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Thread: Point/Counterpoint: Are the Service Academies in Trouble?

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by baboon6 View Post
    Do you know if the Israelis consciously modeled their system on the German one (seems unlikely but you never know) or if it just developed that way?
    From my own enquiries, it appears that the idea that officers have to prove themselves in the ranks comes from Palmach.
    Because the Israelis lacked the British "class" and private education system, you had to prove yourself to be a leader. They were also strongly socialist in ideology, so merit was strongly emphasised. All that conspired into the modern system you see today.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote:
    Originally Posted by William F. Owen
    I recently asked one of the Sandhurst Staff how many got failed out of the course and he told me, that it wasn't their job to fail people, but develop them. - This is fundamentally disagree with.

    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Concur. Much depends on the attitude of the company commander, the laddie beside me sacked 5 of his cadets when he was company commanding at Sandhurst. Combat arm DS tend to be more demanding at Sandhurst, especially of those who aspire to join the combat arms.
    Yes and no. My opinion is that it is up to the initial selection process (OSB) to get it mostly right so that the course staff could concentrate on taking the students to their potential (as much as you can do in such a short period.) I got intensely irritated when presented with obvious hopeless cases from the outset.

    Better to have half the size of the course and have a better pass rate of better trained and exercised young officers than to carry passengers along for the ride for no purpose.

    I liked the idea the Selous Scouts had when they trained some National Servicemen (yes believe it or not even they needed to top up with 18 year olds). They took them directly on a physical selection course where they were placed under constant stress for a period of a month where they learned bushcraft and the like. A great test of character. 99% of those who made the first month passed out I understand.

    Now (at last) here is a good use for Kenya. Take the cadets out there for a month where they will do just enough drill to get from A to B, do all the field craft/bushcraft stuff, do the basic personal weapon training stuff, mix in a lot of endurance and team work issues, cover the map reading etc etc

    So effectively you cover:

    TO1 Demonstrate combat fitness
    TO2 Handle and fire platoon weapon systems (rifle and LMG)
    TO3 Navigate across country
    TO4 Apply battlefield first aid
    TO5 Carry out basic fieldcraft
    TO12 Lead Individual and Team Training (adventure training, cadet platoon projects, sports et al)
    add Intro to tracking.
    Plus many of the leadership aspects.

    After one month they will have had the best/most interesting/most enjoyable training they will ever have and you will have sorted the men from the boys.

    I say its a bargain. (I'll be available for the hot season say November
    Last edited by JMA; 05-28-2010 at 02:39 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    I think it is a cultural thing. The system works well enough and therefore there is no over-riding reason to change. I went through the old 'O' type system of Potential Officer Development Course which used to be compulsory for Scottish Division Officers. Basic training at Glencorse, no more then 4 hours sleep a night and a 'blind' programme where we did not know what was going to happen more then 2 hours in advance - those were the days
    If you look at the IDF system it appears to be built around their 2 year National Service with the requirement for officers to sign on for another year before being posted to the reserve (this as I read it from the exert from the quoted book). This may be the limitation of the system as it effectively screens out any potential officers who for whatever reason do not want to extend their time on active service another year. It also appears that NCO promotions take place within the first year after recruit training. That is very much a national service thing and would be exceptional within a regular army structure.

    It works for them just as it can probably be said by most countries that their system works for them also.

    This idea of the need of service before commissioning seems only valid if it is built upon time served as a trained soldier and not merely some sort of egalitarian approach to basic training.

    From my personal experience I did 6 months "basic" training in the South Africa as a national servicemen then went on to Rhodesia where i did the whole basic training thing again for 20 weeks. And did First Phase on officers course (was it 12 weeks? out of the 12 month course - can't quite remember) which culminated with "Passing off the square".

    There were differences. Important differences. My instructors on recruit course were sgts and cpls while on officers course only c/sgts and WOIIs. Big difference. The recruit training was pitched at preparing one to be a "bayonet" in a rifle platoon while clearly the officers course was all about leadership and even during section battle drills we were involved with the demonstration company (that's all we had) as troops to command.

    So quite honestly the basic training itself came nowhere close to the quality of the first phase of the officers training.

    It was the time served in an operational subunit which was valuable. The 5 contacts I had as a troopie were valuable. It is this aspect that needs attention. The Sword of Honour on my officers course had attended university first so had a head start yet speaking to him 30 years on he believes that he too would have benefited had he spent some time in the ranks before officers course or being commissioned.

    So it really appears that there is a need for practical experience of soldiering prior to taking command of a platoon on active service and not necessarily to be trained with and soldier with basic recruits.

    We played with the idea of understudies where new officers would spend time working with a platoon commander who was coming to the end of his 3 year stint as a platoon commander. Not satisfactory. We had op attachments where officer cadets were attached to operational companies (a variation on the understudy theme). Worked quite well except was never long enough.

    So if a person was to first do basic training and then a year as a trained soldier how much could you reduce the 12 month officer course by? If the recruit course was 20 weeks then you could probably offset about half of that and bring it down to 9 and a half months. IMHO
    Last edited by JMA; 05-29-2010 at 12:06 AM.

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    Default USMA Grad's Discoveries

    I'm Major Alex Braszko, currently a student at Intermediate Level Education at Fort Belvoir, Command and General Staff College. I'm replying to an earlier posting that commented on the frustrations with service academies.

    The views expressed in this blog are my own and do not reflect official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

    When I graduated West Point in 1997, I attended MI OBC at Fort Huachuca, AZ. Our graduating class had some of the top students, as well as bottom students, from our class branch MI. Literally, our #3 ranked academic student, I believe, as well as another that was down in the 800s both made it into MI. I was somewhere closer to the middle top. My understanding from ROTC peers was that MI was much more selective in their respective colleges and universities, but I don't know the actual stats.

    It appeared, at that time, from talking to my West Point classmates at OBC, that we were somewhat more prepared than our ROTC peers when we attended MI OBC, especially from a discipline perspective. We West Point grads seemed much more content to be "free" and didn't mind the requirements of early morning PT, long academic days, etc. However, the slight advantages we may have initially had changed rapidly after our first 12 months. From then on it seemed like USMA and ROTC grads were in the same boat.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    If you look at the IDF system it appears to be built around their 2 year National Service with the requirement for officers to sign on for another year before being posted to the reserve (this as I read it from the exert from the quoted book). This may be the limitation of the system as it effectively screens out any potential officers who for whatever reason do not want to extend their time on active service another year. It also appears that NCO promotions take place within the first year after recruit training. That is very much a national service thing and would be exceptional within a regular army structure.
    The system is built around a 3 year period of service. The officer selection is based on something called Kaba (quality) scores, that is based on your life before the army from school work, family history and psychological examinations on joining. It is notable that almost all successful IDF officers have very high Kaba scores. This is the bit everyone misses.

    You are selected as a potential officer before you get into uniform. If you want to be an officer, you have to serve longer, be more committed and smarter than everyone else - and prove it constantly. Only the highest scoring candidates from the NCO school, make it to Officer School. The IDF system is essentially based on selecting officers, not just training them.
    By all accounts things are less brutal than they used to be, but it's still very tough.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The system is built around a 3 year period of service. The officer selection is based on something called Kaba (quality) scores, that is based on your life before the army from school work, family history and psychological examinations on joining. It is notable that almost all successful IDF officers have very high Kaba scores. This is the bit everyone misses.
    Is there any literature on the kaba methodology? While at university a friend of mine did his thesis on the Army Officer Selection process. The Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) is surprisingly sophisticated (most of us just remember command tasks with 3 barrels, 6 toggle ropes, 2 planks and a hangover; as well as the dreaded 6ft wall ) with lots of psychometric testing. I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.

    Replying to JMAs point on officer training syllabus, the first term at Sandhurst is the trained soldier syllabus, so if officer candidates had to come having completed time in the ranks then you ould in theory cut the course by approx 1/3.

    Sandhurst has recently been given a bit of a new broom and I was there a couple of weeks ago trying to ascertain how they had changed in the light of operational experiences. I will see if I can write up my notes this week and publish. I know that they have trialled Ex Caractacus, a complex COIN TEWT set in Wales circa AD 100.
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Is there any literature on the kaba methodology?
    Portrait of an Israeli Soldier is on Google Books. That's the best English version I know.
    I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.
    Wow. AOSB assessed themselves as successful. What about the actual performance of those officers?
    Even if that were true, all that tells you is that AOSB can identity those who can be successful within that system. It fails to tell you if the men selected were actually good officers, compared to other methods.

    IMO the UK could do a better job of selecting and training officers, if the need became more apparent and pressing.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Even if that were true, all that tells you is that AOSB can identity those who can be successful within that system. It fails to tell you if the men selected were actually good officers, compared to other methods.
    I quite agree, but the point I was making is that in the same way that the kaba methodology appears to show a correlation between high score and high performance in the IDF, so does the AOSB scoring and performance in the UK Army. What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    IMO the UK could do a better job of selecting and training officers, if the need became more apparent and pressing.
    Undoubtedly, but the system works sufficiently as it is. AOSB takes in a very large number of candidates and passes a declining percentage of them, a reflection perhaps on the changes in society when viewed against the perceived requirements of the army. Those that pass selection and then training are (in the army's opinion) performing well on ops.

    I think there is more of an issue with the through training and education of the officer corps then there is with initial selection, training and performance on operations. Our challenge is how to encourage robust, professionally competent and flexible thinking officers within an organisation that is inherently conservative and hierarchical. Perhaps we do not want to encourage flexibility and (mental) agility across the officer corps but nurture not penalise what we have, recognising that it is a necessary talent pool?
    RR

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Is there any literature on the kaba methodology? While at university a friend of mine did his thesis on the Army Officer Selection process. The Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) is surprisingly sophisticated (most of us just remember command tasks with 3 barrels, 6 toggle ropes, 2 planks and a hangover; as well as the dreaded 6ft wall ) with lots of psychometric testing. I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.
    Actually if you go to page 118/9 of the referred to book.

    (Go here to start. Then select the page 119 option. Then scroll up to the last paragraph of page 118.

    It says: " Far more important (than the Kaba assessment), however, are the addition means of selection. They list some and then say again that despite all this stuff they still have to undergo "3 to 4 days of situation screening procedures, called Gibush..."

    Now any bets that the planks, the wall, the barrels and the toggle ropes (probably without hangover) will be found during the Gibush phase?

    It appears the Kaba is a intelligence test.

    Replying to JMAs point on officer training syllabus, the first term at Sandhurst is the trained soldier syllabus, so if officer candidates had to come having completed time in the ranks then you ould in theory cut the course by approx 1/3.
    As I said I found the whole training of recruits and then officers were approached from a totally different angles. In the nine years since UDI I don't think things could have changed that dramatically in the UK. We we probably still working off the same script.

    For the record then the recruit training aimed to produce "bayonets" (riflemen) and had corporals and sgts as instructors. While the whole emphasis on the officers course was to give the officer an understanding of minor tactics so as to know exactly what his sgt, his corporals, his support weapons and his riflemen were supposed to be doing and where the training was carried out by colour/staff sgts and WOII's. So my position was that one could not just deduct the time spent on recruit training from the officers course as there was a need to cover what I stated above and also supplement the personal weapon handling skill of all platoon weapons with specific training on the tactical employment of these platoon weapons. You copy?

    Sandhurst has recently been given a bit of a new broom and I was there a couple of weeks ago trying to ascertain how they had changed in the light of operational experiences. I will see if I can write up my notes this week and publish. I know that they have trialled Ex Caractacus, a complex COIN TEWT set in Wales circa AD 100.
    Good to see there is some effort being made. I don't know what the Officer Instructor / cadet ratio is nowadays at Sandhurst but I seem to remember that it was higher than the one : ten/twelve ratio which I believe is preferred.

    I would be interested in how that TEWT has been drafted.

    I would say that all current courses should read the following two books and discuss and study them in detail. These should be essential reading for all serving officers and senior NCOs:

    Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

    and

    The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

    PS: I wonder if the author Lester W. Grau, a Vietnam War veteran and retired lt col in the U.S. Army is still with us. Shouldn't he be an essential speaker to every Staff Course, officers course and senior NCOs course?
    Last edited by JMA; 07-05-2010 at 01:59 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    For the record then the recruit training aimed to produce "bayonets" (riflemen) and had corporals and sgts as instructors. While the whole emphasis on the officers course was to give the officer an understanding of minor tactics so as to know exactly what his sgt, his corporals, his support weapons and his riflemen were supposed to be doing and where the training was carried out by colour/staff sgts and WOII's. So my position was that one could not just deduct the time spent on recruit training from the officers course as there was a need to cover what I stated above and also supplement the personal weapon handling skill of all platoon weapons with specific training on the tactical employment of these platoon weapons. You copy?
    I think I copy!
    The first term at Sandhurst is the Common Military Syllabus (Recruit) (CMS(R)) at heart, as it assumes no prior military knowledge of the officer cadets; walk before run. Once the cadets are trained soldiers (have completed CMS(R)) then they can go on to learn tactics.

    The previous ethos of Sandhurst was to use infantry tactics as a vehicle to teach leadership. Recognising that for most officers Sandhurst is going to be their ownly exposure to light role infantry tactics there is now much more emphasis on not just tactics as a vehicle for leadership training, but to ensure tactical profiency by all officers regardless of branch or arm.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Good to see there is some effort being made. I don't know what the Officer Instructor / cadet ratio is nowadays at Sandhurst but I seem to remember that it was higher than the one : ten/twelve ratio which I believe is preferred.
    Each platoon has a Captain instructor and a CSgt or WO2 intructor, so 2:30 ratio. For some specialist lessons (skill at arms, signals et al) they will go to specialist wings and the ratio of instructors to students is increased.
    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I would be interested in how that TEWT has been drafted.
    So would I!

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I would say that all current courses should read the following two books and discuss and study them in detail. These should be essential reading for all serving officers and senior NCOs:

    Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

    and

    The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
    Both books are very well known in the army, being on the mandatory reading lists.
    RR

    "War is an option of difficulties"

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    They list some and then say again that despite all this stuff they still have to undergo "3 to 4 days of situation screening procedures, called Gibush..."

    Now any bets that the planks, the wall, the barrels and the toggle ropes (probably without hangover) will be found during the Gibush phase?

    It appears the Kaba is a intelligence test.
    The Kaba "Score" refers to an overall assessment, not just how smart you are. The Gibush is nothing like the RCB with planks and barrels. Its essentially about putting people under psychological and physical pressure. It is used as the practical confirmation of the what the Kaba has indicated.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.
    Possibly. A lot of IDF stuff does not translate due to the gulf in cultures, but both armies claim to be looking for the same basic things in officers.
    I would not recommend using an Israeli (or German) approach, but I think there is amble evidence to support a move to a "Sans-Sandhurst" approach that may prove more effective.
    Those that pass selection and then training are (in the army's opinion) performing well on ops.
    Concur. Nothing I have ever seen tells me that the UK has a problem with junior officers. Most I have met in recent years seem to be a bit more switched on than those I served with.
    I think there is more of an issue with the through training and education of the officer corps then there is with initial selection, training and performance on operations.
    Again concur. There is a problem with professional education. I don't buy into the "complex adaptive" thinker BS. Someone grounded in professional knowledge and experience is all you need. What that professional knowledge and experience is, is very up for grabs.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The Kaba "Score" refers to an overall assessment, not just how smart you are. The Gibush is nothing like the RCB with planks and barrels. Its essentially about putting people under psychological and physical pressure. It is used as the practical confirmation of the what the Kaba has indicated.
    That's not what the book says.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    That's not what the book says.
    Well the edition I have on my desk, gives a pretty explicit statement on page 85 - "In search of Quality" - and if you talk to IDF officers, they most readily translate the Kaba score as "quality score." "Dapa" is the intelligence component of the Kaba. There are four Kaba components.
    Experiments with armour crews showed that placing "high Kaba" scorers together lead to significantly better performance, that "low Kaba" crews.
    To describe the Kaba system as an "intelligence test," is inaccurate and misleading. It is far more.
    "Ha Gibush" is practical testing aimed at placing candidates under stress, because a Kaba score will not indicate a candidates necessary level of aggression and determination, plus his ability to keep thinking while holding a 20kg Jerry can over his head.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.
    I would not rush to that conclusion and apply it either way or from other countries as well.

    There is always something to learn from others, a little bit here, a fundamental bit there. But what is not in the culture of most modern armies is to accept that they can learn from other armies thereby implying that others are "better" in some respects than they.

    If one understands the underlying principle or concept then one can apply it to ones own setting.

    Rhodesia was very much like the Brit army in that it was based on a professional army while the SADF (South Africa) was very much built around its National Service system (much like the Israelis) of two years but obviously less effective than the Israelis as national service was a year shorter.

    Now having been in both camps as it were the 'old' Brit system (as I understood it) is far superior than the Israeli system.

    Goto Chapter 6 and follow the explanation of "Induction and Basic Training" and see what you glean from that. NCOs of two years service as instructors and 2nd Lt as training Platoon Cmdrs. Appalling. The same weakness as the SADF.

    But from what you say (that the first phase of officer training is from a syllabus common all recruits) the 14 week first phase seems to fit in with the egalitarian approach of "everyone gets a common basic training". This all sounds good in the name of standardisation ans streamlining but it translates, I submit, into 14 weeks of lost time in officer preparation in a context where a brand new 2nd Lt for the first 'x' number of months is of dubious value anyway. At least in the Brit army there are 7-10 year service sgts who can nurse the youngster along while he "finds his feet" but in the Israeli army after nine months of training and some service in between he is expected hit the ground running.

    Then onto the instructor ratio. I thought the ideal squad size for weapon training and fieldcraft was 12? We even had 12 per barrack room. So on the RLI recruit course I/we had a corporal per 12 recruits and a sgt per 24. But I was talking about the officer ratio (as I thought the NCO ratio was a given). The Training Troop was commanded by a Capt (ex- RSM/CSM commissioned) and supported by a CSM. Lived in terror of the CSM and saw the Training Officer regularly but he seemed to be more interested in what and how the instructors were doing their stuff than us.

    On officers course we started with 24 or 25 and 12 passed-out. Two colour sgts gave us their undivided attention under the eye of the Wing SM for all that stuff while we had an OC Regular Cadets (Maj) and a Course Officer (snr Capt) and they were under the eye of the OC Cadet Wing.

    Years later when I was the Course Officer on a Regular Cadet Course the system remained the same.

    Not over the last 30 years has anything led me to believe that the ratios I mentioned above could be diluted without a significant negative effect.

    I am hoping that your response will be that most changes are forced through budget reviews rather than because it is a better training solution.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Goto Chapter 6 and follow the explanation of "Induction and Basic Training" and see what you glean from that. NCOs of two years service as instructors and 2nd Lt as training Platoon Cmdrs. Appalling. The same weakness as the SADF.
    Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
    The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
    Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
    Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
    The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
    Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
    Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.
    Yes I can see that the Israelis have built their system around their 3 year national service cycle. Given that fixed parameter they have to make the most of it and other than insist on an extra year for officers its three years active serve then into the Reserve after that.

    They probably do the best they can under the circumstances.

    Purely in terms of instructor experience, maturity and training the Brit system (as I understand it) is way ahead of the Israelis (as I understand theirs).

    Instructor corporals involved with basic recruit training would have 5-7 years service? Sgts involved with recruit training would have 7-10 years service? Add to that they would have done a drill and weapons course and/or a minor tactics course (maybe these courses have nes names now). Certainly the course officer would not be a 2Lt with what 18 mths-2 years service.

    I'm talking quality of training given. No comparison.

    One understands the Israeli need to get the most out of the 3 year national service, train them quickly, identify and train leaders quickly, get these conscripts into active service units quickly... because the next big war may be just around the corner.

    Given the limitations of operating within the 3 year national service system the Israelis have done exceptionally well.

    As to my comment about "appalling". I stand by my comment that an NCO with 2 years or less total military service being used for recruit instruction is an appalling thought.

  18. #78
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Purely in terms of instructor experience, maturity and training the Brit system (as I understand it) is way ahead of the Israelis (as I understand theirs).
    Actually you do have a point, but it has to be asked how much of a problem it really is. For example, a lot of the gunnery instructors at the armour school are 19-year-old girls. The same is true of the Sniper instructors at the sniper School, and the parachute instructors at the airborne school. 19-year-old girls!!

    OK, so how good or experienced do you have to be to teach either of those subjects, if the instructors have been selected from their ability to instruct them? In the IDF, the girls, pass on the basics, just as well as anyone can, and the men they are teaching then go off and gain the experience. None of the guys have a hang-up about women instructors, so it's simply not an issue.
    Senior instructors, who train the instructors, tend to be long-service NCOs.

    Tactical/operational training is done by officers.

    I have known a good few very experienced soldiers who were very bad instructors. Experience generally informs practice, not teaching. "Them that can does. Them that can't, teach."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
    The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
    Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
    Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.
    My comments re the Brit and Israeli systems stand.

    The 2 year National Service in Rhodesia had a different training solution. Again the aim was to get as much active service time out of the conscripts as possible.

    The National Service cadet courses at the School of Infantry would last 4 and a half months. Out of that one could get 2 Lts, sgts and corporals who would then be posted out mainly to the National Service "Independent Companies" and also to Signals, Engineers, Armoured Cars, Artillery etc.

    Hardly ideal... but it worked for Rhodesia.

    The course I took passed-out 16 of which 9 were 2 Lts. Seven members of the course were graduates (mainly BSc types) all of whom were commissioned. Two were sadly later KIA and for the rest we remain in contact through a closed Facebook group. I have received good feedback from them looking back 30 years ago.

    Again this approach to the training of National Service leaders was the best idea Rhodesia had under their circumstances and within their 2 year National Service.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Actually you do have a point, but it has to be asked how much of a problem it really is. For example, a lot of the gunnery instructors at the armour school are 19-year-old girls. The same is true of the Sniper instructors at the sniper School, and the parachute instructors at the airborne school. 19-year-old girls!!

    OK, so how good or experienced do you have to be to teach either of those subjects, if the instructors have been selected from their ability to instruct them? In the IDF, the girls, pass on the basics, just as well as anyone can, and the men they are teaching then go off and gain the experience. None of the guys have a hang-up about women instructors, so it's simply not an issue.
    Senior instructors, who train the instructors, tend to be long-service NCOs.

    Tactical/operational training is done by officers.

    I have known a good few very experienced soldiers who were very bad instructors. Experience generally informs practice, not teaching. "Them that can does. Them that can't, teach."
    In a second follow up reply I covered the Rhodesian approach to nation Service "leader" training.

    I accept if there is a system whereby careful selection (like the Israeli Kaba for example) and an low instructor student ratio are achieved there is a lot you can do with talented people in a relatively short period of time.

    I think it is intelligent to analyse each specific training subject and assess exactly who really needs to provide that instruction. Back then I would have loved to have a 19 year girl give me training on my personal weapon and I don't see it matters with para training or even dispatching. The thing is you don't necessarily free up "men" for active service by doing this as I noted a tendency for those maybe not best suited to active service tended to gravitate to training and peripheral jobs.

    I do think that the student / instructor ratio is a critical success factor in just about all training.

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