How Insurgencies End

[Dayuhan]

To throw another monkey wrench into the gears, I don't think Insurgency should be classified as "war" at all.

Again, I think one of the problems with these discussions is that we, like the Rand monograph, lack a consensus definition of insurgency. It's all very well to take the the "I know it when I see it" approach, but it makes discussion difficult, because while we all know it when we see it, we may be seeing it in different places.

I think we gain clearer insights as how to approach insurgency and the relative roles of the Host nation government, its military and that of any outside governments and their militaries that intervene to assist by looking at insurgency not as war, but as a civil emergency. Not to apply the rules of war, but to apply the rules of military support to civil authorities. Not to supplant the civil leadership, but to supplement the same, holding them to task.

Agreed, but I'd point out that these formulations have little or no applicability to our current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, because in neither of these cases did we "intervene to assist".

He saw this as a spectrum along a scale of violence. The causal factors being the same, but what begins as "subversion" at some point becomes "insurgency", not because the events somehow changed in nature, but merely becuase it had become more violent. So, Kitson would call non-violent insurgency "subversion." Same event, just different stages. Sometimes the subversives win without having to employ violence, as with Ghandi or King. Or sometimes an insurgency is suppressed back down into a subversive phase for a number of years before it goes "insurgent" again, as in Mindanao. You solve it when you address the root causes, and level of violence is only one of many metrics to measure success with, and certainly not the decisive measure.

I'm not sure that the level of violence is the only distinguishing factor. Certainly we could imagine a continuum moving from dissidence to subversion to insurgency. But where, then, would we place someone like Timothy McVeigh? Based purely on the level of violence, we'd call it insurgency, but I'm not convinced that's appropriate. I'd think that a certain level of organization and scope is necessary to distinguish an insurgency from the work of a small number of very angry dissidents.

In similar vein, we often assume that dissidents embrace violence because no peaceful avenue for change is available to them. In some cases that's true, in some it's not. Sometimes people embrace violence because they are unable to generate enough popular support to make use of conventional vehicles for change... again, such as McVeigh, or the Baader-Meinhof, or other violent but extremely restricted fringe groups. Certainly this is violent dissidence, but can it be called "insurgency"?

Possibly a load of unnecessary semantic detail, but given the extent to which insurgency is discussed here it might be useful to define the term.

[MikeF]

Again, I think one of the problems with these discussions is that we, like the Rand monograph, lack a consensus definition of insurgency. It's all very well to take the the "I know it when I see it" approach, but it makes discussion difficult, because while we all know it when we see it, we may be seeing it in different places.

Agree.

Agreed, but I'd point out that these formulations have little or no applicability to our current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, because in neither of these cases did we "intervene to assist".

Partially agree. We intevened to force arbitration on non-cooperative actors in the hopes that we could force a better solution (governance).

I'm not sure that the level of violence is the only distinguishing factor. Certainly we could imagine a continuum moving from dissidence to subversion to insurgency. But where, then, would we place someone like Timothy McVeigh? Based purely on the level of violence, we'd call it insurgency, but I'm not convinced that's appropriate. I'd think that a certain level of organization and scope is necessary to distinguish an insurgency from the work of a small number of very angry dissidents.

I was going to make a similar reply. The problem with BW's tomato analogy is that oftentimes, the root causes or ideas or grievances behind the rebellion or secession is deeply ingrained in the community. For example, if we look at other areas in the Phillipines where the communist continue to mobilize, the root causes seem to be land reform and reparations issues that pre-date back before the christians and the United States were ever introduced. How do you resolve that? But BW has a point, every 20 years the insurgency vanishes, the gov't chalks up a win in the COIN category, and then they rise again in perpetual cycle.

[Dayuhan]

We intevened to force arbitration on non-cooperative actors in the hopes that we could force a better solution (governance).

I thought we intervened to throw out governments we didn't like.

I was going to make a similar reply. The problem with BW's tomato analogy is that oftentimes, the root causes or ideas or grievances behind the rebellion or secession is deeply ingrained in the community.

That's true, and it's also true that different sectors of a populace may have irreconcilably different demands. Still, it makes sense to start looking at an insurgency by asking why the insurgents are fighting and whether there's a possibility that those issues could be addressed without having to fight a war over them.

if we look at other areas in the Phillipines where the communist continue to mobilize, the root causes seem to be land reform and reparations issues that pre-date back before the christians and the United States were ever introduced. How do you resolve that?

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

But BW has a point, every 20 years the insurgency vanishes, the gov't chalks up a win in the COIN category, and then they rise again in perpetual cycle.

In Mindanao the Philippine government has at several points gained enough military ascendancy to introduce real political reform, but there's never been any real effort in that direction. Instead the focus has been on coopting key leaders, often by offering them lucrative positions on the government side of the fence. The underlying issues are not addressed and soon enough new leaders emerge, often more radical than their predecessors.

[MikeF]

I thought we intervened to throw out governments we didn't like.

That's another way to say forced arbitration on non-cooperative actors. It is a values call by the US to say their behavior was unacceptable.

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

And if you are correct, then you have to determine how to win and build consensus within the Philippine gov't to enact your plan. That seems to be the crux of the dillemma.

From BW,

"I realized one day just how silly it was to argue about fine nuances of concepts that are completely subjective and undefined."

Sir, couldn't agree more with the exception of when we reach the point where the definitions affect law, policy, resources, and mission. And, BTW, I like your tomato analogy.

From Wilf,

Unless you have a common language with common coherent meanings, you will soon have a pseudo-science like "COIN Theory" or "Operational Level of War."

There's definitely some truth in that.

[Bob's World]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists. Look to the recent input here at SWJ by Daves Maxwell and Witty on UW. You'll never make everybody happy in defining such broad concepts as UW, COIN, Insurgency, etc.

I used to get right in there and argue with everyone else; but I realized one day just how silly it was to argue about fine nuances of concepts that are completely subjective and undefined.

So I think the best you can do is to state up front what definition you are applying, and then make your case based upon that definition. Then, for those receiving that input, to resist the urge to simply argue with the definition that the other party used, and to instead focus on the points that he is attempting to make in relation to the definition he based them on.

"Insurgency" is not some neat, precise operational task, like "screen" vs "guard"; or "block" vs "fix". To try to make it such is probably extremely counterproductive to achieving the understanding that one is seeking in the first place. Like I was telling the metrics guys the other day at a staff meeting. Too often we confuse "Precise" with "accurate"; and when you seek a set of metrics that you can measure very objectively and precisely to determine how well you are doing on something as fuzzy and messy as COIN, you probably are not going to be very accurate.

[William F. Owen]

Definitions are a problem because we make them one. Particularly in the military where a focus on doctrine, and the poduction and employment of precise "terms of art" within the profession, promotes endless arguments when no firm, agreed-to-by-all definition exists.

Hmmmm..... Sorry, but the real problem is that soldiers of today use language carelessly and without rigour.

This probably did not really exist until about the 1930s, when people like JFC Fuller tried to create "Military Science" - and after which we see a plethora of nonsensical terms.

You cannot have "Doctrine" without usefully precise meaning, because Doctrine is what is taught - that is what "Doctrine" means. You cannot have "practice" unless you have sound theory that explains it.

Unless you have a common language with common coherent meanings, you will soon have a pseudo-science like "COIN Theory" or "Operational Level of War."

Yes, the military does create problems for itself, basically by not studying it's own profession.

[Steve Blair]

This probably did not really exist until about the 1930s, when people like JFC Fuller tried to create "Military Science" - and after which we see a plethora of nonsensical terms.

This is an unnecessary simplification, IMO. Obviously there were (many) soldiers out there who failed to use language and concepts with rigor prior to the 1930s. Militaries prior to the 1930s certainly did study their own history, and many came away with amazingly wrong conclusions about that history. The root of all good and all evil did not come from the 1930s, and much of the thinking during that period was in direct reaction to World War I.

Most armies have some sort of defining period for their self-images. These obviously shift over time (with the most extreme example being the French with their shifts from [to over-simplify] "all offense" to "all defense" in the aftermath of World War I), but they tend to shape thinking (or lack thereof) within the army in question. The U.S. has had a couple of these (the Civil War and World War II), and both had a major warping effect on our thinking. The British may have found one of their more recent ones in the 1920s and 1930s. And in just about every case these periods came from the army in question studying its own profession and coming away with lessons that may not have been especially helpful or accurate. Armies (like other large institutions) have shown a great ability to shed those lessons that they don't like or don't fit into their own self-image or visualization.

Sorry to divert the thread, but it's important to understand that history is a continuum of sorts, and that any event has things that led up to it and will have consequences that we cannot accurately predict based on those leading events and the reaction to them by each individual involved.

[William F. Owen]

This is an unnecessary simplification, IMO. Obviously there were (many) soldiers out there who failed to use language and concepts with rigor prior to the 1930s.

....and allow me to reply!

Yes, there failures of thought prior to the 1930s, but based on the evidence to hand in terms of the written record, the language was generally simple, coherent and useful. They were far from perfect BUT they were much better than today's.

Some of what was written in the UK's 1909 Field Service Regulations, was utter rubbish, but it was simply and clearly written rubbish. It was not the arch-twaddle you find in "FM3 Design" for example.

[Ken White]

I agree with Steve Blair's post, particularly with his last paragraph. However, Wilf has a very valid point IMO in respect to military writing. After the 17th Centuryt it consistentlv became more concisely and directly oriented. Mellifluous prose gradually disappeared. Most writing during and immediately after WW I was an indicator of a trend reversal. Since WW II, it has gotten far worse each decade and now we;'re producing 300 page FIELD manuals that say little. Illustrations which can help, are part of that. So are arcane charts and 'matrices' that are not helpful.

So, IMO, you're both right (send checks to P,O Box 479... ).

[jmm99]

Looking back to the ancients is not a fruitless endeavor. Take Callwell's Small Wars: Their principles and practice (the 1903 edition is available from Google Books as a pdf download), chap 1, p.1:

Small war is a term which has come largely into use of late years, and which it is somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field. It thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.

The expression " small war " has in reality no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out; it is simply used to denote, in default of a better, operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.
....
[JMM note: In the text, a brief digression where Callwell suggests that the 1894 Sino-Japanese War might "almost be described as a small war" since the Japanese were a "highly trained, armed, organized, and disciplined army" and the Chinese forces "could not possibly be described as regular troops in the proper sense of the word".]
....
Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.

Both small wars and "big wars", are conflicts (violence between armed forces) which still fall into the broad category of "armed conflicts" legally. Another continuing legal concept viable from Callwell's time to our own is the distinction between regular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a nation-state) and irregular forces (read generally as the armed forces of a non-state actor) in legal terms.

Callwell does not deal with the "political struggle" (read that generally as civil affairs, but it goes well beyond that as viewed by Mao and Giap, including low intensity violence). Presumbly, he relied on British colonial administrators to handle that in cases where it was needed.

A few years back, John Sulllivan wrote a thesis with the long winded title, The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars - Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms? (in SWC library), where he summed several definitions (I've switched the order to put Callwell, the oldest of the four, first):

Appendix C – Small Wars & Other Associated Definitions

small wars

Small Wars – Small wars include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. Small wars cover operations varying in their scope and in their conditions. Small wars denote operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.[99][99] Callwell, Small Wars, 21.

Small Wars Manual - Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.[98][98] U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-1.

military operations other than war (MOOTW)

DOD Dictionary of Military Terms - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.[100][100] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/m/index.html [JMM: no longer among the definitions "in force"]

low intensity conflict (LIC)

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 - a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[101][101] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_intensity_conflict [JMM: definition in 1990]

The trend in these definitions emphasize the shift away from a purely military definition (in Callwell's Small Wars), to inclusion of diplomatic concerns and the military in support thereof (in the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual), to military operations short of war ("to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power"), and to LIC where the conflict is expressly defined in terms of a "a political-military confrontation", which "is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments."

Those examples illustrate no shocking changes in military doctrine qua the "military struggle", but they do present an illustration of the progressive inclusion of aspects of the "political struggle" in US military doctrine.

Dayuhan presented an example of the "political struggle"; timely because of an article in Foreign Affairs, And Justice for All, citing a UN estimate that 4 billion people are ruled under corrupt crimiinal and civil justice systems:

The areas of the Philippines where communist influence remains significant are generally fairly remote, and are generally ruled under what are effectively feudal dynasties. Land reform or reparation are less the issues than the corrupt and abusive character of local governance, and the immunity from legal process enjoyed by the politically influential families. I actually think this could be resolved in most of the affected areas, with sufficient political will, and that the impact on the insurgency would be substantial.

Obviously Steve presents a problem that can only be solved via the "political struggle". So, who is tasked to come up with the solution on the counter-revolutionary side - military or civilians ? The insurgents, if good ole Coms, will present Peoples Courts as the answer (the Taliban, Taliban Courts).

Thus, What is to be done; and who should do it ?

Part of the answer to those questions depends on whether a pollitical solution is needed to end the insurgency. A political solution could be a negotiated settlement, but it could also be the political solution of the dominant party being forced down the other party's throat.

Regards

Mike