Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

An odd article, especially as it coincides with the appearance in London of an ex-Taliban minister, Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, for talks.

The deal that Zaeef is thought to have discussed with Foreign Office officials is this: in return for power in parts of southern Afghanistan, the Taliban would accept the authority of the Kabul government and expel al-Qaeda and its jihadist affiliates.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...y-to-fail.html

For once a couple of the comments are worth reading - those by permare.

[Tukhachevskii]

1.
2. What is "good governance"? For the average Pashtun, it probably means being a good muslim and having a nice scooter. What's constitutionalism got to do with all of this? Probably about the same as elections and universal sufferage. This seems like a "bottom-up" vice a "top-down" issue.

Exactly, we tend to forget that there are alternative forms of governancethat don't fit into our preconceived notions of how a polity (as opposed to a state) is meant to function. There are/were innumerable tribal networks of authority and consultation (the pre-Revolutionary loya Jirga was one) that help form, develop and direct consensus. The fact that these processes dont seem to fit the Weberian ideal type of a rational organisation confounds us especially where we seek to "interface" withnthem (i.e., CIMIC). Which brings me to this...

That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

Wasn't the push for a constituion part and parcel of the CIMIC measures we forced/suggested to them? Which brings me to this....

We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Our colonial perspective isn't just about the "form" of government "we'd" like to see. It's much deeper than you acknowledge. The "state" as a rational, bureaucratic (never could spell that!) actor as we understand it and foist on others is as much part of the problem and is a collonial one to boot. We have a "standard of civlisation" which, when others fail to meet it, we assume it is because their "states" are imperfect (there's a functionalist bias in there somewhere) which we assume social engineering and legal machinery can "fix". You only need to puruse our COIN manuals to see that "state building"- the re-creation of ther states into "our" image- seems to be more important than working through existing structures...and then we wonder why there's "friction": military and otherwise, when our rival systems don't "gell" and when the "natives" revolt!!!. But you can only do that by either destroying the very structure/fabric of "Afghan" life and totally re-educating the "Afghans" or by superimposing "Western" state structures (and that entails) on top of an existing diffuse system of authority/value allocation. Our greatets successes have worked when we have ourselves adopted their system of tribal networks. Our failures (politically) have resulted from ignorance of that. The American system of governance works because it is American; it was an organic development in which all participants to that particular revolt were able to make their voices felt.

[Bob's World]

Tuk,

I'd never say to recreate governance for anyone else in our image. I stand for the principle of Self-determination, and that means I might not like what the guy I am helping comes up with.

But that does not preclude setting certain parameters as the condition of my support. The current constitution is the primary cause of insurgency in Afghanistan. I would be happy to debate any expert on constitutional law or COIN or Islamic studies on that point (I might lose, but I would enjoy the fight!) We must remove that thorn from the paw of the lion that is the Pashtun populace of Afghanistan. Even the Northern Alliance would reject the current constitution if roles were reversed, as they know full well that it is designed to control and oppress enemies of the state rather than to empower and liberate the people as a whole.

A good constitution is indeed tailored to the culture and needs of the people it defends and supports. If not, they will not in turn defend and support it. It must do a few things, how it does them is moot.

1. It must design a government that clearly
A. represents the entire populace equitably
B. selects representatives in a manner and for a time that is recognized and accepted by the populace
C. has built in, un bypassable obstacles to efficiency that prevents any one element of government from abusing its power.

It must also identify and protect the human rights and principles that this populace believes to be essential.
A. The rights of information, (press, speech, assembly) and to remain armed (keep and bear arms) in some form are critical as the "4th branch" of government; that ever pressent reminder to all who enter government that if they violate the people's trust, that the people will ultimately find out, organize, and violate them in turn.
B. It must allow for values to adjust over time. Certainly American values have changed radically over the years, but the principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability.

[Tukhachevskii]

Col.,
I have to say that, though I may not agree with a large amount of what you have to say, I have to admit liking the way you say it. The expertly interlocked contradictory propositions that can be spun to fit any argument depending on the reception of them and the ability to formulate sentences that negate their own predicates is amazing. If I didn’t know any better I’d think your dialectical flourishes betrayed a deep adherence to Marxism! Anyway, let’s crack on. (p.s. forgive the length of the reply, when I get a bee in my bonnet...ahem, sorry, I mean beret. I’d never wear a bonnet you understand! )

I'd never say to recreate governance for anyone else in our image. I stand for the principle of Self-determination, and that means I might not like what the guy I am helping comes up with. But that does not preclude setting certain parameters as the condition of my support.

(Note the opening contradiction in the above proposition!) Self-determination is not a universal covering law or some kind of value free nomothetic principle of political science but a politically motivated and ideologically understood concept. Standing for it is advocating an understanding of how the world works and how it should work. Self-determination was our mantra after WWI when we dismantled and “acquired” large tracts of the Ottoman Empire in the name of self-determination (after a suitable mandate period you understand). Some of the more hot-headed Muslims out there consider self-determination to be a colonial plot to destroy the caliphate or any chance of resuscitating it (and I’m not sure they’re wrong on that score either. In fact I’m sure the USSR had the same problem with the concept). Language is not value free or neutral; freedom may be your mantra and it may invoke a whole semantic chain of fuzzy warm signifiers that are central to your culture/ideology but to Muslims- not Arabs per se, but Muslims- that word (hurriyya) signifies chaos (it also means prostitute in one of its forms). You may as well be an anarchist! Further, the fact that your recognition (Oh, Hegel [pbuh], where art thou?) of a polity’s self-image is dependent upon your acceptance of it as congruent with whatever vision you have of how the world (should) works merely undermines the whole concept of “self” determination and thus agency broadly speaking (at least in the international realm). Cf. Taliban state-making below.

The current constitution is the primary cause of insurgency in Afghanistan. I would be happy to debate any expert on constitutional law or COIN or Islamic studies on that point (I might lose, but I would enjoy the fight!) We must remove that thorn from the paw of the lion that is the Pashtun populace of Afghanistan. Even the Northern Alliance would reject the current constitution if roles were reversed, as they know full well that it is designed to control and oppress enemies of the state rather than to empower and liberate the people as a whole.

Forget about international law (jmm’s field that) or COIN (talk to Ken White or Wilf) let’s talk about “enemies of the state” (what state? Is there one? Who are the “enemies? The people ISAF/Taliban is/were trying to steamroll into some bureaucratic monstrosity? ), “empowerment”, “liberation”, and even “the people” shall we? (That’s a rhetorical question by the way).

A good constitution is indeed tailored to the culture and needs of the people it defends and supports. If not, they will not in turn defend and support it. It must do a few things, how it does them is moot.

Weber (pbuh) you’re legacy lives on! Methinks I detect the age old legal positivist mantra of a codified and/or written constitution underlying your argument here and below. The idea of people defending a constitution is a peculiarly American conceit. Most other people would defend their state or even their fellow citizens but a document (yah rub!). Well in that case doesn’t the Shari‘a(h) count (which incorporates local ‘urf or customary tribal laws and maqasid)? Or the Quran for that matter? They are the only legal elements within that culture that achieve the hallowed status that the US Constitution does (...now isn’t that suggestive!?) and which, for that matter, similarly delineates the responsibilities of rulers and ruled, of justice, rights, and responsibilities. To see the Islamic version of the US constitution I refer you to Muhammad’s Constitution of Medina the ideal type (speaking in Weberian terms) to which Muslims refer when a “modern” constitution needs to be formulated. Anyway, in the words of Burke(pbuh), “men are not tied to one another by paper and seals, they are tied by sentiments, bonds forged in blood (&c, or some such)”.

1. It must design [Ugh! Really?! What’s wrong with outline, delinate, or demarcate or instil or create, &c?- T] a government that clearly

A. represents the entire populace equitably [now there’s another loaded term- T]
B. selects representatives in a manner and for a time that is recognized and accepted by the populace .
C. has built in, un-bypassable obstacles to efficiency [another loaded term- T] that prevents any one element of government from abusing [nah, I’ll let that one slide- T] its power.

A. “Equitably”, means all things to all men. Perhaps a system of ethnic quotas? And how did that work out in Lebanon? That kind of weighting of votes along with the census it would need to be effective would (if they told you the truth in the first place) only create deep societal anxiety at numerical weakness and create a demographic security dilemma the knock on effect of which would be to further depress the status of women (if that were possible). The size and power of the Pashtun’s, extending as it does across the border into Pakistan, would merely cause further rifts thereby creating a “cleft” state with “Pashtunland” facing off against a loose tribal coalition bifurcating Afghanistan. Keeping the tribal system means that internal Pashtun rivalries can be kept in check without destabilising the entire (admittedly shaky) edifice. A shura at which all tribal heads can wheel and deal sounds much more “equitable” than one based upon the size of one’s population (hardly conducive to creating a sense of “nation” now is it?). Number crunching and head counting may work where everyone is equal (and considers himself equal to his fellow citizen) but it is a recipe for serious doo doo there.

B. But tribal structures already do that incorporating charismatic and traditional authority (as opposed to the rational type) within them! Ever heard of a Shura? Even the Shi‘a have such a representative mechanism in the concept of emulation in which a cleric must appeal to worshippers to get a following and thus a living and status, honour and reputation. As soon as he loses that he no longer represents them (political competition). Tribal authority works in similar ways (at least in Islamic cultures). However, the key word here is “consent” and what that means to different cultures and political structures.

C. Ah, I wondered when you’d get to that, the separation of powers...everyone lower heads reverentially. Again, both the traditional tribal system of governance, normatively and practically, contains strictures against the overweening power of any one group/jamaat/tribe (why do you think they change sides so often?). The shari‘a(h) contains provisions for ‘urf (customary law) which enables tribes to coexist and appeal to shari‘a when ‘urf fails. Furthermore, the shari‘a(h) sets definite limits to political authority (it must be religiously based, must not oppress unduly its subjects, etc.). In fact the history of Islam attests to this concept with the numerous civil wars between various sects/parties (can’t be one without the other) railing (sp?) against “tyranny” on an appeal to shari‘a law. In fact the Ikhwan’s “resistance” to Mubarak, and the subsequent doctrine of shirk and jahilliyya that Arab rulers were said to have fallen into, was based precisely on a system of laws which you ignore (at your peril I might add). Cf. below...

[Tukhachevskii]

Within the context of Pashtun tribal society, warlordism could find little space. As in most other regions of Afghanistan, the competition coming from ideological groups was modest until the mid-1990s and they were certainly not favoured by the patronage politics adopted by the political leadership of the parties based in Peshawar. However, at the same time warlordism faced competition from tribalism, which ended up imposing a logic different from militarism, even when warlords did emerge to play an important if often temporary role. In the more general terms of the study of warlordism as a social process, the experience of southern Afghanistan suggests that warlords can only prosper in social environments that allow them to easily acquire political control over a territory [part of the process of state-building- T]. It is the intrinsic political role of the tribes that prevented warlordism from finding a fertile ground. Warlordism, since it implies the existence of autonomous players not bound by political or social loyalties, could not find roots in Pashtun territory. The closest thing to a pure warlord to be seen in the south, the Khalqi commanders Allah Noor and Khano after the fall of Najibullah’s government, were also forced into seeking to establish tribal connections. However, they were ultimately perceived as strangers by local society and this, coupled with their lack of social knowledge, prevented their re-legitimisation and led to the formation of a large alliance against them. (my italics) (my italics, p. 17)

It must also identify and protect the human rights and principles that this populace believes to be essential [therein lies the rub-T].
A. The rights of information, (press, speech, assembly) and to remain armed (keep and bear arms) in some form are critical as the "4th branch" of government; that ever present reminder to all who enter government that if they violate the people's trust, that the people will ultimately find out, organize, and violate them in turn.
B. It must allow for values to adjust over time Certainly American values have changed radically over the years, but the principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability.

Again, what exactly are “human rights”? Are we speaking of Natural Law here? In which case- if it’s the theological rather than the secular humanist version- then I think I know what the Muslim reply will be. In fact, even it’s the secular version I think the reply will be the same. This also reveals your ideological understanding (though you won’t see it that way, which is part of an ideology’s charms) of the meaning of good governance (I don’t think “commanding the good and forbidding the wrong” are part of it, at least in terms of what Muslims call good governance). What “this populace believes to be essential”, then, is diametrically opposed to what you do.

A. “Right to bear arms”? That’s a universal given is it? Norms and values such as the ones you point out operate already in far subtler forms such as badal/revenge for instance which help to “balance” the “(over)authoritative allocation of values”. Furthermore, shura councils are held at every “level” or “circle” (a more precise term) of “Afghan” society (which, of course, spills over into surrounding “states”. Is Pakistan a state? Or an Army occupying some land? Now what was the original quote about Prussia...? Answers on a postcard please). As for rights to information, speech and assembly I wonder exactly what you mean by a “right”. I know of no polity on earth that allows its citizens to assemble, speak or seek information without simultaneous putting certain restrictions upon them without which their “rights” would become null and void. Apparently where you come from rights are antecedent to obligations and duties. “Restraint”, said Paul Vincent, “is a moveable feast in Liberal thought”. Meditate upon that if you will.

B. The idea that values (and other things) change over time sounds awfully “whiggish” to me. The idea of progress is ingrained in “western” thought (and in American thought even more deeply). Remember Plato(pbuh)? “If you wish to understand a polis, understand its people”. In Islamic cultures the very idea of change is suspicious; given the religion and its followers are already perfect by definition why, fi ardihi, would they want to change? My god man, nothing much has changed since the Raj! (All right, that’s a bit polemical). In Islamic thought bid’a/innovation is frowned upon (but not wholly out of the question so long as it is not anything Islamic that changes). Religion is what passes for a common denominator out there, it’s the one thing holding them together as a “people”, it provides them with a lingua fraca if you will. You can’t mobilise the “people” behind the state without some glue (nationalism in Europe provided this) meaning it only gets a tighter grip. They’ve got a whole panoply of values/norms (like Pashtunwali, or more importantly, sulh’, et al). As you say, “The principles those values are based upon remains a solid foundation for stability”, but you seem, again, to want to ignore the “solid foundation for stability” that exist in Afghanistan because you don’t like it.

(I might be rambling a bit here but I’ll leave it anyway). A strong case can be made for the Taliban as a state-creating force that sought to utilise Islam’s egalitarian aspects (even though it also legitimises tribalism) to circumvent and ultimately loosen and sunder tribal bonds. Only then could the Taliban create a “national” movement that transcended the very tribal structures that acted as a breaking mechanism (against tyranny no less, surely that resonates with your American ideology and myth of origins! [mythomoteur]). The very processes of state-making creating a “national” (“confessional” may be more accurate) movement that was “representative” of all “Afghans”, thereby masking what was essentially Pashtun “nationalism”, required the lowest common denominator taken to the extreme as the only means to suture the asocial (tribal) fabric of Afghan society beyond their core Pashtun following and thereby resemble something like “national” (i.e., state) representatives (the Taliban are thus to an extent “Modernists” in accepting the idea of the “state” like the Shi‘a of Iran under Khomeini) and thus gain some kind of “legitimacy” based on that common denominator. Yet, that intensified, as in Soviet Russia, the need to be Islamic and seen to be explicitly so. Moreover, the Taliban’s adopting of or interpretation of Islam was consciously different from the tribes (whose adherence was “lax”) thereby supervening upon tribal authority structures. Again, like in Russia under Communism, the only way to enforce the legitimacy of the regime was to become ever more stringent (even in contradiction to the Shari‘a’s acceptance of tribal laws). This intensification would have led to the creation of a modern state which, after a period of time, may have collapsed under tribal opposition but which would have left, at least a “state” structure for them to contend with and which they had some experience with in handling as opposed to tribal structures. Remember, the rest of the world got on fine without states long after the state became the only beast in Europe.



There, I’ve said my peace. Let the contradictory sophistic literary wizardry of the Col. flow... (nah, you’re alright, it's probably just envy speaking!).

[Steve the Planner]

Tukhachevskii:

Stunning post.

Here is the great riddle: There is no riddle at all.

Cast aside our misperceptions and a lot of things become a lot clearer.

Where, I think there is a continuing revolution/evolution is in urban populations, and especially more technically sophisticated young people and professionals, where their "tribe" is still in transition.

Brezinski's great tome "The Technotronic Era" envisioned a world where even far-flung rural populations would have a radio to "listen" to brief news broadcasts. It was never understood, at that time, that the level of contact and access would include wiki-ing the actual historical documents and maps of the sulh' Versailles, their national budget, pictures of Mubarak's yacht (and figures on his estimated wealth). Let alone that they could interact....

From my perspective, I read what you described as the formal empire/nation governance systems being a "tail" wagging the dog, which makes a great deal of sense for populations defined through generations of colonial occupation---a "gray market" for social structure, norm setting, and control.

We are committed to driving from the Tail, and can't understand why the dog won't go that way.

[davidbfpo]

The former DNS chief sacked by Karzai has given an interview, which gives some context to what is happening and remarks like:

Very simply, the Taliban are our killers, they are not our brothers...

The Taliban say they have a licence from God to kill, to torture, to marginalise women...That we don't accept. No Taliban will say my licence comes from Mullah Omar, their leader: they say my licence comes from God. Settlement with that type of group is a disaster for Afghanistan

His response, as part of an ex-Northern Alliance bloc:

.. he and his allies were preparing for a worst-case scenario where the Taliban were allowed to keep southern provinces with "weapons and structure intact" after agreeing to a ceasefire with Mr Karzai. "That will mean fragmentation of authority within Afghanistan, emergence of another state. In that situation we will rise..It will only be a matter of time before Taliban jump into other areas."

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...e-Taliban.html

[Bob's World]

To attempt to create two states is not "reconciliation." Members of the Northern Alliance, who dominate GIRoA, fear any compromise with the Taliban for good reason. This is why they accepted our aid in driving the Taliban out, and why they are quite content for us to stay forever and dedicate our wealth and energy to keeping them out. This representative from that community of Hazara, Uzbek and Tajiks is correct, IMO, of his assessment that to create a Taliban-led Pashtun state in the south would merely be a step toward that state ultimately acting to re-establish their historic control over the whole. That control has always subjugated the ethnic groups of the Northern Alliance.

How does one create trust where no trust exists? This is the real question, and this should be the focal point of US operations in Afghanistan. Not how do we help one side to prevail, for there is no permanent stability in forcing such a victory.

The current constitution of Afghanistan is rooted in this historic distrust. It is designed to ensure that no one outside the Northern Alliance circle of trust has any legal means to compete with them for either political or economic (which in this patronage society are one and the same) success. Once that gauntlet was thrown down, behind the protection of the Coalition, the insurgency began to grow in earnest. Once we ramped up our efforts to "defeat" that insurgency the resistance element among the largely apolitical populace began to grow as well.

I wheel out the US Constitution because I recognize it for what it really is. A masterpiece of COIN; an effort to create and preserve trust among a similarly diverse and divided populace to help them learn to work together toward a better future for all. To have a system that they could trust in, even when they could not trust in each other. This is the true genius of the US Constitution, all of the mechanics and rights woven into it are simply interlocking elements of blocking any loopholes to trust. Many of these same mechanisms are equally disruptive of governmental efficiency. Efficient governments are governments that come to abuse the people over time. To control the people over time. Inefficient governments are governments that the people are able to retain control over.

Our recent buffoonery in Congress and the White House over the deficit, budgets, etc, are a great example of this. Curse their inefficiency, but praise the constitution for doing what it was always intended to do.

I do not advocate for any other people to adopt the US constitution. That would be a disaster of illegitimacy in action. I do advocate for others to come together to debate their distrust for each other and for government and to find a system that works for them to overcome the same. That is reconciliation.

(Of note, the one issue too thorny to resolve, slavery, was rarely mentioned in the formal debates of 1787, and was simply set aside to resolve later. That was a big mistake. I think those assembled all realized that while this was an issue that they could not resolve then, that it was one that had to be resolved someday. I think they could have agreed to a date well in the future, 50-100 years down the road, for that institution to end. That is a lesson learned. Do not ignore the elephant in the room, but do not let it drive you out of the room either. Note it, agree to deal with it later, and drive on. Every society has such elephants, certainly Afghanistan does.)

[jcustis]

Our current approach is much like a team of SF candidates dragging 100 lbs of personal gear each and a couple of jeeps across several miles of North Carolina Sandhills, collapsing short of the finish point while some some cagey old SF NCO (like Ken White) lounging in the shade of a pine tree asks "Did any of you think to see if you could get one of them to start?"

I just caught this, and have to say that it is one of the funniest things I have heard in some time, regardless of the thrust of the argument .

[Dayuhan]

How does one create trust where no trust exists? This is the real question, and this should be the focal point of US operations in Afghanistan. Not how do we help one side to prevail, for there is no permanent stability in forcing such a victory.

Trying to make that the focal point of US operations seems to me a repeat of a mistake we've made before in Afghanistan: handing our people on the ground nebulous and unspecific goals that they are ill equipped to accomplish... if indeed those tasks can be accomplished at all. Armies can't build nations and armies can't create trust. Why ask them to do what they cannot do?

Do we need "permanent stability" in Afghanistan? Is there some more moderate and more achievable goal that we can set?

The current constitution of Afghanistan is rooted in this historic distrust. It is designed to ensure that no one outside the Northern Alliance circle of trust has any legal means to compete with them for either political or economic (which in this patronage society are one and the same) success. Once that gauntlet was thrown down, behind the protection of the Coalition, the insurgency began to grow in earnest. Once we ramped up our efforts to "defeat" that insurgency the resistance element among the largely apolitical populace began to grow as well.

I remain unconvinced that any other Constitution would have made a difference. Whoever is in power will exclude, marginalize, and oppress whoever is out of power. Whoever is out of power will fight back. This is Afghanistan. A document is not going to change it. It can change, over time, as the people involved seek other ways... but until they take that initiative themselves, it won't happen. We can't make it happen.

I wheel out the US Constitution because I recognize it for what it really is. A masterpiece of COIN; an effort to create and preserve trust among a similarly diverse and divided populace to help them learn to work together toward a better future for all.

"Similarly divided" seems a rather enormous stretch. The founding fathers were in fact a remarkably homogeneous group with rather similar interests, and they did not have anything like the recent history of conflict and oppression that the contending parties in Afghanistan have.

I do advocate for others to come together to debate their distrust for each other and for government and to find a system that works for them to overcome the same. That is reconciliation.

Advocating it won't make it happen. We may be able to bribe or bully people into making a show of negotiation, but if they don't really want to be there and they don't trust the parties they are negotiating with and they have no confidence in anyone's commitment to follow whatever "agreement" is reached... well, that's not reconciliation either. That's a facade.

We're in this mess in Afghanistan because we took on the absurdly impractical task of trying to dictate how Afghanistan is going to be governed. We will not get out of that hole by digging ourselves deeper into it. IMO, as always.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

I realize you don't understand or agree with my points.

I stand by them all the same. We either focus on building some degree of trust that allows this country to come together and move on, or we simply go home. Frankly I am fine with the latter, except for the small fact that if we just do that it will be those who placed trust in us that we have been pleading for, who will suffer the most.

We don't need trust in us, we need them to trust in each other. That demands a proper legal framework and a neutral system of enforcement. We built the wrong legal framework, and then backed it with a one-sided system of enforcement.

[Entropy]

Bob,

I generally agree with your points about the constitution. The flaws in it were obvious from almost the beginning. I just did a search and found that I mentioned the issues you're talking about on this forum over 2 1/2 years ago and it's something I've discussed elsewhere and was even part of my pre-deployment IPB in 2005. I think, even at this late date, that changing the constitution would help, though I don't think it would be as decisive as you seem to think.

The problem is that the constitution isn't going to be changed. Even if you, me and other like-minded people could band together and use the underpants gnome strategy to convince the US government that this needs to be the focus of our policy, the Afghans will reject it. I'm not confident that there is any amount of outside pressure will get them to consider, much less implement, such changes even assuming we can change US policy. It would require the current leadership to voluntarily give up most of their power, money and influence - how likely is that? This is a society that runs on patronage and the Afghan government is the mother-of-all patronage networks.

I hate to say it, but this is an idea that needs to be filed with a picture of a pink unicorn on it because I will probably see one of those before I ever see the current Afghan government reform the constitution. There are too many entrenched interests, in both the US and Afghanistan, that support the status quo. Here, I think, the US is actually a hindrance since our money is feeding this beast and our own systems are dependent on the Afghan top-down power structure. We would have to fundamentally alter the way we do business in Afghanistan which, again, at this late stage, is bloody unlikely.

I wish I was wrong about this, but I'm pretty confident in my estimate. The flaws were blatantly obvious for at least the last five years, yet talk of reform is still a side issue. I don't see anything on the horizon that's going to give this proposal new life or alter the basic status quo. Maybe it's my lack of vision, or maybe it's my cynicism, which I admit clouds just about all my thinking on Afghanistan, but I just don't see it happening.

[Dayuhan]

We either focus on building some degree of trust that allows this country to come together and move on, or we simply go home. Frankly I am fine with the latter, except for the small fact that if we just do that it will be those who placed trust in us that we have been pleading for, who will suffer the most.

We don't need trust in us, we need them to trust in each other. That demands a proper legal framework and a neutral system of enforcement. We built the wrong legal framework, and then backed it with a one-sided system of enforcement.

Actually I agree with you: if we could create trust and fix the politics we could solve the problems. If we could make people trust each other and fix other people's politics we could bring peace to Mindanao, build a government in Somalia, democratize Saudi Arabia and China, and have the Israelis and Palestinians dancing cheek to cheek. The problem is in that big little if.

I don't think Americans can or should try to build "a proper legal framework" or "a neutral system of enforcement" for Afghans. Those are governance functions and if we take them on we are, like it or not, governing. I don't think for a minute that the contending parties in Afghanistan are going to trust each other, work with each other, or stop trying to take power for themselves just because we want them to.

Most of all, I am not comfortable with the idea of assigning our people yet another nebulous, non-specific, and probably unachievable "nation-building" task. Our presence in Afghanistan is dominated by the army, and asking an army to build a legal framework, install a neutral system of enforcement, and make people trust each other is like asking an engineer to do surgery. They aren't trained or equipped to do that (I'm not sure anyone is) and the attempt will end badly. I know they will try, if asked, but it doesn't make sense to ask.

I'd also have to point out that as an engaged combatant we are not well positioned to act as a mediator.

It seems to me that we need to slow it down with the grand, noble, and unachievable goals, and ratchet the aim back to something specific, practical, and achievable. Do we really "need" them to trust each other? Is there no way to meet our minimum goals and still acknowledge the reality that they don't trust each other, and will not no matter what we say or do?

[davidbfpo]

The murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, ex-Northern Alliance leader, a Tajik, suggests IMHO that the Taliban and others have no wish to reconcile.

An in-country BBC reporter's profile and commentary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14996850

From Watandost:

The killing was a strong statement of Taliban opposition to peace talks, and as the latest in a string of high-profile assassinations will increase the apprehension of ordinary Afghans about their future as the insurgency gathers pace.

Link:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2011/0...n-rabbani.html

[Bob's World]

The murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani, ex-Northern Alliance leader, a Tajik, suggests IMHO that the Taliban and others have no wish to reconcile.

An in-country BBC reporter's profile and commentary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14996850

From Watandost:

Link:http://watandost.blogspot.com/2011/0...n-rabbani.html

We really don't know who put the hit on Rabbani, now do we? Based on the interests of the parties I would offer that it is every bit as likely that it came from GIRoA as from the Taliban if political in nature; if not political, then the pool of candidates widens significantly.

An alternative assumption, that is IMO more likely, is that Rabanni was making headway and that the outcome was going to shift the distribution of power in ways that someone who felt he and his affiliates would be net losers in. This is almost any Hazara or Uzbek; or even those Pashtuns whose tribes were able to move into power positions on the skirts of the US invasion (like for example the current Kandahar COP Razik and his tribe that gained control of the cash machine of the border crossing between Spin Boldak and Qetta from the very large and powerful Noorzai tribe in Kandahar).

After 10 years, we are still babes in Afghanistan when it comes to understanding the dynamics of power, its employment, and the competition to gain and hold it. The Taliban are just one group of one aspect of this.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

We seldom agree, but not on this one.

Does it really matter who pulled the trigger, which most say was Haqqani?

The storm was brewing around this chaotic concept of peace talks not supported by the Mullah, raising substantial unaddressed issues for non-Pashtuns, and, in the end, threatening to unravel the instability that so many important players depend on for their status and continued wealth.

How was this initiative really supposed to accomplish anything but, in the end, an assassination? Especially when viewed through the overall strategy of high-profile targeting in Kabul to continually demonstrate the weaknesses of the central government.

Instead, the obvious question is: Who's next?

[Bob's World]

There are only two paths to "stability" in Afghanistan:

1. Reconciliation by GIRoA that bring the various Taliban factions into legal political competition for influence. (This is best, but as many point out, those who have power don't want to share, and those who don't have power will equally attempt to sieze all as well. This is the Afghan way.)

2. We leave and allow whomever is naturally strongest to rise to power. We created an artificial solution, as such will never be legitimate or sustainable. A natural solution must occur, and that will be messy and will not be anything we can or should control. We would then simply be willing to have open relations with whomever prevails as the best way to support our interests there.

Both of those options are better than the one we currently pursue.

As to who is taken out next? That really depends on who is seeking to create what advantage for themself. There is tremendous friction within both the Taliban and GIRoA, possibly as much as there is between the two. This is a no-trust environment.

This is the genius of the US Constitution (and why it is a masterpiece of COIN) is that it was specifically designed to create trust where no trust existed, and allow 13 diverse and separate sovereign parties work and move forward together as a collective.

Everything I learned about the Constitution in 8th Grade Civics and later in Law School totally missed the true essence, purpose, and power of the document.

[Bob's World]

An insightful quote off of Al Jazeera today:

Amrullah Saleh, a former Afghan intelligence chief who fought against the Taliban under Rabbani, told Al Jazeera the attacks showed the government's failure in protecting high-profile figures.

These attacks tell us that the policy of appeasement and deal making with the Taliban and Pakistan is not going to lead to peace.

By adapting a vague policy of so called reconciliation, [the government] has created confusion in our society and weakened the government to the extent that they can't even protect high-profiled leaders in the capital.

Rabbani's death could also unleash the resentment building up among some senior Northern Alliance members, who have criticised Karzai for his peace efforts with the Taliban, Saleh said.

If Karzai wants to keep Afghanistan united, he has to launch massive massive investigations and bring the culprits to justice.

One can see his words dripping with contempt for the idea of reconciliation. As I have said, this is the critical task, ISAF has left it to GIRoA to accomplish, and it is not in the interest of GIRoA to make it happen.

But a news flash for Mr. Saleh: A government cannot "appease" its own populace by making concessions to address their reasonable grievances. That is simply government doing its job to govern the entire populace, and not just certain segments at the expense of others.

Appeasement is when a government makes concessions to some foreign body at the expense of their own populace. Certainly Pakistan sees their interests in Afghanistan best represented through the Taliban, but the Taliban are a nationalist insurgency that draws from a populace that just happens to overlap the border between these two countries. The Taliban do not attack GIRoA because Pakistan tells them to, they attack GIRoA because GIRoA denies them full participation in their own country's politics and economy.

It is fully within the capability of GIRoA to resolve this insurgency on reasonable terms now. It will not be about one side "winning" or one "losing" but rather about moving from a biased, polarized government established by our intervention there to a more balanced government established by Afghans for Afghans. But it is not in the interest of GIRoA to do this so long as they can rely on ISAF to protect their current unsustainable model.

The fast road to peace and stability in Afghanistan is for ISAF to pack up and go home. At that point GIRoA's interests will make an amazing swing, and we will see an amazing growth of interest in such things as reconciliation and security force capacity that seem lacking now.

[Dayuhan]

The Taliban do not attack GIRoA because Pakistan tells them to, they attack GIRoA because GIRoA denies them full participation in their own country's politics and economy.

What basis do you have for stating this as fact?

Seems to me the Taliban attack the GIRoA because they want power. They had it, they lost it, and they want it back. When they had it, they excluded and oppressed other groups. When they lost it, they were excluded and oppressed. If they get it back, they will exclude and oppress. They're not likely to accept anything short of full control unless they see it as a tactical step toward gaining full control.

What tangible evidence have we to suggest anything but a winner-take-all outcome?

It is fully within the capability of GIRoA to resolve this insurgency on reasonable terms now. It will not be about one side "winning" or one "losing" but rather about moving from a biased, polarized government established by our intervention there to a more balanced government established by Afghans for Afghans. But it is not in the interest of GIRoA to do this so long as they can rely on ISAF to protect their current unsustainable model.

Again you state this as fact, but why? Why would you think a balanced, inclusive government has any chance among bitter enemies who loathe and distrust each other? Why would they share? Given the obvious conflict over patronage, corruption, and the privilege of running technically illegal enterprises without interference, why would they just get along? Doesn't it seem more likely that they will fight over the goodies until somebody wins?

The fast road to peace and stability in Afghanistan is for ISAF to pack up and go home. At that point GIRoA's interests will make an amazing swing, and we will see an amazing growth of interest in such things as reconciliation and security force capacity that seem lacking now.

I don't see GIRoA's interests changing at all. The interest will be in survival and profit, just as it is now, though with survival less likely short term profit and exit strategies will become more important. I don't see any evidence that anyone in either party sees shared power as viable, except as a transitory tactical step toward gaining full control.

I can't see the Taliban agenda changing either. With the US gone they'd see all the marbles ripe for the picking, and why would they settle for half when they can have all? You might de-motivate elements driven purely by resistance to the foreign invader, but you'd re-motivate opportunistic elements who see the Taliban as likely to win and want to get in on the side of the new distributors of largesse.

It would be wonderful if a US withdrawal would deprive the AQ narrative of strength, but at this point it wouldn't. AQ draws most of its support from opposition to foreign military intervention in Muslim lands, and if the US had declined any extensive and lasting involvement in Afghanistan from the start, that would have hurt AQ badly. Too late to make that work now, though: we exit now, AQ spins it as victory... and the spin will be believed.

Unfortunately, our own bad decisions have boxed us into a place where we're stuck supporting a government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to let fall, and where the only rational step for us to take can be credibly claimed as victory by our opponent. This was forseeable, but we didn't want to see. I don't see any very good end; least bad is all we can hope for... and hopefully we learn a thing or two.

Statements that the Taliban are fighting for inclusion and participation, rather than control, or that an American withdrawal would produce reconciliation, are far from self-evident and cannot be stated as self-evident truth. They need to be supported with evidence and reasoning: what exactly makes you think that these parties are going to suddenly trust each other and share power, given the recent history and current positions of the contending parties?

[omarali50]

The notion that the taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want
"reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesnt know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.