Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Entropy]

Col. Jones,

This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?

JCustis,

After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.

[marct]

Hi Entropy,

Obviously, I'm not speaking for BW, but....

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

Well, populations are not singular; even in families ! I think that they key would be to understand it along the lines of entering into an insurgency always appears reasonable to them (a part of the population) at that point in time. Think back to all the dickering and confusion during the American Revolution for a good example.

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in?

No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.

Cheers,

Marc

[Entropy]

Well, populations are not singular; even in families !

That's exactly what I'm driving at. Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?

Applying this to Afghanistan, I really need to be convinced that good central governance in Afghanistan is even possible, much less the highly centralized government that currently exists. The best that could be hoped for, in my estimation, is something along the lines of how Pakistan is currently organized, but that isn't working out all that well either. The alternative is the devolution of central power altogether - if centralized good governance isn't possible, then perhaps a highly decentralized state is. Certainly there is precedence for that in Afghanistan, but we are limited by the political reality and the conditions today, which is a highly centralized Afghan government wholly dependent on foreign powers.

In short, I question that there is any kind of "good governance" under the existing system which can satisfy all the competing factions.

The alternative is for the populations to change. Such change occurs very slowly. This is, I think, what happened here in the US with slavery. Good governance did not solve the irreconcilable differences between the North and South, even after the Civil War. Ultimately, and over a long period of time, the populace changed. In Afghanistan I fear trying to bring misplaced notions of good governance through a highly centralized government will set the stage for more violence in Afghanistan and not less.

In the end what we think is "good governance" may, in reality, turn into quite the opposite. Jcustis' comments highlight our continuing collective ignorance on Afghanistan which impedes our ability to understand what good governance is in Afghanistan, much less our ability to foster it.

No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.

That's true and I do understand there are various levels of government and/or authority depending on circumstances. "Monopoly" is the wrong word and I didn't mean a monolithic "state" so sorry for the confusion.

Let me put it this way - what is it that prevents me from taking justice into my own hands? In large part it is because I'm deterred from doing so because the "state" (ie. some authority with coercive power over me) will visit negative repercussions upon me that I cannot avoid. In short, one can't have a governmental authority without credible coercive power to include violence. If I tried to set up my own independent system of justice here in my neighborhood it wouldn't last long because the government has the coercive power to prevent it, even if my system of justice is superior and more legitimate in the eyes of my "population" (ie. my neighborhood). I would still fail because the government has the coercive power to prevent my system from being used.

Now suppose that the government had limited (or no) means to prevent me from forming my own independent system of justice. In that case my system has the chance to win based on its merits vs what the government can offer. I have the opportunity to supplant the government in delivering justice for my population. More likely, though, the government would have some coercive power and so would I. We are both, then, in the position of competing over the population as well as trying to reduce the other's coercive power. It may be the case that our justice systems are not that different, or are not sufficiently different that the population would not live under one or the other. In that case, legitimacy is not derived from who can provide the best system of justice, but who can exclusively provide any system of justice - in other words, competing over the justice system becomes a power struggle. This analogy isn't far removed from what's happening in parts of Afghanistan where people DO need a justice system to resolve disputes.

So legitimacy isn't just the ability to deliver a government service - it's the ability to deliver a service and prevent competitors from offering alternatives and that requires the credible ability to bring violence or coercion on those who would buck your system.

For years and years now we've read stories and reports where Afghan government and coalition efforts in any number of areas are stymied because once the government authority leaves, or the project is built, or whatever, a new authority moves in and either fills the vacuum or displaces what government authority there is. The population isn't going to accept your authority unless it is both perceived as legitimate and you posses the credible capability to enforce it. Afghans are notorious fence-sitters because they are so often caught in the middle of power struggles. So for any Afghan government or coalition project to succeed, it must have the durable and credible ability to keep the insurgent governance structure out. The ability to do that successfully is what will give you true legitimacy.

As I said, I think Col. Jone's model is useful and easy to understand, but I would like to know how his model accounts for these factors.

[slapout9]

Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?

I would say yes. Slavery gave the south a competitive advantage over the North. Before it's abolition if the Government would have arranged a fair compensation war could have been avoided. That wasn't done and war followed. Lincoln was assassinated before reconstruction could be completed and extended southern suffering for some time, during which the KKK was formed and prospered until finally MLK arrived and the civil rights act.


As it relates to countries with multiple oppressed populations inside loose borders, yes your actions can create violence between those groups while trying to do the right thing so to speak. But this goes back to Basic Green Beret Stuff, that type of population analysis should happen during step1-psychological preparation of the targeted population.

Finally there is nothing in the Jones model that says your are going to end up with some standard democratically/capitalist style government. Your survey of the population may indicate you should pursue a very different system of government.

We used the Special Warfare model twice in A'stan very successfully and then blew it by not finishing the mission.

[Bob's World]

Col. Jones,

This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?

JCustis,



Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.

The responsibility for Good Governance DOES rest solely on the government. That is why it is called "service" or "duty". When governmental leaders begin to think of the populace as existing to serve them you are on the slippery slope to Poor Governance, Subversion and Insurgency.

The population's rationale only have to be reasonable to them. As my wife is quick to tell me "don't tell me how I feel." Governments like to think that what they think is right, and what the populace thinks contrary to those offiicial positions is moot. This natural tendency is what allows subversion to grow among the people while the government rationalizes the danger away as being attributed to a few radicals.

As to the insurgent being right or wrong, I have to go with what was captured quite intentionally in our Declaration of Independence. It is both the Duty and the Right of a Populace to rise up in insurgency when faced with Despotism. As an attorney, I understand that a Duty is something that one must do, and a Right is something that cannot be taken away. As an SF officer I understand that insurgency can take many forms; that the formative causal factors that must be addressed are the same, regardless in what form the movement manifests. The natural tendency, when denied legal recourse, if for the populace to take illegal routes to change. As Maria lays out in her work, the non-violent ways are more apt to succeed than the violent ways.

To simply say violence is war, and war is a military matter, and the military's job is to crush said violence is the same supervicial analysis from the perspective of the Despot that has lead to many a long, drawnout struggle between a populace and its failed governance.

Better instead for Governance to see such movements as the clearest of metrics, the most accurate of polls, and to modify their behavior to the degree practicable to resolve their failures short of simply ramping up the oppression.



Dayuhan: Concur completely that AQ is not an insurgent organization. After all, they have no populace, and they have no state. They are a political club that employs the tools of the modern information age to conduct Unconventional Warfare to incite, leverage, and support the insurgencies of others to their ends.

This used to be the realm of states. Hitler needed a state to go from a Dissident in Munich to causing trouble on a global stage. Today, if AQ gained a state they would be crushed in days. By remaining in the "sanctuary" of their non-state status (no, Afghanistan is not their essential sanctuary, their status is), they remain outside the reach of the tools of statehood. What we need to focus on are the many unique, distinct troubled relationships between states across the Middle East and their populaces, and also assess our roles in those relationships as seen from the perspectives of the populaces.

The intel guys always cast this in friend-foe model that is wrong-headed and dangerous. It drives the F'd up PIRs that were mentioned. PIRs need to get to the critical questions that the boss must understand to focus his efforts to win. Those PIRs should be based in my four causal factors, not in what is the current manifestation of violence up to.

Oh, and final point. When one invades and displaces the governance of another, and replaces it with a government that has a higher duty to the foreign power than they do to their own populace; The despotism at work is that of the foreign power. To conduct such operations may sometimes well be necessary. But the aftermath must very much be rooted in allowing / enabling the populace to shape what comes next and for the foreigner to go home ASAP. He can always come back if need be, but to stay is to create conditions that are brutally hard to overcome.