Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
...A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort.
Creighton Abrams as CofSA was the real initiator of that AC to RC move of CS/CSS units in 1973, it was desinged so that future Presidents would have to mobilize the guard and Reserve to got to war. It worked -- and works today.

The moves were well in place by the time Meyer and Weinberger appeared on scene (in 79 and 81, respectively). Abrams plan was the basis of (and in support of) the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984 even though he long preceded Cap. The AOE plan was on the right track but a change of civilian leadership meant that it fell by the wayside before it got fully implemented. That happens a lot.

I'll add that all this proves yet again that the Weinberger and Powell 'doctrines' were idealistic to an extreme and thus flawed...

Probably also proving that concrete structural plans and efforts as opposed to 'doctrine' can work and last. Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.