Brian Linn weighs in on Gentile vs. Nagl

[Ken White]

society that is essentially not war like -- most do not want to think about war (including a surprising number in uniform...) until they have to and thus they'll put it off as long as possible.

Apparently the DSB Summer 2008 Report report LINK discusses how well we do 'own goals.'

"One of the most revealing parts of the study is a top ten list of why the U.S. gets surprised at the strategic level.

* Thought we could respond without doing anything new

* Knew it was likely, understood the magnitude of the implications, but didn’t pursue it appropriately

* Did it to ourselves

* Believed they were not up to it

* Believed they wouldn’t dare

* Knew it might happen, but were trapped in own paradigms

* Didn’t imagine or anticipate the strategic impact

* Lost in the ’signal to noise’ of other possibilities

* Imagined it, but thought it was years away

* Were willing to take the risk that it wouldn’t happen. "

I particularly like the 6th and 3rd in that order...

[J Wolfsberger]

society that is essentially not war like -- most do not want to think about war (including a surprising number in uniform...) until they have to and thus they'll put it off as long as possible.

Apparently the DSB Summer 2008 Report report LINK discusses how well we do 'own goals.'I particularly like the 6th and 3rd in that order...

Which gets to the glaring omission from Linn's list: the Leader. The guy (or gal) who accepts the responsibilities of achieving a goal, formulating a plan, building a team, inspiring their efforts, and so on. All the Guardians, Heroes, and Managers in the world are going to exert a lot of effort with little return until the leader steps up and provides focus, a plan, and most of all, inspiration (or aspiration) to achieve the goal. (I'm omitting the Survivors since they don't contribute anything.)

Rumsfeld, since the 70s, has been an advocate for "Easy Button" warfare. He's the classic systems analyst who views humans as a messy, unpredictable part of the any system to be designed out at any opportunity. I don't know whether he distrusts leadership because he can't reduce it to numbers, or whether he simply doesn't believe it exists. But he seemed to play whack a mole any time leadership began to emerge (as it will in any group of people organized to complete a task or achieve a goal).


I'm reading Rick's book, "The Gamble." It wasn't until Keane took on the responsibility of leadership that the necessary step one of removing Rumsfeld took off. It wasn't until Petreus took command that the leadership was in place to uniformly apply the principles that had already been proven (McMasters, et.al.).

[Brian M. Linn]

I really appreciate the comments, but please keep in mind that the terms used in ECHO OF BATTLE (Guardians, Heroes, and Managers) refer to intellectual traditions within the US Army. They apply to how officers THINK about war in peacetime, not how they practice war. This typology is NOT a personality profile or a way to predict performance in combat. Someone who believes that martial virtues are the key determinant in warfare (a Hero) might behave like a Manager when in command (George C. Marshall might be an example). Thanks.

[Gian P Gentile]

I strongly commend Professor Linn's book, "Echo of Battle" to readers of this blog. It is tightly written, superbly argued, and a brilliant intellectual history of the US Army. This weekend I re-read Weigley's classic "The American Way of War," and will follow it up this week with a re-read of Brian's new classic, "Echo of Battle."

At a time when the American Army is thinking through contemporary operational and strategic problems, and is thinking hard about the future, Professor Linn's book should be at the top of any reading list on small wars or war and conflict in general.

I should also mention congratulations to Professor Linn for being sworn in as the new President of the Society for Military History.

[Steve Blair]

Already read it.

And actually, Ken, Linn doesn't really miss survivors. And as he pointed out, the book's more about philosophical structures and not so much individuals. That's another reason the "leader" profile doesn't exist as such.

And welcome aboard, Professor Linn.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Professor Linn, welcome and congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Society for Military History.

While I haven’t gotten to The Echo of Battle as of yet I have thoroughly enjoyed the professor’s other works:

The Philippine War, 1899-1902

The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902

Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940, which is my favorite of the three and should be read, together with Coffman’s The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941, for an appreciation of life in the Oooold Army.

[reed11b]

I really appreciate the comments, but please keep in mind that the terms used in ECHO OF BATTLE (Guardians, Heroes, and Managers) refer to intellectual traditions within the US Army. They apply to how officers THINK about war in peacetime, not how they practice war. This typology is NOT a personality profile or a way to predict performance in combat. Someone who believes that martial virtues are the key determinant in warfare (a Hero) might behave like a Manager when in command (George C. Marshall might be an example). Thanks.

The bright flash of light as I suddenly "got it" after reading the above caused my co-workers to ask if I was taking pictures. Thanx for assist Prof. Linn.
Reed

[CR6]

The bright flash of light as I suddenly "got it" after reading the above caused my co-workers to ask if I was tasking pictures. Thanx for assist Prof. Linn.
Reed

When I read Echo of Battle I had difficulty envisioning officers who fought heroically as "managers" (such as GEN DePuy). This post clarifies the distinction for me. Very valuable Professor. Thank you.