Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

Steve the Planner, those are some great insights and I hope others contribute their own over time. Being a grunt in 03 and a find, fix, finish dude in 07 I was constantly wondering where those civilian leaders/problem solvers were. It was clear from my optic that the military was unintentionally impeding progress, because the people sat and stewed waiting for the conquerors to lead, and for a while we didn't because we didn't know who was in charge or what direction to go in, and then spontaneously most units starting doing reconstruction work on their own learning a lot of hard lessons over the years. I don't blame the players at the tactical level (either military or civilian), but some of the players at the national level should have known better (we have ample history to draw from).

Surferbeetle, in time a new, more liberal Middle East may emerge, but I doubt it will be the result of our invasion of Iraq. Rather it will be result of our ideas being shared and embraced through diplomacy, education, trade, etc. that ultimately will weaken the current oppressive regimes. It will be their revolution, not ours. Perhaps I'm not given certain strategists enough credit for their vision, but it appears to be that they thought we could rather easily impose political, social and cultural change in Iraq, or worse they just assumed it would naturally blosom after Saddam fell, and it would create a domino effect. That social-political experiment failed. Other things may work out in our favor over the long run.

Sadly the news coming out of Egypt is mixed, and there remains a good (perhaps strong) possibility that the Islamists will ultimately rule, start killing off the Coptic Christians and declare the Peace Treaty with Israel void. I remain neutral, not optimistic or pestimestic at this point.

[Dayuhan]

This is a good summary of the post-WWII insurgencies in the Philippines, but in truth there has really only been one insurgency, and it has been radiating out from government since the Spanish planted a flag. Swapping that flag for a US flag changed nothing, nor has changing that for a Japanese or now local homegrown elite leadership either.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...ilippines.html


"Peasant revolt is historically endemic to the Philippines despite the differing nature of the insurrections it is the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military that remains the main cause of unrest. Luckily for the Philippines governments the nation has remained low on the list for any countries wishing to supply arms to the rebels and luckily for the rebels the US was frightened of any further involvement following Vietnam. Despite the end of the Marcos regime the insurgencies still rumble on and seem to do so unless the social and economic and political structure of the Philippines changes radically. “Philippine history shows that rebellions can be suppressed but rarely eliminated for long “ (Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, R.J Kessler)"

Two insurgencies, actually... the one in Central/Western Mindanao really doesn't derive from "the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military" and has fundamentally different causative factors.

The assumption that all derives from governance can obscure the reality that governance and patterns of governance often derive themselves from culture and history. When incompatible populations are combined by quirks of post-colonial borders into "nations" with implicit potential for conflict, it's only natural for governance to reflect the inherent conflicts. Of course in theory you could expect governments to transcend these issues, but in reality governments reflect these implicit divisions and it's not realistic to expect them to do otherwise.

The "governance-centric" approach, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, has virtues and does help to understand why insurgency emerges. The risk, of course, is that from the conclusion that all emanates from governance, we may deduce a need to run around changing the way other countries are governed, which is likely to get us into an even deeper pile of scheisse. Understanding the role that governance plays in generating insurgency has to be matched by an understanding of the challenges and general undesirability of attempts to dictate, impose, or attempt to generate changes in the way other nations are governed.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

My guess is that each of us will have a different story, and none of us will have the whole picture until they are all told. There were so many different Iraqs and so many different US's in Iraq.

Back to the Afghan topic, Omar does the Tent Maker thing, reminding us that the solutions are across the border(s), and very much more complicated than anything solvable within any forest we could be dropped into.

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

[Bill Moore]

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

GEN McCrystal recently said we didn't understand the history and complexity of Afghanistan, and that we didn't even understand the last 50 years of history there (himself included). Davidbfpo posted a link to an interesting article/book summary that pointed out several myths regarding Afghanistan to include the myth that the Stinger was what convinced the Soviets to leave, and that the Taliban didn't have popular support (initially), etc (Inserted link : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...ut-afghanistan. We created a plan based on our own warped sense of reality, and then wonder why it isn't working?

The problem with Afghanistan is that is is several problems and "we" decided to solve all of them inn hopes of (objective) denying a future safehaven for AQ, not realizing, or refusing to acknowledge, that AQ has developed plenty of safehavens since we squeezed the ballon in Afghanistan. In some respects it seems that an AQ safehaven in parts of "remote" Afghanistan is better for us strategically than in other locations as long as we have the political will to strike it as needed. That point can be argued, but the most counterproductive result of our occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan is that by occuppying Muslim lands we gave new energy for the global jihad propaganda and grew the movement, which not only grew but adapted well to our current strategy of exhausting ourselves in the wrong location. This reminds me of watching my dog as kid dig furiously to chase a burrowing creature that already escaped out of another hole. She didn't lift her head and look, she was simply going by smell and was fixated on that hole.

Most of the world would have accepted (not necessarily liked) a harsh response (punative attack) to the 9/11 attacks, and the continued right for self defense, but that is entirely different than occuppying a nation.

I think part of our ambition is based on a collective guilt by certain government agencies that felt we dumped on the Afghan people after the USSR left, but that isn't entirely true either. Collective guilt drives a lot of bad policies, to include our own welfare state, and once the decision is made and implemented it is even harder to back out of it (creates more guilt).

[Steve the Planner]

I think that the big piece that is missing from many of the military analyses is the background issue of occupation, and the government's externalized beliefs in half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures.

It was these delusional and/or half-constructed efforts that frustrated military intentions in an ever expanding cascade of problems, many of which you referenced.

The weapon with the greatest power is civilian engagement, but it is a very tricky and dangerous sword, especially when wielded in a foreign land by what are perceived to be occupiers.

Back to terminologies: Influence vs. control.

[Dayuhan]

I think that the big piece that is missing from many of the military analyses is the background issue of occupation, and the government's externalized beliefs in half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures.

It was these delusional and/or half-constructed efforts that frustrated military intentions in an ever expanding cascade of problems, many of which you referenced.

The weapon with the greatest power is civilian engagement, but it is a very tricky and dangerous sword, especially when wielded in a foreign land by what are perceived to be occupiers.

Back to terminologies: Influence vs. control.

If you go back to Iraq before the operation, it was of course impossible for the US to wield influence or pursue civilian engagement without first achieving control through military means. The transition form one to the other proved far more difficult than many expected, and I'd put that down largely to irrationally optimistic expectations.

It's hard for me to look at these questions without remembering the absurd discourse that went on before the invasion... all the talk about "installing" a democracy, about how Iraq was such a good candidate for a democratic transition, how the educated westernized exiles would all return and lead the country to progressive prosperity, how other Arab states would flock to democracy once presented with Iraq's transcendent example.

Far too much of our planning and preparation was built around expectations that were impossibly unrealistic, and when the predictable problems emerged, we were unprepared.

I'd hope that our faith in those "half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures" has gone through a major reality check, but I suspect that those concepts may spring back into life at some point, with predictable consequences.

[carl]

Historically, intervention with a large military force has not been successful.

We disagree on this and matching historical point vs. point would be great fun but historical accuracy is not the main reason I don't like a catagorical (sic) statement like that. I'll get to the reason next.

I don't believe either Bob'sWorld or I are being dogmatic. We are simply saying one has to choose one's battles -- and we've made some very dumb choices. We can do better. "It" indeed will always happen again and I know we are both aware of that -- the issue is not whether "It" will happen, the issue is how best to respond to "It."

I well trust that neither you nor Bob'sWorld would BE dogmatic in the event no matter how I interpret your statements. I do not trust Big Army to be anything but dogmatic. That is the danger in stating that this or that can't be done, Big Army will believe it and never bother thinking about it again. I don't think that is good for the country in the long run. Even if we haven't done it yet, doesn't mean that it can't be done or that it might not have to be done. The corporate monster will use a dogmatic statement to be dogmatic, come hell or sandstorms.

I've tried to explain this idea as best I can. Forgive me if I am unclear.

[Surferbeetle]

Bill:

My guess is that each of us will have a different story, and none of us will have the whole picture until they are all told. There were so many different Iraqs and so many different US's in Iraq.

Back to the Afghan topic, Omar does the Tent Maker thing, reminding us that the solutions are across the border(s), and very much more complicated than anything solvable within any forest we could be dropped into.

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

Hey STP,

Lots of history out there. Difficult to put it into context but here is a quick drive by:
Sumer, 4500-2340 BCE
Akkad, 2340-2000 BCE
Elamites, 2000-1760 BCE
Babylonians, 1760-1595 BCE
Assyrians, northern Iraq, 3000- 1830 BCE and 827-612 BCE
Neo-Babylonians, 792-595 BCE
Medes and Persians, 539-330 BCE
Macedonians, 331-129 BCE
Parthians, 129 BCE - 234 CE
Sassanids, 224-636 CE
Muslims, 638-661 CE
Umayyads, 680-750 CE
Abbasids, 750-1258 CE
Ilkhanids, 1258-1334
Jalairids, 1334-1410
Black Sheep, 1410-1467
White Sheep, 1467-1509
Safavid, 1509-1534
Ottomans, 1534-1915
Brits, 1914-1932

...and you and Bill and I and others lived through some of the rest.

To be crude, our moment in time is equivalent to a gnats fart in a hurricane. We will see what history brings

[Bill Moore]

To be crude, our moment in time is equivalent to a gnats fart in a hurricane. We will see what history brings

True, but it was smelly and persistent fart.

[Ken White]

I do not trust Big Army to be anything but dogmatic. That is the danger in stating that this or that can't be done, Big Army will believe it and never bother thinking about it again.

We can also disagree on that. The Army put itself through a bad patch from 1975 until 2005 or so. It did that for a variety of reasons, some good, most not so good -- basically it hunkered down and tied to rebuild. It did a great job in many respects but it also erred in others. It was helped in erring by USSOCOM who were more flexible and saw an opportunity to get missions (money, spaces) and the Army did not realize what was happening -- or many in the Army did not. It was also not aided by Congress who passed a number of restrictive and counterproductive laws in the interests of fairness, objectivity and guarding the taxpayers dollars. In any event, that was then, this is now and that the Army will not learn from the last ten years -- and adapt -- is not only far from certain, indications thus far are that it is trying hard to change a good many things.

The last regime on E-Ring would have emulated -- did try in may respects -- the 75-05 processes. My belief is the new one will not do that. We'll have to wait and see but in the interim, being convinced the system will invariably take actions of which you disapprove might be considered a teeny bit dogmatic...

I don't think that is good for the country in the long run. Even if we haven't done it yet, doesn't mean that it can't be done or that it might not have to be done. The corporate monster will use a dogmatic statement to be dogmatic, come hell or sandstorms.

Much truth but no certainty. The real issue is not the Army, it's the Politicians. The Army will do what it's told, it may sluff and cheat a bit but it will do the job. The important thing is that Politicians -- and the broader electorate -- really need to know far more about the capabilities and limitations (because there are both and they are fairly finite...) of military force than most do at this time. Armed force is destructive, attempts to use it peace or nation building are likely to be unsuccessful; if one wishes to do that sort of stuff, a different force, one not specializing in violence should be formed -- if one can afford to do that and wait for a chance (or look for one...) to employ it. Sounds awfully expensive to me but the electorate can decide on that.

I've tried to explain this idea as best I can. Forgive me if I am unclear.

Not unclear. I as always applaud your intent even if I disagree with it. The Army isn't nearly as monolithic as many seem to think. It is conservative, it is self protective, it is bureaucratic -- but it plays in the political mess that is Washington; for better or worse it is a reflection of the nation.

[carl]

We'll have to wait and see but in the interim, being convinced the system will invariably take actions of which you disapprove might be considered a teeny bit dogmatic...

Ok, guilty as charged. You actually know the Army, I only know what I read here and see in the chow hall.

I was very glad to read the following.

In any event, that was then, this is now and that the Army will not learn from the last ten years -- and adapt -- is not only far from certain, indications thus far are that it is trying hard to change a good many things.

[Steve the Planner]

It's hard for me to look at these questions without remembering the absurd discourse that went on before the invasion... all the talk about "installing" a democracy, about how Iraq was such a good candidate for a democratic transition, how the educated westernized exiles would all return and lead the country to progressive prosperity, how other Arab states would flock to democracy once presented with Iraq's transcendent example.

Far too much of our planning and preparation was built around expectations that were impossibly unrealistic, and when the predictable problems emerged, we were unprepared.

Dayuhan:

You are pointing into the whole that I travelled to the bottom of and saying the obvious: That sure is deep!

The military had studied Iraq a lot during Iraq I, and, apparently, everything they learned then had gone the way of retirements, reassignments, or just plain lost. As a friend once said, "The government has no mind," nor, as it were, any repository of knowledge. Every event is a new one, and every place a new discovery.

After inventorying the chaotic and crumbling infrastructure and systems of Northern Iraq in early 2008, it was clear that what Iraqis often said later was true: Everything had crumbled under Saddam---power, water, sewer, whatever. By 2003, the enfeebled Iraqi systems were on their last legs.

Must have been frustrating for Hans Blick, etc... trying to explain to the world that Iraq hardly had functional electricity and running water, let alone an advanced industrial capacity to operate any weapons of mass destruction. A land where people sold gasoline in small black market containers on the street side was hardly a technological threat.

Looking to the State Department's Exile Study Group was a complete waste of time, like asking a bunch of eastern european exiles living in LA for twenty years to describe the problems of their home country now---- a lot of myths and legends, a lot of old memories and re-memories, but nothing useful. Mostly about politics or strife, nothing about the mechanics or structure of a society.

We plunged into a dark whole with nothing, at least on the civilian side.

Could have, instead, knocked the whole regime and society over with a few well-waived feathers---it was that bad. But only if you understood the structure, how to effect it, and how to re-direct it. Out with the old, in with... (let's figure it out when we get there).

Great, lets take over that country, then create a new one from scratch. Pretend there is a New England-style town hall democracy. No, have no idea what we are talking about, have no pencils or desks, let alone fire trucks and schools. Let's all play along.

Serious analysis (which never took place) could have routed Saddam by a carefully measured and targeted civilian approach for which little to no military efforts (beyond NFZs and embargoes) were required, and the homegrown replacements would have been no less unstable than today---better they did it themselves than we do anything for them (especially doing it badly).

I rest in the comfort that we have learned nothing, and never will. Just more stuff to fix after it is screwed up.

[Surferbeetle]

Don't agree that we have learned nothing, or that the 'sociology-political experiment' has failed.

I find it very interesting that instead of limiting the free flow of ideas by burning down the Baghdad Library or the Alexandria Library we, a small band of mil/civ folks, have instead helped in opening 'space' for ideas to flow and compete upon their own merits via digital libraries and conduits.

While my team (inside & outside the wire) and I developed relationships, surveyed infrastructure, prioritized repairs, and advocated for resources in '03 I was often struck by the many hand drawn engineering maps, hand written records, and the need to have physically stamped documents hand delivered to various people across the country.

The massive tidal inflows of computers, cell phones, fiberoptic cables, and air conditioners were amazing to watch in '03. The results on display from having a functioning free market of ideas in '10 was very different from my baseline '03 experiences.

We have 'encouraged' and 'incentivized' the flow of ideas in various anticipated and unanticipated ways. The Arab Spring, in part, results from our actions in that part of the world. Nothing is perfect, but IMO there is forward movement. I would also say that something is starting to take shape in Afghanistan...we will see.

Our efforts, although perhaps timely, are only a tiny sliver of the whole.

[Ken White]

I was very glad to read the following.

is that some changes the Army must make are embedded in Title 10, USC (and others...) -- laws are hard to change; Congress is loth to admit errors and reluctant to grant too much authority to its vassals...

Prognosis is good but it ain't gonna be easy.

[Entropy]

The assumption that all derives from governance can obscure the reality that governance and patterns of governance often derive themselves from culture and history. When incompatible populations are combined by quirks of post-colonial borders into "nations" with implicit potential for conflict, it's only natural for governance to reflect the inherent conflicts. Of course in theory you could expect governments to transcend these issues, but in reality governments reflect these implicit divisions and it's not realistic to expect them to do otherwise.

That's a great quote that bears repeating. Couldn't agree more.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

Great quote. Looking back to Beetle's abridged list of by-gone empires/conflicts, one would expect a great deal of underlying turbulence, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, with or without US involvement.

Sometimes, it does pay to create a valid yardstick: What would have happened if we had not....

In Iraq, as 800 and 900 person pits continue to be discovered (arguably 2-4 hundred thousand Iraqis killed by Iraqis, it is a little bit disingenuous to say that the underlying turbulence was not substantial.

If, as some contend with various foundations, several hundred thousand Iraqi civilians were killed during our time, it remains an open question as to what that may have been in an alternative approach 9including doing nothing).

Example: An enhanced no fly/no drive action (as in Libya) might have helped a southern Shia uprising, while Kurds pressed from the North. An Iraqi coup with no US troops. What would the civilian death toll have been? How long would it have gone on? Would Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey have become engaged?

Still believe it will be a long time before the complete picture emerges for any of us.

[davidbfpo]

Back to reality readers and hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den:

A new report from the Afghanistan Analysts Network on ISAF capture/kill operations, written by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, shows a significant fall-off in such operations from June 2011, possibly due to the departure of General David Petraeus, whose command saw an increased emphasis on such actions.

Commentary:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....s-decline.html

Report itself, which is twenty-five pages long and full of stats, graphs etc:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.net...ssReleases.pdf

Graphics by categories:http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datab...map?intcmp=239

[omarali50]

Dr Taqi, good as usual: http://t.co/e7fHaphs

[Bob's World]

Pakistan is the main show, not Afghanistan. And its going downhill: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/...his-defenders/

More accurately, Pakistan is the main Metric of the effectiveness of our operational design and engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As you note, the indicators are that we have mis-diagnosed the nature of the problem severely and that our approaches to date are inappropriate.

[Ray]

Pakistan knows it onions.

It is not going down that easily, or is it?

There is news report that their Senate has refused to go the Army HQ for a Briefing.

Instead, they have asked the Army to come to them and give the briefing.

There is still some hope!