Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Bill Moore]

Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought.

posted by Reed

Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.

Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.

[reed11b]

posted by Reed

Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.

Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.

Bill, I disagree. Even in '03, the violence that the insurgents caused was unwelcome by populace in Iraq, but they were more afraid of them then us. This has only escalated. Yes, it had some influence, but an immediate and full fledged effort to rebuild the infastructure would not have defeated the insurgency. We should have realized the importance of elictricity and worked to get it back on-line because it was the right thing to do, not because it would have defeated the insurgency. Your intelectual friends sound like they were rationalizing to me.
Reed

[Bill Moore]

Bill, I disagree. Even in '03, the violence that the insurgents caused was unwelcome by populace in Iraq, but they were more afraid of them then us. This has only escalated. Yes, it had some influence, but an immediate and full fledged effort to rebuild the infastructure would not have defeated the insurgency. We should have realized the importance of elictricity and worked to get it back on-line because it was the right thing to do, not because it would have defeated the insurgency. Your intelectual friends sound like they were rationalizing to me.
Reed

Last post, then I'm going to bed. We may be in violent agreement if you consider what I meant. First, my intellectual friends were presenting the history they witnessed in the narrative that the Iraqi people understood it. Much of what they shared has been backed up by various studies I read, and unfortunately AQ used the sanctions and the suffering it caused has a rallying call with its propaganda also long before the war started. Sanctions in any situation rarely hurt the leader we're intending to undermine, rather they tend to strengthen his position because he now has control of the few resources available to distribute, and of course Saddam was a master of rewarding those loyal to him and crushing those he saw as threats.

I have argued previously you can't fix electric power infrastructure until you have established security, which in this case would have meant suppressing or defeating the insurgents so we could fix it, and show the benefits of the U.S. and transition government winning. Some folks were going to fight us anyway, no dobut about it. However, others who were sitting on the fence may not have if we improved their standard of living.

I agree with you that in 2003 the infrastructure expectations didn't contribute much to fueling the insurgency, because there was a long window of uncertainity before the flames of rebellion were fanned by a number of issues, but I think the lack of electric power and other issues was one of the many insurgent propaganda themes that contributed to recruitment and overall subversion efforts circa 2005.

It definitely was not the only factor, nor the most important factor, but I do think it was a contributing factor. Expectation management is important if you are believer in population centric engagement. We failed to manage expectations in this case. Think about for a while, if you still disagree let me know. I receptive to new ideas, as long as you don't incorporate EBO into them