What would a US withdrawal from Iraq look like?

[jcustis]

Good finds.

The damn disturbing thing about this ties into Steven Simon's The Price of the Surge article in the May/June issue of FA, which I bought into the first time I read it.

As we step back on the military front and do more "by, with, and through", who's job is it to perform quality control in this integration process? Is it a PRT task, a Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) problem, or will this turn into another life in the emerald city problem where the blind start tring to lead the blind?

Recently retired U.S. Army counterinsurgency expert Col. John A. Nagl, who traveled with Mr. Kahl to Iraq, partly attributed the slow integration to bureaucratic problems.

"I´m sure that there is some sectarianism in these decisions, but I also am confident that some of it is just inefficient bureaucracy," said Col. Nagl, the author of several books on counterinsurgency, who helped write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual published in December 2006.

Mr. Kahl also warned against a strategy of limiting integration to Sunni leaders and placing them in low-level jobs.

"Oh, sure, we´ll let that colonel in the ... Republican Guard into the Iraqi police, but we´ll make him an enlisted beat cop," he said, describing the attitude of some Baghdad officials. "Do you know how low on the social scale that is in Iraq and how humiliating this is?"

"You don´t have to believe that 100,000 of these guys are going to turn back into insurgents," Mr. Kahl said. "If 5,000 of them do, that could be a big problem."

I worry because I am about to step back into Anbar, and wonder where these integration issues fit into the measures of effectiveness for LOO work. When I last stepped into Iraq, the 1st Mrine Division was trying to integrate Iraqi volunteers (predominantly Shiite) into small special formations to put an Iraqi face on our operations. I had a front row seat to the scheming and maneuvering from these "volunteers" to become a part of the fledgling security apparatus in order to reap greater reward down the road.

The start-up program died and got rolled into a large MOI/US effort, but the intentions of the Iraquis were clear: get in, establish what power base I can, and then run with it. Are the Sons of Iraq any different? If they want to infiltrate the security apparatus and the government is stonewalling, who is on the dime to break the impasse and move forward?

So this leads me back to my original question. If think tank guys are identifying potential friction points, who is smoothing them out...a suit and tie in Baghdad, a grunt in Rawah, or a State guy?

[Tom Odom]

I worry because I am about to step back into Anbar, and wonder where these integration issues fit into the measures of effectiveness for LOO work. When I last stepped into Iraq, the 1st Mrine Division was trying to integrate Iraqi volunteers (predominantly Shiite) into small special formations to put an Iraqi face on our operations. I had a front row seat to the scheming and maneuvering from these "volunteers" to become a part of the fledgling security apparatus in order to reap greater reward down the road.

The start-up program died and got rolled into a large MOI/US effort, but the intentions of the Iraquis were clear: get in, establish what power base I can, and then run with it. Are the Sons of Iraq any different? If they want to infiltrate the security apparatus and the government is stonewalling, who is on the dime to break the impasse and move forward?

So this leads me back to my original question. If think tank guys are identifying potential friction points, who is smoothing them out...a suit and tie in Baghdad, a grunt in Rawah, or a State guy?

Ultimately the Iraqis will have to define the terms. That process is underway and this is part of it. Maliki is setting conditions for the SOFA via the press and as the process continues those conditions get tougher. No doubt that part of that is for the media effect. Equally no doubt that the sentiments that prompted those pronouncements are quite real. This is of course all happening in a seam of the US political backdrop; Maliki knows that and can afford to push the envelope. Where he cannot afford to push the envelope is inside Iraq against the Sunnis unless he really wants it to fall apart.

Bottom line: the Fat Lady is now where near the stage, much less ready to sing...

Tom

[Tom Odom]

I missed this last week as Ike came steaming in: more in the Awakening versus the GOI

Tom

Iraqi government reassures the Awakening, but fighters are wary
By Nicholas Spangler and Mohammed al Dulaimy | McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD — The Iraqi government will not turn its back on the men who paid in blood for the country's fragile peace, said the officials on stage in the ballroom at Baghdad's al-Rasheed Hotel, referring to U.S.-paid Sunni militias. But the Awakening leaders listened warily. "I don't trust a word they said," said one, afterward....

...The leaders of the Awakening never expected the Americans to leave them in such a time," said Firas Qaasim Khalef, commander of 475 men in the al Amil neighborhood of western Baghdad.

"I see this will be a big mistake," said Naji Rahal, commander of 400 men in Taji. Over the years, 14 of his men have been killed, 23 injured, and six had their homes destroyed. Some of his men now wear police uniforms, but they have not been put on permanent staff, and he distrusted the leadership.

"It is breached," he said. "I saw an al Qaida member, a killer, who is a colonel in the (police) now. "If a report is written, who would the government listen to, this colonel or me?"

[sullygoarmy]

Everytime someone metions a withdrawl from Iraq I keep wondering just how we are going to get all of our crap out of there. Anyone who has been to Camp Victory or LSA Anaconda has an idea of what I'm talking about. While I'm not a loggie, most say you can plan on getting out about one BCT a month...perhaps a little more if you do not have troops coming in as you are getting them out. The BCTs are mobile (and practiced) enough to do the move out. It is all the infrastructure, the stay behind equipment and the 60' plasma screen TVs in the AAFES tents that makes me scratch my head...not kidding about the TVs either!

I am guessing there has to be an agreement between the U.S. and GOI regarding what facilities we are going to leave for them (payment?) and what is going to be torn down and sent back to the states. If I were a loggie, I'd be pulling my hair out just trying to plan on how to get everything out. I'm sure somewhere in a dark office in a basement of one of Saddam's old palaces there probably is a team doing this...and thank goodness I'm not on it! I thought I could use Desert Storm as an example but then we did not have the years of build up infrastructure to send back to the states..."just" soldiers and equipment.

Any thoughts on the physical efforts it might take to get us out of there...for the most part?

[jkm_101_fso]

...with something like this:

Gen. Petraeus Leaves Iraq After 20 Months

BAGHDAD — David Petraeus, the American general who presided over Iraq's pullback from the brink of all-out civil war, relinquished his command Tuesday to Gen. Ray Odierno under a cascade of official thank-yous.

In an elaborate ceremony in a marble-lined rotunda of a former Saddam Hussein palace on the outskirts of the capital, Petraeus handed off to Odierno the responsibility for leading U.S. and coalition forces at a stage in the still-unpopular war that appears far more hopeful than when Petraeus assumed command 20 months ago.

Petraeus leaves behind a heavy dose of caution, reflected in his recommendation to President Bush that he maintain 15 combat brigades in Iraq through the end of the year instead of pulling out one or two, as many had expected.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,423092,00.html

[Steve Blair]

Any thoughts on the physical efforts it might take to get us out of there...for the most part?

In terms of the physical pullout, I'd say that Vietnam might be a decent case study of what Iraq could look like. We had massive infrastructure there as well, and many base camps were more or less abandoned once the major equipment was shifted to other units (RVN or US) or backhauled.

[carl dick]

I will not repost the letter I added to another discussion sheet, so I attached the link below:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...473#post107473

The 60 Minutes program tonight on 3 OCT 2010 had a very specific narrative, that Military action to resolve any crisis is wrong, that money was wasted, that General Odinero was to blame, that the militiary can never show Iraqi success, and that future military action will lead to more problems.

The elite media loves this narrative, but it has no critical analysis and assumes Americans are stupid. If you want to see election problems and problems with governance, visit the gulf coast or Washington D.C.

THere were no problems regarding security; all of the problems were governance, development and economic. However, there was no discussion on failed USAID leaders or PRT or state department or ambassaders. These are American problems, not General Odinero's or General Austin's problems, but the media have never held civilian leaders accountable (unless your name is Bush).

MAJ Carl Dick, Fort Leavenworth, 3 OCT 2010

[SJPONeill]

Is that the same 60 Minutes that, a couple of years back, was critical of the US Government for not using its military to force Myanmar's government to accept international aid after the country was ravaged by a cyclone...? Seems to me they were also pretty damn happy to see the military step in and maintain order in Haiti recently...

I guess we should all just pull a chair on the sidelines now and watch it all unravel...