Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?

[Ken White]

No, post #132 contained the following (which you obviously missed)

I didn't miss it, I responded to the post I quoted. Not to 132. However, since you bought 132 into the conversation:

My question re the photo (in post #124) was because that was a lot like a view from an OP or from the gunship as one started lifting on arrival at the target. Every contour ridge (or bund) is a massive potential problem for infantry on the ground as are the mud walls but are nothing from the air.

The obvious, well stated...

The only possible response to that is "Well, yeah..." The rest of 132 is all equally valid but doesn't address the question you raised in Post 124 to which I responded, to wit, "What exactly is the problem with this terrain? " So, I answered that with an obvious statement.

See, two can do that.

Incidentally, jcustis is Jon, not John.

Think enemy and terrain (or METT-TC if you prefer). If you have air effort and there are TB in that village area then you should be able to get them all.

Umm, perhaps. Except for the ones that pretend to be -- or are -- local farmers or who have hidey holes constructed or who can out run their pursuers. IF you have air...

If you don't that hill mass and others like it pose a bit of a problem.

Not quite, terrain is how you use it.

Er, well yeah. I deeply regret not choosing the precise phraseology you specify.

However, I sort of meant the same thing. "What one make of it" also puts the onus on the user not the terrain.

[JMA]

The obvious, well stated...

OK, progress.

So lets play the "so what" game shall we?

So if it is difficult to see the object from the ground yet easy from the air then... so what?

That would tell you to clear ground from the air where possible and make maximum use of air observation and CAS on the objective, yes?

Except for the ones that pretend to be -- or are -- local farmers or who have hidey holes constructed or who can out run their pursuers. IF you have air...

If you don't that hill mass and others like it pose a bit of a problem.

As one of the Brit brigade commanders is on record as saying that they were forced down a certain tactical path due to lack of availability of helicopters.

It is very sporting of the Brits to impose ridiculous rules of engagement on their troops but insane to deny them the edge in battle.

Not sure of this but I heard that the USMC now have a 10x the helos the Brits had in Helmand. If this is so then I can't see what the problem is.

[Ken White]

OK, progress.

Where? I missed it...

That would tell you to clear ground from the air where possible and make maximum use of air observation and CAS on the objective, yes?

Yes. If you have that support available. Not always the case.

Not sure of this but I heard that the USMC now have a 10x the helos the Brits had in Helmand. If this is so then I can't see what the problem is.

Numbers prove little. The Marines also have considerably more troops there and a much heavier support package (which uses more aircraft...). Thus the aircraft : troop ratio may not be much changed. In any event, the raw number of helicopters is slightly important, when, where and how they're used is far more important...

And we do not know those things.

If:

The role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.

they're probably going to have to do that on foot. With or without air support.

As an aside, that described task is not the role, it is one of many tasks that Infantry perform. Saying it's the 'role' is good propaganda and psychological preparation of the Troops (some believe. The Troops don't...) but little else. That's why Armies say it's the role -- not because that's the reality today.

Air observation is handy, no question -- it also does not give the total picture of the ground from the perspective of a rifle platoon. No question CAS is helpful and solves many knotty tactical problems but it's not always available or usable. Even when available in quantity, neither of those things make much difference when two opposing ground elements close on each other.

If everyone just had your magic wand and all the answers, life and combat would be simple...

[JMA]

Air observation is handy, no question -- it also does not give the total picture of the ground from the perspective of a rifle platoon. No question CAS is helpful and solves many knotty tactical problems but it's not always available or usable. Even when available in quantity, neither of those things make much difference when two opposing ground elements close on each other.

Who said total picture? Air observation is a massive advantage which even the fire team should be able to use to its advantage.

Well CAS needs to be available and response times better than an hour or so. There are many circumstances when CAS may not be "usable" I accept. Where safety is the issue I learned that the more one trains with the CAS pilots (more needed if they do short tours) the closer and more accurate you or your corporals can bring in an air strike with less chance of a blue on blue. I'm just wondering how much of this training is actually done out in Afghanistan involving the troops on the ground and the actual CAS pilots?

If everyone just had your magic wand and all the answers, life and combat would be simple...

What I can share with you is that I have found out that in the last month or so that the "Brits" accept just about everything I have said here but they believe that for one reason or another it can't be implemented.

The one issue they are yet to accept as being a problem is the short length of tours. Give them time.

The weakness therefore is a sorry characteristic which has been identified where battalion level officers seem willing to take no for an answer. Worse still it is only once these officers leave the service that they find their voice.

The British soldier deserves better leadership. The penny is starting to drop in this regard but how does the officer corps reform itself?

[JMA]

It goes that officers should get the facts correct, do the planning and then not take no for an answer (especially when soldiers lives are at risk.)

[Infanteer]

JMA, here's a chew toy for you - Nimroz has been largely ignored in favor for the more populous greenspace provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

Note the last para:

http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3805

[davidbfpo]

Infanteer,

I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.

SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.