Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Debating Jihadi YouTube Videos

[Dayuhan]

I would not. As you say it's "normal." I'd just do nothing. Normal is already there.

If the situation was "normal" you wouldn't be there, no? I'm assuming that your objective is to return an abnormal situation to something approaching normality.

..but that assumes that the insurgent has the bones of a legitimate grievance. In the case of the UK, if some young Muslim thinks the UK should leave Afghanistan, nothing the UK Government can say will stop him opting for violence, if he wishes, except the concept of sanction and/or retribution.

You're not only targeting the committed insurgent who has already make up his mind. If there's doubt in the mind of an insurgent or an insurgent supporter, you want that doubt to grow. If someone is considering joining or supporting, you want to provide reasons not to. Lot of people out there who are, to one extent or another, on the fence.

Of course in any given situation you need to know who you're targeting and what kind of information might have an impact on their decision-making process. Generalized "we're good they're bad" stuff is not likely to be effective, neither is coming off like a used car salesman.

[William F. Owen]

If someone is considering joining or supporting, you want to provide reasons not to. Lot of people out there who are, to one extent or another, on the fence.

OK, but that assumes the person you are engaging with will make a rational choice, based on facts or argument. My experience is that folks almost never do that
....which is why I see very little utility in debating issues that people are trying to settle via violence.

[Erich G. Simmers]

Why discourse? This isn't a debate. You don't have a discourse with drug dealers do you?

Why not just do what harms them most within the constraints of the policy? Break their will. Make their life misery. Harass them.

Are they worth it and can you can change the law to allow it is another question.

It seems as though you are assuming that the discourse is an "enemy-centric" one. Moreover, you seem to be assuming that the enemy tp be engaged is a monolithic, irreconcilable one. Not only are you engaging a discourse with friendly and neutral populations, you are also engaging elements of the enemy whose motives for joining the insurgency may be as varied as following the family tradition of fighting the Soviets, leveraging their own political ambitions, a source of income, or a genuine politico-religious calling. Or they may be a violent psychopath. In all of the above cases, we are going to have to engage the larger discourse which all of these actors (friendly, neutral, or enemy) are participating.

In this sense, I would argue it is very much a debate. Even at the most tactical level, there is a discourse that occurs in the battlespace between all elements of the population including those sympathetic, neutral, and hostile to American interests. If, as one example, the Taliban posits that they offer law and order in the face of American imperialism, then there is an absolute need to counter that message in words and deeds. This discourse will occur whether we engage or not--and not simply on a tactical level but also a strategic one. The Taliban makes their case to both a local and global audience. If we don't make an effort to control this discourse, then our enemies will.

After all, what is the goal of this harassment you mentioned? How close are we to breaking their will? Frankly, Al Qaeda has done a much better job harassing us than we have them. Those "printer" bombs shipped from Yemen were cheaper than the man-hours to operate a Reaper and the Hellfire dropped on some terrorist safe haven, and they have a more disruptive affect on our social and political system. Everyone who passes through domestic airline security is reminded of their global reach. Billions are spent reacting (and overreacting) to yesterday's threats. Whose will is closer to breaking? Of course, I am not speaking of warfighters' will but the larger, more diffuse American political will.

There are not enough missiles, bullets, and warfighters to kill everyone willing to do violence to the United States. More importantly, the threat of violence has done very little to deter any number of state and non-state actors whose very existence often depends on an antagonism with this country. Counterintuitively, I would argue it is cheaper and easier to erode their political base through a combination of words and action. This is particularly true in terms of engaging the populations in which insurgent groups receive support.

To return to the "cyber" element of this discussion, it is very difficult to disrupt an enemy's message via the Internet for reasons I have already stated. Isn't the point of counterterrorism to disrupt terrorist networks? What if that network is the Internet, a resilient, distributed global system designed to withstand nuclear attack and upon which the United State is increasingly dependent? We can't simply pull the plug. Our enemies are leveraging this system whether it be WikiLeaks' subversion, distributing bomb-making materials, or communicating a broader political message. Why not counter the message where we can? If we are going to mix in offensive action taking down sites and info ops, there is a need for a change in mindset.

On the U. S. Naval Institute Blog, poster "galrahn" had a great piece on this called "24th Air Force Defeated in Modern Information War" point to the failures of the American military and civilian reaction to "cyber" information operations. It is very much worth reading.

OK, but that assumes the person you are engaging with will make a rational choice, based on facts or argument. My experience is that folks almost never do that
....which is why I see very little utility in debating issues that people are trying to settle via violence.

While I am not one to argue for the universal rationality of human beings, it is reductive to argue that all groups fight within--for example--Afghanistan are not making rational choices. What of the Afghan family who sends one son to fight with the ANA and another to fight with the Taliban to hedge their bets against all possible outcomes? What about the Afghan who turns to the Taliban because the central government is too corrupt? These choices seem hyper-rational to me. By denying any rationality, you are ignoring a tactical and strategic imperative in my humble opinion.

[Fuchs]

I misread
"Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Debating Jihadi YouTube Videos "
as
"Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Defeating Jihadi YouTube Videos "
and it reminded me of the G.I.Joe action figure "hostage".
That was probably (the blueprint for) a great info war coup.