What we support and defend

[Ken White]

...we have the same two citizens and they have differing ideas. Should the ideas of citizens be weighed upon the merits of the ideas, or should the ideas be weighed upon what the citizens have done in the past? I think the variant ideas should be weighed upon the merits of the ideas themselves, not the rep of those who hold them.

I'd opt for basing the decision on the merit of the ideas. Thus, you lose. Bob's idea is to return in large measure to a formula that worked well for the US for the bulk of our 225 years. Yours, as nearly as I can ascertain, is to maintain the status quo -- a status you continually denigrate -- and / or expanding the Navy.

Personally, I think both your ideas have merit but I also think neither is in accord with political reality...

The likely outcome is a melding of both ideas with a slight tilt towards the Bob solution.

That's all an aside, I intruded due to this misperception:

In Desert Storm we moved a very large force very quickly half way around the world because the civilian leaders thought that is what we should do....I do remember reading that it was a good thing the big army from the cold war was still around.

Your recall of part of what you read is, as always, correct but your summation as occurs frequently is not. That BTW is not an insult nor is it an indication of lack of sophistication or even of ignorance, it is an indicator IMO of nothing more than a lack of experience in the mechanical aspects of fighting wars.

The bulk of the troops in DS/DS came from Europe as the to be disbanded VII Corps was moved from Germany to Saudi Arabia. It bears mentioning that the Corps was inactivated immediately after DS/DS and the large Cold War Army largely disappeared very quickly. That Army continued to disappear in smaller increments for the next nine years plus, the decline in numbers being halted only by the attacks of 9/11/01

However, your major error is "quickly" though I acknowledge that word is relative -- in the context of DS/DS, it was 'quick' only because Saddam Hussein was not very smart. Had he attacked early on and in force, even with the Iraqi Army in the sad state that it was, the outcome might have been very different. It was nice of him to allow us over six months to get deployed, train and organize for the limited objective attack . To any military guy, that six months is not quick. Picture, for example, the difference in actions during the six months from December 1941 until June 1942...

[carl]

I'd opt for basing the decision on the merit of the ideas. Thus, you lose.

Yes I do, in Ken's opinion. But "as usual, others will make up their own minds. Fortunately."

That's all an aside, I intruded due to this misperception:Your recall of part of what you read is, as always, correct but your summation as occurs frequently is not. That BTW is not an insult nor is it an indication of lack of sophistication or even of ignorance, it is an indicator IMO of nothing more than a lack of experience in the mechanical aspects of fighting wars.

The bulk of the troops in DS/DS came from Europe as the to be disbanded VII Corps was moved from Germany to Saudi Arabia. It bears mentioning that the Corps was inactivated immediately after DS/DS and the large Cold War Army largely disappeared very quickly. That Army continued to disappear in smaller increments for the next nine years plus, the decline in numbers being halted only by the attacks of 9/11/01

However, your major error is "quickly" though I acknowledge that word is relative -- in the context of DS/DS, it was 'quick' only because Saddam Hussein was not very smart. Had he attacked early on and in force, even with the Iraqi Army in the sad state that it was, the outcome might have been very different. It was nice of him to allow us over six months to get deployed, train and organize for the limited objective attack . To any military guy, that six months is not quick. Picture, for example, the difference in actions during the six months from December 1941 until June 1942...

Like you say, quickly is relative. It took a lot longer to move sufficient forces to invade Normandy to England, and that is a shorter distance. A large part of that time was taken in up in creating the forces that didn't exist. VII Corps existed. And also that big pre-existing cold war army used to practice moving as fast as it could (fast of course being reletive) from one continent to another as best it could. So having that big about to be reduced army in existence was a bit of an advantage I think.

Six months was a long time in 1942. So it was lucky we had started to build up forces well before then. Existing forces helped us a lot then just as they helped us a lot in 1991.

Saddam was kind of dopey.

I you are having trouble ascertaining my position, you should ask me.

[Ken White]

I (sic) you are having trouble ascertaining my position, you should ask me.

However, your penchant for making analogies from history that bear only a superficial resemblance to each other and then drawing conclusions for the future from those analogies sure muddies a lot of water...

Comparing Normandy to DS/DS other than that both involved the US and others and each entailed an invasion is not particularly advantageous to your position -- whatever it is.

[carl]

However, your penchant for making analogies from history that bear only a superficial resemblance to each other and then drawing conclusions for the future from those analogies sure muddies a lot of water...

Comparing Normandy to DS/DS other than that both involved the US and others and each entailed an invasion is not particularly advantageous to your position -- whatever it is.

Is there a question in there somewhere or don't you want to ask me what my position is?

Superficial resemblance to each other only if you take a superficial gander at it. Allow me to guide your gaze. See in 1942 there wasn't a well equipped fairly well trained military force available to send to England. We had started working on it but basically it didn't exist. We had to create it and equip it before we could send it to England. That took time. If there had been a big, well equipped, fairly well trained force available in 1942 we could have sent it to England a lot sooner where it might have done some good, sooner. In 1991 there was a big well equipped, fairly well trained military force available courtesy of the cold war. So we could send it to the area in only a few months and it was able to do good a lot sooner than if we had to train up and equip almost from scratch, thereby illustrating an advantage of having a large, well equipped, fairly well trained force hanging around.

[Ken White]

Is there a question in there somewhere or don't you want to ask me what my position is?

Nah, no question, merely a statement -- and no, not particularly

Superficial resemblance to each other only if you take a superficial gander at it. Allow me to guide your gaze...So we could send it to the area in only a few months and it was able to do good a lot sooner than if we had to train up and equip almost from scratch, thereby illustrating an advantage of having a large, well equipped, fairly well trained force hanging around.

Gee, really? Who knew...

As point of minor interest, while your basic point is acknowledged -- indeed, it was never in question -- the fact remains that the only similarities were US involvement and an invasion was to occur. The differences in number of troops involved, the scale of combat to be undertaken, the resources and supplies available and provided, transportation and communication improvements and the global political and military situations make that analogy not only superficial but suspect and sorely subject to misinterpretaion. Not least that you left out North Africa where a large US military force was operating in 1942 -- and you apparently ignored the geopolitics that made that the case...

If, however, you believe there's a lesson to be learned there, by all means go for it. Good luck with convincing others. I can't help with that, I'm too busy chuckling.

[carl]

As point of minor interest, while your basic point is acknowledged -- indeed, it was never in question -- the fact remains that the only similarities were US involvement and an invasion was to occur. The differences in number of troops involved, the scale of combat to be undertaken, the resources and supplies available and provided, transportation and communication improvements and the global political and military situations make that analogy not only superficial but suspect and sorely subject to misinterpretaion. Not least that you left out North Africa where a large US military force was operating in 1942 -- and you apparently ignored the geopolitics that made that the case...

Well lets see. Maybe the difference, logistical that is, were not all that great and there are valid comparisons to be made. The Iraqis attacked in the beginning of August and by the end of September there were around 200,000 American troops of various kinds in Saudi Arabia to prevent further attacks. That was quite an accomplishment, a fast accomplishment no matter what time frame you are working with. When the ground war got going there were almost 700,000 Americans hanging around over there ready to do harm to Saddam. I don't know if that figure includes Navy and USMC people hanging around offshore. That is a lot of people. Even more force when you consider how much firepower they had.

Now we can't exactly compare a quick little war fought mostly with what we had on hand to WWII when the entire nation mobilized for years but it is useful to compare some things. Operation Torch started in Nov. 1942 almost a year after the war started and there were about 60,000 American troops landed. Many more followed of course but we couldn't put an especially large force on the beach even almost a year after the war started. And they were not very good at what they did. So that big army in being was able to put an immensely greater amount of combat power much more rapidly than the Army could do in WWII. Which was my point.

As far as Normandy goes, I just read that on D+11 there were about 326,000 Allied troops onshore. That 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia by the end of Sept compares quite favorably to that. So maybe you can compare to a small extent the numbers of men and amount of resources deployed especially when you consider the time frames, years on the one hand, months on the other, involved. The point being again that it helps to have a large Army in being if you want to invade a place quick.

If, however, you believe there's a lesson to be learned there, by all means go for it.

Obviously the situations were not exactly parallel, but if you insist on exact parallels you will never be able to learn anything from history.

Good luck with convincing others. I can't help with that, I'm too busy chuckling.

I wander the world spreading joy and merriment. It is what I do.

[Ken White]

When the ground war got going there were almost 700,000 Americans hanging around over there ready to do harm to Saddam. I don't know if that figure includes Navy and USMC people hanging around offshore.

It does and it also includes the USAF and USCG and further includes all those near but not in the theater who were supporting -- to include the VII Corps Rear Detachments in Germany...

For comparison purposes, the Army's Troop Basis for 1942 was 2M initially and that was raised in March to 5M. The Army ended the year in December 1942 with 5,397,674. There were at the time 74 Divisions for the two ocean - two front war and a little less than half, about 30 Divisions (a net of of a little over 1.5M soldiers counting Division slices) were nominally combat ready.

On 30 September 1991, the Army's total strength, worldwide, was 725,445. US on the ground troop strength in Kuwait (and Sailors and Marines afloat in the Gulf) as well as the large USAF contingent never exceeded 500K; the Amy provided about 375K (about 140.000 RC) and was only able to do that because of the 'availability' of VII Corps. Had their continued presence been required in Europe, things would have been different. It is noteworthy that the DS/DS troop strengths were about double Operation Iraqi Freedom strengths.

As an aside and FYI, DS/DS was a total aberration in all aspects of combat. It is not a good example to use for hardly anything pertaining to warfare -- or military logistics. That's not a Ken White opinion, it's a stated Army position that few disagree with.

Now we can't exactly compare a quick little war fought mostly with what we had on hand to WWII when the entire nation mobilized for years...

You're a master of understatement.

...but it is useful to compare some things.

Always -- but which things are selected is important.

Operation Torch started in Nov. 1942 almost a year after the war started and there were about 60,000 American troops landed. Many more followed of course but we couldn't put an especially large force on the beach even almost a year after the war started. And they were not very good at what they did. So that big army in being was able to put an immensely greater amount of combat power much more rapidly than the Army could do in WWII. Which was my point.

That's an example of what not to do. As you mentioned above but apparently forgot:

Even more force when you consider how much firepower they had.

Your comparison, even though you mentioned it, really suffers from that major difference. Further, the Troop numbers for Torch are a function of both the requirement and of available lift more than of trained persons available. Conversely DS/DS deliberately went for 'overkill' -- far more Troops than were really deemed necessary simply because VII Corps was available -- it had already been slated for inactivation...

An added factor is training. We do not yet train as well as we could or should -- but in 1990, training was literally light years ahead of WW II (particularly in the early days before the Germans and Japanese undertook to train us more properly).

Different wars, different Armies, different training, different weapons -- Vastly different in all cases. There is really almost no comparison.

The point being again that it helps to have a large Army in being if you want to invade a place quick.

That's a statement of the obvious and no one is disputing that -- or at least I certainly do not dispute it. What I'm trying to point out is that while your end point is logical to the point of self evidence, the route you follow or lay out to arrive there is rather illogical and quite flawed in concept.

Obviously the situations were not exactly parallel, but if you insist on exact parallels you will never be able to learn anything from history.

No one is existing on exact parallels but some congruity would generally be beneficial...