'America's Broken Army' NPR Series. Cavguy makes COL Gentile proud ...

[Schmedlap]

I suspect that I am inadvertently cherry-picking or that I am missing your point, but I'll throw it out there just in case it's relevent...

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else. Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

[Eden]

I suspect that because most of us who haunt the forum are or were Army or Marines we miss the big point about designing forces for the next war. Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

[William F. Owen]

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

DING Ding! - Exactly. That has been the central argument of my force development work for the last 7 years! - Kudos Eden. Didn't know the US had the same problem. Many thanks.

[Eden]

To illustrate a bit the problems staffers face when working on force structure changes, I can relate my own experience as a bit player in designing a Stryker Division - that is, a division element controlling three Stryker Brigades. This never came to fruition, but the boundaries we were given at the beginning of the process were as follows:

1. A manpower cap - I can't remember what it was but somewhere around 12-15,000.
2. Deployability - the whole division had to be deployable by air given so many sorties in a certain amount of time.
3. No post in Alaska or Hawaii could have fewer soldiers on it at the end of the process than they currently had - a politically imposed condition laid on in deference to the powerful senators from those states.
4. USARAK had to maintain its airborne capability.

Cost (in terms of dollars) never really came into it. But these are the kinds of things that cause otherwise intelligent organizations to do stupid stuff.

[Ken White]

Ratzel Said:

"I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?"

Really good point. I think though, that the answer to the first question is that we were not much better than halfway trained for HIC in 2000. That is due to the fact that our obsolescent and really inefficient personnel system causes an annual rotation of 25-35% of all people in a unit -- so a really well trained unit at one point in time will degrade over the course of a year. That is reality.

That is also not as bad as it sounds; it is, in a word, good enough -- not great but good enough. That has almost always been true of all Armies. Long way of getting to the point that halfway trained for the full spectrum of warfare is acceptable. It's a lot better than being 90% trained for one form and then being confronted with another (See Iraq, 2003).

The answer to the second question is that, quite simply, outside of the Leopard 2A6, the M1A2 has no competition, therefor a new tank is not needed, merely continue to do some R and D. Which we are doing. So "that money" is or will be used to enhance our stability operations capability (see below).

Wilf said:

"The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.

True, though I think from what I read both are finally starting to realize that and are slowly changing; also see below.

Eden said:

"So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Wilf's right, kudos for that. It often gets forgotten.

I agree but would point out that the HIC capability is critical to survival; the LIC capability is nice to have. It appears that many in the policy realm seem to think along that same line.

The cost of effective LIC systems is generally quite low (relatively speaking), so the diversion of only one Carrier Battle Group (for example) to oblivion would and will pay for both a few more spaces and possibly much equipment tailored for LIC. It is my perception that these trade-offs are being discussed and planned for implementation in the post 2014 period. The spending for the interim is already in place and there is no existential need to change it and Congress would likely not change it barring a major push by someone...

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

A terrible truth. Also the driver of many more things than most realize. Congress is at the root of many perceived DoD-related problems...

[William F. Owen]

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else.

I'll clarify. The US Air Force is not just relevant, they are Essential. - and as you say, 500lb bombs. It don't matter if they come from an F-16, F-14, B-52 or P-3. It doesn't matter if you get air from the Air Force or Navy - both only exist to support ground operations, and their support is critical.

Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

There are vast range of assumptions about UAV operations, which once subjected to rigour, do not paint a clear choice between manned and un-manned aircraft, especially when it comes to COIN operations, and especially when it comes to cost. When it comes to UAV's "Lies, dam Lies and Statistics" are to the fore! It is very context and mission specific.