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Thread: Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

  1. #61
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    One question worth pondering is:

    If militia forces in Afghanistan were able to outright defeat or frustrate the two greatest modern conventional militaries; how would the creation of a 3rd rate conventional military better secure Afghanistan against that same threat?

    Or, said another way: What is the proper mix of security forces that the nation of Afghanistan needs for the threats they face?

    One would think that a confederacy of militia forces, oriented more toward law enforcement vice attacking each other, with an added capability to deal with those external elements that come into the country conduct UW to incite and support insurgnecy would be most appropriate.

    Often "mini-me" is probably not what is needed.

  2. #62
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    Default Mini-me is definitely not needed

    The trick is in your next to the last paragraph -- not fighting each other.

    So far, history is NOT in our favor on that one.

    The strengths of the ANA, as planned anyway:
    Multi-ethnic, multi-tribal, merit-based entity
    Subject to and comfortable with Rule of Law

    There are many Afghans dedicated to "making it work this time".

    But there are still many who are trying to wait us out so they can revert to the old ways.

    Not sure anything but time will tell.

  3. #63
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good point and I think you're correct, Bobs World.

    My perception is that a part of the problem in Afghanistan is that the US and possibly NATO, certainly the UN all want a strong central government due to their own experience and the ease of dealing with such an entity versus having to cope with 20 or so fiefdoms in a loose confederation. Old Eagle's post seems to confirm this. I'm dubious such a state is obtainable and sustainable at this time -- possibly after 20 years or so of relative peace...

    I think too many in positions of power or influence tend to subscribe to this view LINK which I see as beyond deluded and almost literally living in a dream world -- he obviously missed the Tamil Tigers, various scuffles in Africa, the demise of Yugoslavia -- much less Kosovo -- the Scottish Parliament and a veritable host of other things over the last few years. Nationalism (and to an extent, tribalism) is on the increase except among the chattering classes who foolishly see an implausible if not impossible world government as a panacea for all our ills and who are very fortunately outnumbered by an extremely large number of people with a great deal more sense who understand smaller is better...

    My belief is that the future of the world will tend to lean toward the the far more anarchic model described in "Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War" by Thomas M. Nichols; LINK. Nichols makes a case for preventive and preemptive war but more iimportantly, he describes the demise of the Westphalian model of state relationships -- the world has changed and too many are trying to live in the past...

    We -- the US, NATO and even the UN -- need to determine a sensible and ACHIEVABLE end state for involvement in Afghanistan and head that way.

  4. #64
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    This summer I drove through the Black Hills, and picked a copy of Stephen Ambrose's "Crazy Horse and Custer" at the bookstore at the base of Mt Rushmore.

    This book was not written as an analogy for the current war on terrorism, and yet as one gets into the efforts of the US Government, with the Army in the lead; to democratize the Souix Indians on one hand, forcing them to among many things, pick one central leader; while simultaneously conducting capture/kill CT operations against those rogue bands, such as the one led by Crazy Horse.

    The parallels to what we are doing today were both frightening and insightful. Well worth the read. Bonus if you enjoy military and indian history, and biographies of these two great characters of their times.

  5. #65
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    You might want to look at some of the studies of the problems the Army faced in Arizona during the same period. The situation there is also deeply instructive given the factionalized nature of the Apache, difficult terrain, and actions of outside parties (read: local white settlers) in stirring up some of the issues.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  6. #66
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default True on Arid Zone, Steve

    Crook's techniques and rejection of the 'strategy' Bob's World cites are also instructive for current problems...

  7. #67
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    Default Two different national strategies

    When I first saw "Crazy Horse" in Bob's post, I thought of a different book - I imagine Ambrose's book is less biased than the one that flashed in my mind.

    I thought of Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, which is here.

    Spirit tells the story of the Lakota insurgency of 1975 and one of its leaders Leonard Peltier (a Méti, who is presently serving life - and, for purposes of disclosure, is some sort of half-assed distant Pelletier cousin to me and my wife - don't know him or his family). It is not a pleasant book, but seems very relevant to the issues of how a low-level insurgency develops and is handled (or mishandled).

    ------------------------
    Back to the lead of this post. I think it might be informative to compare two contrasting "national strategies" in North America:

    1. The American Indian campaigns, rez policies, etc. which made up the expansion westward (really from the 1600's), and reflected a policy of total control and colonization.

    2. The CFM-Canada (that's my little avatar guy's unit) and its application of a far different strategy in the period 1610-1760 (when the little guy got his clock cleaned). Basically, these Canadian Marines moved as fish in a sea, which they did not seek to control; but did seek to influence - more by practical diplomacy than by military force - although they were not adverse to that.

    Unfortunately, comprehensive books on item #2 are lacking. Francis Parkman, France and England in North America (2 vols) is good, but is very dated:

    From The Washington Post

    The greatest history ever written by an American. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

    Product Description

    This is the first of two volumes presenting all seven parts of Francis Parkman's monumental narrative history of the struggle for control of the American continent. Thirty years in the writing, Parkman's "history of the American forest" is an accomplishment hardly less awesome than the adventures he describes. This volume begins with the tragic settlement of French Huguenots in Florida, then shifts north as explorers like Samuel de Champlain map the wilderness and wage savage forest warfare against the Iroquois; resolute Jesuits attempt to convert the Indians and suffer captivity, torture, and martyrdom in the wilderness; conflict rages in French Canada between religious extremists and fur traders. Dominating all is the fiercely indomitable La Salle, whose obsession with colonizing the Mississippi Valley leads to vast treks across the western prairie and assassination in a lonely Texas swamp. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
    available at Amazon - picked up an unused hardcover set at a used book store for peanuts.

  8. #68
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Benefits of a minimally funded and resourced effort

    (Canada under the French) and one perhaps over funded (us). Excess money and goodies will let you do dumb stuff.

    Some things don't change much...

  9. #69
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default The City-State Model or something completely different?

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post

    Sometimes more isn't better. I would therefore argue that in many parts of Afghanistan we need to quit pursuing our paternalistic notions of governance and work with the local power structures to ensure their independence from all outsiders - Kabul and Taliban alike. The irony here is that in order to save a central government in Kabul, we may have to undermine its authority in some parts of Afghanistan - at least until it grows in capability and legitimacy enough to overcome the very real and long-standing hostility to central authority among many populations in Afghanistan. In trying to control the entire country, the coalition and Afghan government are overreaching. Better, IMO, to work on governance and legitimacy in those areas where that goal is realistically achievable over the short-to-medium term. In those areas where it is not, try to strike deals that guarantee local independence in exchange denying sanctuary and support to the Taliban and their allies.

    Anyway, that's my theory.
    Entropy,

    Is the City-State Model applicable for Kabul? Could it be a new Samarkand?

    Samarkand was founded by the Persians in the late 6th century BCE and it was one of the main centers of Persian civilization in the ancient times. It is one of the oldest inhabited cities in the world, prospering from its location on the trade route between China and Europe (Silk Road). At times Samarkand has been one of the greatest cities of Central Asia. Founded circa 700 BC it was already the capital of the Sogdian satrapy under the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia when Alexander the Great conquered it in 329 BC (see Afrasiab, Sogdiana).
    For the independent areas outside Kabul what would the model be? From a western view point are we interested in self-sustainable autonomous areas which are able to prevent some of the organizations that we are concerned about from taking root?

    Regards,

    Steve
    Sapere Aude

  10. #70
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    Steve,

    That's an interesting suggestion. I don't know much about the city-state model, but I suspect that it may not work in a multiethnic/religious society as diverse as Afghanistan.

  11. #71
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Entropy,

    Is the City-State Model applicable for Kabul? Could it be a new Samarkand?



    For the independent areas outside Kabul what would the model be? From a western view point are we interested in self-sustainable autonomous areas which are able to prevent some of the organizations that we are concerned about from taking root?

    Regards,

    Steve
    Steve

    That is the model I had in mind when discussing Somalia and the Congo simply as a way to move forward versus continuing to flail around with the concept of nations when discussing "failed nations" that have never really been nations in the first place.

    best

    Tom

  12. #72
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Crook's techniques and rejection of the 'strategy' Bob's World cites are also instructive for current problems...
    Interesting, what I picked up from that history was not Crook's refusal to negotiate (in the end he did negotiate w/ Geronimo, and he was actually a step up from the previous General in the human relations department) but his use of Forts to geographically isolate his enemy. That would be the lesson that I would key in on.
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

  13. #73
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    reed11b,

    Your instincts are sound, but I believe you are too "threat-centric" (see the paper I posted that everyone dogpiled on...) in your thinking.

    If you are willing to kill all of the indians, ie, remove that problemsome segment of the populace from the environment, it will work. We've demonstrated that. If, however, you determine that the entire populace will remain in this environment, one must shift their focus to how to achieve an enduring effect by engaging and modifying the underlying conditions giving rise to the conflict. Neither side is either wholly right or wrong, and all need to learn to co-exist (which requires new structures, policies, laws etc designed to protect the rights of all, while recognizing the rule of the majority; etc). The concept is simple, the execution is complex. Far easier to just kill all the indians and call it victory.

    Like I said, the parallels of our current GWOT strategy to our old Indian strategies are disturbing. We need to evolve. We can't just make everyone confrom to act like us and kill the ones who refuse.

  14. #74
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Then you'd key in on exactly the wrong thing.

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Interesting, what I picked up from that history was not Crook's refusal to negotiate (in the end he did negotiate w/ Geronimo, and he was actually a step up from the previous General in the human relations department) but his use of Forts to geographically isolate his enemy. That would be the lesson that I would key in on.
    Reed
    What you should key upon is his dumping of large wagon supported forays and large numbers of troops to instead use small columns with mule trains for logistic support, better selection and training of small units that could move as fast as the opponent and the co-opting of members of the pursued tribe, band or group to serve as indigenous trackers in large numbers.

    The Forts were not to 'geographically isolate the enemy,' they were simply to provide bases for his light columns and were to shape the area of operations, not isolate. Pretty hard to isolate a crew in their native habitat if they don't want to be isolated with a small fixed installation.

    "Refusal to negotiate" and later negotiation are political considerations. Crook's success was in his tactical concepts which created the possibility of negotiation.

  15. #75
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    What you should key upon is his dumping of large wagon supported forays and large numbers of troops to instead use small columns with mule trains for logistic support, better selection and training of small units that could move as fast as the opponent and the co-opting of members of the pursued tribe, band or group to serve as indigenous trackers in large numbers.

    The Forts were not to 'geographically isolate the enemy,' they were simply to provide bases for his light columns and were to shape the area of operations, not isolate. Pretty hard to isolate a crew in their native habitat if they don't want to be isolated with a small fixed installation.

    "Refusal to negotiate" and later negotiation are political considerations. Crook's success was in his tactical concepts which created the possibility of negotiation.
    Darn it! I did notice that as well since it directly relates to my own concepts and perceptions on how to best train and organize forces (particularly infantry), but the startegic uses of bases was also important, even if my choice of verbage was poor. (read what I mean, not what I write!! )
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

  16. #76
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking I tried, I really did...

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    (read what I mean, not what I write!! )
    Reed


    Seriously:
    "... but the startegic uses of bases was also important...
    I don't think so and i'd also argue it was tactical, not strategic. The Forts in no way compromised the Indians. Whichever batch Crook was after at the time -- the Apaches were not his only opponents. They were too mobile and too knowledgeable of the local terrain to allow the Forts to have much if any impact. The value of the Forts and their placement was that they allowed rapid and frequent resupply of his mule trains which while much faster and more mobile, could not carry as much as wagons. They were a tactical benefit.

    He pushed his troops and those trains into rapid movement over a large swath of very inhospitable terrain and they could never know where pursuit of the bands might lead, hence the number of small forts versus a few large posts. The only thing remotely strategic was the site selection; the military benefit was purely tactical or, more pointedly, logistical...

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