New Rules of War

[Fuchs]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

[William F. Owen]

The best effect of such texts is to push readers into new territory. Some readers may feel compelled to look up "swarming" for their first time, for example.

(Swarming works under the condition of superior elusiveness of the swarming parties; see sub wolfpacks in '40-'42, Parthian light cavalry.)

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

Mongols did not "swarm." Nor did Panzer Regiments. I keep hearing about Swarming, but no one actually seems to know what it is. If it just means simultaneous attacks from multiple directions, then its hardly a useful characterisation.

[Fuchs]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

So what is "Swarming." Wolfpacks, moved dispersed then massed on command, often directed by aerial reconnaissance. The answer to Wolfpacks was convoys - again massing.

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

Wolfpacks were quite complicated. Aerial recce played a minor role, there were never more than two aerial recce squadrons with sufficient range available and their aircraft were quite suboptimal.

First Phase:
Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).

Second Phase:
One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy and radios its position and movement.
A central station receives the radio message and transmits necessary info, not the least to make sure that every sub gets the message with minimum radiation from the shadowing sub.

Third Phase:
The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time.
This was a saturation approach to overcome the defences.

Fourth Phase:
Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night, proceed to phase 3 again.



It's vastly different from the more understood tactics of battlefleets and army units/formations from battalion up to corps (the big arrows on maps).
This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.
Conventional tactics don't include an all-round pulse attack - not even during the annihilation of a pocket.
The German army would never have developed wolfpack tactics - their mode of attack was too much opposed to the Schwerpunkt idea. The difference is huge.


@marct:
"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

[marct]

Hi Fuchs,

"Finding" was no key issue in the Teutoburg Forest battle. Enemy identification was the key issue for the Romans, logistics & politics for the Germans.

Hmmm, I would include "enemy identification" under the heading "finding" myself, as in finding the moles . And I agree, for the Germans it was definitely politics and logistics.

[Ken White]

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not. Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

What most miss is the human dimension. Too many leaders are not up to the theoretical level of performance. A good example is the above mentioned Viet Nam experience that Tukhachevskii posted:

"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units..."

The good Perfesser fails to note -- or notice -- that the Organization was totally capable of morphing into small units and Checkerboarding and many units did just that and did it successfully but USARV / MACV did not do so in toto because the leadership and the too powerful Staffs at high echelons were comprised of people whose experience was predominately in northwestern Europe and thus they tried to force the fight in the paddies to be conducted the same way they would have on the north German plain.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

(ask Arminius !)

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not.

I remember reading some years back, that a science becomes a science when it drops static typologies and looks at change over time. Swarming, checkerboards, etc - any tactic really - can work if the factors limiting the situation are right. No tactic, however, is a Holy Grail; they will all fail if the situational limits are against them.

Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

Hey, I resemble that remark !

More seriously, cherry picking historical examples of the success of a tactic (or strategy) is fine as long as it is designed to highlight the limiting factors. Unfortunately, the author in this article appears to be doing it for another reason. Swarming, as a tactic, seems to work best when there is limited capability for opponent identification and when immediately available defensive technologies can be breached quickly. It also seems to work really nicely when you have both of those conditions and the aim is actually to attack in some other area, usually moral via logistics (i.e. force the non-swarming group to invest heavily in infrastructure and logistical support). Probably the classic campaign along these lines, which, BTW, Arquilla does not mention, was Crassus' expedition against the Parthians.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

Yup! That is the lesson he should have drawn from the legions.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

[Outlaw 7]

Anyone here on this blog ask the 1st Cav what they thought about "swarming".

Ask about the high losses at two of their COPS in 2007/2008 and then deduce that there is nothing to swarming---it was the primary battle tactic of the IAI and AAS starting in 2007.

Ask US forces about their losses in recent COP attacks in Afghanistan.

Jesus guys do some reading and asking--- actually the article was the first sign that someone is starting to understand "open source warfare" (OSW).

I cannot believe the number of comments here that seems to wipe the concept of swarming off the table and to a degree want to negate a DoD study by RAND off the table.

[Outlaw 7]

To all---and where you all when the discussion around "swarming" and "open source warfare" (OSW) broke in of all times 2004 WHEN it was how many months after we entered Iraq? Here is a portion of that article.

Tuesday, 18 May 2004
GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING
Swarming tactics have been used successfully in wars throughout history by a variety of organizations from the tribal Parthians (horse archers) to 20th century Germans (U-boats). Global guerrillas (next generation terrorists) will likely use swarming tactics as part of their doctrine. This technique, in combination with new market-based financing techniques is what's called a killer combo.

Definition.
A good place to start an analysis of swarming is Sean Edwards' "Swarming on the Battlefield (PDF downloads). Here's his excellent definition of swarming: a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Benefits.
It's easy to see the advantages of this type of maneuver:


•It cuts the enemy target off from supply and communications.

•It adversely impacts the moral of the target.

•It makes a coordinated defense extremely difficult (resource allocation is intensely difficult).

•It radically increases the potential of surprise.

Types.
Swarming is typically divided into two types:
Massed swarming -- Swarmers begin as a massed unit. They break apart and then swarm on target.
Dispersed swarming -- Units are dispersed (geographically) from the start. Once a target is identified, they converge to attack. This is the most difficult of the two types of swarming to defend against since the attacker never presents a massed target.

Effectiveness.
Historically, swarming is successful only when it scores high in the following areas:


•Elusiveness -- either through mobility or concealment.

•Long range firepower -- standoff capability.

•Superior situational awareness -- having more information about the enemy than they have about you.

Swarming contra infrastructure systems: guerre de course
Given this background, how will global guerrillas use swarming? First, the target for global guerrillas won't be isolated military units but rather urban infrastructure systems. The objective of these attacks will be damage that results in economic attrition. Let's examine how global guerrilla's will leverage swarming tactics to accomplish this objective.

The effectiveness of Global Guerrilla swarmers.
Global guerrilla swarmers will maintain their effectiveness across the vital swarming attributes in the following ways:


•Elusiveness. Global guerrillas attain concealment through anonymity in large urban environments. Reliance on the local population isn't necessary. High degrees of mobility are accomplished by leveraging public transportation networks.

•Superior situational awareness. Open source intelligence is easy to accomplish (via the Internet, the media, and other sources). Further, encrypted global communications, via the Internet, enables global intelligence sharing information sharing. The small size of operational cells limits the potential of discovery and counter-guerrilla intelligence development.

•Standoff attacks. Like many historical swarming attacks, global guerrillas will have significant standoff firepower potential -- the ability to attack from a distance. However, this firepower isn't a traditional weapon, rather, its the global guerrilla's ability to use attacks on infrastructure to impact downstream systems miles (perhaps hundreds of miles) distant. Attacks will be rotated among infrastructures in a modern variant of horse archer tactics.

How global guerrilla swarmers will surmount traditional limits to operations.
Historically, swarmers have been limited by terrain, logistics, and communications. Global guerrillas will not be constrained by these limits. This makes global guerrilla swarming unique to history as can be seen in the attached 2x2 matrix. The upshot is that global guerrillas will be able to conduct dispersed swarming maneuvers on the operational level. Here's how global guerrillas will surmount the traditional limits on swarming:


•Ubiquitous public transportation networks (roads to airlines) enable rapid, low-cost transportation for dispersed units.

•Logistics requirements can be met via open economic transactions and don't require population support. The requirements for operations are relatively limited (damage to infrastructure requires low-tech tools). Additionally, the small size of the cells (~5 people) requires little housing/food/etc and in most cases would fall well below the threshold of detection.

•Real-time, anonymous, wireless communications (both data and voice -- VoIP, e-mail, Web, cellphones, etc.) enable global guerrillas to coordinate dispersed operations on the operational level. Tactical operations will be of a conventional type, typically by a single unit or individual.

[William F. Owen]

A RAND study pretty much defined the stuff about a decade ago.

Cool! Where?

You're wrong. Wolfpacks were the answer to convoys, not the other way around. Convoys were the answer to individual subs in 1917.

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

1. First Phase:
   Establish a screening line till one sub gets in contact with a convoy (that enough subs can intercept in time).
2. Second Phase:
   One sub gets into contact and keeps in contact, shadows the convoy ....
3. Third Phase:
   The subs of the wolfpack move into position and attack all in the same night, from different directions if possible at almost the same time....
4. Fourth Phase:
   Convoy still being shadowed, subs regroup for an attack another night....

OK, how does that qualify as "Swarming?" Did the Kriegsmarine ever call it swarming? Sounds like U-boat specific "Wolfpack," to me.

This vast difference easily justifies that earlier authors chose to attach an own label to this behaviour.

So who else has used "Swarming" tactics?

[Fuchs]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311/

My position is that RAND pretty much defined this term for military theory by publishing that work. That was a legitimate move because they identified a group of tactics that were sufficiently different from more common tactics to deserve a group name.


edit: Slightly related text http://redteamjournal.com/2009/12/interposing-tactics/

[Fuchs]

So the response to Wolfpacks was to STAY in Convoys, not disperse.

Not really. The response to wolfpack tactics was a huge set of efforts.

- dispersed aerial sub hunter patrols over the whole ocean
- suppressing the shadowing by pressing the subs below water using carrier-borne aerial cover for the convoy
- sub hunter groups (equivalent of combat air patrols) near their bases
- naval minelaying (especially in training areas and coastal regions)
- bombardment of bases, shipyards and industry
- more escorts per convoy
- more efficient convoys (area of a square grows faster than its borders - bigger convoy allows for more freighters per escort)
- technological innovation
- intelligence efforts
- industrial effort (a much, much larger ship production output)
...and of course a higher tolerance for losses than some 'experts' had expected.

[William F. Owen]

Not really. The response to wolfpack tactics was a huge set of efforts.

....so basically enhancing and supporting the convoy system? No convoys, no point.

I think the question could be, did the Wolfpacks require a disproportionate allocation of resources to defeat, balanced by was the Wolfpack the best use of the U-boat - which I do not think it was!