Air Force Motorized Jaeger Regiment?

[Steve Blair]

Concur with JW as well. This proposal also ignores the vulnerability of airlift assets as well as any light air-deployed force once it's on the ground.

[William F. Owen]

Concur with JW as well. This proposal also ignores the vulnerability of airlift assets as well as any light air-deployed force once it's on the ground.

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

[wm]

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

You could also call it DUMB (Doubtlessly Useless Misuse of Bodies)

[J Wolfsberger]

You could also call it DUMB (Doubtlessly Useless Misuse of Bodies)

You win.

[Entropy]

Well, I was kind of hoping this thread would die a quiet death, but I guess it's not to be.

The bottom line is the Air Force doesn't have any interest in developing a ground force, nor should it have any interest (beyond, of course, small specialized units and SoF) in doing so. The closest you will get is forces for air base or air field defense.

Distiller, I think you've unintentionally hit on the Air Force's biggest problem: they don't want to understand their role within the full spectrum of warfare, nor do they want to perform the activities that role requires.

That's a bunch of hooey. The reality is that the Air Force doesn't perfectly conform to what some think the Air Force's role should be within the "full spectrum of warfare." That's a difference of opinion and perception, not fact. The Air Force isn't a subordinate arm of the Army, no matter how much some may wish for it. It therefore has a legitimate say in how best to use air forces in joint operations. It's fine if you disagree with the AF's official view (as many in the AF do), but the sweeping unsubstantiated hyperbole ("whining," "group of people without a clue") gets a little old as do statements of opinion presented as statements of fact.

That the evidence for your point of view is apparently only obtainable from the mouths of a few drunk airmen doesn't help your argument much. Nor does using events that occurred two decades ago. Nor does your completely wrong statements about F-16's landing heavy - that's a serious problem for Marine/Navy aircraft returning to carriers (who often have to jettison ordnance in order to land), not so much for those using airfields.

[Distiller]

The idea is not mine, and certainly not new. Just tried to put it into context with the capabilities of the other branches.

The Russians (Soviet's, that is) had/have a whole bunch of their "VDV" formations designed for just exactly that concept, that's what the BMP vehicle series was/is for. And the fact that they lost the Cold War doesn't change their quite sharp minds in military matters and their tendentially clearer conceptual thinking. And if you look into the late years of the German Wehrmacht, they were also thinking into that direction, with Ar232 and Me323.

[Rifleman]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.

[slapout9]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.

That is a very good point Rifleman.

[ODB]

my own aerial platform that fly in, jump out of and just let it crash where ever it stops. Throw away disposal air platforms for the Army. Oh wait, we tried that once, Gliders. Mine will be better though, they will be self powered and we would actually jump from them, not wait for them to crash.

[COMMAR]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.

No, Rifleman does not have a good pt, he uses that to point out role & mission when those are the 2 things he leap frogged over to try & make his point.

If it was simply a matter of surgical shooting, there were 9 Marine Scout-Snipers on the Boxer who could've easily taken those shots but that would over look the fact that dedicated Hostage Rescue is not a Marine Corps Role or Mission.

Not to mention disregarding the long & difficult song & dance of setting up those 3 shots. Something only a Dedictated HR team could've done.

Dedicated HR is not a mission the USMC is interested in.

So what you saw was a Dedicated HR Unit, using the sound HR tactics of time, deception, & irritation to make something very difficult look easy. Not 3 SEALs who were "secretly" airdropped in to encroach Marine sharpshooting territory.

[Culpeper]

If it was simply a matter of surgical shooting, there were 9 Marine Scout-Snipers on the Boxer who could've easily taken those shots but that would over look the fact that dedicated Hostage Rescue is not a Marine Corps Role or Mission.

I had no idea there were already snipers on the destroyers. If so, you're correct the USMC snipers could have completed this mission, considering the final action that was needed to end the situation. Monday morning quarterbacking on my part. The SEALs were brought in for HR, which is one of their jobs. Nobody knew at the time, I'm sure, that it would boil down to 30 yard single shots to end the standoff. I concur with your statement. Apples and oranges.

[J Wolfsberger]

That's a bunch of hooey. The reality is that the Air Force doesn't perfectly conform to what some think the Air Force's role should be within the "full spectrum of warfare." That's a difference of opinion and perception, not fact. The Air Force isn't a subordinate arm of the Army, no matter how much some may wish for it. It therefore has a legitimate say in how best to use air forces in joint operations. It's fine if you disagree with the AF's official view (as many in the AF do), but the sweeping unsubstantiated hyperbole ("whining," "group of people without a clue") gets a little old as do statements of opinion presented as statements of fact.

That the evidence for your point of view is apparently only obtainable from the mouths of a few drunk airmen doesn't help your argument much. Nor does using events that occurred two decades ago. Nor does your completely wrong statements about F-16's landing heavy - that's a serious problem for Marine/Navy aircraft returning to carriers (who often have to jettison ordnance in order to land), not so much for those using airfields.

I'll take the well aimed (and deserved) hit for being blunt and heavy handed in my characterization.

But I'll stand by the substance of my criticism (restated in a more professional manner):

1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.
2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.
4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.

I may be wrong in my understanding - would certainly not be the first time. At present, I have a poor opinion of their doctrine and attitude. If you can point me to publications or articles that prove me wrong, I'd like to follow up. Regardless of my opinion of doctrine and attitude, the men and women wearing the AF uniform are still our comrades.

[Cliff]

this subject returns every 6 months or so.

But I'll stand by the substance of my criticism (restated in a more professional manner):

1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.

What do you base this assertation on? The AF developed the JDAM and GPS, both of which have arguably been the biggest revolution in fire support for troops in the field since the airplane. Currently CAS is probably the highest priority mission in the AF, with numerous squadrons training at CAS over their supposed primary missions. Red Flags train extensively on CAS, SCAR, and BAI. The AF is trying to increase the number of JTACs. I am sure there will be a Desert Storm/eliminating the A-10 example given... Much has been made of this. Regardless, the focus of TAC and the tactical AF in the '80s was AirLand Battle... which was the Army's idea. AF doctrine was written with TRADOC... for both services. If TAC had had its way, Desert Storm would have had almost 0 strategic attack and just attempted to pound the Iraqi Army into dust. Didn't happen due to Gen Schwarzkopf choosing a different plan... kinda hard to blame the AF for that and say that CAS isn't a focus. This notion is 20 years behind the times.

2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.

The AF attitude is that Airpower is an essential part of the joint force. Air power is a key enabler... without Air Superiority, the Joint Force would have a very difficult time winning any war. You wouldn't be able to get to the fight, you wouldn't be able to use your helos, no CAS, no medevac, no resupply by air. No UAVs... Oh by the way all your lightly armored vehicles would be toast vs. a real air threat...

This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can. Just as Land Power and Sea Power can win some wars. Guess what... we usually do best when we all work together - usually that will mean air power gaining air superiority first, then supporting the other components.

Why folks insist that we shouldn't be allowed to protect them from enemy air is completely beyond me - sometimes it seems like maybe we should go ahead and just do what folks think we do and go play golf rather than trying to keep everyone on the ground safe. I would be curious to see an NTC rotation with realistic red air and no air superiority... once you run out of Patriots, good luck!

3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

What are you basing this on? Arguably the AF didn't bring everything to bear in Iraq... during OIF, due to the FSCL being moved too far. But that wasn't a huge issue... since then I haven't heard anyone arguing we're not being allowed to bring capability to bear. Maybe that some UAV/ISR capability is being wasted by being diluted... but never that we are holding back.

3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.

What do you mean by this? Are you really accusing the AF of thinking that civilian casualties are OK? If so this is absolutely ludicrous... The AF arguably goes to greater lengths than any other service to avoid civilian casualties. Do Army folks have to use a computer model of their ordnance effects and consult a JAG before using artillery, mortars, or rockets? The AF does... before EVERY use of kinetic weapons.

4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.

This is also ridiculous. No one I know of in the AF thinks this. OIF is a great example of how to MINIMIZE the damage and casualties to make postwar reconstruction better... show me any other armed service in history that went to the lengths the AF did in OIF to minimize unneccessary damage.

I may be wrong in my understanding - would certainly not be the first time. At present, I have a poor opinion of their doctrine and attitude. If you can point me to publications or articles that prove me wrong, I'd like to follow up. Regardless of my opinion of doctrine and attitude, the men and women wearing the AF uniform are still our comrades.

From AF Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare:

"Large applications of US military force in COIN operations should be limited when possible and forces should perform such roles as restoring order orseizing the initiative."

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ser...bs/afdd2_3.pdf

I'm not sure where your sour opinion of AF attitudes and doctrine comes from. The AF is fully comitted to being a part of the joint team across the spectrum of warfare. In addition, the AF is is still trying to maintain some small shred of deterrence against a high-intensity war along with the USN. This allows the USMC and USA to focus a little more on the low intensity conflicts currrently going on while keeping risk low.

I know this forum is fairly ground-centric due to the subject matter, but it seems like there is a sort of group-think when it comes to the Air Force in particular. Every time this topic comes up the same mantra of "the Air Force doesn't care" comes up...

I'd be curious to hear what folks in/recently returned from OIF and OEF think of the current AF attitudes mentioned above.

V/R,

Cliff

[BayonetBrant]

This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can.

Didn't we disprove this in Kosovo? Grandiose claims of vast swaths of dead enemy vehicles, shown to be tractors and outhouses once the ground forces arrived?

[J Wolfsberger]

Cliff,

Thanks for the pointer to AFDD 2-3. These stood out:

"In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of military force is in support of other instruments of national power ..."

"In addition, operations conducted in such close proximity to the civilian population also present LOAC and ROE challenges."

So you'll understand the source of (at least) my attitude, it's in response to an article by MG Dunlap (that I can't find a link to right now), and the historical attitude of "COIN from the air." 2-3 addresses the latter issue very well.

The issue of AF reluctance in the area of CAS remains.

[Ken White]

this subject returns every 6 months or so.
...
I know this forum is fairly ground-centric due to the subject matter, but it seems like there is a sort of group-think when it comes to the Air Force in particular. Every time this topic comes up the same mantra of "the Air Force doesn't care" comes up...

I'd be curious to hear what folks in/recently returned from OIF and OEF think of the current AF attitudes mentioned above.

I didn't just return from either OIF or OEF but a lot of those guys and I have defended the AF on these 'every 6 months or so' soirees -- you're right, they do seem to come back to haunt us all...

So I'll again defend the USAF and say all your points are valid. In fairness though, I'll also have to say that J. Wolfsbereger's points are valid based on the perceptions that some in the AF have planted. Every thing he says has some validity and that validity is due, I think to the fact that some in the AF have been unduly parochial or community centric in the face of logic and thereby left a bad taste in many mouths.

Strategic bombing has been defended in the past in spite of pretty conclusive proof that it does not work; the USAF did want to avoid the CAS mission and did several times try to dismiss the A-10; USAF aircraft flying CAS in earlier times did fly higher and faster than did some Navy and Marine aircraft doing the job -- that was because of aircraft type and capabilities as much as anything else but it is also a fact that lead to denigration of the AF and which the AF clumsily handled. That is a part of the problem; the AF gets a knock, gets defensive and handles said knock clumsily. Add to that the many procurement problems and an undeserved belief that the AF has an undeserved sense of superiority gets planted.

Thus even though that was then and this is now, you, Entropy and a few others have to come 'round every few months and rise to the defense of that AF as it gets slammed for past transgressions, bad purchasing and equipping decisions and poor PR skills. *

Why can't we all just get along...

* NOTE: ALL the services have, have had and will have similar problems; the Navy's smart enough to ignore the socially lesser mortals, the Marines are astute and energetic enough to counter it, the Army's big enough to ignore it and that leaves the poor AF to have to get defensive. Except you really don't. You guys do okay, just shut Dunlap down... ADDED: He's a smart guy but his excessive parochialism and statements have IMO not done the AF any favors, quite the contrary in fact...

[Rifleman]

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

I was waiting for that little bit of sarcasm.

And with the M113A whatever model number it's up to now as the striking vehicle of choice, right?