Is the U.S. Military Affordable

[gute]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Combine division BCTs into two larger BCTs instead of four each. This will reduce the number of HQ positions.

The Army is moving away from divisions so I will lay out the numbers by Corps:

III Corps - six HBCTs, two IBCTs, four CABs, one Corps Engineer Brigade, one Corps Arty Brigade (all MLRS and HIMARS), one Corps MP brigade, one EOD group, plus 10 SFG.

I Corps & AK/HI - Transfer the HBCT from Korea to 3ID, eliminate 10th Mountain and 25ID HQS, 10th MTN becomes two IBCTs stationed in Alaska under I corps, the six SBCTs become four (if not sent to the NG - if sent to NG keep one IBCT in HI and three mechanized BCTs at Fort Lewis (CV90 vehicles organized like the SBCT). Keep one Corps Arty (HIMARS), one Corps Engineer, one Corps MP, etc. Keep two CABs. 1SFG.

XVIII Corps - Combine all airborne assets (82, 173, 4th IBCT AK and Rangers) into four BCTs with two CABs each assigned to 82 and 101. 3ID gets the HBCT from South Korea to form two HBCTs. Deactivate the one 3ID IBCT. Keep one Corps arty brigade (HIMARS + M777), one Engineer brigade (airborne), MP, etc. 3, 5, and 7 SFG.

V Corps - Deactivate.

All Corps arty, engineer, etc not on active duty go to the NG.

Keep CAG.

I've eliminated the 75th Ranger Regiment, but not Ranger school. I believe the airborne forces can fill the Ranger role.

1AD -

[William F. Owen]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

[Uboat509]

I have to ask, though, how much would the AF really complain if the Army got the ground attack aircraft assigned to them? I am talking specifically about the A-10s and perhaps some Harriers like the Marines have. From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.

[William F. Owen]

From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.

True, IIRC. They tried to make it an F-16 mission.
So basically the decision on who has what aircraft rests on what aircraft the air force like - not on the military utility of air power.

What ever the A-10 supporters say, historically the replacement for the Ju-87 Stuka was the FW-190F' and G's. There is very little logic in air power theory.

[slapout9]

There is very little logic in air power theory.

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority. Just because something moves through the Air does not make it an Air Force if that were true than the Air Force should be charge of bullets flying through the air.


Clear the skies, hold the skies and build an air bridge to the objective.

[William F. Owen]

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority.

If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!!

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

[slapout9]

If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

"The Air Campaign" by Colonel John Warden, hang on and I will find a link to free PDF.


Chapter 9 The Orchestration of War, simple and short and points out a lot things that are often misunderstood about Warden. One being that he is not Anti-Army he just believes that there are only certain times when it(ground forces) should be the "Key Force" or "Main Effort".

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp09.htm hit the back to contents button for the rest of the book.

[Fuchs]

If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!!

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

Warden wrote (EBO) air war theory, but I wasn't motivated enough to read it because of what I learned about it from secondary sources.

Both naval and air war lack the ability to really force an opponent to yield as a rifleman pointing his rifle at the enemy's chest can do. Air war theory is therefore much more about operations and tactics than about strategy.
The highly technical nature of air power (and as a consequence, the influence of technology on capability and the widespread misconceptions about air power) didn't help to push air power theory forward.


The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization. Both the force structure and the operational emphasis (air combat first? SEAD first? attack airfields first? CAS from day one? interdiction from day one? race forward to intercept enemy AEW&C aircraft early on?) would profit a lot by a good theory on how to prioritize (depending on the situation, of course).

[gute]

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

170th and 171st are stationed in Germany. IMO, bring em home and deactivate. The units are not needed. Combine the 173rd battalions with the 82 BCTs, then deactivate the BCT HQS. A separate HQS is not needed. I would shift the SBCTs to the NG. IMO this is a vehicle better suited for urban infantry operations, peace keeping, and disaster relief. With the shift to the NG the 2ACR is not needed. The 3rd ACR will not be required because the ARS in each HBCT will have its own ARS and the Corps will have its own RSTA Cav squadron(s).

Yes, this will cause a reduction in forces, but that's my point. It's not about having the military wewant, but what we can afford.

[SethB]

Military spending makes up such a small portion of government spending that suggesting we cut that amount by half and then not producing any cost estimates just doesn't make sense.

[Fuchs]

Military spending makes up such a small portion of government spending that suggesting we cut that amount by half and then not producing any cost estimates just doesn't make sense.

Small amount? *insert inappropriate language here*

Channeling half the U.S. Defence Budget into industrial investments would probably suffice tot run around the economy.

[SethB]

Defense spending is only about 20% of Federal spending. And that doesn't include local and state spending, either.

[Fuchs]

Only?
By that measure pretty much everything is "only".
We're talking here about an annual bill on the order of about USD 800 Bn (actually, more than 900 if you count the hidden positions in non-DoD budgets)!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:U...._-_FY_2007.png

Halving the military expenditures (including some coast guard, nuclear "energy" budget and DHS budget positions) would in itself suffice to eliminate the deficit in a few years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:20..._Increases.png


"Foreign aid (reportedly the favourite target for fiscal conservative rhetoric) is "only" and "small" and unable to contribute significantly to any cost savings.
So-called "Defense" is a huge chunk and deserves to be called the reason for the federal budget deficit.

[qp4]

The Army:
Combine division BCTs into two larger BCTs instead of four each. This will reduce the number of HQ positions.

I'm really at a loss here, are you not keeping up with the US Army at all? I understand there is bloat at the BDE and DIV HQs, but that's due to a number of factors, not the least of which is the experienced force that simply has to go somewhere when they get promoted.

More importantly however is that the US Army is using BDE and DIV HQs as plug and play units. The colors are pretty much there for lineage at this point, though each does seem to have its own character. It is the BDE and DIV HQ that not only control the battlefield, but contain the assets that aren't just trigger pullers. We need more of these, a BDE HQ is great for the number of battalions it trains, but in our current operational set we'd be better off with a BDE HQ for two or most three line BNs.

[Entropy]

The Feds take in the most money, so much that even in their wildest schemes, they cannot spend it all. Thus they pass a large quantity of funding down to States, local governments and even NGOs to spend on project of dubious merit.

In short, it's violating the principle of subsidiarity.

There's a reason why Europe's industrialised countries used some welfare programs to influence social problems and the U.S. did not; Europe had no uncolonized West where the poor could go and grab natural ressources to fix their economic problems.

The reason is federalism and an American culture distrustful of centralized power and too diverse to provide a foundation necessary to support such a social contract.

[gute]

I'm really at a loss here, are you not keeping up with the US Army at all? I understand there is bloat at the BDE and DIV HQs, but that's due to a number of factors, not the least of which is the experienced force that simply has to go somewhere when they get promoted.

More importantly however is that the US Army is using BDE and DIV HQs as plug and play units. The colors are pretty much there for lineage at this point, though each does seem to have its own character. It is the BDE and DIV HQ that not only control the battlefield, but contain the assets that aren't just trigger pullers. We need more of these, a BDE HQ is great for the number of battalions it trains, but in our current operational set we'd be better off with a BDE HQ for two or most three line BNs.

I do try to keep up with the U.S. Army, but I am no where near as knowledgeable as many who post on this site. I have a great affection for all things military, but my experience is limited to a stint in the Corps 20 years ago and 18 years of putting dope dealers in jail.

Have you read an article titled Why Small Brigade combat Teams Undermine Modularity? I apologize for my lack of computer skills or I would have linked the article. I do believe someone has linked the article under a different discussion. I may have missed the point(s) of the article so I am interested in your opinion of this article.

[Kiwigrunt]

Have you read an article titled Why Small Brigade combat Teams Undermine Modularity? I apologize for my lack of computer skills or I would have linked the article.

Here it be