Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
My belief is that doctrine has too often driven US strategy to the exclusion of the other parameters and, further, that doctrine is -- but should not be -- seen as so very important that it becomes an inflexible driver of means.

I also believe that the inflexibility thus induced permeates the defense establishment and effectively -- nowadays -- constrains strategic thought. We have become risk averse and use 'doctrine' as an excuse. A major US advantage in previous wars has been our ability to innovate and improvise. By paying excessive heed to 'doctrine' we have partly eliminated that significant advantage, constrained imaginative and resourceful leaders and encouraged mediocrity.

Anyone concerned about why Captains and Majors (not to mention SGTs and young SSG) are departing in large numbers -- and have been for many years, before 9/11, should take a hard look at that issue
I concur wholeheartedly that some seem to view the linkage between doctrine and strategy as a one-way, linear relationship, and one that tends to have a "materiel" step in-betweeen the two (part of my point in mentioning Doughty--the French 75 was poorly suited to the counterfire mission that would be imposed by a static war situation but it was not replaced as it was great for close support and quick displacement in a war of maximum offensive maneuver.)

My position is that doctrine and strategy are interrelated and ought to create a dynamoic that causes a continuous reassessment and revision of on based on what is (or isn't working) in the other. Wilf's last post indicates to me that he will disagree for he holds yet a third position on the definition of strategy

As to doctrine being used as an excuse for risk aversion, I submit that we have a doctrine which has risk aversion at its center rather than the other way around. Working with a doctrine that uses technology to reduce the risk of casualties has been with the US military for a long time--off the top of my head, I'd say since at least the end of the Civil War. (Please don't beat me up on this last point for I have nothing other than gut feel to support it right now.)

During the Cold War, we used to say that besides our technolgical edge, the thing that would allow us to win WWIII was the innovativenss of our junior officers and NCOs, that we, unlike our Soviet counterparts, were not hamstrung by an unthinking attachment to doctrine. I used to fear that this was not the case and think that Ken has similar fears based on his closing lines in the above quotation.