Lines of Operation

[Strickland]

Many planners and commanders have reached the conclusion that our planning processes need to be modified in order to incorporate lines of operations. While not a new concept, articles written by individuals such as LTG Chiarelli about their use of Lines of Operation in Iraq have renewed the debate. LTG Chiarelli used the following Lines of Operation: Combat Operations, Train & Employ Security Forces, Essential Services, Promote Governace, and Economic Pluralism. Others have suggested Rule of Law and Information Operations as appropriate LOOs. While working to assist the Sri Lankan Gov't against insurgents in the 1980s, Dr. Tom Marks developed a campaign based on the following LOOs: Elimination of Grievances, Population and Resource Control, and Military/Operational Measures. I would like to hear what others think of the utility of using the LOOs approach, as well as what they believe to be the most useful/appropriate LOOs for SASO/SROs. In addition, any discussion of what implied tasks fall under each line would be helpful.

[Strickland]

Additionally, if anyone has any recent material concerning the application of Warden's 5 rings to Lines of Operation planning, please pass it along.

[Merv Benson]

What is the difference between "lines of operation" and a "To do" list?

[Strickland]

Instead of using sequentially phases or staged operations (ie - Phase IV operations), the utilization of lines of operations allows for simultaneous actions throughout both shaping and decisive actions/phases/stages, etc. Instead of having Phase IV (SASO/SRO) tasks, you would have implied tasks associated with a Rule of Law Line of Operation that was in effect throughout the operation. Therefore, during initial operations, the military could be eliminating threat competitors or establishing basic security, and then as the operation progressed, focus on recruiting and training security forces, establishing courts, etc. While the tasks would change, they would all enable or affect rule of law. The to-do-list portion of this is in the implied tasks.

[NDD]

Same guy?
LINK

As you said, nothing new. Galula, Clausewitz, O'Neill, Callwell all wrote about it. Magsaysay and others did it. Rings, tables, to do lists. Same requirements in a different wrapping. We seem to be following the lead of the business world with all these "new" concepts, but most of the time we end up right back where we started, just like the business world.

We know what has to be done, we need to quit re-wrapping the package and get on with it.

I thought this was interesting:
Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.
Does anybody here believe this will really work with the enemy we face now? Or any other True Believers?

Looks like a "more sensitive approach" with a group that saws heads to me.

He also needs to study Clausewitz more. He is making the same mistake many do. Clausewitz goes on to address less than total war, even admitting it will be the case most often. Destruction of the enemy is indeed the essence of war - whether or not it reaches that point is a conscience decision depending on the circumstances. But the essence of war does not change.

To go into a war with anything less as mindset is to go in half-assed and asking for defeat.

[Martin]

Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.

Does anybody here believe this will really work with the enemy we face now? Or any other True Believers?

I think that a true believer would not give up.

I think one can go about destroying an enemy in many creative ways. What is needed is partly determined by those involved in the fight and what the desired end state is. For example, if your enemy want to annhilate all infidels, that makes your desire to bring them into society less appealing. On the other hand, everyone may not be hard core, so perhaps you could use PSYOPs on some parts of society or the organization, etc, etc.

The author in that quote makes a mistake in differentiating between tools and cause.

People fight for reasons. Clausewitz said that "War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." If we rewrite what Col Warden said, if the enemy has fulfilled our will, there is no need for war. But we cannot rewrite what he said so easily, because to "accept your position" entails a hint of self-destruction or drastic social re-orientation if, for instance, your demand on the enemy is to die because they do not have the same skin color, or do not believe in democracy and in the rule of law by a just justice system. Culture, too, may not allow this to happen.

On the other hand, de-escalation can work to allow negotiations to solve an issue - depends on the issue and those involved. One of the building blocks for democracy.

Then, war is a tool. You have to choose it at the right time, and know how to bend it to your needs. It still work towards that goal of getting your enemy to acknowledge and accept your position.

I think that it being a "total waste of time and energy" either suggest that you have chosen the wrong tool for the task at hand, or have mis-identified the scope. Which brings us back to the beginning: Who is the enemy, and why?

Martin

[ChrisPaparone]

Yesterday my faculty partners and I had a seminar session with Army staff college students and found ourselves still (after 5 years of "settled joint doctrine") struggling with the new, more abstract idea: logical lines of operations.

Here is a slightly edited version what I wrote the students this morning -- and would appreciate your comments (I invited them to engage here and take a look at SWJ blogger comments as a follow-on).

In a conventional, force-on-force fight, operational art involves examining the integration of physical lines of communication (LOCs—the “pipeline” where forces and sustainment move from one base to another base) and physical lines of operations (LOOs—the line of maneuver between the force’s base and its objective). During WW II, the U.S.’s Pacific theater provides a superb example of the “island hopping campaign” where LOOs established new LOCs and LOCs enabled new LOOs (involving physical orientations on THE ENEMY FORCE).

Several years into the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are characterized more by FID- and COIN-oriented activities and goals, doctrinaires searched for a way to define the metaphysical (“logical”) links between military activities as they relate to more nebulous goals like “population security,” “support to insurgents,” and “increasing legitimacy of the host government.” These writers searched for the additional abstraction to describe how to intertwine activities of other agencies and organizations that are nonmilitary in nature (and may constitute the main effort with the military-in-support). Army doctrinaires called these “lines of effort” while joint doctrinaires labeled them “logical lines of operations.”

Keep in mind that these efforts are geared to desirable social and psychological change; hence, are not clearly tied to the physical world. Logical lines of operation are more existential (subjective, interpretive, infused with human-created meaning, etc.) in that they address PEOPLE -- changing minds, social norms, ideas about legitimacy, and so on. In essence, you are orienting military activities and nonmilitary activities on the opinions, values, and attitudes of a POPULATION (be they good guys, bad guys, &/or “fence sitters”).

In short, the joint doctrinaires used the old reliable operational art concept of LOO and metaphorically extended the "physical meaning" in it into a new, much more abstract meaning, i.e. "logical" (the reasoned way of expressing intentional causality). Both kinds of LOOs (physical and logical) serve to reasonably link actions toward a purpose. The former is more easily measured (because it has a physically identifiable “end state” like “we secured objective bravo at map grid so and so”). The latter desired condition is much more difficult to measure because it is so open to subjective interpretation even if we try and operationalize (objectify) it (e.g., “on average, the local population has improved its trustworthy feeling toward the central government;” “the enemy’s morale is deteriorating;” or, “on average, US citizens support the war effort.”). Such reifications of subjective reality are what makes logical lines so difficult to apprehend (as social scientist researchers have found, our "operationalized variables" are, at the end of the day, quite ambiguous; albeit, they sure seemed reasonable when invented).

[slapout9]

This may be a little of course but based upon my experience in"The One Minute Guerrilla Warfare Course" an LLO is finding the cause (usually viewed through a Marxist Contradiction) that people will fight for. A Guerrilla force needs a cause in their head and a rifle in their arms. When you have that the Physical Lines of Operation will almost begin to appear by themselves because you will know the physical things the enemy needs and what you need to destroy in order to win.

As we do it now it is almost a build it and they will come around to our way of thinking, which is dangerous in my opinion because what may happen is we will build it and the enemy with a cause will take it over and use it against us.
My 2 cents anyway.

[Hacksaw]

While I don't have much issue with the method you use to characterize the nature of Logical lines of Operation... your sequencing of how they emerged and why are a bit askew (I think )...

I'm near certain that logical lines of operation were a part of Army Doctrine (FM 3-0) before our immersion in these population-centric full spectrum operations...

If my memory serves me correctly, not a given, I think they emerged more in response to a shift towards effects-based approach to operations. Not necessarily the system-centric models, but rather the intuitive extension that all combat operations O/D/S are conducted for a purpose linked to a change in the relationship of the friendly force to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations... as such is often more coherent to establish logical lines of operation with regard to processes/aspects of the environment as opposed to just physical manifestations of the terrain...

To wit, as we wrote the Long-Range Plan for the Stabilization & Reconstruction of Northern Iraq (Mar-Apr 2003), our LLO were Security, Civil Services, etc... with essentially only one oriented on the "enemy" ... all of which pre-dates FM 3-24 or the subsequent re-writes of FM 3-0, 5-0 and 3-07

Live well and row

[ChrisPaparone]

Hacksaw,

You have a good point -- I'd have to substitute "originators" for "doctrinaires" in my text. Yet the argument is the same -- it is still metaphoric.

[Seahorse]

EBO - or as I refer to it 'Effects Blurred Operations' encapsulates the arguments I believe you are making. I was engaged in the campaign assessment process and found it extremely difficult to define effects within the OPP process that a)could be achieved, b)could be measured effectively, and c) whose assessment could inform the larger strategies. Instead, I saw what I refer to as OPP with an effects based language. No one seemed capable of creating an effects based campaign plan (and NATO had 5 LOOs - Security, Governance, Security Sector Reform, Reconstruction and Development, and finally Coordination).

Typically the OPP failed to produce definable, realizable and measureable end-states, effects, or measures of effectiveness. Almost all the measures were in fact measures of performance, quantifiable measures which did little to advance the mission objectives and nothing to assess strategies and priorities. Secondly, even when adopting qualitative measures, these were typically utilised at higher HQ levels to report on mission achievements and progress rather than sorting out weather we were doing the right things. Finally, the measures utilised had littel to no ownership and therefore no stakeholder had accountability for problmes, errors, missteps etc. It seemed, only successes were applauded and promoted. I even witnessed senior effects planners advocating that where Afghan polling results agreed with their opinions, they were useful, however when they disagreed with perceptions, they could be completely ignored.

Such are my experiences.

Cheers,

David

[MAJ Shane Sims]

Sir,

Disagree. By stating logical lines of operations are existential in nature, you are limiting the scope to things which are hard, if not impossible, to influence at a military level and perhaps best left to the diplomats, local political and tribal leaders, market economies, etc. Logical lines of operations are existential in part, but there are very real, physical elements, which will have an impact on overall objectives. For instance, securing a Sunni/Shia mosque can be a logical line of operation. It becomes logical because if a Sunni element blows up a Shia mosque, it will move an area closer to sectarian violence/war. Force protection is another logical line of operation. It is logical because we know if we lose political will (massive loss of lives = loss of political will), we will lose a critical resource (time) and jeopardize our ability to complete mission. Point being is that even in conventional wars we have similar logical lines of operations. We decided to drop the A-bomb on Japan to break the will of the Japanese government and end the war sooner rather than later. This got directly at the heart of the population (ours and theirs). This was a logical line of operation for us during World War II.
I also disagree with your assessment that population security is a nebulous term. Just because securing the population is untraditional compared to destroying it does not mean it is nebulous for the military. Tell a police officer his job of protecting/securing a city is nebulous, and I bet he could provide you with several non-nebulous ways to do his duties. We can, as a military, secure areas. It is a common military task. The question is not whether we can secure an area (which I believe is the overarching military objective we have been called upon to do in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to support the whole of government approach to building an effective capacity in the local governments to eventually secure it on their own), the question is how do we secure (which is answered by identifying logical lines of operations) and how many resources (including Soldiers, equipment, and time) will our government provide the military to do it.
v/r
MAJ Shane Sims
Student, Command and General Staff College
Satellite Location: Fort Lee, Virginia

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[The Pap]

Your points are very thoughtful. I agree that there are objective aspects of "logical" lines of operation and your argument is very strong.

My point was more ontological in that we have taken a more concrete (objective dominance) view of the military concept of LOO and extended it to include existential or metaphysical aspects (more dominated by a subjective view of reality).

This is likely why we are having this conversation -- because LOOs are now more subjectively produced (based on judgment calls rather than a scheme of physical maneuver). In other words, why there is ambiguity in the extended meaning of LOO in joint doctrine. This requires "interpretive" skills, and much less "concrete" skills.

This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.

Metaphoric extension of the idea of LOOs from more physical to the more metaphysical should cause us to be critically mindful of the shortfalls of analogically-based abstract reasoning.

For example, the physical linearity of maneuver-to-objective may confuse us to believe (through uncritical use of analogy) that this cause-and-effect relationship applies to attempts to change social-psychological conditions, say, in counterinsurgency operations.

I would prefer to highlight the DIFFERENCE (not the analogical overlap) Social-psychological manipulations are so inherently complex as to defy one-way causality (the prospect of mutual causality borrowed from complexity science) may better help us frame the situation. Perhaps we'll be less surprised by dynamic side effects (unintended consequences) of those manipulations. Recognizing these sorts of LOOs as an "unknowable science" may be a source of wisdom (and not a source of prescription indicated by borrowing meaning mindlessly from physical LOOs),

Thanks!

[slapout9]

This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.

Perhaps if it was taught as a "line of questioning" or "line of reasoning" as it is in the LE/Legal profession. In that manner you are taught not to forget that you are dealing with a live opponent who is going to try and outwit you and you learn to expect and be prepared for surprises. Instead of expecting it to be some type of a straight trajectory.

[Navy Dave]

As I follow this thread, it seems to me the term “logical lines of operation” is a misleading metaphor and directs us toward a relatively narrow mode of linear thought. General Chiarelli’s article in Military Review suggests that the term “logical lines of operation” is useful because it moves us away from the phased approach to warfare, allowing for simultaneous action toward a final goal rather than discreet, albeit blurred transitional phases of action. However both concepts harken us back to traditional “lines of communication and maneuver”, and are still distinctly linear in nature. Indeed the term itself, “lines of operation” borrows from “lines of communication” and (as The Pap likes to remind us) originates from a time when communication relied on linear physical infrastructure, delivered via roads, rail, or telegraph lines.

General Chiarelli reminds us in his article that “Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight... We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought.”

But doesn’t thinking in terms of “Logical lines of Operations” simply borrow a linear metaphor from classic military modes of thought? Speaking from my perspective as a Navy officer with admittedly limited experiences operating with the Army, I have often thought and remarked on what occurs to me as a distinctly linear approach that the Army takes toward problem solving. And though I admit this tendency of linear thought undoubtedly pervades all of our military services (a fact which perhaps lends even more credence to these suggestions), it is perhaps more so with the Army.

In an earlier post Shane Sims makes a great point that “Logical lines of operations are existential in part, but there are very real, physical elements, which will have an impact on overall objectives.” I suggest that those physical elements are indeed lines of operation, but that what we think of in a broader sense as “logical lines of operation” should be thought of as something quite different. A design approach might help us break from this classic military linear thinking.

As The Pap notes in his article Design and the Prospects of a US Military Renaissance, “With a more open search strategy, we may collaborate with others with varying views, call upon the unfamiliar arts and sciences, merge heuristics, and, extend and displace concepts until we discover new meaning in the situation.”

I suggest we search for our own “Eureka” moment in our effort to make sense of what “winning the peace” means today. Defining logical lines of operation with a new design way of thinking might help us to break out of our linear mental mold. Though NDD points out that none of this is really new, and “We know what has to be done, we need to quit re-wrapping the package and get on with it.” I propose that words and concepts really do matter, that there is a time and place for critical thinking, and that thinking should shape our action.

V/r
LCDR Dave Purkiss
Student, Command and General Staff College
Satellite Location: Fort Lee, Virginia

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.