Foresman's articles has much to recommend it. However, I suspect that its pleas will fall on many deaf ears for a number of reasons. The following quotation, for example, only gets to part of the story.
The Air-Land Battle in its day served another important purpose. It was a cathartic document that allowed the Army to rid itself of the demons of Vietnam, to rid the Army of all mention of counterinsurgency operations, to focus on major combat operations and to ignore the rest.
While I acknowledge the cathartic value of Air-Land Battle doctrine, we should not forget that it also allowed the Army to justify a lot of very big spending initiatives--things like the Abrams and the Bradley and a huge investment in attack aircraft for dep strikes against the enemy's follow-on echelons. Performing effective transformation includes the need to heed Eisenhower's admonition about the military-industrial complex.

If we truly want to succeed in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we must embrace a future that is a radical break with our past. Merely changing our organizational structure is not sufficient. We must be willing to break with our past as we execute in the present and prepare for the future.
This break will require that the military move away from the "metrics" based world that was forced upon it by folks like Robert MacNamara. Success in a low level conflict is defined much more qualitatively than quantitively. Our future success will also require that the country review its grand strategy for defense. I know that many members of this group have little use for Edward Luttwak. However, I think that a perusal of his Grand Stategy of the Roman Empire might be in order. Our current defense strategy to keep the barbarians at bay by fighting them well forward of the homeland smacks of the Roman limes defensive concept. This strategy didn't work over the long haul then. By the end of the 5th Century AD, Roman had been sacked several times. I do not believe it will work any better today. And my reasons for saying so are identified in the following quotation from Foresman.
Paradigm is an overused word in the military. It is one of those terms that are trotted out whenever one wishes to convince a skeptical audience that an idea is not just the repackaging of an old one. The Army truly needs a change in thinking. Wars of the future are going to be more like the campaigns on the 19th-century American frontier and less like World War II. The Army is going to have to adapt to a new world order in which our enemies will choose not to fight us conventionally but in a manner of their choosing. In the past, our doctrine stressed getting inside the decision cycle of the enemy. Now, the enemy knows it can get inside our decision cycle. It can strike when and where it pleases and knows that our response will be predictable. Although our actions may be justifiable, words will not compensate for the images speeding through the virtually connected world.
The 3rd Century barbarians showed enough agility and acumen to figure out the Roman strategy defensive and get around it. As Foresman notes, our current foes have the same, or better, abilities in this regard. (MarcT, I think the tribal wars Foresman refers to in a later restatement of the idea quoted below, are those of the early Middle Ages --e.g., Ostrogoth vs. Visigoth, Vandals vs. Gepids, etc, etc, etc.)

While this next quotation is true, I think there is another danger.
As I have mentioned, transformation is more than organizational change — it is a change to how we think of war. The greatest threats to transformation are those who would turn back the hands of time to an earlier day when the Army would concentrate on fighting major combat operations or grand wars and ignore the rest.
This other danger is that we do not look too far back in time. I suspect that the real lessons we need to learn are those of the world when there was, by and large, only one major power dominating the world stage. That would be the Roman Empire in the first few centuries AD and perhaps the British Empire in the latter half of the 19th Century.