Results 1 to 20 of 42

Thread: U.S. troops face Afghan enemy too young to kill

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Interesting logic.

    Quote Originally Posted by 40below View Post
    My point was not that there have never been child soldiers...and the average child soldier would get about one shot in his active military career before seeking treatment for a broken collarbone and a dislocated shoulder, maybe a broken jaw too.
    but as a big bore (.30-06, slightly more potent than the .303 and not to mention that %$&* 12 gauge...) shooter at age 11, I do not agree. Not at all.

    The Australian, British or Canadian Soldier in the third picture above may not be malnourished. he has the pre-war British pattern ammunition pouches for the .303.SMLE (the WW I Mk III, not your Ranger's WW II era No.4). The Poles and the Russians are probably malnourished. Note the Russian all have Nagants and the 7.62x54 is a contemporary of the .303. I posted two pictures showing .303 category weapons in the hands or likely so of 'child soldiers' and you come back and impute that weapon recoil would be a determining factor. Not a good argument, kids were padding their shoulders with rags a long time ago-- in the era of muzzle loaders...

    While it is fact the AK enabled a proliferation of 'child soldiers,' for the reasons you cite in your response, my initial comment was not aimed primarily at refuting your perhaps unintentional overstatement. You said
    "...without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them." (emphasis added /kw)
    'None' initially then added the caveat 'or not as many.' I agreed on the not as many, just as a minor aside, really, disagreed on the none.

    The comment by me -- and the pictures -- really was intended to make two important points. Thanks for allowing me to reiterate them:

    (1) Armed kids are not an African or third world only problem.

    (2) Whenever and wherever armed kids exist and attack, they are as dangerous as adults. Perhaps more so because many through a false sense of concern will not react as quickly to kill a child and they deserve no special consideration. None.

  2. #2
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    but as a big bore (.30-06, slightly more potent than the .303 and not to mention that %$&* 12 gauge...) shooter at age 11, I do not agree. Not at all.
    Me too, though it was SMLE No.4 and I was 13, but whole generations of British School Boys from 13-18 learnt to shoot on .303 until very recently.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  3. #3
    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Michigan
    Posts
    806

    Default $.02

    In Vegetius' essay on reforming the Legions, he discusses beginning the training of young men in the military arts as soon as they reach puberty. The concept of "child soldier" is a late 20th century invention. For most of human history, across all cultures, when humans entered puberty they were considered adults. For females, this meant marriage and children. For males, it meant farming, hunting and warfare.

    Nonetheless, the issue here is first, reluctance on the part of Western troops to kill combatants the perceive as children, and second, the psychological problems resulting from the engagement (i.e. either killing them, or suffering casualties from reluctance or hesitation to kill them.).
    John Wolfsberger, Jr.

    An unruffled person with some useful skills.

  4. #4
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    This highlights one of the major problems with the tactical directives in Afghanistan: They placed illogical emphasis on Age and Gender over situational factors such as time, manner, place, activity.

    A Coalition member engaging a young man such as described by Guy is likely to face challenges from higher HQ regardless of the activity engaged in.

    One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.

    I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.

    Add this to my list:

    If you don't understand insurgency, you can't do COIN;
    If you don't understand insurgency, you can't legally advise a commander doing COIN either.


    (Oh, and I suspect a rather large portion of those who fought in the American Civil War were in this 14-18 age range, and handled their .58 caliber rifles with ease and deadly skill; rode their cavalry mounts with the same agility and lack of fear they ride skateboards today; and generally were tremendously resilient and effective)
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  5. #5
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Doesn't Infantry literally mean, Boy Soldier?!

  6. #6
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    Just one quick google:

    http://www.civilwarhome.com/boysinwar.htm

    (only 46,000 out of a sample of 1,000,000 over the age of 24)


    Napoleon is quoted as holding that Generals over the age of 40 were over the hill. (though I suspect strongly that this is a misquote from him saying as he rode away from Waterloo, "I'm too old for this Sh#%")
    Last edited by Bob's World; 07-15-2010 at 02:18 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Brother Bob! -

    This situation would probably be beyond my capacity to survive without going postal:

    One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.

    I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.
    You have to have a strong stomach or a large ulcer.

    My initial reaction was that the LEGAD was bad and that all would be well if a "good lawyer" had been on call - in short, blame it on the lawyer (a variation of pile on the wabbit). If that were the problem, the solution would be solved by employing SJAs like COL Hays Parks, who wrote in 2003 re: Astan, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms:

    At the US Special Operations Command (“USSOCOM”) annual Legal Conference, May 13–17, 2002, the judge advocate debate became intense. While some attendees raised questions of “illegality” and the right or obligation of special operations forces to refuse an “illegal order” to wear “civilian clothing,” others urged caution. [3] The discussion was unclassified, and many in the room were not privy to information regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Special Forces, its special mission units, or the missions assigned them.

    [3] In the debate that ensued over the next year, it was my observation that those most strident in their criticism were most distant from Special Forces ground operations or were judge advocates not serving with or familiar with the missions of Special Forces units.

    COL Parks bio (from same) - Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1979–2003; Stockton Chair of International Law, Naval War College, 1984–1985; Colonel, US Marine Corps Reserve (Retired); Adjunct Professor of International Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC.
    While there is truth to that solution (or to the alternative, "get rid of all the lawyers") in many situations, the problem you faced is part of a greater problem in Astan.

    That problem (also directly involving the ROEs, RUFs and EOFs) has been the conscious election by the political and military masters (of ISAF, including the US; and of the Astan national government) to adopt "bad law" even though (at least for the US and Astan) that would not be required. That "bad law" hinges on the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, Direct Participation in Hostilities and Customary International Humitarian Law as endorsed by the ICRC - many in the ISAF would see that "bad law" as "good law" (as apparently does Nick Carter's LEGAD).

    It has to be frustrating to deal with nonsense like CIVCAS, restrictive ROEs, etc. (and please note, while I'd prefer a broad hunting license, I do not believe that everything in the woods needs to be shot).

    Regards

    Mike

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •