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Thread: Information Operations

  1. #61
    Council Member Randy Brown's Avatar
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    Default The IO sum is greater than its parts ... as is its definition

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”

    Randy, I don't disagree with what you wrote above, actually I agree strongly with much of it; however, the entire point of this thread was to address the confusing definition of IO (first post).

    I would argue what your writing about falls under the Army's definition of:

    Influence Operations: to effect the behavior of the intended audience through coercion, information engagement, presence and conduct.

    AND

    Information Engagement: the government's use of integrated employment of public information programs, psychological operations, and support leader and government activities (reparing a school, security force behavior) to influence a target audience.
    Roger! My apologies if you thought that I was shooting outside the barber poles. I agree that the definitions of Influence Operations and Information Engagement do encompass much of what I'm wrestling with in this thread. However, I thought I was aiming a little closer to center-mass, IO definition-wise, in that I would be loathe to divorce the tech-stuff (EW, CNO, the hardware side of PSYOP) from the soft-power stuff. I still think it's germaine; please indulge me a few more sentences to apply SPORTS and get my sight picture again ... (Further apologies for beating my semi-amusing range-fire metaphor to an early death this morning.)

    Caveats: the usual U.S. "better-fighting-through-better-technology" bias is definitely at play here, and the fact that I'm a commo guy working in an intel slot (so I gots to have my tech-toys).

    Schmedlap: Thanks for your notes regarding "working groups." I'd started to get into the "ad hoc" part in yesterday's rambles, and now wish that I had. I agree that we're in agreement: the interaction and de-confliction regarding IO is best done on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. In the civilian world, I'd even use "virtual team" as another way to say "working group," given that the experts might be geograpically dispersed on the battlefield.

    As with Bill's notes regarding "Influence Operations" and "Information Engagement," I am also mentally juggling your points on "Information Superiority." Because the term seems to invite comparison to "Air Superiority" (the subject of some other fun conversations on this site, by the way), I wonder whether this is a way to resolve my apparent need to incorporate the tech-side, as above, AND to address William F. Owen's position that:

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    IF (the control of information content and flow across/among BLUFOR, enemy, and population) is the goal, then it is unattainable. It's like "all-weather" and "information dominance." The idea that anyone or anything can "control" information in the Information Age is both illusory and highly damaging.
    I agree that information cannot be controlled, but it can and should be shaped to meet battlefield objectives. Taking a page from my engineer buddies, information viewed in obstacle terms can be "fixed, disrupted, turned or blocked."

    Information Operations, as defined by JP 3-13, allows for a doctrinal sum greater than its parts. (Granted, unpacking the definition will keep us busy for years--just look at this thread.) For example, when a brigade commander has to weigh whether or not to alienate the civilian population by shaping the local frequency spectrum (perhaps "IO Air Superiority" is "Airwave Superiority"?), it's not ...

    ... just "messaging." (Because there is a physical-space component.)

    ... just "collection" or "targeting." (Because it, if nothing else, creates a secondary observer effect on the battlefield.)

    ... just "electronic warfare." (Because it involves implicit and indirect messages--what do the locals think when the proverbial dial-tone goes dead? What do the bad guys think? How do both populations react?)

    I think it's ... "Information Operations." And, short-story-long, I think that means I'm in agreement with the JP 3-13 definition.

    (Side note to Schmedlap: The last paragraph is the best way to-date that I've been able to generically articulate a concrete example of how/why I see Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP implications stemming from non-lethal effects targeting.)

    (Additional note: I posted before seeing this reminder regarding pros-and-cons of Taliban operations against civilian cellular telephone infrastructure.)
    Last edited by Randy Brown; 06-30-2008 at 03:49 PM. Reason: Added note and link on Taliban vs. cell phones
    L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
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    -- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
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  2. #62
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    Default And the competition says.....

    On the PSYOP side of the house AQ has recovered its internet capability, while we give lip service to the myth of IO.

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...302135_pf.html

    The war against terrorism has evolved into a war of ideas and propaganda, a struggle for hearts and minds fought on television and the Internet. On those fronts, al-Qaeda's voice has grown much more powerful in recent years. Taking advantage of new technology and mistakes by its adversaries, al-Qaeda's core leadership has built an increasingly prolific propaganda operation, enabling it to communicate constantly, securely and in numerous languages with loyalists and potential recruits worldwide.

    Every three or four days, on average, a new video or audio from one of al-Qaeda's commanders is released online by as-Sahab, the terrorist network's in-house propaganda studio. Even as its masters dodge a global manhunt, as-Sahab produces documentary-quality films, iPod files and cellphone videos. Last year it released 97 original videos, a sixfold increase from 2005. (As-Sahab means "the clouds" in Arabic, a reference to the skyscraping mountain peaks of Afghanistan.)
    This isn't strategic, operational or tactical, but it has a real impact on the battlefied where the population is the primary objective. Coercive power is important in irregular warfare, but using coercive power without understanding how it supports a theme, or message, is like punching in the air, it will have little impact on our opponents if they are even half way competent. Using information to influence target audience is critical, but information superiority is a pipe dream (even in North Korea). Information superiority is a sales pitch that a number of contractors embrace to sell their wares (to include government think tanks). We need realistic objectives instead of pie in sky illusions.

    One must also consider what we're trying to do with our influence. Are we trying to sell democracy and capitialism? If that is our method of stability operations, then in many cases we're attacking core identies of the societies we're trying to help, thus our propaganda is easily countered. This simplistic approach of, "hey we can you make you like us" isn't always well received.

    Note the OPSEC measures our opponents employ also.

    The Web forums are password-protected and highly regulated. In certain sections, only high-ranking moderators have the authority to post material -- such as bulletins announcing a new bin Laden video. As a result, al-Fajr and others can quickly spot fake material, ensuring that the propaganda maintains a high level of reliability and consistency, analysts said.

    "By controlling that content, al-Fajr Center can make sure everybody who is getting that information knows they're getting it from an authentic source," said Josh Devon, senior analyst at the SITE Intelligence Group, a private firm that monitors Islamist terrorist groups online and serves as a consultant to U.S. and foreign government agencies. "It'd be extremely difficult for the CIA or another intelligence agency to introduce credible and effective counterpropaganda."

    Al-Fajr is extremely security-conscious, Devon said. It distributes a manual called the "Technical Mujahid," which advises how to cover electronic footprints and avoid infiltration.
    DMO continues at warp speed, we need to stop the IO patrol, take a knee, face out, and get the 2LT off point. Once again he is lost.

  3. #63
    Council Member Randy Brown's Avatar
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    Default Another face in the cloud ...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    On the PSYOP side of the house AQ has recovered its internet capability, while we give lip service to the myth of IO.

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...302135_pf.html

    This isn't strategic, operational or tactical, but it has a real impact on the battlefied where the population is the primary objective. Coercive power is important in irregular warfare, but using coercive power without understanding how it supports a theme, or message, is like punching in the air, it will have little impact on our opponents if they are even half way competent.
    Bill: Great article, thanks! I was struck by how the name of "As-Sahab" ("the clouds," in Arabic, according to the Washington Post writer) also describes/illuminates/suggests its operation as a networked entity, conceptually along the lines of cloud computing, crowd sourcing, and, most importantly, crowdcasting. We have, as a culture and as a military, not yet harnessed the full power of a free Internet.

    I'll get off the net for now, but keep those cards and letters coming!
    L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
    -- A lesson is knowledge gained through experience.
    -- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
    -- A lesson-learned is not "integrated" until shared successfully with others.

  4. #64
    Council Member dguidry1's Avatar
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    Post An FA30 Perspective...

    As an IO officer, I must say that it is very refreshing to see the range of understanding about Information Operations in this discussion. I have read every post and cannot find one thing with which I really disagree. Everything stated can be considered valid depending on the environment.

    I will also say up front that Information Operations is by no means an easy discipline because ultimately it boils down to affecting the human psyche and emotions. Many commanders and staffs do not like to hear that, but that's what must be targeted in order to change behaviors and decision-making. It really is all about INFLUENCE.

    In terms of defining IO, I accept the Joint (JP 3-13) definition. That one definition provides the Functional Area 30 (FA30) IO officer with parameters broad enough to allow unconventional, asymmetric, irregular, out-of-the-box thinking and planning of IO. And Information Operations are not limited to the five core elements in that definition if one considers the limitless extent of supporting capabilities, as well as the related capabilities of Public Affairs, CMO, and Military Support to Public Diplomacy.

    So to answer the question about what exactly is IO --- well, "IT DEPENDS"...

    There is no 'EASY' button There are no cookie cutter solutions, no standard checklists, no quick-fix knee-jerk responses to make things right. There are no such things as 'IO messages', and IO products do not exist anywhere in doctrine. To put it simply, IO is a PROCESS - not a "thing".

    During my 17 months as the IO Instructor for the COIN Center for Excellence in Iraq, the one thing I always tried to get participants to understand is that this is not an exact science - everything is relative to the context of the environment(s) in which targets and target audiences exist. In the simplest terms what that means is IO officers and supporting staff must first and foremost gain a true understanding of the information and operating environments, as well as develop an appreciation of the complexity and fluidity of those environments. And we have to understand them from the perspectives of various systems, networks, and operators within these environments - friendly, neutral, AND adversary. We must acquire information BEFORE projecting it in any kind of operation. That information must then be processed, validated, managed, stored, protected, etc (there's lots to be considered and done prior getting the proverbial 'word' out). Once this is accomplished the real work for the FA30 begins - continued planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization.

    IO officers essentially are (or should be) responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing applicable resources, capabilities, activities, etc, in order to support command objectives. And though these actions could be considered as normal Commander/G3/S3/XO functions, the G7/S7 (IO) becomes the action officer to fit the pieces of the different puzzles together. One of the main reasons is the exorbitant amount of time it takes to achieve desired outcomes. Embracing TIME rather than the need for immediate, visible, 'marketable' actions is key to almost always ensuring enduring results/effects...but time is often trumped by the dependency on one-way communication in the form of off-the cuff non-existent IO messages and talking points.

    Also, IO does not look the same at the different levels (strategic, operational, tactical). However, there should ideally be synergy among those levels that is mutually supporting from Joe on the ground all the way up to the POTUS. And it gets real tricky in that twilight zone where DoD operational meets USG strategic. As a Corps IO planner I've had the pleasure of being in the belly of that beast.

    But before I get too deep into a lengthy response, I will offer that IO should be called INFLUENCE Operations. The word "information" seems to draw the mind to communicating, 'messaging', or just telling somebody something that we want them to hear. There's so much about IO that we must do a better job of educating leaders and staffs to understand...that's REALLY the hard part.

    (I won't post them here, but I have several documents I will make available to requestors to illustrate many of the concepts I've shared about IO.)
    Last edited by dguidry1; 06-30-2008 at 10:40 PM. Reason: Corrected spelling.

  5. #65
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Randy Brown View Post
    the civilian population by shaping the local frequency spectrum (perhaps "IO Air Superiority" is "Airwave Superiority"?), it's not ...

    Believe it or not we used to have that. Those of us that are old enough to remember the old Civil Defense system had what was called CONELRAD. which stood for Control Of The Radio-Magnetic Spectrum....640 and 1240 on your am dial that is for you Ken!!!
    What is now the EMS system was part of CONELRAD which was part of get this an Air Raid Alert system!!!! It was used a lot during my stay in Florida during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Only information on 640 or 1240 was valid everything was considered wrong or enemy propaganda. It was a lot better than Homeland Defense.


    go to this link and listen (scroll down till you find it) to a recording from JFK support for CONELRAD 1961
    http://www.conelrad.com/media/audiodirectory.php
    Last edited by slapout9; 06-30-2008 at 11:35 PM. Reason: add CONELRAD Link

  6. #66
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You mean like this 1960s car radio,

    with the little Civil Defense logos:

    on the dial at 640 and 1240 AM?

    Before my time...

  7. #67
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    Default It depends?

    I will offer that IO should be called INFLUENCE Operations. The word "information" seems to draw the mind to communicating, 'messaging', or just telling somebody something that we want them to hear. posted by dguidry1
    By your position and experience you're an expert in post modern IO, but since most experts don't like to be called experts I won't stick that label on you. On top of that I still have the gull to disagree with you.

    Everyone on this thread has an idea of what needs to be done, and in most cases we are in violent agreement with what needs to be done, the debate is over what is IO. IO and what needs to be done are not necessarily the same in my humble opinion.

    I agree with your proposal to influence operations (INFLUOPS), not to be confused with influenza (but there are several parallels).

    Information Operations (IO) on the other hand should focus on information technology, EW, CNA, defending or electronic databases, etc. For example, jamming radio signals, jamming radar, attacking enemy C4I systems (remotely with hacker attacks and directly with bombs), and defending against the same. The information technology networked battlefield was the origin of IO (if I recall it correctly). IO is heavily slanted towards information technology and INFLUOPs is heavily slanted towards PSYOP, though a number of supporting activities are not PSYOP, and IO can support INFLUOPs.

    If IO is influence operations, then what is the difference between a PSYOP'er and an IO officer? If IO is holistic PSYOP, what is EW and CNA?

    Riddle me that Batman and you'll set me free from my anguish.

    If you tell me it depends, you'll leave me with a severe headache.

  8. #68
    Council Member Randy Brown's Avatar
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    Default This is only a test ...

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Believe it or not we used to have that. Those of us that are old enough to remember the old Civil Defense system had what was called CONELRAD. which stood for Control Of The Radio-Magnetic Spectrum....640 and 1240 on your am dial that is for you Ken!!!
    What is now the EMS system was part of CONELRAD which was part of get this an Air Raid Alert system!!!! It was used a lot during my stay in Florida during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Only information on 640 or 1240 was valid everything was considered wrong or enemy propaganda. It was a lot better than Homeland Defense.

    go to this link and listen (scroll down till you find it) to a recording from JFK support for CONELRAD 1961
    http://www.conelrad.com/media/audiodirectory.php
    And here my wife told me I was crazy when I ran an Ethernet cable out the window to the backyard fallout shelter ... ("The Internet is a nuclear-proof network, Martha--ARPA says so!") Now, I can listen to CONELRAD rebroadcasts in streaming audio while playing Worlds of Warcraft in my post-apocalyptic paradise.

    The alternating "640-1240" jingle brought with it the instant shock of recognition. Keep in mind, I can't remember high school algebra. But I can remember this stuff?!

    Thanks also to Mr. White with the visual blasts-from-the-past. Loved the car radio. Sometimes, I miss my first car ... and the Cold War.

    All of this nuclear nostalgia reminds me of a buddy's war story about a briefing he once received as a USAF enlisted person, in the late '70s to early '80s. It went something like this:

    BRIEFER: "In the event of a nuclear attack against this airbase, you will assemble at the super-secret alternate location. Any questions?"

    AUDIENCE: "Uh, yes, sir: Just where is the super-secret alternate location?"

    BRIEFER: "In the event of a nuclear attack against this airbase, you will advised of the location the super-secret alternate location. Any questions?"

    AUDIENCE: "..."
    And, because when I tell these little stories, I should have a point: For me, inspired and informed by dguidry1's insights, the moral at hand is ... "it depends."

    I am now ducking and covering ...
    Last edited by Randy Brown; 07-01-2008 at 03:21 AM.
    L2I is "Lessons-Learned Integration."
    -- A lesson is knowledge gained through experience.
    -- A lesson is not "learned" until it results in organizational or behavioral change.
    -- A lesson-learned is not "integrated" until shared successfully with others.

  9. #69
    Council Member Spud's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post

    If IO is influence operations, then what is the difference between a PSYOP'er and an IO officer? If IO is holistic PSYOP, what is EW and CNA?

    Riddle me that Batman and you'll set me free from my anguish.

    If you tell me it depends, you'll leave me with a severe headache.
    Well from my experience as a regular embed in the US IO world and on Aussie led actys (we don't have a FA30 equiv ... we just have people like me that wished we did so I'd have a career) ... it depends

    Well not really

    The key difference for me is that in all reality (and I know some of you work current ops) an IO Officer is planner (whether that be in FUOPS or Plans I'll leave that up to you) and a good IO Officer is multi-disciplined in that they can provide that wider planning support. If we're utilising our IO guy in the "now" space we're either not coordinated or reactionary or both.

    An anecdote from my time in Iraq ... seven "IO Planners" on the HQ working on average 3o-odd different planning actys at any one time. Within that seven we had a couple of FA30's, myself, a EW guy, a PSYOPer, a STO weirdo, and a CA guy. It was interesting to see the plans when they came back ... FA30 plans were "full-spectrum" in that they provided direction for all IO task elms. The individual specialists however turned out great plans for their specialty with that other aspects thrown in as an afterthought. It’s the cross-domain planning and coord function that allows a good IO officer to really contribute to the op.

    If we get back to what IO really is ... synchronisation and coordination of non-lethal and, as appropriate, lethal effects it makes a hell of a lot of sense to have a dedicated staff function on the HQ as in someone performs the role of S/J/G/SOJ39... whether it needs to be a dedicated functional area career stream though I'll leave up to you (we're to small for it).

    Australia also has a concept and doctrinal basis over were we are going with this. IO as a function occurs at the operational level and is by its nature a joint process. Above it we do shaping and influencing at the whole of Government level. At the tactical end we carry out information dominance and influence actions and these can individual service actions as required. We utilise Strategic Communications as the "process" (not a group of people) that ties all of this together and empowers our most tactical elms to align with the strategic narrative.

    dguidry1 has got it spot on though and like him I've been fascinated watching where this thread leads (particularly as I'm supposed to be writing a paper justifying "IO" as specialist trade that some officers could stream into if they give up all notion of command)
    Last edited by Spud; 07-01-2008 at 08:46 AM. Reason: added a bit

  10. #70
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    I agree with your proposal to influence operations (INFLUOPS), not to be confused with influenza (but there are several parallels).

    Information Operations (IO) on the other hand should focus on information technology, EW, CNA, defending or electronic databases, etc. For example, jamming radio signals, jamming radar, attacking enemy C4I systems (remotely with hacker attacks and directly with bombs), and defending against the same. The information technology networked battlefield was the origin of IO (if I recall it correctly). IO is heavily slanted towards information technology and INFLUOPs is heavily slanted towards PSYOP, though a number of supporting activities are not PSYOP, and IO can support INFLUOPs.

    If IO is influence operations, then what is the difference between a PSYOP'er and an IO officer? If IO is holistic PSYOP, what is EW and CNA?

    Riddle me that Batman and you'll set me free from my anguish.

    If you tell me it depends, you'll leave me with a severe headache.
    I agree completely with this distinction between IO in Influops. I suspect that the confusion arises because of the inclusion of Psyops under the IO umbrella.

    Psyops may be used as a tool to degrade an oppponent's information exchange capabilities, in which case one may wish to say that it falls under IO. However, I think Pysops' primary goal is to influence one's opponent's (and the non-aligned fence sitters') mindset using non-kinetic means. Consider this comparison. H&I artillery fires may well degrade enemy morale and cause an opponent to be more likely to surrender. Does this justify one in calling H&I a Pysops tool? I do not think so. Similarly, a Psyops message may well cause a C2/information breakdown (particularly if it is a black or gray message). However, that kind of effort would be more along the lines of what I was taught was manipulative deception, a component if EW, not Pysops.

    What worries me is that folks may look at a Pysops asset like Commando Solo as a high powered jammer, hence an EW asset, rather than as a mobile media broadcast system. But, by using that sort of thinking, a Bradley or M113 is also just a fancy tracked cargo delivery vehicle.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
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    Default Thanks!

    Thanks, all, for the considered posts in response to my query. All of this is quite useful and reminds me of a passage from Orwell's 'Homage to Catalonia' I read over the weekend and worth sharing:

    'Wherever the lines were within hailing distance of one another there was always a good deal of shouting from trench to trench. From ourselves: "Fascistas -- maricones!" From the Fascists: "Viva Espana! Viva Franco!" ... On the Government side, in the party militias, the shouting of propaganda to undermine the enemy morale had been developed into a regular technique. In every suitable position men, usually machine-gunners, were told off for shouting duty and provided with megaphones. ... Of course such a proceeding does not fit in with the English conception of war."

  12. #72
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Wink Time for our weekly agree/disagree, wm...

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    I agree completely with this distinction between IO in Influops. I suspect that the confusion arises because of the inclusion of Psyops under the IO umbrella.
    So do I.
    ...H&I artillery fires may well degrade enemy morale and cause an opponent to be more likely to surrender. Does this justify one in calling H&I a Pysops tool?
    I'm firmly convinced that H&I Artillery fire is about as effective as strategic bombing -- which means it's almost a total waste and is often counterproductive. It is rarely beneficial and in a COIN situation is invariably detrimental. We use it because we think our opponents are stupid; they are not.
    But, by using that sort of thinking, a Bradley or M113 is also just a fancy tracked cargo delivery vehicle.
    Yes.

  13. #73
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    IO, PsyOps, EW, Influence Ops? Any others?

    I actually think some of this is less than useful, unless we arrive at a clear understanding of the intended end state.

    I submit, that unless these are breaking the enemies will to fight, or denying him the means to fight, it falls outside the realm of the military. EW, COMINT and SIGINT is a generally cohesive and well understood area of military activity. It's all basically FINDING and FIXING, using the EM spectrum.

    PSYOPS should be about breaking will, by using information products. Generally, history and the operational record suggests we are not good at this, so I suspect we should not be trying to do it. and Weapons do it better.

    Information Operations, should perhaps be confined to communicating with the civilian population, to aid their protection.

    ...and I suspect that this may be too simple an answer but I'd like put it out there, to have the neccessary bricks thrown at it!!
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 07-01-2008 at 01:44 PM. Reason: seemed fun at the time
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  14. #74
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default And the weekly kumbaya response

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    I'm firmly convinced that H&I Artillery fire is about as effective as strategic bombing -- which means it's almost a total waste and is often counterproductive. It is rarely beneficial and in a COIN situation is invariably detrimental. We use it because we think our opponents are stupid; they are not.
    Ken,

    I don't remember ever saying that H&I achieved its stated purpose. For one's oppponents it primarily serves as a training reinforcement and means of culling the herd. If it has a negative impact on morale, I suspect it does so more on the friendly cannnoneers who have to deliver it at odd hours of the night, sort of like the effect on the unlucky soul who had to pull fire guard in BCT/AIT at 0300.
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    I guess my issue is that we shouldn't need a name, a definition, another staff officer, and another publication. We don't have "firepower" operations and write a publication for it and set up a functional area and make space for yet another group of desks on the TOC/JOC floor to handle firepower. We just integrate various forms of firepower, whether it be artillery, mortars, suppressive fire from direct weapons, et cetera. Likewise, I don't understand why we don't just integrate all of the assets that now concern the IO doctrine writers. We already have the assets and experience in using them. Why not continue to do so without creating another staff billet, functional area, and slew of publications?

    Someone gave an example H&I fires and asked, "is this PSYOP?" I don't know if it is PSYOP, but purely kinetic operations can and do have effects that many normally assume to be IO. My favorite example occurred in OIF III when residents actually complained that we were too soft and weak because we took well-aimed shots, rather than firing indiscriminately at insurgents. They were truly angry with us, claiming that the insurgents were humiliating us and showing their strength. The support for their argument was that Kent the insurgent was slinging an entire magazine at us, while Stan the rifleman was only firing back with 3 well-aimed shots. We explained that we were trying to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but this did not resonate with the city-folk.

    Soon thereafter, we adopted a slightly different approach: we returned fire with 40mm, AT-4's, and 25mm, as appropriate. Hellfire strikes became more common, as did the occasional visit from an M-1. The effect was that we killed/captured no more insurgents than we were killing/capturing before, but the PERCEPTION was that we were routing them. Suddenly the city-folk were expressing satisfaction with our work. One man said, "thank you for fighting back." We weren't before? Thereafter, IEDs and direct fire attacks began to plummet and we got significantly more intelligence and cooperation from locals. No IO annex required.

  16. #76
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    I guess my issue is that we shouldn't need a name, a definition, another staff officer, and another publication. We don't have "firepower" operations and write a publication for it and set up a functional area and make space for yet another group of desks on the TOC/JOC floor to handle firepower. We just integrate various forms of firepower, whether it be artillery, mortars, suppressive fire from direct weapons, et cetera. Likewise, I don't understand why we don't just integrate all of the assets that now concern the IO doctrine writers. We already have the assets and experience in using them. Why not continue to do so without creating another staff billet, functional area, and slew of publications?

    Someone gave an example H&I fires and asked, "is this PSYOP?" I don't know if it is PSYOP, but purely kinetic operations can and do have effects that many normally assume to be IO. My favorite example occurred in OIF III when residents actually complained that we were too soft and weak because we took well-aimed shots, rather than firing indiscriminately at insurgents. They were truly angry with us, claiming that the insurgents were humiliating us and showing their strength. The support for their argument was that Kent the insurgent was slinging an entire magazine at us, while Stan the rifleman was only firing back with 3 well-aimed shots. We explained that we were trying to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but this did not resonate with the city-folk.

    Soon thereafter, we adopted a slightly different approach: we returned fire with 40mm, AT-4's, and 25mm, as appropriate. Hellfire strikes became more common, as did the occasional visit from an M-1. The effect was that we killed/captured no more insurgents than we were killing/capturing before, but the PERCEPTION was that we were routing them. Suddenly the city-folk were expressing satisfaction with our work. One man said, "thank you for fighting back." We weren't before? Thereafter, IEDs and direct fire attacks began to plummet and we got significantly more intelligence and cooperation from locals. No IO annex required.
    Utterly Brilliant! Yes. I agree 99.9%!! It is a pity that this common sense is not more common!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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  17. #77
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default A dying ember...

    I thought I had fired my FPF in my last entry, and that I was going to retrograde out of my position and this thread. However, much like Michael Corleone (and the Mafia) this thread keeps sucking me back in.

    Bill... It seems clear that you are want to focus IO on those technical aspects of the discipline. This is perfectly legitiamate since there is much work to be done with regard to EW, CNO/CNA and KM. These specific functions are important to success. I, as a confessed generalist/operational planner/COIN bubba, am apt to focus on the influence side of the house. Which I believe to the depth of my soul belongs to commanders and 3's. You think I'm focused on PSYOP, I say I'm focused on the operational environment. The predominent operational theme for the next 20 years is some form of IW/IA/COIN that will be conducted in and amongst the people. As such, seperating my adversary physically and psychologically (making no assumptions about whom I support, I may be the insurgent proxy next time) from the population is almost always decisive. That is commanders business. I use the caveat only as an homage to Gian, but until we are free from the "evils" of the 24/7 news coverage, a more draconian/british approach is most likely unacceptable.

    Wilf... Amazingly, must be a blue moon, we might agree. It is about winning and breaking wills (well sort of). Breaking the will of the population that allows the adversary the legitimacy to control/rule. I know that isn't what you explicitly stated, but I think we do share the sentiment that we need to bring each element to bear to serve that purpose of our operation. Sometimes its killing and breaking things, sometimes it is buying a coke, most the time its somewhere in between. However, what matters most is what we do as opposed to what we say. That is so long as the two aren't at the opposite ends of the spectrum.

    JP 3-13 and other subsequent doctrine lumped the various IO functions together for a reason, one opinion shared between two 4-stars that I was privy to eavesdrop was that the purpose was to get the institution's arms around these functions and put some rigor behind the development of concepts & capabilities. During that same conversation, they agreed that it might be about time to break the function apart again, that the consolidation had served its purpose. IO, CNO, EW, PSYOP, OPSEC all have their own named Army proponents (for a reason)

    UGH... Feels like I've been on a division staff MDMP inspired caffine jag for four days...

    Not sure where this entry is really leading, other than to opine the following:

    There is a strong record of anecdotal evidence (at all levels in Iraq - Corps to PLT) that when the leader makes the mental transition that the info aspects of the operational space are so interwoven with the other aspects that he can't seperate it as a matter of convenience, that he has to view that same operational space through the lens of more than just his own, and that if he considers those facets prior to conducting a tactical action he can multiply the effect of the tactical action several fold by anticipating the effect of his tactical action, mitigating the possible negative impact by proactivly putting in place plans to counter adversary propoganda, and actually use that analysis to perhaps posture his unit to take advantage/turn that negative propoganda/tactical response to his own advantage. If that is PSYOPS, ok, but I prefer to just call it ops. Its this dynamic that brings some to call IW/IA/COIN the graduate level of war. I don't share that opinion, I think its nothing more than action, counter-action, counter-counter action in a different context. The only big difference is that this type of mental aptitude is a requisite as opposed to a luxury in our more junior leaders.

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  18. #78
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    I guess my issue is that we shouldn't need a name, a definition, another staff officer, and another publication. We don't have "firepower" operations and write a publication for it and set up a functional area and make space for yet another group of desks on the TOC/JOC floor to handle firepower.
    Almost agree, we do have definitions, staff officers, publications, and processes dedicated to synchronizing firepower... Its call the battle staff, MDMP, targeting boards and FM 5-0 etc. Now do we need unique processes for IO... NO! Do we need to make sure that those functionalities are an intimate part of the plans process... YES!
    Hacksaw
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    Default Common sense

    Schmedlap, I wonder if we were in the same locale in 2003, because we had the same complaints from the locals, and we adjusted accordingly. COIN is local, as perceptions vary based on culture, and some cultures (Iraq being one of them) are used to a higher leve of violence. In another location, bringing in the M1 tanks and responding with 40mm would equate to strategic failure. It depends.

    You and I didn't adjust our tactics based off an IO planner, we changed based off of our experiences (learning organizations) and feedback from the locals. We understood the objectives and adjusted our tactics to best achieve those objectives, and some objectives were all about influence. In hind sight I would call that common sense, not IO. A counter argument can be made that common sense isn't that common, so there is the risk that some folks won't get it, but an IO planner at the Bde level will not change the command climate, only commanders will do that. As for influence planners, we have PSYOP planners to help with that.

    If we need IO at all (and we probably do), it is at the operational/strategic level of war, not the tactical. At the tactical level we execute tactical tasks that have strategic effects.

    Information Operations, should perhaps be confined to communicating with the civilian population, to aid their protection.
    Mr Owen, to be clear are you proposing changing the argument from influence to simply informing the target audience? If that is your proposal I disagree.

    I submit, that unless these are breaking the enemies will to fight, or denying him the means to fight, it falls outside the realm of the military.
    I disagree with this arguement, and I think the argument disagree with itself. In a COIN situation the populace is the primary objective, and the side that ultimately controls (influences) the population will probably win. Since the enemy emerges from the populace, one of the key ways to break the enemy's will to fight is to influence the population with activities ranging from coercive to incentives to changing the local narratives. How else do you intend to break the enemy's will to fight?

    There are other ways, but this is 2008, and we're not going to violate international laws, so within the realm of reality, just how would the military break the will of the enemy to fight without influence operations?

    Also, what other organization out there is going to do this if it isn't the military?

  20. #80
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post Ok here goes nothing

    This comes from someone whom should anyone ask has no real credentials from which to speak authoritatively on the subject buuut considering thats never stopped me before here goes

    I would start with a reference back to my original post (Piece of the pie)
    The most notable issue with IO seems to be that it is redundant to everyones jobs in a command staff and has the audacity to presume a sort of hierarchial superiority to each of them. First from those I have met and spoken to this is not the case but rather the IO officer will tend to (as I believe has been mentioned here) look to each of the areas specialist for indications of how any particular actions, inactions, protocols, circumstances, the operational environment. The Environment or Information Operations being in reality the focus on everything to do with whats happening, has happened, or looks to happen in the Operational environment.

    I think we've seen this role before but noone really took offense at it because its known as that of the commander. Difference being that in todays rapidly changing, and information dense environments it is more often than not more than any one commander could study sufficiently to maintain awareness at a level of comfort for rapid decision making.

    So what am I saying, something along the lines of this,

    Staff lets all welcome the new commanders executive assistant(not XO).
    HE/She will be part of a consistent collaborative effort between the various specialties in order to maintain a broader picture of daily, weekly and monthly operational environment conditions to include statistical and trends analysis in order to provide the commander with a better overall situational awareness and ability to coordinate actions of all elements of the force.

    _______

    Final conclusion
    Each and every aspect of the operational environment is represented to a command by the information which it accesses, Just like air is to breathing information is to environment

    Think matrix, the picture is made up of information throughout all aspect of human interaction and thus someone must constantly put the pieces together in order to maintain the picture. Intel does this but only within what it knows, same goes for everyone elses pieces. Show me one of these areas where all these aspects are constantly being monitored and pieced together and put forth.

    BTW yes I realize the entire staff together does this but because of the engorged size of said staffs and the bueracratic nonsense the CO doesn't always get the picture they need. One or two integrators, Sythesizers cando wonders for making a group more effective and more importantly clear for the one person ultimately responsible for the final answer.

    I now await the storm to come
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