Watching the IDF (catch all)

[Rank amateur]

I am not disparaging Hezbollah for an inability to hold ground. I am correcting the perception that they successfully defended any villages - and when they did try, they were unable to do it, according to the men I have talked to.

No offense, but I think that the men you've talked to have too short of a time frame. Isreal isn't occupying any villages now.

how ever the idea that the IDF somehow lacked tactical or operational skill

I don't think that is the suggestion.

and was out fought by Hezbollah

That is the suggestion

then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.

To me, it appears as though Hezbollah inflicted sufficient fear to cause withdrawal. Like I said, that isn't necessary defeat, but if the war ends after one side withdraws, it certainly looks like defeat to me. Germany withdrew from France. WWI ended. Germany was defeated.

[William F. Owen]

Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

[Rank amateur]

Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

IMO

1) Realize that Hezbollah can't invade and hold Isreali territory
2) Repel cross border attacks without panic, because Hezbollah can't invade and hold Israeli territory .
3) Retaliate with bombings. (Objective: cause more pain to Hezbollah than Hezbollah inflicted on Israel.)
4) Accept the fact that Hezbollah can't be destroyed.
5) Enjoy the nice weather. Israel is a beautiful country.

[William F. Owen]

IMO

1) Realize that Hezbollah can't invade and hold Isreali territory
2) Repel cross border attacks without panic, because Hezbollah can't invade and hold Israeli territory .
3) Retaliate with bombings. (Objective: cause more pain to Hezbollah than Hezbollah inflicted on Israel.)
4) Accept the fact that Hezbollah can't be destroyed.
5) Enjoy the nice weather. Israel is a beautiful country.

1.) No but they can throw rockets and kidnap your people.
2.) Repel, OK, but how about killing them before they rocket and kidnap your people.
3.) What do you bomb? You can't bomb the Insurgents in Iraq so why would you bomb Hezbollah. Besides, the evidence is that this does not work. Other things work much better.
4.) That's asking a lot of the average Israeli, and their physical destruction is not required. Their consistent suppression is.
5.) Can't enjoy the weather if you spend all day in the shelters while the Arabs shoot Kasam at you. Ask the populations of Haifa, Kyriat Shimona, and Sderot.

[Rank amateur]

Their consistent suppression is.

Deterrence is sufficient. The problem is that some people can't accept deterrence. They'll have to learn, or as Abujnoub suggests resort to nuclear weapons or genocide.

[Rex Brynen]

Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?

I think we rarely have a collective opinion I'll give it a shot, though.

From the perspective of Israeli national security interests, a very much shorter air campaign, with much less targeting of civilian infrastructure (power station, bridges, gas stations, etc.), and possible a few well-aimed heliborne raids in "rear" areas. Then stop, declare victory, and let it wind down the way it usually winds down.

Hizballah's original snatch-and-grab was something of an uncharacteristic political blunder, which generated little enthusiasm in Lebanon. Indeed, it was striking how much political capital the first few days of the war cost Hizballah, even in the Shi'ite community.

However, as things dragged on and the target set grew, Lebanese opinion shifted almost 180 degrees. The party was thus saved from the folly of its own mistakes by even bigger Israeli blunders (the scope and nature of the IDF response), as well as Hizballah's ability to ride out the punishment.



Complicating things further now--and this properly belongs in a different thread--there are indications that UN cartographic reexamination of the "blue line" (to which Israel withdrew in 2000) has found that Hizballah may have been right, and the Israeli-occupied Shaba Farms area really is Lebanese (and not Syrian) territory. Oops.

Let's say this is true. Under present political circumstances, I don't foresee Israel acknowledging this or offering a Shaba withdrawal for fear that it will look like a Hizballah victory. Yet it also means that Hizballah will remain political resistant to anything the IDF might throw at them.

[William F. Owen]

From the perspective of Israeli national security interests, a very much shorter air campaign, with much less targeting of civilian infrastructure (power station, bridges, gas stations, etc.), and possible a few well-aimed heliborne raids in "rear" areas. Then stop, declare victory, and let it wind down the way it usually winds down.

I have no real quibble with that, except I would exclude all and any targeting of any civilian infrastructure. I'd have also left the International Airport alone.

...but how would have "declaring victory" stopped the clouds of rockets that would have occurred in the face any direct action - or how would you assess the "rocket threshold"

[William F. Owen]

Salem Aleikum, and Shalom Abujnoub.

Before we get into your post (and we will) go to his this link, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1441 and give us all some details about who you are and where you are coming from.

[Abujnoub]

Salem Aleikum, and Shalom Abujnoub.

Before we get into your post (and we will) go to his this link, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1441 and give us all some details about who you are and where you are coming from.

Done.

[tequila]

@ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.

So how exactly did the Mar 14 movement succeed in driving Syrian troops from Lebanon without a shot fired? They may be besieged, but the Mar 14 coalition is still in power in Lebanon, and certainly their names are being spoken quite often in Beirut and throughout the region.

I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).

[Rex Brynen]

I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).

I largely agree, Tequila. I do, however, think Hama/1982 does illustrate the utility of massive, raw brute force--when coupled with sustained and effective authoritarian controls. However, the fact that the Syrians couldn't use similar levels of brutality to maintain their position in Lebanon, to eliminate Arafat in Tripoli in 1983 (or to eliminate Fateh in Lebanon thereafter), or even to force their way into Sidon against the PLO/Joint Forces in 1976 highlights the constraints that even highly authoritarian countries face in using it.

No one will be using Hama levels of brutality (2-3% of the civilian population killed per week) in Lebanon (thank goodness!). Given this, I would suggest that "of course they can be destroyed" is an abstract possibility at most. We could also be on Mars in three years. We won't be.

Which gets back to the political puzzle of how best to "moderate" Hizballah's behaviour and gradually shift it away from armed activity. Here we face several problems. The first is that hopes of integration into Lebanese politics (including cabinet participation) leading to greater Hizballah moderation have been challenged both by its recklessness in sparking the war in 2006, and in its subsequent recklessness in trying to bring down the Siniora government (although I'll add that not all of their gripes are without foundation). Second, and as I've suggested before, resolution of the Shaba Farms issue--something that might also facilitate the demilitarization of the movement--is much more remote in 2008 than it was before 2006. Finally, in the absence of a Israeli-Syrian peace deal the Syrians have no interest in a demilitarized Hizballah, and in the current context of Iranian-US relations, nor do the Iranians. Quite the contrary.

[Rex Brynen]

Unless the Lebanese Armed Forces are the ones to make the attempt, then it doesn't matter....

In order to keep things neat (and since this was originally an IDF COIN discussion), I've posted by response to this Lebanon thread.

[Jedburgh]

JCPA, Apr 08: Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience

Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among which are control of the ground where the insurgency is being waged, acquiring relevant intelligence for operations against the terrorists themselves, and isolating the insurgency from cross-border reinforcement with manpower or material. It will also examine the factors that can help drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgent forces seeking its support. The principles of war will also be analyzed in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare to show how they still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror. Finally, the study warns that if the U.S., Israel, or their Western allies incorrectly conclude that they have no real military option against terrorist insurgencies – out of a fear that these conflicts inevitably result in an unwinnable quagmire – then the war on terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged......

Complete 42 page paper at the link.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories

.....This article assumes that the government’s response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government’s response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency’s level of organization and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also played a role. Still, “of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.” This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.....

[William F. Owen]

JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories

Good article.

However I have serious doubts about the contention that the US can learn from the IDF experience in relation to the West Bank and Gaza, and apply it in Iraq. The circumstances of each are simply too dissimilar.

[William F. Owen]

To me, it appears as though Hezbollah inflicted sufficient fear to cause withdrawal. Like I said, that isn't necessary defeat, but if the war ends after one side withdraws, it certainly looks like defeat to me. Germany withdrew from France. WWI ended. Germany was defeated.

Well if that was the case it could be said that the IDF caused sufficient fear to halt rocket attacks from the Lebanon. The fighting may have stopped but the war is ongoing.

IMO withdrawal does not define any aspect of defeat. The sole criteria I use to define defeat is permanent, collective, physical, and psychological withdrawal from combat. And that stands for COIN as well as larger conflicts.

[Rank amateur]

IMO withdrawal does not define any aspect of defeat.

I agree, but IMO when the attacker withdraws it does indicate that the defenders have successfully defended their territory.

The sole criteria I use to define defeat is permanent, collective, physical, and psychological withdrawal from combat. And that stands for COIN as well as larger conflicts.

I fully admit that I don't know the official definitions of many terms, and I appreciate being allowed to contribute even though I don't, but I think there's some problems with the word permanent. Germany's withdrawal from France in 1918 wasn't permanent.