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Old 05-23-2010   #1
Bob's World
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Default Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Sun Tzu


Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?

With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.

But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??

In other words, is the conventional wisdom attempting to back its way into stability by importing the products of good governance rather than going in the front door by targeting the perceptions of good governance among the disaffected populace?

I have produced COG-based engagement tools in the past, and shared them with the SWJ community on other threads. My recent work the Jones Insurgency Model caused me to go back and readdress that work. In the past I came to the position that there are two COGs; "The Populace" for COIN; and "The Network" for CT. Once I completed my work on my Insurgency Model I realized that I needed to reassesses my COG for COIN. Many had challenged the rather broad category of "The Populace" previously, but I had nothing better to offer to describe what I was getting at, and frankly, neither did any of these challengers. I wasn't fully satisfied, but I couldn't "get no satisfaction" either.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...urgency-model/

So this morning I dusted off my old COG targeting model and reframed it in the context of the Jones Insurgency Model. I offer that product here for your collective consideration and comment. In the example below let us assume that a variety of HN, interagency, military, and NGO teams are all working independently to conduct COIN in a specific community. For currency sake, let us say that community is the Arghandab valley on the northern outskirts of Kandahar City. Each of the teams has its own mission, chain of command, authorities, funding, priorities, etc. In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything. In this (hypothetical) case, they all have read about the Jones Insurgency Model, and decide to conduct an assessment of the perceptions of Poor Governance among the populace of the Arghandab. Upon completion of that assessment they determine that the number one concern of the populace that was also a causal factor of insurgency under the Jones Model was the lack of Justice. (Thus elevating "Justice" from being a CR to also being a CV in this community). Continuing to drill down on this CV they derive a series of HVTs and HVIs and a scheme to work within their respective lanes to mutually produce this critical line of operation aimed directly at the heart of the center of gravity, and to make it each of their number one priority project.

Armed with this new focus each is able to tailor their overall schemes of engagement by minimizing or cancelling ineffective engagement that they had been working on (with the greatest of intentions) previously; and also many discovered that they had more in common with each other than they had thought prior to this new effort.

Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.


(Note, I do not employ the COG process as described in the Joint Pub, as I find it illogical and as likely to produce arguments and confusion on a staff as it is to produce focus and synergy. CvC didn't prescribe any particular rules, so I feel free to think about this concept in a manner that makes sense to me.)
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"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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Old 05-23-2010   #2
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Here's some quick editing recommendations for your argument.

Quote:
With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.
Another analogy is Ayn Rand's character Dagny Taggart in Atlas Shrugged. She saw her world and society collapsing around her, and she felt that she could change it through her own sheer will and determination. She was over-confident in her own abilities and over-optimistic in the potential of others and the state of human nature.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??
Change output to outcome. You're speaking in technical systems terms. Outputs in a governance system would be in terms of the stable, insurgency-free metrics (low levels of violence, free/fair elections, mutual respect towards differing cultures/religions, women's rights, etc...). The outcome is good governance.

For the slide, the picture is confusing. It looks like a systems slide, but the items on the left are critical requirements not inputs.

Mike

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Old 05-23-2010   #3
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Mike,

You're missing my point, so I'll try to be clearer.

Perhaps from the bottom up:

The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.

So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.

So, yes, it is a "systems" slide in that it takes a fuzzy concept like COG and frames it in a predictive, logical format that allows COG to more than just a slide in the Command Brief that drives nothing; or a topic for strategy geeks to debate at the club.

If you are confused by the slide start at one end and work your way to the other. It is a simple reduction/refining process.

I contend that currently we focus on those things that exist in a state that has no insurgency, and believe that if we produce those things in a state that has insurgency, the insurgency will go away. I offer that that logic is flawed and is not likely to work. It is based on observation of the symptoms of insurgency rather than being based on the root causes of insurgency.
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"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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Old 05-23-2010   #4
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Hi Sir,

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Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

What I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.
Thanks for the clarification. Can the above be considered your BLUF?

Quote:
I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.
Here's one example, as I see it, of our attempt to bring in the final products without first building the factory.

Marjah- Marines clear Taliban gov't and assume control; however, there is no ready-made alternative government structure to fill the political, security, and economic vacuum. Without an existing security force to police, a judicial system to resolve disputes, and an economic system to encourage growth, the local populace perceives bad governance.

OTOH,

Quote:
So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.
This reminds me more of the Phillipines or Colombian model. The task organization would be 80/20 state to mil. Instead of clearing and holding areas, advisors would work to assist and encourage the existing gov't towards better governance.

Am I tracking?
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Old 05-23-2010   #5
William F. Owen
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Default The COG

Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
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Old 05-23-2010   #6
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Default Ahh, but Carl wrote of war, I write of Insurgency

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
In war each opponent has a COG; he must defend his own and seek to destroy the other's.

In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.

Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.

Those who believe COIN to be extremely difficult and likely to be a long drawnout affair believe so because they fight it like a war; or because they think they can develop their way out of it. One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance. Or, one can produce Good Governance and make the insurgency go away. I'd love to have this conversation with CvC. While most of his deciples will fight me to the mat, like Peter slicing the Roman soldiers ear from his head with his sword to protect his master; I think CvC would immediatlely grasp the nuance I put before him.
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"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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Old 05-23-2010   #7
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Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.
Then it's not a COG! It's something completely different. You need to call it something else, and not muddy the existing proven and good theory by using the same term in an imprecise and confusing way.
Quote:
Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.
I strongly disagree. Insurgencies use violence for a a political purpose, therefore War, thus is conducted using warfare - as were many countless rebellions and revolts throughout history.
Quote:
One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance.
Yes anyone can do stupid stuff, by ignoring the fundamentals of warfare. Your job, as a soldier is to break the military means used to oppose the policy. The policy is none of your business unless you are an Army not accountable to it's civilian leaders.

This is nothing to do with suppressing symptoms. Ends Ways and Means!! Your sole job is to prevent the "enemy" attaining his policy via violence. If he does it using song, art or ballet, good for him. Your job is to ensure he does not use violence and opts for peaceful means.
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- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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Old 05-23-2010   #8
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Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".

I do especially object to
Quote:
The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", (...)

Let me quote myself:

Quote:
Ever since I've been irritated by the use of the term "center of gravity" (Schwerpunkt) in (American) English military theory writings. It's being used with the meaning of "critical vulnerability" instead of as "great accumulation of power for the best chance to win an important battle".

It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it. Most importantly, don't link your concept to a respected theorist because that's an illegitimate move that exploits that author's crediility.

Again and again I discussed these points with little effect. The new meaning of the term was long since established in English-language literature and people stubbornly kept linking it to von Clausewitz.


Well, it turned out to be a double surprise because my position was long since official doctrine - in the U.S.! The USMC acknowledged this in its FMFM-1 "Warfighting" field manual (1989):

"(...) Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climatic test of strength against strength "by daring all to will all" (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability."

in a footnote that was in reference to

"Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable, the better."
The American CoG concept seeks an easy lever for victory, while CvC's "Schwerpunkt" was primarily about how to arrange the own forces without wasting potential.
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Old 05-23-2010   #9
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Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
If he does it using song, art or ballet, good for him. Your job is to ensure he does not use violence and opts for peaceful means.
So subversion,espionage,sabotage,blackmail are OK and are not Acts of War?
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Old 05-23-2010   #10
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Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".
OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?
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- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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Old 05-23-2010   #11
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So subversion,espionage,sabotage,blackmail are OK and are not Acts of War?
Not OK and depends on the context. By act of war, do you mean "warfare?" None of those things are warfare in and of themselves.
None of the things you cite, are in of themselves military task to counter.
They may well be criminal. Do they involve killing? All those things are far more likely to fall towards police/state security, than the army.

An Army can only be used against armed force.
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- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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Old 05-23-2010   #12
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Default Meanwhile, as Fuchs and Wilf exchange CvC volleys at 10 paces...

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
Am I missing something?
In a word? Yes.


First, COG as applied to warfare: While I largely consider the Wilf vs. Fuchs debate in the category of "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin," it really does not apply to the positions I am forwarding here. In warfare though, I would suggest that accurately understanding the enemy's COG is critical in knowing what must be defeated; but is probably not something that one wants to attack. Best to pit one's strength against their opponents weakness; thus why it is a very helpful construct to understand what are the requriements that are critical to the functioning of the COG; and then of those, which are also vulnerable to defeat. Attack the CVs; not the COG.

But for Insurgency all of that is rather moot. I do not want to defeat the COG, I want to outcompete the insurgent in the race to be perceived by the populace as the producer of the COG. He who provides Good Governance wins.

Now, if I am simply focused on counter insurgent operations, to go out and counter violence with violence and to wage a physical dual with the insurgent, using the warfare approach to COG could be helpful in winning that battle. Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.

But I don't write any of this to convince Wilf to change his "war is war" approach, nor to disabuse Fuchs of his notions that only Germans can understand CvC; I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.
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"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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Old 05-23-2010   #13
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Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.
....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?

Quote:
Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.
Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.
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- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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Old 05-23-2010   #14
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OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?
"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.

The Schwerpunkt is mostly about concentrating your power (and leave only token, "economy of force" units elsewhere) in order to have the maximum probability of success in battle. Only militarily weak powers can have a different Schwerpunkt (and this is then a political/strategic concept, nto a military one anymore), such as a capital or something related to allies (more about that later).
"source of strength" and "from which the enemy draws his strength ..." push a reader into a wrong direction.

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.
A Heer that moved in separate corps and unites for a battle like Sedan or Königgratz forms a Schwerpunkt in order to be strong enough for a monumental battle.
A Heer than focuses almost all its armor divisions at the decisive location of the Camaping and adds maximum CAS once the surprise is lost - such a Heer forms a Schwerpunkt in order to succeed with its most critical task of a campaign.



CvC IV/11
"Die Hauptschlacht ist daher als der konzentrierte Krieg, als der Schwerpunkt des ganzen Krieges oder Feldzuges anzusehen."

my translation:
"The main battle is therefore to be seen as the concentrated war, as the Schwerpunkt of the whole war of campaign."

CvC IV/11
"Darum ist eine beabsichtigte Hauptschlacht nach ihren Verhältnissen mehr oder weniger, in gewissen Graden aber immer als der vorläufige Mittel- und Schwerpunkt des ganzen Systems zu betrachten."

My translation:
"Therefore is an intentional main battle by its conditions more or less, in a certain degree always to be considered as the preliminary central point or Schwerpunkt of the whole system."

CvC VI/25:
"Der Wirkungskreis eines Sieges wird natürlich abhängen von der Größe des Sieges und diese von der Masse der besiegten Truppen. Also gegen den Teil, wo die meisten feindlichen Streitkräfte beisammen sind, wird derjenige Stoß geschehen können, dessen glückliche Wirkungen am weitesten reichen; und wir werden dieses Erfolges am meisten gewiß sein, je größer die Masse der eigenen Streitkräfte ist, die wir zu diesem Stoß verwenden. (...)

So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da findet, wo die meiste Masse beisammen ist, und wie jeder Stoß gegen den Schwerpunkt der Last am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der stärkste Stoß mit dem Schwerpunkt der Kraft erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. "

This is the most important part, so I'll translate it despite the length. The grammar is terrible because his grammar was complicated and I'll stick close to the original.

"The range or the effect of a victory will naturally depend on the size of the victory and this one on the quantity of defeated troops. Therefore against that part where the most enemy forces are united will be the thrust possible whose advantageous effects will have the greatest consequences (or: longest range); and we will be most sure about this success, the greater the mass of the own forces, that we employ for this thrust. (...)

Just as the Schwerpunkt (physics' center of gravity) is to be found where the most mass is close to each other, and just as every thrust against the Schwerpunkt of a load the most effective, and as furthermore the strongest thrust with the Schwerpunkt of a force is being maintained, so is it as well in war."

CVC VII/4 (a book that was especially unfinished)
"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl XII., Friedrich der Große hatten ihren Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wäre dies zertrümmert worden, so würden sie ihre Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten, die durch innere Parteiungen zerrissen sind, liegt er meistens in der Hauptstadt; bei kleinen Staaten, die sich an mächtige stützen, liegt er im Heer dieser Bundesgenossen; bei Bündnissen liegt er in der Einheit des Interesses; bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptführer und in der öffentlichen Meinung."

"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl VII, Frederick the great had their Schwerpunkt in their army, would this have been shattered, so they would have played their role poorly; with states that are disunited by internal partisanship, lies it most often in the capital; with small states that rest on powerful ones, does it lie in the army of their ally; in alliances does it lie in the unity of interests, in (improvised militias) in the person of the main leader and in the public opinion."

The extension of the Schwerpunkt idea into the realm of policy seems to have been a later idea than the original thought about campaigning (operational art). He also struggled a bit with wars against multiple enemies that had not one big army, bur several ones.
It's probably the root for the re-interpretation in American literature.

Ironically, his understanding of Newtonian physics was very crappy.
And yes, his original writing is this complicated and chaotic.
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Old 05-23-2010   #15
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Col. Jones,

I will need to mull this over for a while (I'm a slow thinker), but here are some initial impressions:

As a generic model, it makes sense. However, the example used to demonstrate the model is problematic and rests on a few questionable assumptions, so "operationalizing" the model is where I see problems:

The biggest flaw begins with this: "In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything." That condition is the completely normal result of independent bureaucracies with independent resources and independent agendas. Your example first assumes they are all working on "COIN" and further assumes they can be brought together in the context of that COIN work towards a common objective. Then there is the assumption that this can be accomplished simply by "showing them the light" on what the principle concern in the area is.

That is wishful thinking IMO. First of all, it's not obvious that they are actually working toward "COIN" despite what they main believe/claim. Secondly, independent organizations cannot be made to reliably work together without some kind of unified command with the authority to force competing bureaucracies and interests to play nice. Third, independent organizations are not going to work together based on a survey, no matter how comprehensive and rigorous. In short, you can't assume that those organizations will see things your way and rearrange their priorities toward the goal you've identified as central in priority.


Quote:
Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.
To summarize my argument, how are you going to keep those bosses from putting the plan in the circular file?

I like the model, but, like any model, one must consider if can be reasonably implemented in a given set of circumstances.
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Old 05-23-2010   #16
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Smile I'll be a little more charitable

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?


Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.

Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.

Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.

Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid. Though I suspect that the Colin Powell leadership principle of "Never get so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego falls with it." is applicable here.

Point two is that most counterinsurgencies have unfolded this way. I don't believe those officers were stupid for thinking of insurgency as warfare, that is what they were trained to think and do. I just don't think it was the fast track to success, and most COIN "victories" won in such fashion of re-emerged over and over and over and over.. as the underlying causation was never addressed.
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"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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Old 05-23-2010   #17
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Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.
So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?
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The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.
Concur. I subscribe to the CvC view, because it is clear and I understand it.
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Old 05-23-2010   #18
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Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.
Same was true in Northern Ireland, and the American Southern states. The point was the degree of violence falls below the threshold of War because it does not use military means and is not countered using military force. - see Pablo Escobar, once he moved into politics!
Quote:
Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.
I submit that if they use military means, then it is useful and necessary to term it warfare. Look at Southern Thailand. Once the violence is escalated beyond the capacities of the Police, you have warfare.
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Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid.
Well at least we are clear what we are disagreeing about!
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- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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Old 05-23-2010   #19
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Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?
BW, I just watched a movie on HBO awhile back called "The Objective" It is about a CIA operative backed by an SF A-team who has to gain critical information about a secret WMD inside A'stan. The CIA guy goes to a local "holy man" for advice and this is what he said.
"America cannot free Afghanistan only Allah can free Afghanistan".:eek: The WMD turns out to a Spiritual WMD aka Bad Ass Ghost with extreme powers. I hope that is not the future!


Your recent posts has a lot to think about so I will answer in sections, since I have to cut the Grass here

CR's are inputs-Good Governance is a PROCESS not an output or an out come IMO. The system in focus is a "Territorial Stabilization System". Good Governance is the process used to achieve that. A'tan is a territory not a country or state IMO.... like Steve Blair's Arizona Territory.

Drop the COG stuff, just call it a critical process.
How to operationalize it example.
I-P-O- model


Input-------------Good Governance PROCESS ----------Output

__________________________________________________ __________


People...............voter registration/election .................Elected Official
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Old 05-23-2010   #20
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Default Gotta agree with Slap

Your COG usage muddies your water. Wilf and Fuchs challenge to it will be repeated by many others...
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