The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[reed11b]

Where does it reason that good infrastructure helps defeat an insurgency? Cyprus, Thailand, and Northern Ireland all had/have excellent infrastructure. They did not help stop an insurgency in any way. The only time when provision of infrastructure the might stop an insurgency is when it's lack is the issue. In Peru, the road building program, actually aided the drugs trade!

I think the military mission should cease at prevent death and stop suffering.

Sorry Wilf, disagree 100% on this one. unemployment and dissatisfaction strengthens the insurgent leaders ability to recruit. Army units Iraq did a great deal of humanitaruian work early on becouse they were all that was available for it. $87bil for Iraq in '03-04? Never left Kuwait. The building projects you did see came from the CA budget and unit slush funds. If the infastructure had never been there, then your point might have some validity, but in Iraq, it had been there at one point.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

unemployment and dissatisfaction strengthens the insurgent leaders ability to recruit. Army units Iraq did a great deal of humanitaruian work early on becouse they were all that was available for it.

Reed, I am not doubting that, and I have no abiding problem with the military providing humanitarian aid, be it the provision of water, food, power, and constructing shelter where needed. It's both ethical and logical, to a population you are protecting.

I have no real issue if the Army provides employment in providing those things. They can even recruit/train Soldiers and Policemen. That is all part of the mission. Repairing or building roads/railways to assist the logistical provision of aid, is also good.

However, I am sceptical when it comes to building schools, and other types of social programmes and civilian infrastructure. This is getting into muddy water. The Army is not there to provide education and employment. If it needs to hire, then great.

[reed11b]

However, I am sceptical when it comes to building schools, and other types of social programmes and civilian infrastructure. This is getting into muddy water. The Army is not there to provide education and employment. If it needs to hire, then great.

The exception being civil affairs; however, they are supposed to coordinate local assets, not do it for them. Those type activities did need to get done in Iraq in 03-05 and the local and international resources dropped the ball completly in that particular case. Perhaps the Army trying to pick up the ball created a bad example and false expectations.
Reed

[AmericanPride]

If infrastructure and social well-being is decisive in Iraq as a component of the military strategy, I think that's a situation unique to the country (and region) in general and the conflict specifically. Iraq has few sources of natural wealth and resources, except oil, and so the state itself becomes the primary patron of the citizenry. Add into the mix the complexity of religious, ethnic, and tribal relations without any real unifying identity or ideology, and the only effective means of management is state power; whether that's a reliance on violence (i.e. Saddam), institution-building, or some kind of combination of both. But even while the lack of infrastructure or employment may encourage, for example, a professional soldier with no other opportunities to "work" for the insurgency, that does not suggest the same motivation is applicable to other elements of the insurgency, much less to other wars in general.

The political will to employ and persist with military means is not one that should concern the military. What should concern the military is achieving the outcome the politicians want. (it may include loosing or not winning.) - as soldiers that's none of their business.

I agree for the most part in that military planners should not be concerned with politics at home; but the enemy's politics is fair game. I should have clarified that in my previous statement. Understanding why the enemy fights clarifies how (and to what extent) he fights. So, as for the article, categorizing a war by how it was, or should be, fought is not very useful whatsoever without the "why". Why is the "psycho-cultural war" concept useful if the conditions in which its applicable are not universal?

[Ken White]

AmericanPride; I sort of agree with your post at #5 above with one caveat:

"I think it's dangerous intellectually to talk about the nature of war, or the outcome of any war, without first discussing its relationship to politics."

I think it is dangerous practically to try to over define the nature of war as it's an academic exercise with no practical merit. The causes of war are too diverse and the methods of warfare are even more varied. In the immortal words of Donald Rumsfeld, "You go to war with the Army you've got." Just so. I'd add that Army had better be prepared and able to fight that war it got into. It's that simple.

wm's wisdom comes through:

"Ken, it provides the economy with a lot of jobs for people who work in organizations that garner "lessons observed." Too bad we have yet to figure out a way to convert lessons observed effectivelt and efficiently into lesson learned. (No offense to folks like Tom Odom intended)."

Yep to the first clause and egos are the answer to the second... Sad.

Wilf contributes an absolute gem and one of my pet questions:

"My guess is that a lot of folks are very reluctant to discuss why an ACR squadron, for example, cannot perform certain missions they are supposed to."

To which I'm sure he'd add that one could change the ACR (my personal favorite) to several other types of units. That is, IMO, considerably more pertinent a question than is what kind of war are we in...

Which gets to AmericanPride, post 19:

"Understanding why the enemy fights clarifies how (and to what extent) he fights. So, as for the article, categorizing a war by how it was, or should be, fought is not very useful whatsoever without the "why"..."

I think that understanding why he fights may -- just may -- give you a clue to to why he fights (though I'm unsure how important that it is). The key being truly understanding as opposed to just thinking one understands (and I suggest the last seven years are living proof of that... ). I'm quite sure it does not give you a clue to what extent he will fight because you have a say in that which can change his predilection.

"...Why is the "psycho-cultural war" concept useful if the conditions in which its applicable are not universal?"

It isn't...

[sullygoarmy]

Thought MG Scales presented a good alternative to the other "Generations of Warfare" articles that are out there. I especially like his focus on the soldier versus technology.

The only point I would bring up is the use of "cultural awareness" versus "cultural understanding". In my simple mind, cultural awareness does nothing for me. You can be aware all you want regarding a foreign culture and still trample all over it. Being aware is one thing, understanding not only the culture but the ramifications of that culture is where we should be trying to get not only our leaders on the ground, but our soldiers as well.

By better understanding the culture, we can shape our actions to strengthen our currency in the eyes of the population and devalue that of the insurgent...that's really the name of the game.

I know www.clausewitz.com has some of Beyerchen's articles posted there. May be worth a read after going through MG Scales' article.

[AmericanPride]

By better understanding the culture, we can shape our actions to strengthen our currency in the eyes of the population and devalue that of the insurgent...that's really the name of the game.

But is "[strengthening] our currency in the eyes of the population" an effective means in suppressing an insurgency, especially one as complex as the Iraqi insurgency? I'd agree there's a strong correlation, but I'm not certain there's a definite casual relationship of one preceding the other. Even so, I'm not sure how earning someone's fondness or respect will make them desire what they want any less. By nature, insurgencies of whatever type are pro-active and not reactionary; they'll keep fighting until they get what they want. Peace for them is not simply the absence of violence, but the institution of their version of "justice". And that makes me wonder if we have the cultural aptitude to adjust to the Machiavellian nature of power politics? As I see it, we're not so much as engaged in a war in Iraq, but instead shoulder-deep in the cut-throat domestic politics of a foreign country. One day we're shooting up Faction XYZ, the next day we're arming them. That's not war. That's politics. So I'm not sure how effective the military can be in that kind of situation without significantly expanding the scope of responsibilities for the military beyond war. Or, even if it's wise to move the military in that direction.

I agree with your statements about cultural awareness vs understanding, however.

[Ron Humphrey]

By nature, insurgencies of whatever type are pro-active and not reactionary; they'll keep fighting until they get what they want. Peace for them is not simply the absence of violence, but the institution of their version of "justice". .(emphasis Ron)

That this is always the case. Seems like quite a few parts of any given "insurgency" are quite reactionary.

Consider that the "acceptable" versions of justice might quite often vary even within the insurgency itself.