Returning to a Division Centric Army

[Van]

If we were to revert back to muzzle-loading rifle-muskets it would support the kinder, gentler, population-centric COIN approach, as opposed to the firepower-intensive Fulda Gap model. We could save on ammo costs as well.

Muzzle loaders? That's too effete.
Sabers. 1850 Staff and Field Officer Sabers.
Eliminates ammunition costs, allows for exception precision in targeting, virtually eliminates the possibility of collateral damage, useful in offence or defence, quiet, promotes morale and esprit de corps.

@Hacksaw - if you're in Honolulu, first round is on me.

Re: the PGM/conventional munitions debate - This is one where the pendulum has only gone one way so far. GEN Chiarelli is the first senior leader I've heard questioning the value or efficiency of PGM. I am curious to see if there is serious, quantifiable research done on this or some instantaneous and unreasoning ad hom attack on whoever questions the superiority of gadgets.

[Ron Humphrey]

Something along the lines of determining exactly how and if PGM and associated delivery mechanisms may or may not change the calculus when one talks about field artillery?

Just a guess, very interesting article though

[SethB]

I had the chance to attend a Fires conference in which General Ridge posed the PGM question as "How much precision can we afford."

In that vein, GMLRS makes a lot of sense because one guided rocket has the same planning value as six standard rockets, as well as twice the (UNCLAS) range. When accuracy for the standard round is 10 mils a 1M CEP is a tremendous improvement.

There was the implication that we could save money on PGMs and apply that towards more gunnery instruction. When you are using AFATDS the degree of accuracy possible is significantly higher than with standard techniques. When you are using a system like the M777A2 that can receive Fire Commands to the nearest tenth mil your accuracy increases as well.

You still have to account for the five Requirements for Accurate and Predicted Fire, four of which fall squarely on the artillery unit. An Artillerist on another forum that I frequent mentioned that when he was shooting in OIF he shot "cold stick" which means he made no attempt to quantify some non-standard conditions. Specifically, he stated that he shot without accounting for the differences in propellant lot. When you have dozens of different lots of propellant on hand it may be difficult to use the proper one (on the sun section) and quantify the effect on MVV (on the FDC).

With a system like PGK, the round would automatically compensate for that error and impact where the guidance system directed.

Excalibur is a different deal. It offers the ability to hit and kill a single building, or even a room in a building, with an increase in range over standard 155MM rounds, a near vertical angle of fall, and a small warhead that limits collateral damage. It also requires certain charges and the Fire Commands must be digital. Thus it has some limitations. It is also the most expensive FA PGM.

As for what we can afford, we have JDAMs in service or in development that can do all these things, but once you factor in flight time they may not be any cheaper.

I would like to ask those more senior to me if it would ultimately be cheaper to use aircraft to generate targeting information and then fire the mission from a SPLL or HIMARS.

But then, I do have a professional bias.

[Ken White]

Chiarelli was in a Division in Desert Storm. He saw what Divisions did in Iraq in 2003. He commanded a Division there. Divisions work great in the Desert -- we found that out in North Africa in WW II. He saw that...

He's never fought anywhere else and is Armor, the Combat Arm of Derision; they believe in MASSS. However, What we found in virtually all other types of terrain WWI and in the Pacific, in Italy, in Northwestern Europe during WW II, in Korea, In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan -- and even in Mexico and the Civil War -- was the Divs aren't much good anywhere else, they're too big and unwieldy (I'd say totally unnecessary and even an impediment in the form of underemployed and overindustrious Div Cdr and Staff except for the fact we haven't adjusted that admin / log effort to cope with the absence of the Div); so you break up into Regimental Combat Teams, Brigades or Combat Commands which do work and work well. The Div supports them and the Div Cdr gets to visit and ask odd questions.

Their (RCTs, Bdes, etc) biggest downside is they do not call for enough General Officers...

Msg
Fm: Old DAC
to: Hacksaw

Pendulums swing. Fourteenth iteration

P.S.

Design an organization that EVERYONE says is one maneuver Bn light of a full load, that decimates the Field Artillery branch much to their chagrin and has acknowledged inadequate sustainment capability built in; then determine that it doesn't work as well as is we would like. Masterful...

[Pete]

Sabers. 1850 Staff and Field Officer Sabers.

I own a Model 1840 Light Artillery Saber that shows signs of field use and also has the original leather straps still attached to the rings on the scabbard. It's marked 1860. I also have a Model 1840 NCO's Sword and leather scabbard that's in almost new condition. It was made by Ames and is dated 1864.

[Fuchs]

Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.

There's also a trajectory correction system with which the launcher simply aims too high and the trajectory correction module in the rockets gets radio command to deploy air brakes at the perfect time to negate the distance error/dispersion.


Divisions/brigades:
It's been accepted in Europe since the Division 59 (a brigade-based design) that brigades are the way to go. The Americans learned the same in WW2 and re-learned it after the Pentomic excursion (maybe after ROAD, don't remember ROAD details now).

I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.
Brigades might actually be too large already. A very small brigade (two reinforced battalions worth) might be the way to go (=full circle to early 50's). We need very agile formations, and we've got much to do till we have them.

[Pete]

The Pentomic force structure with Battle Groups didn't work out.

[Ken White]

the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...

[Pete]

Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.

[82redleg]

the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...

Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.

Pete, I think Ken actually served in the Pentomic Army. I know what it was, but only through reading about it.

[SethB]

Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.

That system increases accuracy, but it will not give the the 1M CEP that you can get through the GPS/INS systems that GMLRS uses.

Rockets don't use propellant lots. They are standard. Artillery rounds do use the propellant lot code to determine MVV.

[Tukhachevskii]

I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.

Sorry, I disagree. Although I like the idea of having brigade groups you'll still need an intermediary HQ between Corps and Bde if not because of span of control then information overload (I think the two might be connected. A purely divisional HQ outfit, no supporting arms (etc), purely devoted to C&C (anyone remember that game? brings back memories...) will be needed (as per UK practice). In fact, if 'm not mistaken the whole Uv/Ux/Uy/Uz (or whatever the acronymns are, Yanks really do love 'dem acronyms) is based on the concept that a "divisional" type HQ will be set up (on an ad hoc basis) to manage the bdes. Can't see a corps commander having to deal with up to 5 manouvre bdes, a couple o' support bdes, maybe an artillery bde or two (if the US still has those of course) and maybe an aviation bde (for starters). Of course if fewer bdes are attached you've just got an old school Div anyway. Come to think of it, IIRC I read somewhere that US doctrine calls for US commanders to plan two levels below them (hardly aufragstaktik, but if it works for them, who am I to judge). IFF (if and only if) that's the case then a Corps cdr is going to have to plan not only for the 5 bdes (my maths isn't as good as TAH's, or anyones for that matter, so 'll forgoe mentioning the other bdes) but also for their constituent bns (lets say four) for a total of 20 and five Bde HQ. That's my take on it anyway.

[Fuchs]

I can describe a leadership & command method that easily allows for such a corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.

Military history has seen many highly successful operations with a very small amount of directions from corps or division down to brigades.
The challenge at the operational level doesn't seem to be the span of command, but the understanding of the situation and issuing missions in a timely fashion.
An emphasis on reconnaissance / skirmishing forces helps with the former, minimal staff sizes and careful selection & training of leaders and staff personnel helps with the latter.

[SJPONeill]

I can devise a leadership & command pattern that easily allows for such corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.

Straight up, I'm sceptical about that but would love to stand corrected and see this occur. I think it might run all very well so long as every thing was IAW THE PLAN but at the point of departure from THE PLAN, I think the corps staff, no matter how augmented by staff and technology, would be unable to keep up with events. The complexity would not come so much from the conduct of combat/kinetic operations but from the need to sustain those forces one their initial loadout was consumed and equipment began to require maintenance, recovery, etc...

A centralised headquarters would also be just that, centralised, keeping the next higher level of command and coord away from where operations are being conducted i.e. unless the missionspace is so small or the tempo so slow, the corps command can only be close to some not all of the actions that may need influence/guidance from the next level up...

[Fuchs]

Well, this may be the right time to mention that I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions.

The force densities and the mobility of a well-organized and well-trained battalion exceed the horizon of a divisional headquarters anyway. To restrict brigades to Div Cmd and to lead a corps operation by issuing orders to two or three divisions isn't going to work well any more any way.

Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset.

West Germany would have introduced a brigade-centric army without divisions based on late war experiences in the 50's, but didn't for entirely political reasons: The government had promised 12 "divisions" to Western Allies.

That's how outdated the division actually is.