Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict

[Dayuhan]

Hmmm, actually, it's not a consequence of industrialization per se but, rather, a consequence of a certain type of industrialization that has been pushed for the past 80 years or so. It is quite possible to industrialize and have mass transport capabilities that do not rely on fleets of trucks: canal systems and rail systems being the two main alternatives...

...I'm not saying that all countries which get tanks will do this. All I am saying is that if they get tanks and try and do things most efficiently, they will have a number of social consequences that may not be optimal for security and stability.

Certainly it's possible to hypothesize a development model that does not rely on concrete roads, and with sufficient central direction (sufficient meaning a whole lot) one might even implement such a model. While the desire for military mobility in general (not only for tanks) has in many cases driven road construction programs, I'm not convinced that military considerations in general or tanks specifically have been the principal reason for the emergence of road/motor-based development paradigms.

To assess the social consequences of the decision to acquire tanks and the (frequently absent) decision to use them efficiently you'd hve to separate those consequences from those of a whole raft of other parallel factors, and I suspect that at the end of the day the causative role of the decision to acquire tanks would be fairly minor.

Why do we worry about Venezuela? Damned if I know.

Does anyone worry about Venezuela? I can't see why, at least in the military sense, and even in the political sphere poor Hugo seems more a minor irritant than a serious concern. Of course a spat with Colombia is not outside the realm of possibility and could be an awkward thing, if only for the potential impact on oil prices!

[tequila]

But when we, or Huntington, are talking about the ferocity, ruthlessness, bloodiness, and intractability of wars along cultural fault lines, we're not talking either politics or economics, but the way people look at each other, across cultures. And neither we nor they, at the bleeding edge, saw the other as quite human, and worthy of human consideration. And there, in both cause and effect, Huntington's model suits the Pacific War to a T.

But Huntington's model doesn't apply to how cultures and values can change across time or within institutions. Witness the enormous variance in military institutional culture in the Imperial Japanese Army between, for instance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The Japanese took enormous casualties in both wars, but the treatment of POWs taken by the IJA was almost completely reversed.

Also the treatment of Chinese civilians during the Boxer Rebellion (notably good, especially in comparison to the Western forces they fought alongside) by Japanese forces in 1900 versus the Japanese invasion post-1932 (perhaps exceeded only by the Germans in Eastern Europe) is also an example of how institutional culture can radically change in a very short amount of time.

[Tom Kratman]

But Huntington's model doesn't apply to how cultures and values can change across time or within institutions. Witness the enormous variance in military institutional culture in the Imperial Japanese Army between, for instance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. The Japanese took enormous casualties in both wars, but the treatment of POWs taken by the IJA was almost completely reversed.

Also the treatment of Chinese civilians during the Boxer Rebellion (notably good, especially in comparison to the Western forces they fought alongside) by Japanese forces in 1900 versus the Japanese invasion post-1932 (perhaps exceeded only by the Germans in Eastern Europe) is also an example of how institutional culture can radically change in a very short amount of time.

It would apply less as cultures come to resemble each other, true. But if the important point is mere difference, and the extent to which that drives our tacit, more or less emotional view of what is fully human, then it wouldn't make a lot of difference, normally, as long as the change isn't toward greater similarity.

The Japanese are an interesting case, an extreme case, and perhaps a unique case. It's very hard to reconcile their more or less gallant conduct prior to and during the Russo-Japanese war with the way they acted from about 1932 onwards. It's possible that earlier they wished to seem more like the west, then, hence tried to be more like the west. It's also possible that the Great Depression changed them. It also seems to me possible that the coming death of Bushido, which Nitobe Inazo predicted, caused an extreme reaction to the point of the psychotic. Or it could be any combination of those or other factors.

It is, in any case, hard to explain the difference in conduct. This is made worse for us because there just isn't that much in English on the IJA, while there were limited instances of barbarous conduct from the IJN (oh, they killed prisoners, too, mind you) because, perhaps, there were less opportunities for the IJN.

[tequila]

The Japanese are an interesting case, an extreme case, and perhaps a unique case. It's very hard to reconcile their more or less gallant conduct prior to and during the Russo-Japanese war with the way they acted from about 1932 onwards. It's possible that earlier they wished to seem more like the west, then, hence tried to be more like the west. It's also possible that the Great Depression changed them. It also seems to me possible that the coming death of Bushido, which Nitobe Inazo predicted, caused an extreme reaction to the point of the psychotic. Or it could be any combination of those or other factors.

I wouldn't say that it's that difficult to reconcile. The IJA patterned itself on French and German models, and during both the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Boxer Rebellion sought to accommodate itself to international norms of conduct, even in conflicts when Western observers were not present (First Sino-Japanese War, Korean occupation). IJA leadership specifically set this as a goal and made it a priority for troops in the field. This led to IJA behavior towards POWs and civilians that was markedly better than most Western armies (the contrast between Japanese and German behavior in the Boxer Rebellion was most marked).

A combination of the rejection of international norms due to the international condemnation of Japan's invasion of China in 1932 and the grinding brutalization of an endless guerrilla conflict in China led directly to the decline in IJA behavior. The IJA high command had undergone a generational shift between the RJ War to a much more aggressive, fascistic, and ultranationalist leadership. The difference between a leadership which subordinated itself to civilian authority and sought to enforce international norms of conduct and one that dictated to civilians and made a fetish of rejecting international opinion cannot be underestimated.

[Tom Kratman]

I wouldn't say that it's that difficult to reconcile. The IJA patterned itself on French and German models, and during both the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Boxer Rebellion sought to accommodate itself to international norms of conduct, even in conflicts when Western observers were not present (First Sino-Japanese War, Korean occupation). IJA leadership specifically set this as a goal and made it a priority for troops in the field. This led to IJA behavior towards POWs and civilians that was markedly better than most Western armies (the contrast between Japanese and German behavior in the Boxer Rebellion was most marked).

A combination of the rejection of international norms due to the international condemnation of Japan's invasion of China in 1932 and the grinding brutalization of an endless guerrilla conflict in China led directly to the decline in IJA behavior. The IJA high command had undergone a generational shift between the RJ War to a much more aggressive, fascistic, and ultranationalist leadership. The difference between a leadership which subordinated itself to civilian authority and sought to enforce international norms of conduct and one that dictated to civilians and made a fetish of rejecting international opinion cannot be underestimated.

I don't doubt that those are factors. I do doubt that they're sufficient explanation in themselves for quite _such_ a radical change. I can't even think of a simile that quite does that change justice.

[marct]

Hi Dayuhan,

Certainly it's possible to hypothesize a development model that does not rely on concrete roads, and with sufficient central direction (sufficient meaning a whole lot) one might even implement such a model. While the desire for military mobility in general (not only for tanks) has in many cases driven road construction programs, I'm not convinced that military considerations in general or tanks specifically have been the principal reason for the emergence of road/motor-based development paradigms.

Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).

To assess the social consequences of the decision to acquire tanks and the (frequently absent) decision to use them efficiently you'd hve to separate those consequences from those of a whole raft of other parallel factors, and I suspect that at the end of the day the causative role of the decision to acquire tanks would be fairly minor.

Could be, although I'm not sure how much you could disaggregate them causally given that people often make decisions with minimal logic and multiple justifications (this, BTW, is why I tend to preffer the concept of "mutual arising" to that of "causality").

Cheers,

Marc

[Tom Kratman]

It is, perhaps, not insignificant that when Eisenhower announced our soon to be interstate system, it was as the "National Defense Highway System."

On the other hand, one can read too much into names. We have a "National Defense School Lunch Program" here, too. That's because tacking "National Defense" on (or "Patriot" for that matter) is a way of shutting down debate. "What? You oppose this thing with 'National Defense' on its label? You unpatriotic B#$^#%d!"

Minimal logic? Often no logic. Moreover, when someone tries to present a number of reasons for something, very often none of them have any place in the thing at all, but are just camouflage for some other underlying reason they just don't want to admit to. Kind of a pedestrian example of that: We had this female who had come back from Iraq on emergency leave. Every other day she came up with a different excuse not to go back - my mother's dying, I was sexually assaulted, I have this inexplicable pain...etc. I think there were nine such, in total; not unimpressive from a girl who really wasn't all that bright. Then she made a mistake, she brought her three year old son into the office, at which point it became self evident that _that_ was the real reason she didn't want to go back; she missed her _baby_.

As I pointed out to the SF colonel I was working for, as I handed him the open regulation on how to send her butt back to the war.

Hi Dayuhan,



Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).



Could be, although I'm not sure how much you could disaggregate them causally given that people often make decisions with minimal logic and multiple justifications (this, BTW, is why I tend to preffer the concept of "mutual arising" to that of "causality").

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

Actually, I don't have to hypothesize it; it's how Britain, France, the US and most of Western Europe industrialized. The concrete road phenomenon is a result of post WW I development activities both internally and externally. If you wanted more modern examples, Singapore and Brunei offer different ones (variants on the old Port of Trade model using waterborne transport).

Early industrialization in Britain, France, and the US was built around and shaped by the modes of transport that were available at that time. They didn't decide to eschew motors and roads because of the potential consequences; they used what they have. That mode is not likely to be repeated in places that have the road-and-motor option, unless geography supports it strongly, as in Singapore and Brunei, which also have most excellent roads and plenty of motors. Once upon a time industry developed along fall lines where shops could be powered by water wheels; this pattern is also not likely to evolve again!

Seems to me that the concrete road phenomenon was driven by the reduction of the internal combustion engine to a size that made small, independently mobile vehicles feasible. People use what's available to them, and convenience generally outweighs conscious policy.

Somewhere poor Colin is rolling his eyes and wondering where we took his thread!

[Tom Kratman]

Early industrialization in Britain, France, and the US was built around and shaped by the modes of transport that were available at that time. They didn't decide to eschew motors and roads because of the potential consequences; they used what they have. That mode is not likely to be repeated in places that have the road-and-motor option, unless geography supports it strongly, as in Singapore and Brunei, which also have most excellent roads and plenty of motors. Once upon a time industry developed along fall lines where shops could be powered by water wheels; this pattern is also not likely to evolve again!

Seems to me that the concrete road phenomenon was driven by the reduction of the internal combustion engine to a size that made small, independently mobile vehicles feasible. People use what's available to them, and convenience generally outweighs conscious policy.

Somewhere poor Colin is rolling his eyes and wondering where we took his thread!

Eh? I've seen worse threaddrift.

There is a reason they might. Both rail and canal transport are expensive to build, in terms of man hours mostly, but cheap to operate. Roads are also expensive to build, and not cheap to operate. If you're in a place where man hours are cheap...well...what's the downside? (There are a couple, of course. Rail requires a high degree of managerial expertise, discipline, and of societal stability. Hmmm...quick check....hmmm...Zimbabwe: 3 crashes and 105 fatalities in the last seven years. Electrically powered sections turned off in 2008.)

[Dayuhan]

Eh? I've seen worse threaddrift.

As have we all I'm sure, but in an RFI thread you can imagine the one doing the requesting watching it drift away and wondering what happened...

There is a reason they might. Both rail and canal transport are expensive to build, in terms of man hours mostly, but cheap to operate. Roads are also expensive to build, and not cheap to operate. If you're in a place where man hours are cheap...well...what's the downside? (There are a couple, of course. Rail requires a high degree of managerial expertise, discipline, and of societal stability. Hmmm...quick check....hmmm...Zimbabwe: 3 crashes and 105 fatalities in the last seven years. Electrically powered sections turned off in 2008.)

Certainly if these trends were directed by rational, conscious decisions there would be incentives to move away from road-based transport... but how often and how successfully have such economic evolutions been directed by rational, conscious decisions?

[Tom Kratman]

As have we all I'm sure, but in an RFI thread you can imagine the one doing the requesting watching it drift away and wondering what happened...



Certainly if these trends were directed by rational, conscious decisions there would be incentives to move away from road-based transport... but how often and how successfully have such economic evolutions been directed by rational, conscious decisions?

Wait! Wait! It'll come to me.

Does Henry Morgan sacking Portobello and Panama count?

[Colin Robinson]

But busy..
I've been crashing on completing a couple of chapters - including some of the data that you all have been commenting on. I'm not too worried if the thread drifts a bit when I've already gained a great deal of useful data that I'm still working through.

But, since you ask..
Who would be the best guys on the board to ask about general SFA principles, grand strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical level, from Iraq and Afghanistan? I'm reasonably happy I've got the African side of things on the way to being cleared up, but need input from where the fire's been hottest.

And what of our Special Forces colleagues who have been doing FID since before it was fashionable? Anybody I should talk to?

I've learned a great amount and I've really appreciated all the inputs I've got so far.
Cheers