Bush Draws Iraq/Vietnam Comparison

[Steve Blair]

I think you're right on that score, Tom. Hadn't even considered the Lebanese situation in relation to the Iraqis...I wonder if it will turn out the same way for the Iraqis. But as for our involvement, it just seems to me (a non-Vietnam vet as well) that the parallels between our actions now in Iraq and our actions under LBJ in Vietnam are frighteningly close. And it also seems to me that this is lost on our administration. I think a comparison of Vietnam and Iraq is very valid, but I think Bush missed the key points that the comparison should focus on. I wrote a blog on it today as well because Bush's comments really bothered me.

I would say that the response of the military as an institution (at least in the early to mid stages - they have to their credit started taking corrective action in many areas much sooner than they did during Vietnam) has more in common with Vietnam (situational denial, misreading of the situation on the ground, and so on), but NOT so much the military or political situation itself. For that, Tom is quite correct in bringing Lebanon into the comparison discussion. That is a better political and social parallel.

[UCrawford]

I would say that the response of the military as an institution (at least in the early to mid stages - they have to their credit started taking corrective action in many areas much sooner than they did during Vietnam) has more in common with Vietnam (situational denial, misreading of the situation on the ground, and so on), but NOT so much the military or political situation itself. For that, Tom is quite correct in bringing Lebanon into the comparison discussion. That is a better political and social parallel.

But isn't it also relevant to bring up the parallels between Rumsfeld and McNamara's management style? Both were dismissive of military guidance that contradicted their own pre-conceptions. Both were enthusiastic micromanagers. Both appointed military leadership that seemed to be more oriented to agreement with the boss than problem-solving. I think you're right about the military on the ground adapting quicker in Iraq (as the 101st under Petraeus, among others, apparently grasped the concepts of counterinsurgency fairly quickly), but actions by Pentagon-level and above and the lack of a cohesive strategy for victory seem (at least to me) to have rendered many of our combatant commanders' efforts largely ineffective, irrelevant, and/or short-lived. That's where I was trying to draw the parallel with Vietnam...the poor civilian leadership at the top of the chain and a muddy strategy that gives the military forces an almost impossible task to fulfill ("If the strategy is wrong, it doesn't matter how good your tactics are" to paraphrase a quote in the Woodward book). As for the dynamics on the ground, I agree with you that Lebanon is a better parallel than Vietnam.

[Steve Blair]

That's why I said the institutional situation is similar, but not the overall situation. People who try to compare Iraq to Vietnam almost always want to claim that everything is the same. When drawing the Vietnam comparison, it's important to be very specific. The DoD reaction in general has been remarkably similar, and I believe that it would have been even with a different SecDef. Remember, Kennedy was an enthusiastic proponent of COIN-style activities and the military more or less blew him off.

It's that similarity of reaction that has really solidified my support for a major overhaul of the military personnel system and not just unit organization.

[Culpeper]

I see no relative comparison to Vietnam and Iraq. Except what was stated once-upon-a-time as a form of analogy and retrospective...


If them dumb mother####in' politician pukeheads would just let us alone and let us do our jobs, we'd be outta here and back to the World in no time at all. ####! No fixed wing, no direct support from those dumb####, poor-ass tank crews; just our damned M-16s and grenades and they want us to root out a regiment of entrenched NVA in a day or two. Well, let them dumb asshole politicians come over here and follow me around for a minute or two, and see what kind of bull#### happens when dumb#### muther####in' politicians start calling the shots on the ground. Jesus H. Christ, why can't they stick to kissing asses and babies?

Phase Line Green: Battle for Hue, 1968 / Nicholas Warr

[aktarian]

That's why I said the institutional situation is similar, but not the overall situation. People who try to compare Iraq to Vietnam almost always want to claim that everything is the same. When drawing the Vietnam comparison, it's important to be very specific. The DoD reaction in general has been remarkably similar, and I believe that it would have been even with a different SecDef. Remember, Kennedy was an enthusiastic proponent of COIN-style activities and the military more or less blew him off.

It's that similarity of reaction that has really solidified my support for a major overhaul of the military personnel system and not just unit organization.

Iraq is compared to Vietnam because Vietnam was only post-WW2 COIN war US was involved with regular troops. So Vietnam is only war that Iraq can be compared to (well, Afghanistan fits the bill ut that is also ongoing).

[slapout9]

Not true, there was a very successful COIN operation in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. It involved the 82nd Airborne and the 6th MEU. Not much has been written about this because it was handled rather quickly compared to most COIN ops. But there are definitely some lessons learned that we have forgotten, one in particular was the extensive use of PSYOp's.
Here is a link for the 82nd version of what happened. Short article but it is revealing. Anyone else on this site that knows anything about this or where more information is I would appreciate knowing about it.

http://www.bragg.army.mil/history/Hi.../PowerPack.htm

[SWJED]

The United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador, 1979-1992 - Major Paul Cale, US Army. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1996. That the United States Military Advisory Group in El Salvador helped an emerging democratic nation combat a communist supported insurgent threat. That U.S. Army personnel assigned to the Military Advisory Group, and those deployed to that nation for training, helped in transforming the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) into a professional military force. Did the expanded U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Republic of El Salvador achieve the political / military goals set for them by the United States Ambassador to El Salvador and the Commander, United States Southern Command, during the period 1979 through 1992? The Government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed a United Nations brokered peace agreement in 1992 following twelve years of armed conflict. This agreement could not have been signed without the assistance of U.S. military aid, specifically the augmented Military Advisory Group. What did they do? How did they do it? What did they achieve? Will the peace agreement last? What has the United States learned throughout this conflict? This paper will answer these questions.

[Tom Odom]

Not true, there was a very successful COIN operation in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. It involved the 82nd Airborne and the 6th MEU. Not much has been written about this because it was handled rather quickly compared to most COIN ops. But there are definitely some lessons learned that we have forgotten, one in particular was the extensive use of PSYOp's.
Here is a link for the 82nd version of what happened. Short article but it is revealing. Anyone else on this site that knows anything about this or where more information is I would appreciate knowing about it.

http://www.bragg.army.mil/history/Hi.../PowerPack.htm

See Larry Yates Leavenorth Paper at CSI Press for a detailed analysis of DomRep CSI Press

Also for a look at early ops in Lebanon see Roger Spiller's Leavenworth Paper at CSI Press

Both offer great insights on COIN and stabiliy ops in general.

Best

Tom

[CaptCav_CoVan]

Wow! This could take several days of discussions. As a Marine officer who fought in Vietnam (FO, FAC with 3/4, 2/1, CAP at Phu Bai 1965-66, Advisor to the Vietnamwse Marines 1966-68, Battery commander Kilo 4/11 Jan-Aug 1968) I gained an unusual perspective on the war based on my experiences. Vietnam was primarily jungle and consisted small isolated villages and hamlets (Hue and Saigon during Tet excepted), which could be isolated (read oil-spot theory and practices) and effectively cordoned and controlled. Iraq is primarily urban areas where ingress and egress is much harder control, this making it tougher to isolate a population and provide the constant security for their protection. This is why the CAPs worked faily well in Vietnam and have had mixed success when they have been implemented in Iraq. Vietnam started as an advisory effort then built up to the "Army Concept" (see Andy Krepinevich) then went back to an advisory effort, where as Iraq started at a conventional war and just recently began using advisors to stand up the Iraqi forces. I see the same lack of "fire in the belly" with the Iraqis that I saw with many of the Vietnamese units (remember the ARVN rifle--never been fired and only dropped once) and the poor quality of the police force (the Quan Cahns in Vietnam were also called "white mice' because of the color of their uniforms and their general timidity and incompetence). The exception was the Vietnamese Marines, Vietnamese Airborne, many of the Ranger units, the First ARVN Division (especially the Hac Bao) and the Nungs. I see the same emphasis on high-tech gadgets that I saw in Vietnam (people-sniffers, etc) with little emphasis on what the troops on the ground really need (our flak jakets would not stop a poison BB and we did not get jungle boot and utilities until 1966 while we were eating 1953 C-Rats and firing 107 mm ammunition made in 1944). I was disappoiunted when the decision was made to go into Iraq and even more disappointed when they threw Tony Zinni's plan for Iraq out the window. Having served as an advisor with him and Joe Hoar, to me that was the first inkling that the Pentagon forgot the phrase "proper prior planning prevents piss-poor performance." The bottom line is that it is having sufficient numbers of troops on the ground who, while being aggressive in spirit, having the language and cultural knowledge that gives them the orientation towards winning the trust and support of the population for security and intelligence reasons, and having the right organizations, both military and civilian, under one command to effective prosecute the war. We could alos look at the effectivesness of armor, artillery, airsupport, logistics, etc and compare the two conflicts.... Perhaps a one- or two-day forum would be in order...

[Steve Blair]

Agreed. The DR gets lost in the Vietnam buildup and tends to be forgotten as a result. I also think it's very important to remember that these comparisons are being made for political and not historical reasons in most cases. It is convenient for some people to draw the Vietnam analogy, so they do so at every opportunity. To me the comparison is most valid when it's applied to DoD (and the services) and focused on their internal response to Iraq. Otherwise it's just a political straw man.