Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

A long, multi-sourced and linked article - the full title being 'Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists' and from an author who is an observer or student of the Syrian Civil War: http://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2...the-jihadists/

His argument is that Assad has consistently followed a strategy of provocation, which is cited as:

I suspect some of these claims are true, but it is also true that the first casualty of war is the truth. We're to the point now, especially in the social media era, where everyone simply quotes their so called experts creating a cesspool of opinion and propaganda attempting to shape the views of various audiences. We won't have access to what our intelligence community knows, but we're to the point that we have to rely on the professionals (not the retired loud mouths from the military and CIA who are making money has talking heads), because the truth has been too distorted in the public realm.

The strategy of provocation sounds logical in hindsight, and may in fact have been Assad's strategy, but it is also a strategy that the state would have had little control over once implemented. Other reasons could explain what is happening, such as the government may be forced to buy oil from ISIS based on economic realities. As for protecting ISIS to prevent the other groups from gaining strength, maybe, but it could also be that ISIS is located in the areas that Assad's forces are not capable of defending (to far away from Damascus). Seems like government has never had good control of eastern Syria.

The counterfactual argument that "if" support was provided to the moderates earlier the extremists wouldn't be as strong is simply pure speculation. First off quite a bit of support was provided to the moderates from a lot of different countries, but we like to ignore that. The moderates simply don't appear to be that strong, which goes back to the former article you posted that they're not that united.

We want to believe so badly that this rebellion is all about moderates seeking to overthrow an illegitimate government that we tend to grasp at straws when they are presented if we think they support our world view. No doubt there are many moderates in Syria who have a vision for the country that is more aligned with what the U.S. considers universal values, but is also true many do not. While most potential outcomes are possible in a conflict, it is hard to envision how various groups of moderates who are not united could effectively control the stronger extremist groups if the moderates actually ousted Assad. First they would have to consolidate power among themselves, and this period of chaos would create a window of opportunity for ISIS and al-Nusra and others who seem to be better organized. We all know this isn't a simple conflict between extremists and moderates and Assad. There are many actors within and external to the country that are interacting in ways that results in an unpredictable situation. In the end, those of us on the outside, and even most in the inside, are stuck viewing this conflict through opinion of others, not expert opinion, just opinion. Those that argue that someday the stock market will crash are probably right, but if they can't tell you when it isn't overly helpful. Those that tell us this conflict is all about poor governance may be right, but again it is trite and not helpful. Those that argue it would be better if the moderates win seem to be right also, but they don't provide realistic strategies on they could.

All the background noise is important, but ultimately we have to determine what, if anything, actually threatens our interests and deal with it. Ideally in a way that doesn't strengthen Iran, Assad, AQ, or other groups that our contrary to our interests. However, we don't live in an ideal world, and waiting to develop the perfect strategy could put us in a position in disadvantage. We may have to choose from the least bad of several bad options.