New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[William F. Owen]

On one hand you can conduct actions against the enemy, counter-force. On the other, you can conduct security operations to prevent the enemy, or insurgent from influencing the population either through persuasion or coercion.

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound?
Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month?
The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.
You require massive logistic support for those operations, there is the risk that the Taliban roam free interdicting your supply routes. More over the static security approach does defeat the Taliban. They merely go on existing.

That being said, the US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were primarily conducting counter-force operations. You are right Wilf, we were not very effective and we caused civilian casualties. However, the solution is not better counter-force operations it is more security patrols. Security leads to every other aspect of COIN.

Sorry, I disagree. Patrolling is an aid to fixing the enemy. It reduces their freedom of action. Yes, security operations are vital, but not to the degree where the enemy has less to fear.
The solution is better "counter-force" operations. That requires a solid approach to ENDS, WAYS and MEANS. US Forces should be better trained, better commanded and better equipped than the Taliban. Security is always traded against Activity, and it is very time dependent.
Intelligence is the key. All efforts should be harnessed in that direction. Nothing here is new. The entire first chapter of Callwell's Small Wars devotes an entire chapter to it. Kitson talks about it at great length. In fact, if you wanted to drift out on another definition of "Irregular Warfare," then the primacy of tactical intelligence would be a not all-wrong start.
So, given that you can successfully and consistently locate the enemy and or predict his activity, why would you not harness that towards killing/capturing him?

Another sad fact that POP-COIN refuses to recognise is that Afghan civilian deaths are almost entirely politically irrelevant. US/UK deaths are vastly more politically significant in terms of sustaining the political will to remain committed.

[Fuchs]

....and there's the rub. How many platoons or squads do you want to put in how many villages? 24 Hour security requires 2-3 shifts. What size of population is worth a platoon? Do you protect every compound? Are you being successful if the Taliban can only kill 30 civilians a month? The real problem with the "POP-COIN" approach is that you are making a promise you can't keep. The Taliban can far more easily keep their promise to go on killing he infidels.

I keep telling that to people for maybe two years now.

My interpretation of the whole affair is that the "establish security" crowd thinks of magic, for there's a huge black box in their reasoning.

Problem - black box - security established

It's the old rule; those who attempt to defend everything defend nothing. Old Frederick already knew that 250 years ago, why is it so difficult to grasp today? Ego?

The Spanish cannot prevent bomb strikes of ETA in their own country for decades. How should that work in Afghanistan? What's the troopsopulation ratio? One soldier who leaves the fortified bases per village?

ISAF will never manage to do the equivalent of the police of Naples providing a witness-protection programme for the whole population of Southern Italy.

Maybe the problem is simply that ego prevents people from accepting their lack of power, so they adopt an illusion and follow a route that at least promises them to be powerful enough to handle their problem.