My observations from Afghanistan were that SF were some of the most effective units in-country for a variety of purposes, and they were successfully integrated with both US and NATO forces on numerous occasions during individual operations.

However, in an operational sense, there was a very real wall between the SOCOM, CJTF, and ISAF staffs. Even after NATO assumed control of operations throughout the country - and maybe especially after this - the efforts of the SF and the 'regular' forces were not properly synchronized. In simpler terms, at least in my opinion, the highly capable SF units operating in Afghanistan could have (and should have) been directed to higher-payoff missions.

I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.