The combat shotgun

[Bob's World]

I disagree completely. Giving a soldier a less than lethal weapon as his primary and then double ought buck in a combat zone is a bad idea. Having a less than lethal option available is not necessarily a bad a idea but making it the primary puts that soldier in a very bad position. When you need the lethal option and all you have is been bags and double ought at a check point, your chain of command has failed you. Certainly we need to do out best, within reason, to make sure that we are killing the right people, but we are getting way too wrapped up in the little details and trying too hard to make this whole thing safe. Out military is NOT a police force and never will be, nor should we expect it to be. I seriously doubt that the difference between an acceptable outcome and a not so successful outcome is going to come down to a few guys on motorcyles getting killed because they fail to respond properly to a checkpoint.

Insurgency may be warfare, but COIN is not. COIN is dealing with a civil emergency. Right now we are ordering our soldiers to apply courageous restraint, and to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. We have given them the orders, and have given them some suggestions cooked up at higher level hq as to how to implement those orders, but we have not given them new tools designed for what they were told to do.

Now, we too can debate the orders, but that will not change the orders or the fact that the soldiers need better tools to execute them.

All of those who insist on calling FID "COIN"; and those who insist on approaching COIN as warfare are, IMO, sadly off the mark. We are not a bunch of Colonial masters out to simply beat down the locals and keep our puppet governance in power, and keep the profits flowing; yet we continue to dig up the tactics of that era and discuss them as valid for the mission we face today. They aren't. And that is before you factor in the effects of the current advances in information technologies that render a whole other segment of oldschool COIN obsolete. Pop-Centric tactics are better, but they are tactics all the same and still require a strategy to shape their employment. Surging additional troops is good logistices, but also requires a strategy to drive the employment of those resources.

So, question is, if this operation was being conducted in Frankfurt (or London, or Kansas City?) instead of Kandahar would you want your soldiers to have effective non-lethal weapons? Is this somehow different because we are in someone elses country?

[Chris jM]

Insurgency may be warfare, but COIN is not. COIN is dealing with a civil emergency...yet we continue to dig up the tactics of that era and discuss them as valid for the mission we face today. They aren't.

Sir - So contemporary COIN is, for the military elements involved, a foreign civil enforcement mission?

That would then indicate that the force elements deployed are better off assuming civil LE TTPs and equipment/ capabilities.

I'm not trying to put words into your mouth, or argue for or against what you've said. Rather, this is a genuine question as it relates to how we train and deploy (esp with regards to less lethal means) as you see it.

[Rifleman]

So, question is, if this operation was being conducted in Frankfurt (or London, or Kansas City?) instead of Kandahar would you want your soldiers to have effective non-lethal weapons?

Bob,

If less lethal is needed, okay, but I believe it needs to be a dedicated less lethal gun. I side with those who are against using both less lethal and lethal ammo in the same gun at different times. And the accepeted term in cop circles is less lethal not non-lethal. A bean bag round to the head can kill.

[Bob's World]

You must understand the nature of the conflict you are in; as well as what it is your national interests are that you hope to address in said conflict; and then what your mission then therefore is and how to best accomplish it.

I think if each of those are decision points that shape major course changes, we've addressed critical decision points with some seriously flawed assumptions about Insurgency, COIN, what interests are at stake, how to best address them, etc, etc.

But, as a rule, yes, I believe that for the government, COIN is best looked at as a civil emergency, and handled as such as well. Civil leadership remains firmly in charge and military capabilities are brought in only as required to supplement where civil capabilities are lacking or are inadequate to the task. That is before you bring in your first foreign troop to assist you in your COIN

We then, are that foreign troop. Does it suddenly become a "war" for us because we are on foreign soil and there to preserve our own national interests over everything else, to include the wellfare of the populace or the interest of the nation we are supporting?

Some would argue yes, or otherwise we should simply stay out of it altogether. Some would argue that you must engage, but also that one can't simply justify any means to by the ends desired.

If your question is: Do I think we need to wage war in Afghanistan to preserve our critical national interests in Afghanistan; I would argue that no, we do not. Unless that is we see our critical national interest to be the preservation of the Karzai government in the face of popular revolt. At that point we have no choice. But I would caution, when we thwart the will of a nation's populace to preseve the governments the west desires over the governments that those popualces desire, we plant the seeds of terrorism in the process. Many of those seeds will sprout in those oppressed lands; but some will sprout among disaffected related communities within our own borders as well.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

If less lethal is needed, okay, but I believe it needs to be a dedicated less lethal gun. I side with those who are against using both less lethal and lethal ammo in the same gun at different times. And the accepeted term in cop circles is less lethal not non-lethal. A bean bag round to the head can kill.

This is a thread about the validity of shotguns in combat. My only point was that they have a role as a delivery vehicle for a family on non-lethal rounds.

With a follow-on point that this is a major shortfall for our troops currently.

The points after that soon left this small tactical topic and got after some aspects of the larger issues I wrestle with. Sorry.

[Ken White]

Insurgency may be warfare, but COIN is not. COIN is dealing with a civil emergency... but we have not given them new tools designed for what they were told to do.

Maybe we're using the wrong tools for the job.

I totally agree that 'COIN' is a civil emergency and not 'warfare -- thus war fighters are an inappropriate tool selection.

Now, we too can debate the orders, but that will not change the orders or the fact that the soldiers need better tools to execute them.

Why will that not change? Is that a lock? Should it be?

All of those who insist on calling FID "COIN"; and those who insist on approaching COIN as warfare are, IMO, sadly off the mark...

We can agree on that.

So, question is, if this operation was being conducted in Frankfurt (or London, or Kansas City?) instead of Kandahar would you want your soldiers to have effective non-lethal weapons? Is this somehow different because we are in someone elses country?

Uh, yes it is different. If the operation was being conducted in Frankfurt, London or K.C. we probably would avoid using the Army...

Back to the thread:

Uboat509 and Rifleman are both correct -- so are you -- there's a need for less than lethal; Most soldiers should NOT be issued such weapons; they should be clearly and colorfully identified as less than lethal and they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Doing THAT would be an invitation to the problems you seek to avoid...

[Kiwigrunt]

This is a thread about the validity of shotguns in combat. My only point was that they have a role as a delivery vehicle for a family on non-lethal rounds.

With a follow-on point that this is a major shortfall for our troops currently.

The points after that soon left this small tactical topic and got after some aspects of the larger issues I wrestle with. Sorry.

Not at all. Yes, my intention here was indeed to examine the shotgun in a combat role. That said, it was unavoidable that within the first few posts the less lethal issue had to pop up. The shotgun would be about the only ‘normal’ firearm well capable of being used in that role.

Chris jM made a good attempt at starting a conversation here, that should cover some of those aspects of the larger issues that you wrestle with.
As Chris mentioned himself, the conversation died young. I’m not sure why because, as you do, I think it is an important issue. I had little to contribute but eagerly awaited more…
There is a relatively strong LE representation here but most of us are/were military. Maybe we still have some trouble getting our heads around this less lethal stuff. We probably really just want it to go away so that we can concentrate on a more black and white and traditional mindset with regards to what armies ‘should’ be used for. Whether we like it or not, our armies will be used for COIN, FID, peacekeeping etc. for a long time yet.


Added:
Missed Ken’s post. Fully agree....ees not their job, but, as per my last, they are given the job. Wrongly, but I don’t think it will change. That makes them the meat in the sandwich and they will need tools to deal with it.

[Chris jM]

BW, I set everything off on the tangent. My bad. The idea that we are policing, not soldiering in the purest sense of the term, interests me and leads directly into the following...

Uboat509 and Rifleman are both correct -- so are you -- there's a need for less than lethal; Most soldiers should NOT be issued such weapons; they should be clearly and colorfully identified as less than lethal and they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Doing THAT would be an invitation to the problems you seek to avoid...

In an ideal world, yes. The ideal world being where the infantry are deployed to the higher-intensity areas where the mission sees the close-with, seek-out, sieze-and-hold sorta stuff. Unfortunately the west lacks the quantity of expeditionary police forces and military police forces to be able to specialise in such a way. Thus infantry and, and most likely will continue to be, on the checkpoints and on stability (presence?!?) patrols through populated areas. Do we create a specialised 'less lethal' position in each patrol, or just factor the less lethal capability into our existing infantry tool-kit?

From my army's experience it (less lethal) has to be an infantry task through necessity. Alternatives, short of radical re-rolling of forces and ToEs, just don't exist.

What we can do is clearly define the less lethal weapons/ ammo natures, train the users and commanders and then rely on proper judgement and employment by the operators.

[Ken White]

In an ideal world, yes. The ideal world being where the infantry are deployed to the higher-intensity areas where the mission sees the close-with, seek-out, sieze-and-hold sorta stuff. Unfortunately the west lacks the quantity of expeditionary police forces and military police forces to be able to specialise in such a way. Thus infantry and, and most likely will continue to be, on the checkpoints and on stability (presence?!?) patrols through populated areas. Do we create a specialised 'less lethal' position in each patrol, or just factor the less lethal capability into our existing infantry tool-kit?

If we lack the right tools for the job due to cost, personnel strengths or other shortfalls, we probably should acquire the proper toools OR not undertake the job at all...

I suggest we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort. Do you know any?

Do not take that as saying the west should not get involved, that's not what I said, not at all. I believe there should be more involvement. It should be undertaken earlier, should be intelligence driven (we do that fairly well, we just don't act on the intel at all well); involve aid, diplomatic efforts and limited special forces-like military assistance -- anything to avoid committing the GPF who will never do it well (nor should they be able to do so)...

What we can do is clearly define the less lethal weapons/ ammo natures, train the users and commanders and then rely on proper judgement and employment by the operators.

Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?

Seriously, I understand and you're regrettably correct given current realities but it is a slippery slope and best avoided -- and the non-lethal weapons should never be the only weapon issued and should be clearly identifiable as non-lethal -- just as the bearer's other weapon(s) should be lethal and clearly identifiable as such.

[William F. Owen]

There a whole range of "Less than Lethal" munitions of the 40mm GL. Back in the day, most patrols in Ulster carried a 37mm "Baton" gun, for just that reason - and you can fire a 37mm baton round out of an M-203!! - oh yes! I've done it.

[Chris jM]

I suggest we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

I'm skipping the majority of your question with this answer - sorry, but it is true from my perspective.

In undertaking these tasks, until we are told to refocus our main effort on 'pure' warfighting rather than the armed constabulary/ warfighting combination, there is an obvious capability gap.

I'm not arguing against you given your acknowledgement of 'current realities'. It's not a slippery slope ahead of us - it's one were already well into.

So the capability cap exists, and the tasks required of us are unavoidable. I see the question of 'avoidability' as completely academic and theoretical and agree with BW that 'this is a major shortfall for our troops currently'.

Rifleman - I side with those who are against using both less lethal and lethal ammo in the same gun at different times.

From my perspective this isn't an issue - we can't afford the diamond-studded solution different weapon systems for 12 ga lethal, less lethal and breaching so my defence force has to make do with what we've got. There are pros and cons to the 12-ga-everything approach - flexibility and ease of logistics/ training vs the necessity for robust C2 and TTPs.

Ken White - they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Unfortunately it is our job, now, so we'll do what we've always done... we'll make do with our own issued kit, and once deployed around our allies we'll find what expensive piece of kit of yours does it best, and we'll steal it

[Ken White]

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

I'm skipping the majority of your question with this answer - sorry, but it is true from my perspective.

for the bulk of the questions I asked. That's always been considered a stock answer by many who serve...

Though I would suggest consideration of the fact that an Army deciding to do its job "with as little harm as possible" is itself on a slippery slope and may very well have an adaptation problem if confronted with heavy combat.

I'm not arguing against you given your acknowledgement of 'current realities'. It's not a slippery slope ahead of us - it's one were already well into.

So the capability cap exists, and the tasks required of us are unavoidable. I see the question of 'avoidability' as completely academic and theoretical and agree with BW that 'this is a major shortfall for our troops currently'.

We can disagree on that -- if you and Bob's World said perceived shortfall, I'd agree while pointing out that IMO you're both looking for a technical solution to a problem of poor training.

"Avoidability" may academic and theoretical at your level; it is not at all academic for the politicians who make decisions on actions. They need to be a bit smarter -- and it is the job of serving Soldiers to make them smarter...

That said and while I certainly accept your answer to most of my comment, I don't believe that answer addresses this question:

"Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?"

[slapout9]

Unfortunately it is our job, now, so we'll do what we've always done... we'll make do with our own issued kit, and once deployed around our allies we'll find what expensive piece of kit of yours does it best, and we'll steal it

See that Maneuver Warfare stuff does work sometimes

[JMA]

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

If you are talking about harm to own forces then I can agree.

However, if you are talking about the enemy I can't agree.

I would be interested to know if you can remember the circumstances this indoctrination was forced upon you?

[Chris jM]

Though I would suggest consideration of the fact that an Army deciding to do its job "with as little harm as possible" is itself on a slippery slope and may very well have an adaptation problem if confronted with heavy combat.

You have 100%, whole-hearted endorsement from me in this. As with everything in life, opportunity costs accompany every decision. The route to pop-centric COIN has come at a cost, either consciously made or unwittingly, and the effects will be felt into the future. How much this affects your Army I can only guess at, but my army has effectively shunned anything over low-intensity combat in favor of high-end policing.

We can disagree on that -- if you and Bob's World said perceived shortfall, I'd agree while pointing out that IMO you're both looking for a technical solution to a problem of poor training.

It's a technical solution to a problem of poor training and poor policy. However, due to the shortfalls, there is a capability gap requiring an immediate solution. Fixing training is certainly a worthy course of action, but won't alleviate the immediate need for our soldier's to be able to deploy less lethal effects. Fixing poor policy is another question altogether... I think we're as likely to fix that as a beauty queen is as likely to achieve world peace.

That said and while I certainly accept your answer to most of my comment, I don't believe that answer addresses this question:

"Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?"

I'm trying out this whole manoeuvre warfare thing, targeting your strengths and avoiding your weaknesses. Turns out MW is great on paper but falls apart when employed against an adaptive opponent (this doubles as a response to Slapout's comment, as well!)

[Chris jM]

However, if you are talking about the enemy I can't agree.

I would be interested to know if you can remember the circumstances this indoctrination was forced upon you?

I'm talking about harm, full stop, enemy/ civ/ FF inclusive. I perceive it to be cultural so I see the indoctrinate is total and all-encompassing. Perhaps I'm wrong - I rather hope that I am...

I would say this is a luxury born of NZ's position and boutique recent strategic involvement/ military history.

Example - I sat in a lecture yesterday on our approach to irregular activity, given by one of our instrumental HQ/ leadership types. It lumped our recent 'successes' in Bouganville, Bosnia, East Timor, Solomon Islands and Bamiyan (Afghanistan) to the application of a competent 'hearts and minds' approach. Assumed and explicitly stated as a conclusion was the fact that 'hearts and minds' kiwi-style was our way of the future to operational success.

A further case in point - we have our defence review (new government white paper) due it in a few months. Public reporting indicates that our MinDefence will elevate 'humanitarian disaster relief' to being a core defence function, and we will reallocate procurement and training accordingly.

Don't shoot the messenger - I don't believe that playing soccer with kids in Timor and handing out blankets in Bamiyan helps our cause - but this view is institutionalised. I held this view when I first participated on this board, and that learning experience was a rather brutal way of undermining my organisational upbringing.

In academic defence of a 'do minimal harm' policy, it's not that bad a concept. After all we need to win the peace - what better way to do that than ensure your avoid destruction and killing wherever possible? It won't work against a competent or conventional army that requires defeat, but against a threat group that is relatively weak, the policy holds up. Knowing when NOT to apply it will be the trouble, and the consequences of misapplication will be very, very painful.

Now, where were we? Shotguns?

[JMA]

I'm talking about harm, full stop, enemy/ civ/ FF inclusive. I perceive it to be cultural so I see the indoctrinate is total and all-encompassing. Perhaps I'm wrong - I rather hope that I am...

When an army spends its time on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and is most unlikely to ever allow itself to get sucked into a real shooting war to any significant degree then it can indulge in the luxury a doctrine of low harm military operations. Perhaps even be proud they they never fired a shot in anger during the deployment to such-and-such a country. (This is not work for an army)

Perhaps this should evolve into another thread where perhaps the necessity of small countries to even train with say armour which they will probably never ever use can be debated.

Countries in Africa maintain large militaries (for their size) to suppress their own people and prey on their neighbours rather than defence of their own nomeland.

For instance what are the realistic prospects of an invasion of the NZ islands?

[Rex Brynen]

When an army spends its time on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and is most unlikely to ever allow itself to get sucked into a real shooting war to any significant degree then it can indulge in the luxury a doctrine of low harm military operations. Perhaps even be proud they they never fired a shot in anger during the deployment to such-and-such a country. (This is not work for an army)

I'll have to start a thread on this at some point, but frankly whatever the national political authorities decide the army will do is "work for an army." It may not be the army's preferred work, and it might well clash (in terms of TTPs) with other things the army does. That's life.

Equally, the development folks would prefer not work in warzones, the diplomats find it simpler when they just have to deal with states, and the IC finds it more convenient when they have to do collection against peer competitors and not insurgents hiding in slums, caves or the bush. However, that's really all irrelevant. None of them--the army included--gets to say (as sometimes happens in the threads here) "sorry, we don't do windows."

Now, back to the shotgun thread...

[Ken White]

On the subject of less than lethal weapons, I believe US police experience has shown that the Orange painted shotguns they use for less than lethal situations are an advantage as if photographs are taken of someone aiming a shotgun at a rioter and that weapon is orange, then lethal intent is not shown by an otherwise exploitable photo.

Thus the FN 303s of the US Army are orange to preclude that potential windfall for opponent propagandizing and info ops. Bad news is the Troops hate to be told to carry them -- because they've found out that opponents quickly develop a tolerance for less than lethal stuff as they learn that only a few people might get hurt a bit and no one will be killed, thus the opponents tend to be actually emboldened by the less than lethal stuff.

Be careful what you wish for, you may get it...

[Uboat509]

So, question is, if this operation was being conducted in Frankfurt (or London, or Kansas City?) instead of Kandahar would you want your soldiers to have effective non-lethal weapons? Is this somehow different because we are in someone elses country?

Not a bit. You can couch it in whatever language you like but the fact is there are a lot of people over there actively seeking to do our servicemembers harm. They are organized and they are not terribly constrained in how they do it. That sounds like war to me. In that situation I want our servicemembers in the best position to protect themselves, regardless of what race, creed, color, etc. the enemy is. And trying to label me a racist because I do not subscribe to your view of how we should best prosecute this war is, at best, insulting.