Combat Participation

[Chris jM]

I have never been very impressed with the macho/gung-ho attitudes that we see a lot in the military. I find it more understandable from the younger ones from a testosterone perspective but to still see it with so many older (more mature?) NCO’s and officers is, uhhhm, a different matter.
This reflective poet does IMO need to be able to generate ‘controlled aggression’ but I don’t think that that requires an aggressive/ gung-ho nature per say.

Having never seen nor led soldiers in combat, I'm reluctant to pass judgement on the need for aggression, and how far that need stretches. I have, however, seen the 'dumb' side of aggression come out in low intensity ops that does more harm than good to both the AO and FF.

I have made a point of avoiding the term 'aggression' or even 'controlled aggression' when it comes to command or tactics. In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

[Ken White]

...In my mind, 'audacity' is the undefinable quantity we need more than all else. Aggression triumphs action above all else, whereas I see audacity being the corner-stone of thinking, aggressive action coupled with purpose.

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

Even better is the really sharp audacious leader who finds and uses the door before it can be shut. If there were more of those leaders, the macho BS would disappear as no longer required...

[Chris jM]

You need some aggression -- and thus some aggressive people; currently, some actions would not be won unless you had at least a few who would go through brick wall if told to do so. More importantly, that aggression needs to be focused by a competent leader who will search for and find a window to go through with everyone else while some batter that brick wall.

I completely agree. In an ideal situation the decisions would be smart, logical and demand only minimal courage of those executing. However when the so-called 'fog of war' descends, aggression and the aggressive type would assist in creating action. I like the idea of audacity as it tempers aggression with smart application, however I would always favour aggression over the quiet, non-competitive type alongside me.

And yes, my views on this matter do diverge with that of Sydney Jary. The obvious discalimer is that he's a little more authoritive in this area, given that my CV doesn't include platoon-level command in WW2!

[Infanteer]

I've noticed no hesitation to take part in firefights - everyone wants to get their "TIC", especially the young Privates. After how many of these does the enthusiasm fade? The NCOs, most who have "seen the elephant", seem to enjoy the challenge with that bit of reservation.

Here's a good article by a former CO who fought in Kandahar in 2006.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/doc...l10.1_03_e.pdf

Once we had found him, we would attempt to fix the enemy with fires and finish him in close-quarter combat. Neither of these things was easy. It required us to stay within 100-150 meters of the enemy and coordinate fires before physically moving to clear his positions. Doing so was contrary to human nature. The degree of success we had in close quarter combat became personality-dependent. The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the “last safe place” they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs). Forward movement or sustainment of our presence on the close-quarter battlefield after night-fall depended upon the continued command presence of battalion and company commanders, supported by the “natural fighters” in our ranks. It became evident to me in May that the number of true fighters we had was a small minority. By fighter, I mean those men and women predisposed to keep fighting regardless of violence and danger; those who repressed fear not just because they wanted to remain with their primary group, but because of an overwhelming desire to beat the enemy; those who truly wanted to hunt the enemy and make him the victim. I would estimate that there were only 6 or 7 such individuals in every forty-man platoon. Yet, their stalwartness almost always became the psychological pivot point for the action of a section or a platoon engaged in intensive battle. I believe that the very essence of the western tradition of sections, platoons, companies and battalions (dating as far back as the Marian reforms, which produced Roman maniples, cohorts, and centuries within a legion) was founded on the premise of ensuring a critical number of true fighters were spread throughout fighting forces. I came to rely upon the courage of commanders and this small number of fighters in each platoon and company to override the inherent fear of close-quarter battle and to ensure that we kept the enemy fixed before closing to finish him.

[jcustis]

The majority of soldiers, when fired upon for the first time, would seek to disengage back toward the “last safe place” they occupied. After several encounters they repressed this urge but would be very reluctant to advance in contact (especially when separated from their LAVs).

Very interesting to note, as I'm sure you understand why. I've noticed that for sure in training. Not so much yet in the true fight, but I'll be keeping my eye out for it.

[Ken White]

They tend to offer a 'safe haven' or cocooning effect that requires strong leadership (not always present) to overcome. I realize vehicles are needed for mobility in some terrain and situations but good training is required to break the umbilical to vehicles for dismounts. They also give a false sense of security or lessened vulnerability that is misleading and sometimes causes crews to take undue risks. Tactical handling, parking and dismounting are in my experience not at all well trained. Drivers have to be good at terrain appreciation and distance and height estimation yet few take the time to train them on those topics.

Combat vehicles where the crew remains aboard like tanks and some scout vehicles (real ones, not HMMWVs or Brads -- or LAVs) are a different matter altogether.

The cited 'last safe place' is a very natural reaction but, as noted, disappears for most with a little exposure to fire. So too is the remark on the fighters versus the bulk of a unit, most of whom will do generally well even if they are not 'go-getters.' The cited 6 or7 out of 40 -- 15 or so percent -- may be a bit low, there are usually some very tenacious guys who don't make a big deal of it, it can run as high as 35 to 50 percent, unit dependent, in my observation, norms at about 25% + I think. The greater the net experience the higher the percentage of aggressive folks. I have seen Platoons where there were literally no sluffers -- rare and a couple. Good leaders build that...