Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Ken White]

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?

M E TT-TC (emphasis added / kw). It can work, just as armor can be employed in the jungle -- but in both cases, you better know what you're doing and / or be significantly more competent than your opponent.

We made a terrible mistake -- one which many in the Army warned against -- in basing many things on the flawed learning of 'lessons' from Operation Desert Storm. One hundred casualties in 100 hours is not a war and the only lesson is that it's unlikely to be repeatable...

On the first item you mentioned, "accessible" and effective conduct of combat operations are not always synonymous activities. Rarely are, in fact. Regardless, I still question the figure -- and still contend it's immaterial...

[ganulv]

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?

M E TT-TC (emphasis added / kw). It can work, just as armor can be employed in the jungle -- but in both cases, you better know what you're doing and / or be significantly more competent than your opponent.

Am I correct in assuming that the decision to employ armor in Fallujah might have been different had the adversary possessed cutting edge anti-tank weapons?

[jmm99]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:



The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

A bit more here (I need to complete the comments - someday). However, I like to look at this small engagement from the standpoint of the German opponent, schwere SS-PanzerAbteilung 501 in the Battle of the Bulge, the independent heavy tank battalion of the 1. SS-Panzerkorps.

The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Clean the clock and scatter the parts. The determinant is the quality of the opponent with respect to training and will (thus the emphasized 'E' -- Enemy). The number of people on each side and the equipment used are secondary though obviously more and better is an improvement over enough and good enough. Fallujah was hard enough with the relatively poor quality of opposition, had they been better, it would've been even more difficult. Lacking that, the cutting edge AT weapons would've made little difference.

[gute]

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...3/ai_n6123806/

I found the article listed above and it explained quite a bit about the use of armor and light infantry.

[KenWats]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:


The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

<Snip>

Regards

Mike

As a historical aside, my old unit was involved enough in the fighting in that portion of the battle to get a presidential unit citation. I dug around and couldn't find much on my old battalion specificly, but I recall that The Damned Engineers (http://www.amazon.com/damned-enginee...7677659&sr=8-1) discussed the fight for St. Vith and Stavelot quite a bit for those who might be historically inclined.

[Firn]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:



The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

A bit more here (I need to complete the comments - someday). However, I like to look at this small engagement from the standpoint of the German opponent, schwere SS-PanzerAbteilung 501 in the Battle of the Bulge, the independent heavy tank battalion of the 1. SS-Panzerkorps.

The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

Regards

Mike

The standpoint form the German opponent seems that a part of it's dispersed armored and mechanized forces operated in a very unfriendly tank country with a lot of blown bridges with increasing limited supplies in fuel and spares under an umbrella of enemy air supremacy interrupted by bad (good) weather against fresh light infantry supported by far superior artillery firepower and a good amount of AT support holding an urban patch called Stavelot in which the heavy tanks barely could move. So while the mission was to striker further west it had to be changed to secure the supply line, part of miscalculation which touched pretty much every aspect of the METT-TC. Then again the person in charge was chosen by a person in charge equally known for it's military wisdom for it's political reliability...

So while in general it doesn't show the superiority of light infantry in such a setting as much as it shows the influence of factors like leadership, troop quality, terrain, the goal of the mission and the overall supporting ressources of both sides.

[kaur]

Hard Fighting
Israel in Lebanon and Gaza

Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare after years of focusing on irregular adversaries. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the following: the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the challenges that Hezbollah's hybrid warfare posed, the lessons the Israelis learned from the 2006 war, the reforms the Israeli military undertook to address its deficiencies, and how Israel fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later.

The author finds that, in facing hybrid opponents, joint combined-arms fire and maneuver are necessary; precision, stand-off fires are critical (but not sufficient); and responsive and adequate air, artillery, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support are vital. Finally, heavy forces — based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles — are key to fighting sophisticated hybrid opponents because they reduce operational risk and minimize friendly casualties.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html

[Fuchs]

I wrote a long text and then ditched it. The short form is that I am sure that a division of infantry is justified.



One branch of infantry should be a mix of light infantry, snipers, LRRP and scouts. It would receive area missions and play its role with low force densities.

Another branch should be armoured infantry (on wheeled APC/MRAP, tracked APC, HAPC, IFV or if necessary trucks) and be coined in its mindset, tactics and training by being a combined arms component and close security element of heavy battlegroups. This would be a part of the Schwerpunkt force.

Finally, a third branch should be optimised for easy (time and money budgets, KISS equipment) training and moderate requirements (fitness). This would be the voluntary reserve (national guard, militia, territorial army - whatever) component that adds much quantity and can be assigned infantry-heavy tasks such as occupying or capturing objectives in infantry-friendly terrain with support (for example by armoured recce, non-organic arty).
It would achieve relatively high force densities.
This personnel could also be tasked with lots of auxiliary jobs, such as guarding POWs or helping construction engineers.


The training requirements vary a lot for this, and unifying it into a single infantry force would cost a lot, fall short of desirable quantities (and thus be weak in terms of deterrence) and would leave only a small share of recruits eligible (a problem, since infantry is usually losing against other branches in the competition for the best recruits anyway). It's telling that the SWC's most vocal proponent of a unified infantry comes from the UK, a county with a history of a usually small and relatively highly trained army.



@kaur:
What RAND described are the needs against a conventional opponent with a very limited repertoire - and the "vital" requirements can be met to good satisfaction only in fair weather conflicts (facing an inferior opponent who by this nature is most likely defending his country, not invading yours or one of your allies').

[jmm99]

Hey Firn,

from Firn
The standpoint form the German opponent seems that a part of it's dispersed armored and mechanized forces operated in a very unfriendly tank country with a lot of blown bridges with increasing limited supplies in fuel and spares under an umbrella of enemy air supremacy interrupted by bad (good) weather against fresh light infantry supported by far superior artillery firepower and a good amount of AT support holding an urban patch called Stavelot in which the heavy tanks barely could move. So while the mission was to striker further west it had to be changed to secure the supply line, part of miscalculation which touched pretty much every aspect of the METT-TC. Then again the person in charge was chosen by a person in charge equally known for it's military wisdom for it's political reliability...

So while in general it doesn't show the superiority of light infantry in such a setting as much as it shows the influence of factors like leadership, troop quality, terrain, the goal of the mission and the overall supporting ressources of both sides.

Esp. "leadership, troop quality" - Stavelot was the second time 1 SS Pz had run into 1/117. The first was at St.-Bart near Mortain in Aug 1944. There, the Panzers and their Grenadiers were also stacked up, but it was a close call. See here and here.

As to "overall supporting resources", those were also present at Stavelot - perhaps more good circumstance (luck) than exact operational planning. 1/117 (organically, 3 rifle coys, a heavy weapons coy - MGs & 81mm mortars, an HHC with a pioneer platoon and an AT platoon) had an attached AT Coy (towed) since Aug 1944 (with them at Mortain). That coy had been pulled back to its Bn (along with its other coys) for refitting and retraining with M-10 SPs. It just got back with 1/117 in time for the Stavelot infiltration.

In addition, 1/117 had attached combat engineers (also with them at Mortain), who eventually managed to blow the Stavelot bridge. Further close support were the 117th's regimental mortars and arty. They happened to be plunked down in close proximity to Stavelot - good logistics or luck.

Thus, the US force at Stavelot was de facto a "combined arms task force" - even though not formally designated as such. I've never claimed, BTW, that infantry alone is superior to armor:

my BLUF (from my post above - with now added bolding)
The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

The Germans did not co-ordinate their panzers and grenadiers. There were good reasons for that (as you've pointed to in the SS 501 articles). Of course, even if they had and eventually wiped out 1/117 and its attached units, that would have taken too long. The Germans were FUBAR because of the "M" and last "T" in METT-T (again as you pointed out).

Regards

Mike