government short of such illegal violence. Too often the answer is no. Certainly that is the answer in Afghanistan. This is why it frustrates me when so many say "you have to crush the insurgent first, then look at addressing the issues of governance." I just don't buy it. Only if one is hard set that the current form of governance must prevail. The current constitution is a train wreck of insurgent causation. We really need to stop ignoring that hard fact and give these good people some legal options to address their grievances.

Uruzgan province is unique; and the Dutch government fell during my tenure in country over the controversy of their role there. I was fortunate to have conversations with local strongmen such as Matiullah Khan and senior leaders such as the CG of the Dutch forces and also to spend time with all brands of SOF forces that worked that region. I was also on duty when the tragic event described by Carl went down, know the parties involved and spent time with the investigators as well. Its complicated, but SF guys know this province as well as any. One team took 50% casualties on a prior rotation. They have a right to be a little quick to call for assistance when hours or days away from any type of ground support. Most of these teams were almost always in a complex mix of direct and indirect fire and IEDS from the minute they left the gate to the minute they returned, yet they go out every day and keep working to hold the edges of the frontier back so that the conventional forces can have some breathing space as they work the main battle area. But it was in the main battle area that "warning shots" killed civilians virtually every day. Poor communication between cultures, justifiably fear and duty to protect ones position, a lack of non-lethal options all combine to keep that count far too high.

Its frustrating. I also think it is largely avoidable. Bringing us back to the basis of this thread of dealing with sanctuaries. I still contend the most deadly sanctuary of all is the one we have created around GIRoA. Once we tear that down we can get at the heart of the problem.

[Ken White]

And as soon as I get back from taking my Wife and Daughter to dinner and if I can find my thinking cap, I'll try to be thoughtful...

[Dayuhan]

If we were to reduce our force size to that which could be supplied via the northern route and air (and maybe even quietly quietly through Iran), wouldn't we have even more leverage because we would still be there and could actually stop the money flow to the General sahibs and their buddies? It might be a radical step to give up the Karachi supply route and live on what comes through other routes given our history, but the current arrangement ain't working. We gotta do something else.

Certainly true, but we have to recognize that the northern route is controlled by regimes whose capriciousness is exceeded only and occasionally by their avarice, and that any arrangement with Iran would be impossible to keep quiet and would come with a very large quid pro quo. Doesn't take much more than a glance at Afghanistan's list of neighbors to recognize that dependence on any of them is going to carry a pretty hefty price tag and some less than pleasant bedfellows.

constitutions come and go because they are typically either written by the winner to solidify their gains; or because they are shaped by some external/colonial power to solidify their interests.

Seems to me that what you're proposing falls squarely into the latter category.

I don't know if this will work either, but of all the things we are throwing ourselves at that have little to no chance to work; I find it odd that the one thing that has the best chance we pointedly ignore. If I was a conspiracy theorist....

People ignore it because they know we can't do it. It's certainly true that there would be a lot less insurgency, upheaval, and misery if everybody had good governance and democracy. There would also be a lot less poverty if everyone had lots of money. These observations are true but they don't get us anywhere, because we can't bring them about.

Someday we will get this through our collective skulls: good governance and democracy cannot be installed, like a light bulb or spare tire. They are not gifts that we can present. We cannot force them on anyone. Not saying the Afghans (or any others) can't achieve them, but they have to do it by their own road and in their own time; we can't simply hand it to them or shove it down their throats because the inevitable messiness that accompanies the evolutionary process is not in our interest.

It's a great solution and a great goal, but we can't achieve it. Pursuing goals we can't achieve has caused us problems in the past, and it will continue to cause problems until we stop doing it.

[Cole]

Carl,

With all due respect, you are smoking some hardcore crack here.

Not likely since I don't even drink. I'm perfectly capable of being irrational while sober.

Conventional ground forces had CIVCAS incidents almost daily while I was in Afghanistan. Typically some lower enlisted guy pulling security on a convoy or at some outpost faced with an urgent decision about what to do when a guy on a motorcycle races toward his position without responding to hand signals or flashing lights; or what to do when similarly a vehicle closed too close to the convoy.

And I watched a TV special where a SF guy claiming he was parking cars in Memphis a year prior shot an approaching truck in Afghanistan and hit a 13 year old in the truck bed in the chest. When taken as a percentage of total troops on hand, SF/SOF CIVCAS are higher at least in the headlines for major incidents. Why else would Karzai be decrying the night raids?

Default answer was to use their assigned weapon and stop the person.

Warning shots? Escalation of force. Isn't self-protection legal? Don't they have signs on vehicles saying to stay back? They tried to field sonic weapons and folks cried foul.

Next on the list was attack helicopters, who typically were held blameless for their actions. The conventional forces compressed their battle space to the ring road, the hwy to Quetta, and a few relative small bulges around major population centers. The remainder (and vast majority) of RC South was abandoned to a a handful of SF and SEAL and Coalition SOF outposts as permanent presence, and sporadic raiding by other SOF.

Sir, in a later post you mention how helpless you guys are out there and that you need the air support. Would respectfully submit you are trying to have it both ways. The Biden plan submits we can get by with outnumbered SOF/SF who can take care of themselves and hold just as much terrain as general purpose forces, influence as many in the population, train/mentor just as many ANA, and do so without calling in AC-130 (Marine incident south of Herat) or attack helicopters, or other aircraft engaging tankers in Kunduz (OK a German incident).

SOF events were and are rare, but they are sometimes dramatic when they do occur.

MARSOC rings a bell in two incidents (one showing off for Ollie North), night raids that killed a police chiefs sons, other night raids that killed a bunch of teens in the northeast?

All too often, pilots with eyes on the target would call the nearest ground commander (some SOF commander in a post isolated from any external support deep in Indian country) and describe a major threat and ask for permission to engage. When later it turned out that the target was a group of kids or women the lion's share of the blame would fall upon that SOF commander.

Sometimes there is some collateral damage but legitimate targets are also struck. Guntape and UAS footage should support one way or the other as they did here:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat...es_reports.php

And UAS footage confirmed that mortarmen were involved in the pre-Wanat incident of July 4, 2008. In the incident you mentioned, the tape turned out missing. Kind of hints at a situation where the cover up was worse than the crime.

Yes, after the fact, in the incident you describe it was determined that the vehicles contained a Hazara group traveling south from Dai Kundai down to Kandahar. To a ground commander listening to Taliban forces coordinating an attack on his small team in an isolated village far from his own base or any conventional support they were described to him as three vehicles full of armed men, accompanied by a large number of dismounts. He obviously could not see the target, he could only incorporate what he was being told into the totality of his circumstances there on the ground. The two pilots who came on station had no such concerns or hindrances. They knew that they faced little threat of effective air defense fire (unless coming within PKM and RPG range); and had eyes on with high tech optics and flew around the target vehicles several times before receiving the ground force commander's authorization to engage. They never told the ground the commander that this was not a Taliban force, they never closed to confirm their doubts, they just lit it up and flew back to base. Like I said, it was a tragedy, and those who dished out punishments or wrote condemning articles did so with full access to dozens of written statements, video and audios available for their review. The commander had none of that.

I hear you. Hindsight is easy, but the Predator guys followed the vehicles for hours...not the minutes that the OH-58Ds were on station.

Regardless, your stated assumption that the Dutch (who largely stayed in the narrow confines of their base and equally narrow surrounding battle space) conventional forces or the Marines (didn't realize Marines had been sent up to Uruzgan, so I question that) somehow have better situational awayness over this region than the US and coalition SOF (USSF, Aussie and Dutch SOF) who have been out and among the people (friendly and unfriendly) out in the rural areas since 2001 is just flat wrong.

My bad. I knew Sangin's location and mistakenly thought it was in Uruzgan and as you know it is close but in northeast Helmand.

But key to remember is that they are all civilians. Be one a hardcore Taliban fighter or a small girl. The whole term "CIVCAS" is a bit ridiculous as it drives decisions based on ones age or gender rather than upon their action or associations. If those vehicles had contained 15 fighters and 12 women and children would that be "CIVCAS"? Under our current rules, yes. Yet are all are equally liable either directly or as accomplices. Our operational laws we employ are broken in my opinion; as are our procedures for clearing fires and assessing blame. But that does not make a good story, SOF guys killing civilians does, so that is what makes the news.

Are you saying there are confirmed cases of women and young children pulling triggers? I've heard about kids throwing grenades over walls.

Just my opinion, and deepest respect for all warfighters in the air and on the ground. Just don't believe that single pilot fast movers at altitude even with Sniper XR, DCGS and RPA operators stateside who do great work but provide no habitual support and can't have the same tactical information, or SOF/SF on shorter tours and in fewer numbers can cover all the terrain and key populations or have the same intell as many more guys on the ground for a year.