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Thread: Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Military Commentary

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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    How good is Russian IR capability and profilition?? Is it close to matching ours from the mid to late 90's?
    The Russians claim that they're upgrading their T-72's with gear to deal with IR ATGM's, but like many Russian claims it is to be taken with a grain of salt. The T-90 is supposedly armed with the appropriate sensors and devices for dealing with IR and laser-guided missiles and the Russians claim it can deal with Javelin, but how well it works in actual combat... (shrug).

    In any event, Javelin is good, but would not have been effective in this war because the rugged terrain was controlled by the Ossetian irregulars, who would have simply taken out any hunter-killer teams that tried to set up there. I am not sure how well you are familiar with the mountainous terrain of the region, but once you get away from the foothills that you saw near Tskhinvali, the terrain goes pretty much vertical and it's pretty much impossible to move through it without serious mountaineering gear or on the established roads -- which were under the control of the Ossetian irregulars. The terrain makes Afghanistan look like Florida ruggedness-wise. Once tanks reach the plains, then you have the problem of the sheer size and bulk of the Javelin system plus vulnerability to air strikes plus tanks and artillery using HE on you. It is not until you get to the cities that the hunter-killer teams would become effective, and Russia avoided sending tanks into the cities and towns until it was clear that the Georgian military had evacuated them.

    In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.

    Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response. Even under the more stringent standards of U.S. tort law, if you consider the NATO treaty as a contract, Georgia's shelling of Tskhinvali would have been considered "bad faith" and thus rendered that self defense clause null and void (is it self defense if you yourself started the war?). Some folks here seem to have an overly ambitious notion of the power of paper. Sorry, folks. In international relations, it all boils down in the end to enlightened self interest and power. The paper is useful only insofar as it makes explicit such. Otherwise, it is just a piece of paper. In the case of the current Georgian action, Georgia having that piece of paper in hand would have changed things not a lick -- it is not in the self-interest of Europe to start WWIII over Georgia, and thus it would not have happened.

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    Quote Originally Posted by badtux View Post
    Finally, regarding NATO, treaty obligations, and so forth, treaties are worth the paper they're signed on in the real world. Nations uphold things like mutual defense treaties when it is in their national interest to do so. If it is not in their national interest to do so, they say "Sorry, you're on your own." That is real world, as vs. fantasy land. I have been thinking hard and cannot think of any NATO state that would see going to war against Russia over Georgia as being in their national interest. Even if Georgia had actually been a NATO member, the response of many major NATO states would have been "Sorry, but you incited this by shelling Tskhinvali, so you're on your own," which, given that NATO actions require unanimity, would have tabled any NATO response.
    That's not an entirely accurate reading of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which doesn't require any unanimity at all for individual member states to take action. However, the treaty doesn't require armed force in response to an armed attack, but rather "such action as [each state] deems necessary."

    Treaty obligations, i would argue, have somewhat more weight than simply transitory self-interest, for a variety of reasons: the create incentives to demonstrate credibility, they modify public and international expectations, and they create webs of institutional interest and interaction that modify the ways situations are analyzed and interests are perceived within government. NATO membership, for example, has profoundly changed the way that the Canadian military, the Canadian government, and the Canadian public view the world.

    Indeed, its precisely because most NATO members see the Treaty and alliance as something more than a fiction that most were opposed to Georgian membership.

  3. #3
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    Default Finnish Defense Policy >> Tactics

    from Render
    ....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?
    Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.

    Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).

    All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).

    The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.

    The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.
    http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61

    But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?

    Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces

    Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia

    ---------------------------------------
    What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.

    Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:

    Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."
    The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".

    Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-15-2008 at 11:53 PM.

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