Storming the Beach

[COMMAR]

Its important to keep in mind in all points of this discussion that Amphibious Ops are not relegated to loading troops on a AAV/EFV/LCAC & landing on a beach.

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

The flow from Beach Head to Build Up to Break Out is more Art than Science & is taught to the level of understanding to all from Colonel to Squad Leader. This is one of the major reasons the USMC stresses training for it.

Why is this Important?

Take the studies done on the Operation in Grenada. Subsequent studies showed that although all forces suffered serious set backs to initial assault plans, all forces eventually landed & began to build forces.

But it was the Marines understanding of Build Up to Break Out; Break Out-stresses sucking the Enemy/Attackers in during the Build Up phase to swell forces at their weakest point using that momentum to "Break Out" & fuel your Counter-Assault, that led to 400 Marines taking 80% of the Island.--Fluid.. Art not Science.

The 2 Coys fr/the 22nd MEU's role was initially very small; lead a Helo Raid to seize Port Pearl for potential Civ Evac to ARG. But were ordered to seize the rest of Island when the Main assault force was pinned down at Port Salinas.

Although this was not a classic Amphibious Assault all elements trained for proved essential in this & all other assault/raid type Operations. Its like training for the Decathlon b/c you don't which event you may be asked to run, training for Amphib Ops is nearly all encompassing.

[slapout9]

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

[COMMAR]

OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

Now we're back to chiding what we don't understand for the sake of a pissing contest.

Its not on my word that calls Amphibious Warfare the most complex of all modern military maneuvers, just everything that's written on the subject. And its not that Gates doesn't know or understand this.

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.




But... this is not the 1st time Gates & the Corps have been at odds over the way Gates envisioned something & he challenged the Corps to change his mind; and they did.

3yrs ago CMC Gen Conway said Anbar is pacified, my Marines are bored, & within a year I would like to begin shifting Our Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Gates publicly chided Conway & said there NO plans to shift the Marines to A'stan & that the Marines will stay in Anbar until the end of our involvement in Iraq.

Gates & Conway tactfully went back & forth in the media for months w/Gates finally laying down the Gauntlet in Dec '07 saying the Marines have presented no viable plan for shifting forces to A'stan.

The opportunity came in Jan '08 when NATO fell 5,000 troops short of the goal set by Gates. The Marines presented a plan to insert 3500 Marines in 3mths along with a new strategy for their area.

1yr later Gates was convinced & there were 10,000 more Marines in A'stan & 10,000 less in Iraq.


Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

[William F. Owen]

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

[Tukhachevskii]

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

Building a better mousetrap: The Unnecessary Capability of the EFV from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (link may be fernickity)

Yet the overwhelming impetus driving the development of the EFV is operational maneuver from the sea [OMFTS]. The vision behind the EFV is one in which a group of vehicles move from apmphibious shipping twenty-five nautical miles from the shoreline and then travel at a high speed to a littoral penetration point to come ashore and seamlessly complete some tactical mission.
The layout and construction of the EFV have been optimised for that high speed movement over water. but this is not a reasonable focus. The mission profile guidance originally given to the EFV (then the AAAV) team was for a 20% operational time in the water and 80% on land. Since then, the mean operational time in the water for all envisioned EFV missions has been revised to 8.2%[!]. Thus the Marine Corps predicts the EFV to operate eight out of every one hundred hours of vehicle operation in water.
If the Marine Corps had fielded the EFV in January of 2001, the high water speed capability would not have been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation IIraqi Freedom both expeditionary operations by any standard. (p.9-10)

Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq from the Centre for American Progress.

It [the EFV] is significantly faster on water, slighty faster on land, and has betetr armor and firepower than the AAV. On land, the EFV is also larger, more powerful, and has betetr communications than other armored personnel carriers, including the Army's Bradley. It only lacks increased armor protection, which the Marines have readily sacrificed for greater mobility. Even though the cost of the EFV has jumped to more than $12 million per vehicle....(p.14)

That last statistic made my eyes water, was a time when you could buy a JAS 39 Gripen fighter for that much (c. 1995-ish). Talk about inflation. If I'm not mistaken an M1A1 costs about $5million?


The Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress from the ever informative Congressional Research Service

Twenty years ago when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could operate 20 to 30 miles from the shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations, but with the advent of these new weapons [anti-ship missiles, mines, small fast attack craft, etc.] and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead in order to sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore - beyond the EFV's range.(p.7)

[COMMAR]

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22. The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.

He's in the process of setting the tone for the future of the DOD.. Drawing the lines of who's doing what & when those lines are crossed. At the end of the day, as far as the overall direction each service takes, the decision is his.

He hears the Marines stubbornly standing their ground & railing for what they see as necessary & has basically said this:
[paraphrased] In the priority of threats both present & near future, & the Budgets & structure that I'm setting to address them we don't agree & I don't see you getting what you want.



But its helpful to start at the beginning where Gates & HQMC disagree, not in the middle w/the programs.

Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.

HQMC has said yes, we agree.. but we're a Two-Fisted Fighter so we're going to need XY&Z to remain Predominant across all boards we touch.

Gates counters; for the foreseeable future (threat wise), those items in the #s you've projected, are unlikely & impractical b/c your primary role & most likely mission in the structure & vision I have set will be IW.

HQMC counters, these items are Dual suited & will revolutionize how we conduct both IW & HIC.

Gates says while these items will be an advancement.. they will not be as significant as to offset my overall (across all services) plans & projected budgets.. your current load out will suffice for any near threats.



And thats where it currently stands. Its not that this Marine Program is bad or that, they just don't fit. But in all fairness by comparison to Multi-billion $ FAILURES like:
-Future Combat Systems (FCS) or Land Warrior
-The Air Force's Tanker deal
-or the Navy's numerous ship debacles

The USMC's programs are well ahead of the curve & a drop in the bucket monetarily.

But what seems to be totally left out of this Debate is that SECDEF Gates has AGAIN left the "gate" open for the Marines to convince him to adjust his plans.

[Granite_State]

The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?" He seemed to think its electronics would be too sophisticated and fragile to stand up to heavy copmbat.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?"

GySgt. J. C. Oster,Do we really need the EFV?, Marine Corps Gazette, Feb, 2010

[slapout9]

Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.

Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory? Especially since IW in the future may include the Hy-Brid warfare scenario where you have civilians operating fairly Hi-tech weapons systems as opposed to guerrillas with just small arms.

[COMMAR]

Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory?

What is the point of this thread?? Gates has shot down HQMC's justifications for their big ticket items, that's been clearly discussed. So what is the point of your question?

If your asking a legitimate question lets expand on it. If your going to be the little kid that asks why after every statement then that's stupid.

[William F. Owen]

Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

The idea that they are needed keeps flowing back to a very doubtful set of assumptions, which almost never seem to challenged. The idea that the EFV skims in from over the horizon, just to be totalled by 20kg bar mine lying 1m above the high water mark seems to be a product of focussing on the wrong problem.

[Rex Brynen]

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

What then are the required capabilities regarding a new Marine APC or IFV? I do think the ability to deploy vehicles to shore without the use of LCs is a useful capability, not just in the very unlikely context of "storming the beach" but in the case of a whole range of potential low-intensity conflict settings.

That being said, the EFV may well be over-engineered with capabilities that it doesn't need.

[COMMAR]

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

The EFV maybe.. maybe not. But the V-22 I can't agree with.

If your basing this assessment by looking at the USMC's present mission, land lock in a static conflict, then its easy to say X-Helo would be a much better choice.

In a Static Conflict the Helo is King, however the USMC is not a static force. Expeditionary is more than just a title, every decision, every acquisition, everything is designed around being expeditionary.. b/c thats the Primary mission.

In an Expeditionary environment the Helo is limited.. Fixed wing is limited. A platform the merges the two is King.

In the 1st 6mths or so of Afghanistan the V-22 would've been god. No staging in neighboring countries, making unfavorable treaties to launch small scale missions & raids. No flying in troops as close as possible fixed wing to transfer to helos for the rest of the way.

No.. there could've been multiple Beach Heads like the 1 the Marines built overnight at Rhino, run a weeks worth of missions & move on, while simultaneously collapsing the time & distance of the Battle Space, enveloping the enemy on a much larger scale w/its speed.

But that's the past. In the near-future.. No matter if their called SCMAGTFs or ECOs or EMOs the Expeditionary Corps will move to a MEU & up to 4 virtually mini-MEUs ringing each Theater Command. Not nearly as equipped like MEUs they'll be Light Reinforced Rifle Coys w/Support & C2, sending out reinforced Plt-sized Dets regionally for a variety of short-duration missions; HA, Bi-Lats, FID, Piracy, etc.

The value the V-22 brings across a T-Comm in speed & efficiency is not additive or in multiples but Exponential. Pick them up where ever you want, travel as far as you want, & put them down where ever you want, repeat continuously for a full 6mth Deployment.

The Corps has & will run 100s of missions outside of Iraq & A'stan that more fit the traditional Expeditionary Nature of the Corps & the V-22 is 100% necessary.

[slapout9]

Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

So, is he questioning the ideas and equipment or just the cost? Meaning you can do what want to do but you have to find a cheaper way?