MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[Jason Port]

The issue in my tactical brain is that we have again brought in "help" from on high, when in fact, we have enough brain power on the ground to conduct the "analysis" that the paper talks about. In the case before us, we have analysts who will visit the tactical level to do collection - interviews of the ground forces. However, in a country the size of texas, we have a large number of troops all of whom have key data to the solution. Asking these analysts to fly around Afghanistan and interview these folks will only place a dent in the collection problem while increasing the helicopter mission requirements, likely taking them away from supporting tactical forces.

This issue is further compounded by the fact that all data in Afghanistan is contextual (like elsewhere, but maginified by the very specific and intensive tribal differences.) Sending an analyst to cover Helmand province one week and another the next may result in very skewed reporting. Like sending the Dallas reporter to cover the Philadelphia Eagles training camp and expecting unbiased reports.

In addition, this will not solve the larger investigative questions like project data and other information that requires longer term collection efforts. I think the paper talks about how many telephone poles are in a given area - shows infratstructure improvement - but there is no way a visiting analyst will capture that. In turn, we would need to get boots out on the ground to conduct these surveys.

Therefore, we need to get a real solution in place - one which allows us to capture information (whatever available information there is) right from the source - the warfighter. Feed these troops managed, real, and beneficial IRs from the commander, prioritized based on timeliness of the needs (rather than the 100 most important questions of the day). This information needs to be managed and stored and shared to these analysts as well as back down to the lowest echelons.

And after 4 years of screaming this message, we are still trying to force help from above (and after 4 years, I know the warfighter wants less help and just better requirements to respond to. . . )

[IntelTrooper]

The issue in my tactical brain is that we have again brought in "help" from on high, when in fact, we have enough brain power on the ground to conduct the "analysis" that the paper talks about.

I think the problem is and has been that far too many tasks demand the attention of the troops, and without an infrastructure and reporting system, not to mention people to maintain the records, that vital information has repeatedly been collected, reported, and lost.

In multiple meetings with government officials, village elders, etc., I was chastized as I ran down my list of questions -- "Every time a new one of you shows up, you ask us these same questions. Why don't you record this information somewhere, or why don't the people before you tell you about this?" It was incredibly embarassing to get schooled by rural Afghans, who have little understanding of the complexities of our ridiculous bureaucracy, and still understood that we were lacking this minor capacity.

Asking these analysts to fly around Afghanistan and interview these folks will only place a dent in the collection problem while increasing the helicopter mission requirements, likely taking them away from supporting tactical forces.

I think the helicopter thing was a selling point for higher-ups, not neccessarily a realistic scenario. What I took away that instead of being static as part of the battalion or brigade headquarters, that these analysts could spend time in their assigned area of expertise. I hope that's the case.

Sending an analyst to cover Helmand province one week and another the next may result in very skewed reporting. Like sending the Dallas reporter to cover the Philadelphia Eagles training camp and expecting unbiased reports.

My understanding was that analysts would be tasked geographically, so someone working on Helmand would only work on Helmand.

In addition, this will not solve the larger investigative questions like project data and other information that requires longer term collection efforts. I think the paper talks about how many telephone poles are in a given area - shows infratstructure improvement - but there is no way a visiting analyst will capture that. In turn, we would need to get boots out on the ground to conduct these surveys.

I agree that using these analysts as collectors is not a good solution and that the troops need to be collecting the information. Again, I'm hoping that the real difference here will be having someone assigned and responsible to track and maintain these types of records for an extended period, rather than just getting assignments to collect information on a whim of the PRT S-2 or battalion S-3, which they eventually forget and all the collected information disappears into the ether.

[Hacksaw]

I couldn't agree more that at the tactical level... it is more about arming a patrol with the right/managable IRs/questions than it is getting some data dump from on high... and to be honest from on valley to the next the questions may very well differ...

However, because of that nature... how do you/can you aggregate those data points into a coherent larger picture? and does it even make sense to do so??? Of course that begs the question and obsession with metrics of success because that is how "policy/strategy" has been quantified... ugh its enough to make the head hurt...

However I will say this... even though a series of local optimized solutions doesn't always add up to a perfect "big picture" outcome, its not a bad start... and all those PLT-sized local solutions are within the means of a company commander to integrate, and CO-sized for a BN to integrate, yada yada yada...

Am I wrong, but I've been under the impression that much of the junior officer and mid to junior grade NCO ranks have largely added this ability to their personal kit bag? I have far more faith in the ability of CO-level leaders and operations to get their piece of Aghanistan straight, than I do some top down effort... I'd think we (the Coalition) could live with that outcome...

now that i've spun myself into the ground I will end

"Inconceivable"
"I do not think that means what you think that means"

[Steve the Planner]

First, as many have noted, and I found in Iraq, most of the information, or the brain power and boots, was already there for big pieces of immediate solutions---they just needed to be drawn out and consolidated.

Second, drilling down for fine details in any region is at least a six month focused effort at teaching people and establishing links for what you are looking for---then it starts to feed together.

In MND-North, it took about three months, as a side project by DivEng/Terrain/CA to assemble a complete map and assessment of most individual infrastructure sectors. Then, you could understand the context of activities.

But some immediate sectors and problems--roads and bridges, electrical, etc..---where already there--just needed to be brought together, assessed on a coordinated basis---and used.

Putting the stuff together from on high would just be more of the same GIGO. It needs to be consolidated through networks of contacts up and down before people believe in it, use it, and feed it to make it work even better.

It is an information system, and a dynamic one. Just tracking populations, is a real-time thing which has to be coordinated with UN refugee trackers, and real-time field work. Using Now Zad as an example, the population has ranged from 30,000 to zero to maybe 3,000 in a year. If you are going to plan mil or civ activities, you need some clue of now, not then.

What was beautiful about the Sadaam Era systems, like those of any good totalitarian dictatorship or our techno-data, by knowing what was, what is, and what is changing, you can start to identify trends and patterns, chart trading systems (instead of stumbling across seven tractor trailer loads of pot), and finding where the key points are for whatever kind of targeting.

It's a process that has to link to the field, be dynamic, grow organically, and become useful and trusted. Otherwise, it is just another contract or a program.

In civilian planning and public adminstration, we use real-time, field tested stuff. The US needs at least some proxy of rough but actionable systemic data to see bigger pictures. None yet.

Steve

[Woland]

I've not got time now to properly look at which of Gen Flynn's conclusions could be applied to the British, but a quick browse suggests 'lots.' It is so fundamentally important that this kind of introspection is taking place. Perhaps I'm pessimistic, but it's difficult to see the British military carrying out such rigorous and critical self review so publicly, irrespective of how much it might be needed.

[Steve the Planner]

Woland:

No offense, but while I was in Baghdad (both for US and UN), I was hard-wired to US Terrain, NGA, etc...

But the one guy that guy that was always on my heels about maps, pop studies, etc... was the top British pol-mil---on duty, off-duty, we were always joined at the hip.

Brits understand maps. Whether they could use what they knew to shape or improve the US effort is an entirely different matter. What is emerging from the British Iraq hearings is what I expected---they had a hard time engaging the US on a meaningful level.

Steve

[davidbfpo]

Well I enjoyed reading the CNAS report, forthright in places, without attributing blame or responsibility - perhaps another version within DoD calls for an explanation? I noted that the youngest officer is an ex-journalist, that aside I could not understand why it had been published by CNAS.

The "solutions" suggested were not convincing. Yes, they may provide lots of required and supplied information from collectors. Will this be manageable and converted into providing context and insight? I am not convinced from my faraway "armchair". 'Reach back' can work, a weakness will be that do these analysts really know the context?

My experience is that setting requirements for intelligence is rarely done, so the "experts" do what they consider is appropriate - hence the all too frequent criticism that intelligence is a "black hole". Providing a simple, robust search engine for basic information retrieval is vital: names, photos, phones, addresses and vehicles.

[Entropy]

Ok, I've read the piece now and there is some good and bad. I can't comment extensively at present so, for now, some bullet points:


1. The Good: I liked the focus on Commander responsibility and the fact that Commanders set intelligence requirements. The bad: If Commanders are responsible for intelligence and if they are not, as the authors seem to indicate, providing proper guidance to support COIN, then why all the negative waves at the intel community? One example of many: "The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign." The intelligence community fell into that trap? Who is the tail and who is the dog here?

2. The Good: The report does a good job identifying many of the systemic problems. The Bad: Most solutions offered are unnecessary reinventions of the wheel. Example: Bandwidth should not be an issue for transmitting narrative reports from the field - you can't tell me we don't have the bandwidth to transmit a few pages of text daily.

Even if there is no bandwidth available, there are more efficient ways to get info from the field than sending people out to collect it by hand. We used to do this before we had all these fancy intel IP-based networks. You pop a disc into the theater mail system, or you mail actual paper containing written or typed reports! We can get stairmasters out to BFE Nuristan but we can't get a disc or some paper to HHQ without sending someone out to collect it? I don't buy it.

Additionally, we don't need a massive proprietary database to store information - all we need is info posted in web format and accessible by a search tool like google (and regardless, the best tools are made by enterprising junior folks in-house). All one needs to do is provide every unit a web-space where they can upload their text reports and any images (with metadata!) - search engine spiders will take care of the rest.

Alternatively, we already have wiki's that are ready to use but remain are largely unused and maintained by a few evangelists - mostly on their own time. To turn them into information clearing houses, all that's required is one order to institutionalize them along with a small staff of editors & researchers to maintain it.

3. The Good: "Information centers" focused on "white" information. The bad: The paper says these need too be staffed by civilians. How is ISAF/USFOR-A going to get national agencies to cough up the bodies and buy-in to this idea? Does the military really need outside analysts, over which it will have no operational control, to analyze and disseminate information derived from military units on the ground?

The biggest take-a-away issue I get from this paper is the lack of information sharing. This IS a real problem and information at the lowest levels is not shared or retained. Inteltrooper - your anecdote about meetings with locals and asking the same questions is no surprise to me and is an illustrative example of this. It just seems to me that is an easy fix - hold Commander's accountable for sharing information up the chain to senior Commanders and HHQ and provide a proven, existing and easy way to help them do so. Structural solutions that require buy-in from agencies outside the military are unnecessary and ill-advised. This is one area where KISS can go a long way.

[BayonetBrant]

PIRs are supposed to be tied to decision points: "I need to know this so I can decide A or B". How many of the PIRs out there actually do that, or are just "things to wake up the commander for" like the death of a soldier?
(Note: I'm not trying to minimize the death of any of our soldiers, just pointing out that it's likely not a PIR that's tied to a decision point within the context of an operation)


Additionally, the understanding of the environment and area in which people operate won't happen when we rotate units every 6-9 months, and rotate them back to different areas within the country, or different countries altogether. No one wants to advocate for longer tours, but that's probably what's actually needed for Joe-on-the-ground to really get a good understanding of his environment.


Finally, many of the digital toys that would support this level of information collection, management, sharing, and visualization already exist, but are held up in some form of contracting, development, certification, documentation, or outright miscommunication process within the current commands trying to get involved in the fight. Not everything can (or should) get dumped into CIDNE and there's a lot of information that could be disseminated that's not because of bureaucratic hold-ups.


Sigh. I'm depressed now.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy's comments:

Agree. Bandwidth ain't the issue. Even in Iraq, we were flying maps and DVDs around in helos. But basic stuff like large-format scanners were a huge whole, especially when we were trying to quickly borrow, scan and return sensitive stuff from the civilian side (yes, they have sensitive stuff too).

As a "blue badger" (DoS), I can assure you that that blue badge allowed me to cross many more boundaries than a DoD or mil badge could. Military folks felt comfortable passing on stuff that they couldn't float upward very easily, and civilians, including Iraqis in sensitive positions, and with important data, would not engage with.

As many people know, CIDNE has a great many holes (including Legacy data), and, as BayonetBrant pointed out, RIPTOAs are killers of data, when the computers are shipped away with all that good stuff on them.

What is needed is not a map, or a data source, but a data system--- a process to collect, update, and use current and valuable stuff. That's not going to come from an outside contractor, or just be tied to a rotational element or command.

It is something else. But the framework and templates already exist---they just need to be focused on this purpose. Example: NGA Country Teams go back and forth all the time on six month rotations---same folks, same work, same continuous links to the same mapping data. Some of thjem can get as much if not more work (of certain types) done in Bethesda than at Baghram, but they need a continuous feeder system back to Afghanistan to make it work.

NGA is one of those many agencies with the capability to tackle some pieces, but not all. It's something else.

Steve

[BayonetBrant]

What is needed is not a map, or a data source, but a data system--- a process to collect, update, and use current and valuable stuff. That's not going to come from an outside contractor, or just be tied to a rotational element or command.

....

NGA is one of those many agencies with the capability to tackle some pieces, but not all. It's something else.

http://defense-update.com/features/2...ht_141009.html
http://mapht.org/