The UK in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

I too have read over a long period Simon Jenkins work, way back to The Falklands (co-author of a book with Max Hastings), when he was at The Economist, The Sunday Times and more. He often writes well and was a man of influence in Whitehall / Westminster. His public appearances on BBC programmes were predictable "Notting Hill" liberalism and a mid-Atlantic stance.

The point he made in the cited article was / is similar to zero budgeting, why do we need to spend X. Even after a number of defence reviews and cuts there is a perception that there remains "fat". I doubt if any of the reviews envisaged the UK would have 10k personnel in Afghanistan in 2010, reliant on an air bridge and overland private haulage along Pakistani roads.

[JMA]

Well I'm in favour of asking the question. If the US can do 1 year tours, why not us, but why do we want to do this?

Yes I know this Afghanistan business is really getting in the way of normal peacetime army routine. A real bother.

I would suggest that it would be indicative of a professional army to take a war that's sapping the morale of the army and the nation and bleeding the treasury dry to either seriously or get out... and fast.

All I have seen in support is very simplistic stuff about "knowing the ground" and experience. This isn't stuff we can guess at. We have to have some very solid data on which to base opinions.

There are none so deaf as those...

The point is simply that this 'little' war is merely an opportunity (it seems) to spread a little war experience around. A new brigadier ever 6 months, a bunch of new COs every 6 months and even more OCs every 6 months. Good for the CVs and maybe a few gongs thrown in.

Ever so thankful to the regiments for fitting in a quick tour of Afghanistan every 2 years... and hell with operational continuity.

To discount the value of operational continuity and knowledge of theater so as to excuse a bad system of allocating forces to the war is really disappointing.

OK, you'll have no problems getting the bayonets to do their 1 x 1 yr tour. You may have real issues getting 3rd tour seniors to ever come back to theatre, so the "experience" gets lost. Put all that into a 9 year cycle (1 on, 2 off) and the levels of experience in any given BG have eroded to nothing. IIRC come the Falklands 10th anniversary, there were only 14 men in 2 PARA who had deployed on Corporate.

Now this is getting interesting.

What is being said here? Why would you have trouble getting 3rd tour seniors back?

I could accept that the current arrangement could be excused because the military did not know how long this whole Afghanistan deal would go on for, but my gut tells me it is more a case of trying to give the impression that the army is taking the Afghanistan thingy in its stride. The arrogance thing again.

In such circumstances the continuity comes through the corporals/sgts/CSMs with some more at Capt/Maj/Lt Col level (with over time some of the platoon cmdrs making a come-back at Capt and even Maj level depending on how long the war lasts). The private soldiers will be where the churn takes place.

The trick is to maintain and develop your NCOs as the backbone supporting your Capts/Majs/Lt Cols and select your Platoon Cmdrs very very carefully (you don't have time for the luxury of allowing brand new officers to find their feet under the guidance of an experienced platoon sgt).

Strange to hear you argue that all experience is lost over a relatively short time and from elsewhere we hear that so few officers read the COIN doctrine (and presumably the lessons learned from previous conflicts) yet arrive in a new theatre claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts (which the troops deployed in fact know very little about).

[JMA]

This depends on terrain, some nations cannot make good enough use of combined arms formations to justify their costs.

Yes and where would this Brit armoured div operate? Certainly not at home. Certainly in conjunction with other nations and under command of Uncle Sam. So whats the point?

[Fuchs]

Yes and where would this Brit armoured div operate? Certainly not at home. Certainly in conjunction with other nations and under command of Uncle Sam. So whats the point?

The Brits are in an alliance that covers many different terrains.
Many nations are not in alliances, and don't have much tank-friendly terrain.
Peru, for example.

The point was that his assertion was too general.

[JMA]

Combined Arms Armour is the core of any modern army, unless you want to run strategic risk based on opinion.

Well... one mans opinion is better than the next's?

In a more perfect world one would like to see the Brits having the wherewithall to maintain an adequate navy/army/air force to cater for 'all seasons'. But Britain is close to bankrupt so logically it is not possible.

The best course of action IMHO is to maintain the skeleton without having all the fresh on the bones. When better times come it is easier to bring in the the bayonets than to reconstruct the formation structures.

Jenkins is correct in questioning the actual risk/s facing Britain. How long for example will the Brits maintain 2,000 troops on the Falklands waiting for the next invasion?

[JMA]

The Brits are in an alliance that covers many different terrains.
Many nations are not in alliances, and don't have much tank-friendly terrain.
Peru, for example.

The point was that his assertion was too general.

Yes, there is NATO but like the other member states the Brits can only offer/promise/supply force levels they can afford, yes?

The (my) point is that the Brits are having a hard time accepting they no longer have an empire which they must be able to defend or control through some good old style "gun boat diplomacy". The past is the past, it is over, gone, done, finished... time to move on.

[William F. Owen]

Yes I know this Afghanistan business is really getting in the way of normal peacetime army routine. A real bother.

OK for you. Not your mates in theatre.
Those of us who have been actively engaged with proposing solutions and ideas over the last 7-8 years never paid much attention to "peace time army routine."

To discount the value of operational continuity and knowledge of theater so as to excuse a bad system of allocating forces to the war is really disappointing.

You are lumping "experience" into one big heap. For real it doesn't work that way. You may get to know the ground really well on one patch, and then get moved to another. Knowing people falls under that issue as well. Continuity has to have relevance and application.
Blindly assuming that another 6 months on the same patch, somehow translates in operational benefit, is twaddle. Suppose that after that 6 months, you move to a new FOB? You start all over again.
That's the difference between being "familiar with the ground" and having a well drilled "Familiarisation process".

Now this is getting interesting.

Can't see how. This is normal stuff.

What is being said here? Why would you have trouble getting 3rd tour seniors back?

Go see Red Rats answer.
Got married, got kids, fought their war, better money outside. Wife will leave if they go away for another year. All the normal stuff that goes on in real armies.
Yes, we had few 7-9 tour beasts from the NI days, but they were a very small percentage of the units and were mostly doing 4-month tours.

Strange to hear you argue that all experience is lost over a relatively short time and from elsewhere we hear that so few officers read the COIN doctrine (and presumably the lessons learned from previous conflicts) yet arrive in a new theatre claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts (which the troops deployed in fact know very little about).

There's 2 different issues here. Not all experience is of the same value or relevance. You may be a Platoon Commander on one tour and be back in Brigade HQ on the next.
I do not know any officer "claiming to be armed with the experience of all these previous conflicts." Who ever said that?

Some experience is relevant. Fact is a VCP drill that worked in Bosnia/NI, will need to be modified for Helmand. If you've never done a VCP drill, then you're starting from scratch.
If you are Vallon trained, then that training will work for all theatres. Updates from theatre come from OPTAG.

COIN doctrine is another issue all together. IMO, having COIN Doctrine is an utter waste of time and reading it does not make it useful or relevant. Doctrine is written, but you do not learn it just by reading. Doctrine has to be taught.

[JMA]

JMA:

Where did you come up with that earth-shattering idea?

Don't you understand that its the rotational nature of random assignments that keeps everything moving forward?

How can we do ten years in Afghanistan one year at a time if you keep the same volunteered core consistency and competency throughout?

No other response I note. I guess this is the very mindset which places ISAF forces always taking a a few steps forward on the learning curve only to take a few back again after that particular tour. Nothing moving forward in Afghanistan.

And the thought behind your third sentence is?

[JMA]

Blindly assuming that another 6 months on the same patch, somehow translates in operational benefit, is twaddle.

That's it? Just twaddle? No attempt to explain the statement?

What I am saying is that semi permanent deployment to Helmand in Afghanistan (with short R&R breaks) would be many times more effective than the current swanning in and out for six months every two years.

"Twaddle" doesn't work, prove me wrong.

Why does one join the army?

So if there are those who would rather leave than do what they have been training for and paid for let them go and earlier rather than later. Or maybe we have inadvertently identified another problem that bedevils the Brit army here? War shy and using mommy and the kids as an excuse?

Now 30 years after a shi**y little war in a shi**y little African country we are trying to figure why there has been such a low incidence of PTSD among those who were in the thick of it continually over a number of years. Maybe simple conclusions like more war time must equal more PTSD need to be reconsidered, yes?

[davidbfpo]

Not unexpected:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10360705.stm

Note:

Some 34 of the 300 deaths have been from accidents, illness or non-combat injuries....Another 1,282 UK military and civilian personnel have been wounded in action since 2006, including about 388 who suffered serious or life-threatening injuries. Of those, 120 lost limbs.

I have shortened the BBC's Security Correspondent's accompanying column:

Put simply, Nato doesn't have years to play with, it has months... What it means is that the Nato-led coalition will need to show demonstrable progress in the south - and soon - if the generals wish to retain their countries' political backing.

Sorry, that time has passed.

Another viewpoint and note the emphasis on Sangin before Kandahar: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...h-solider-dies

[davidbfpo]

A long article by Max Hastings on the UK defence review and added here as it contains a previously unheard of "insider" report. The link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...e-afford.thtml

The report:

A few months ago, for instance, Captain John Bethell of the Welsh Guards produced a formidably sceptical report, after serving as an intelligence officer in Helmand.

‘As an army,’ he wrote, ‘and as armed forces more generally, we have come to place increasing confidence in technological solutions — sensors and platforms — yet we have only begun to grapple with the task of engaging with the civilian population...

‘British forces, without an effective doctrine, rotate rapidly through six-month tours, with limited continuity, and pay lip-service to Northern Ireland experience without examining it in depth... Our forces today are “accidental counter-insurgents” — neither purpose-made for, nor ideologically committed to, the operations in which we find ourselves embroiled.’

Bethell’s strictures, whether justified or not, reflect a belief within the army that there is plenty of scope for doing things better. It was generals, not politicians, who in 2006 decreed the rash emphasis on holding fixed positions in Afghanistan such as Sangin at high cost.

Google refuses to locate the cited report and I suspect it appeared in a 'leak'. Note the author served with the Welsh Guards in 2009, when their C.O. was killed by an IED.

[William F. Owen]

That's it? Just twaddle? No attempt to explain the statement?

As I said, you cannot assume that X-amount of time = X+ in "knowing the ground," and that translates into an overall benefit.

What I am saying is that semi permanent deployment to Helmand in Afghanistan (with short R&R breaks) would be many times more effective than the current swanning in and out for six months every two years.

That may be entirely appropriate for certain people, in certain roles. I have no problem with upping the UK commitment to 1 year tours. THE problem is, no one actually knows the flow down effects on an Army "with NO MONEY" - what about that repeated point on a man power capped deployment do you keep missing.

Maybe simple conclusions like more war time must equal more PTSD need to be reconsidered, yes?

No. Clearly you know very little about PTSD, and have very little understanding of the issue.

[JMA]

The report:

Google refuses to locate the cited report and I suspect it appeared in a 'leak'. Note the author served with the Welsh Guards in 2009, when their C.O. was killed by an IED.

"‘British forces, without an effective doctrine, rotate rapidly through six-month tours, with limited continuity, and pay lip-service to Northern Ireland experience without examining it in depth... Our forces today are “accidental counter-insurgents” — neither purpose-made for, nor ideologically committed to, the operations in which we find ourselves embroiled."

The above quotation is bang-on. The issue is really what the Brits are going to do about it. Muddle-on or take the problem by the scruff of the neck.

[JMA]

As I said, you cannot assume that X-amount of time = X+ in "knowing the ground," and that translates into an overall benefit.

Yes I can. And can extend that to the meaning of terrain in the widest (not the narrowest sense), add knowledge of enemy, add knowledge of population etc etc. All this leads to greater operational continuity. Invaluable.

That may be entirely appropriate for certain people, in certain roles. I have no problem with upping the UK commitment to 1 year tours. THE problem is, no one actually knows the flow down effects on an Army "with NO MONEY" - what about that repeated point on a man power capped deployment do you keep missing.

Well it is rather more important that the 'gap' between tours is short than merely the length of the tours themselves. A year tour with a year gap is better than the current system but not as good as say a 6 month tour followed by 4 months R&R and retraining.

No. Clearly you know very little about PTSD, and have very little understanding of the issue.

Oh, so because I don't agree with your position on PTSD it is me who does not understand?

What I'm saying is that if there is to be a certain percentage of soldiers who are predisposed to PTSD then one needs to learn to live with the effect of that percentage... or try to identify those with this predisposition before sending them off to war. and, and, and.

So if you (or the Brits or both) have got this PTSD all sewn up then why are the PTSD problems continuing?

[William F. Owen]

Yes I can. And can extend that to the meaning of terrain in the widest (not the narrowest sense), add knowledge of enemy, add knowledge of population etc etc. All this leads to greater operational continuity. Invaluable.

So double the time on the ground within 12 months = +2 x the effectiveness?
Yes, you may want SMEs and IO who are intimate with terrain and personalities, but that is another issue.
Operational continuity? Surely that has a lot to do with the hand over, and the relief procedures?

Well it is rather more important that the 'gap' between tours is short than merely the length of the tours themselves. A year tour with a year gap is better than the current system but not as good as say a 6 month tour followed by 4 months R&R and retraining.

There are 5/6+ Inf BGs in theatre. The UK has about 30 deployable Infantry battalions. There is a man power ceiling in theatre and huge budget restrictions. - given you know all this how does that work? You cycle the same Infantry battalions year on, year off?

Oh, so because I don't agree with your position on PTSD it is me who does not understand?

Based on what you say, yes. I grew up watching PTSD wreck the lives of men who fought in WW2. I also have 5-6 friends afflicted with it, with varying degrees.

What I'm saying is that if there is to be a certain percentage of soldiers who are predisposed to PTSD then one needs to learn to live with the effect of that percentage... or try to identify those with this predisposition before sending them off to war. and, and, and.

You cannot predict who falls to PTSD, nor how it will manifest itself, when or where or to what degree. Comparatively small things can lead to PTSD. I know of one man, severely traumatised from just one bad day in Northern Ireland. - and I am talking about real trauma, not just "re-integration" or adjustment issues.

So if you (or the Brits or both) have got this PTSD all sewn up then why are the PTSD problems continuing?

No one has it sewn up. Not the UK, the US or even the Israelis - who have done a good deal of research on it. There is a huge amount of literature on the subject. I would suggest reading some of it before going any further.
Point being a the damage is just as likely to be done in a 4 month tour, as it is in an 18 month tour. - something recognised as far back as 1917.

[Chris jM]

Some open-source statistics on causes of casualties. Make of it what you will.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...s-2006092.html

More soldiers have been killed by small arms fire in the past four months than in the whole of any previous year. While deaths by bullet accounted for just 13 per cent of those killed in combat in 2009, that figure has risen to almost 40 per cent in recent months.

[JMA]

Some open-source statistics on causes of casualties. Make of it what you will.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...s-2006092.html

I quote:
"Most worrying is the indication that a proportion of these were accurate single shots from sharpshooters, or even trained snipers, rather than the traditionally haphazard "spray and pray" method used by the locally recruited Taliban."

This is the logical result of catching soldiers out in the open and watching them stay in the Barma lane out in the open. So eventually they find a few guys who can actually shoot and issue them with weapons which are effective over ranges of more than 500m.

This seems very localised. Sangin. Could this mean a couple of old guys have brought their Lee-Enfield's to the party or that they have brought a couple of marksmen in (or sent some locals for training elsewhere?).

I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues. A sniper gets taken out????? I guess now the Brit snipers know that its back to basics in terms of see without being seen (an expensive lesson learned).

[JMA]

There's 2 different issues here. Not all experience is of the same value or relevance. You may be a Platoon Commander on one tour and be back in Brigade HQ on the next.

Well having had the experience as a platoon commander on the ground this officer would be of more value at Bde HQ than one on his first tour, yes?

(Note: didn't make this point at the time of my first reply so thought I would come back and do so now.)

[William F. Owen]

I say it again (with tears in my eyes) what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues.

Why tears? You have no dog in this fight. You're not engaged with the problem in any way. The British Army is not your Army. You're a spectator.
Why not stop being a tourist start telling us what all the men in theatre are doing so wrong?

[Steve the Planner]

Somehow, I think our whole debate is about the wrong thing.

The best Counter-Insurgents are, like the Gestapo or the old-time New York Beat Cop, the guy who lived and breathed the neighborhood his whole life, went to school there, knows every kid from the playground, and every new person who comes around.

I recall sitting in Baghdad with an Iraqi colonel discussing an operational issue under another colonel's turf. During break, an aide explained that the two had worked together most of their lives, and the depth and nuances of what was driving all the issues behind the issues.

What we are trying to do in Afghanistan is a work-around for the fact that we have no such effective local engagement/participation/knowledge-base. Nor are we from there or likely to stay there.

So, isn't the debate really about how, since we really do not have those key assets to do the job well, we find ways to do the best that can be done?

Or should it really be about either: (1) Whether those real limitations pose an insurmountable obstacle?; or (2) What is the priority to surmount the real obstacles?

How practical is our goal (especially within the RoE) absent substantial local content? Is there a path to legitimate and effective local content (probably a very case-by-case basis)? What is the likelihood of fair and reasonable local content that will not, in turn, create as many unintended detrimental consequences?