Modernization/Development Theory, CORDS, and FM 3-24?

[TheCurmudgeon]

From "Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations"
by Dave Dilegge

"There is a growing recognition of the need to move from a sole emphasis on state building and institution building toward a more pragmatic engagement with de facto authority structures, including nonstate actors and hybrid political institutions on the ground. This is particularly relevant in conflict-affected countries, where significant territory is often controlled by a nonstate actor or a rogue government official."

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog...#comment-35458

Guess the academic elite no longer believe it is worth the effort to try to create little clones of the United States in every conflict area around the world. Wonder how long it takes before we forget this lesson ...

[Madhu]

From "Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations"
by Dave Dilegge

"There is a growing recognition of the need to move from a sole emphasis on state building and institution building toward a more pragmatic engagement with de facto authority structures, including nonstate actors and hybrid political institutions on the ground. This is particularly relevant in conflict-affected countries, where significant territory is often controlled by a nonstate actor or a rogue government official."

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog...#comment-35458

Guess the academic elite no longer believe it is worth the effort to try to create little clones of the United States in every conflict area around the world. Wonder how long it takes before we forget this lesson ...

I thought it paired up conceptually with the following articles/posts (in the sense of trying to categorize conflicts based on a complex set of motivations of the main actors):

US Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis Department have put together a useful reference for small wars students and practitioners entitled "Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962-2009." The resource is available for download in PDF format here. If you are wondering where Volume I is, that government document covers post-World War I insurgencies and revolutions up to 1962 and can be downloaded in PDF here. The original was published by the Special Operations Research Office at The American University in 1962.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cas...ionary-warfare

In order to prepare for the future, we must first understand where we have been moving beyond individual articles of best practices and lessons learned. The intent of this essay is to provide the critique in order to promote an evolution in our thinking. The purpose is to better prepare those who will follow in our footsteps. Finally, we believe that this reform is a duty required from those who directly observed the costs of today's small wars.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...ase-for-reform

I have no idea with the elite business I am terrible at the prediction business, and, apparently, so are most people--experts included. All that "knowledge problem" stuff.

[Madhu]

From the twitter "feed" of Dr. Steven Metz:

http://i72.photobucket.com/albums/i1...strategies.jpg

http://twitter.com/steven_metz/statu...72129582186496

"The US needs four different COIN categories" (paraphrase) and the twitter links take you to the proposed categories.

We have been treating the various Talibans as one Taliban when it may be that only the Talibans with global power projection ambitions/intent are the real issue for our security.

I dunno. It's complicated.

[Dayuhan]

I believe COIN suffers from a similar problem of misinterpreting psychology, but I am not as clear exactly where the mistake lies.

I can see several mistakes. First, the very construction "COIN" assumes that insurgency is by definition something that needs to be countered. I think that's a mistake from the start.

More specifically, a great deal of our current COIN practice seems to be built around the assumption that our people going into a conflict environment and building stuff or delivering services is going to "win hearts and minds" for a government we want the people to support. I don't think that's ever going to work very well. First, people clearly see the difference between our actions and those of the host country government (even when we put up a host country facade; people aren't dumb), and our activity can easily just underscore the host government's passivity and incapacity. Second, people don't take up arms against a government because that government isn't delivering infrastructure or services, especially in places where expectations of government are low. People take up arms against a government because they see that government as a threat to them. Building stuff and delivering services often doesn't address the causes of that perception, and if it's seen as a lever for insinuating government into local life can easily exacerbate that perception.

From the twitter "feed" of Dr. Steven Metz:

"The US needs four different COIN categories" (paraphrase) and the twitter links take you to the proposed categories.

Like anything from a Twitter feed that's a bit superficial, would be interesting to see how Dr Metz builds that case in a venue allowing more detail.

My first criticism would be, again, that these should be called "insurgency categories", not "COIN categories", because the moment we impose the term "COIN" we impose the assumption that there's something here that needs to be countered and countered by us. That I think is a bad place to start.

Second, I'm not completely compelled by the distinction between nations that do or do not share US priorities and objectives. Very few nations fall in one category or the other, most are somewhere in between, and categorizations may reflect the preferences of those doing the categorizing. Furthermore, the principal priority and objective of a government threatened by insurgency is usually survival. In the face of that threat they will typically claim to share the priorities and objectives of any nation from which they seek assistance, a claim that needs rigorous and cynical assessment.

Third, I think the model omits some critical distinctions, as a 4-part model must. Relative strength of insurgent and government and assessed survivability of host government are key. Even if a government shares (or claims to share) our priorities and objectives, if that government has minimal capacity and is clearly sinking, that has to affect our assessments. No point in trying to bail out a sinking ship. The extent of US interest in a given location also has to be part of any assessment on which US policy or action are to be based. Could go on, but that's enough...

[TheCurmudgeon]

I can see several mistakes. First, the very construction "COIN" assumes that insurgency is by definition something that needs to be countered. I think that's a mistake from the start.

I don't have a problem with that. You are either supporting the insurgency against a government or you are supporting a government against the insurgency (COIN). I think it is far to approach the problem differently depending on which side you are on.

More specifically, a great deal of our current COIN practice seems to be built around the assumption that our people going into a conflict environment and building stuff or delivering services is going to "win hearts and minds" for a government we want the people to support.

I didn't see anything in Metz's system that said that winning hearts and minds was part of the plan.

Like anything from a Twitter feed that's a bit superficial, would be interesting to see how Dr Metz builds that case in a venue allowing more detail.

I do like the idea that you need a palette of options from which to chose, so DR. Metz's concept is a step in the right direction. But I also don't like his system of categorization.

I did like his distinction between whether it was a strictly internal matter or whether the insurgents had external backing. External backing provides the insurgency assets and support to keep the fight going. I have seen at least one paper that claims that every successful insurgency had external support, but that is probably a bit of a wild overstatement.

Second, I'm not completely compelled by the distinction between nations that do or do not share US priorities and objectives. Very few nations fall in one category or the other, most are somewhere in between, and categorizations may reflect the preferences of those doing the categorizing.

I also take issues with it. The assumption being that we are either supporting the government or the insurgency -- back to my first comment. I don't believe that we would find ourselves in a position to be supporting a government that we were not somehow aligned with. Or maybe that was the point.

Third, I think the model omits some critical distinctions, as a 4-part model must. Relative strength of insurgent and government and assessed survivability of host government are key. Even if a government shares (or claims to share) our priorities and objectives, if that government has minimal capacity and is clearly sinking, that has to affect our assessments. No point in trying to bail out a sinking ship. The extent of US interest in a given location also has to be part of any assessment on which US policy or action are to be based. Could go on, but that's enough...

I will have to go back but there was an article that discussed the critical aspects of successful counterinsurgency operations. That is probably a good place to start.

[Dayuhan]

I don't have a problem with that. You are either supporting the insurgency against a government or you are supporting a government against the insurgency (COIN). I think it is far to approach the problem differently depending on which side you are on.

You can also decide not to get involved. The first and most important step in evaluating any insurgency situation is deciding if and to what extent involvement is appropriate. Starting out with the "COIN" term in mind creates, I think, a predisposition to assume that insurgency needs to be countered. That predisposition seems to me something that we'd do well to remove, and a start might be more emphasis on understanding insurgency and less on methods of counterinsurgency.

I didn't see anything in Metz's system that said that winning hearts and minds was part of the plan.

No, the first half of the post above did not refer to Dr Metz's system, that came about in the second half. I should probably stop replying to several posts in a single post. I do think that the assumption that "hearts and minds" can be "won" by building things and delivering services, rather than by fundamental changes in the nature of host governance, is fairly well entrenched in American COIN practice. I suspect that we often resort to projects and services when we haven't the capacity to reform host country governance, but I have serious doubts about the long-term effect.

I do like the idea that you need a palette of options from which to chose, so DR. Metz's concept is a step in the right direction. But I also don't like his system of categorization.

I like that idea too, as long as "just stay out of it" is included as an option.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

You can also decide not to get involved. The first and most important step in evaluating any insurgency situation is deciding if and to what extent involvement is appropriate. Starting out with the "COIN" term in mind creates, I think, a predisposition to assume that insurgency needs to be countered. That predisposition seems to me something that we'd do well to remove, and a start might be more emphasis on understanding insurgency and less on methods of counterinsurgency.

Agree, and there are other options also.

Irregular warfare is not the "new" way, but rather a continuation of the most common form of conflict (throughout most of history). The vast majority of times we wisely (and sometimes not so wisely) choose not to get involved at all. If we decide to get involved there are multiple forms of involvement that do not involve the U.S. military directly conducting COIN. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Engage with diplomacy in hopes of reaching a diplomatic settlement

2. Provide financial assistance to the government

3. Provide military equipment with no trainers or advisors

4. Proivide intelligence support

5. Put pressure on external actors providing support to the insurgents

6. Conduct the full spectrum of FID (to include U.S. combat operations).

7. The most extreme (and the rarest) option is for the U.S. to take ownership of the problem.

If we decide to support the insurgents, there are multiple options with varying levels of support ranging from the Libya example to Nicaragua to simply providing internationl legitimacy to the insurgents.

I'm beginning to think that many of those who didn't practice or study FID/UW/COIN prior to 9/11 are viewing the world through a much too narrow spectrum of history. Of course I can't know, but I think that both OIF and OEF-A over time will be viewed as abberations in history instead of the norm. The conflict with non-state actors will continue for at least a couple more decades, but largely facilitated by special operations (small foot print operations conducted by people actually selected, trained, and organized to conduct these operations) in concert with interagency partners and of course foreign partners. GPF will provide critical support, and at times be required to conduct larger scale combat operations than SOF can conduct.

Frequently not a popular opinion on SWJ, but the era of state wars and larger non-state actor formations will require that GPF maintain their higher end major combat skills. I think it is dangerous if we continue to distract GPF from this focus after the military invested so much in SOF to get after the IW problem set. GPF will also be required for large scale stability operations like OIF, OEF-A, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We're all guilty of wanting to chase the shinny thing (with $$$ attached), but in general our tax payers invested over the years invested in a wide range of military capabilities to defend the U.S.. It makes little sense to evolve an organization over decades to conduct irregular warfare, and then give the mission to organizations that were largely focused on winning the fight against conventional forces. There is much SOF can't do, we can't win a fight against a conventional force (we can provide valuable support). The Army, Air Force, and Marines devastated the Iraqi military, SOF couldn't do that. The Navy secures the Persian Gulf, SOF can't do that, etc.

This is relevant to the topic, because we tend to go over board on what we think we can accomplish when we put a large GPF unit on the ground. Once the combat is over, we try to employ them in a social engineering role (or with our new doctrine, before the combat is over) and then we're surprised that this effort doesn't work.