Madhu, you captured my point accurately. Carl I think you're perpetuating our COIN doctrine myth, and blaming the failure of it to work so far because we simply don't do it well. I admit the doctrine seems logical, but having participating in more than two of these conflicts as an advsior in multiple countries in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East I know the logic of doctrinal assumptions tend to fall apart when it hits the reality of a complex convergence of psychological, social, and political influences. There are a few insurgencies around the world where the doctrine would work, but in most cases the conflict is much more complex than simply insurgents battling a so called illegimate government or in our case (when we do COIN) an occupying power.

Back to Syria, there have been some articles suggesting we should intervene in Syria and the authors imply we can use all the lessons learnt from our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize Syria. This implies our COIN doctrine actually worked in those cases, and therefore it would work in Syria. It implies that the population in Syria can be won? What segment is that? The Alawites? The Kurds? The AQ affiliates? I'm sure if we rebuild their schools and create petty jobs with our CERP money that they all forgive each other, Al-Qaeda will retreat, Iran and Hizbollah will withdraw, and we will have denied a future safe haven for terrorists at moderate cost. However, just in case this doesn't work out, what can we do?

At best we can achieve limited military objectives of seizing and securing certain facilities to limit the distribution of weapons to the growing extremist network. We can assist the resistance movements by attacking the Syrian regime, but to what end? I hope we think this one through very carefully. We can shape this conflict, but we can't control it. We can achieve limited objectives if deemed necessary, we can't impose a legitimate government that all the people will embrace.