Again, I believe you are correct but I would say as Ken White has said that the problem is not just in COIN. It is in war in general as we use words like "victory" to describe expectations that often are not met. We have repeatedly marched off to war in expectations of victory and even when we "won" emerged at least partially disillusioned from the experience.Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Best
Tom
True that the same thing applies to conventional warfighting but, I think, it's exacerbated by the "intimate" nature of counterinsurgency. We were able to make at least a reasonable case that we attained victory over Saddam Hussein in 1991. If the outcome of the current conflict in Iraq is a coalition government that includes AQI or other former insurgent leaders, it will be harder to convince the American public that it was a win.
Reading the thread, four thoughts occur
And that's one over my limit for one day...
1. The misuse of words by us and our political masters lead to false expectations. I for one used to get somewhat irate when anyone called me a Warrior -- I contend that a warrior is an undisciplined fighter who may be quite competent personally but in unable to impose his will on anyone other than by presence and direct action. Simplistic, yes but essentially correct. I was a soldier, not a warrior. Dumb term IMO. Same thing goes with the word 'victory.' Note that even you couch victory in Desert Storm as a "reasonable case." That implies that you have questions. Joe and Mary Ann Sixpack may not question that connection. I'd submit it was not a victory but we gave away the farm (that's another topic). Point is that in any COIN op, an acceptable outcome is all that is likely to be achieved. The political trend since WW II is to accept partial 'victories' and draws. The word may need to be buried (along with 'shock and awe' a real loser...). Mellifluous verbosity is unmilitary, he bloviated...
2. The Army has adopted the spin techniques of politicians. They don't work. We need to be more blunt, honest and cautious in pronouncements and should not let the politicians bulldoze us into spinning -- and we certainly shouldn't let ourselves fall into the coverup trap.
Both those above fit into the expectations and public confidence arenas, both absolutely as important in a democratic society to the pursuit of any military goal as the basic strategy and operational plan. To paraphrase Clemenceau with respect to the rationale and expectations issues; War is much too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.
3. The US Army needs to adapt its thought processes to the fact that warfighting is more than firepower, mass and force protection. Seems to be all that's considered. Planning, equipping and training emphasizing those factors has led us down a bad road. Demonstrations and deterrence can sometimes work; stealth, surprise, sensible audacity, agility and innovation most always will...
5. Re: FM 3-24. Interesting read. Way, way too long and way too much philosophizing. Soldier scholars will love it, soldiers who are not scholars will not. Most soldiers are not soldier scholars. Leaves out some things but it'll broadly work. As to its pro- or pre - scriptiveness, I am reminded of the immortals words of Bull Halsey; "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded."
And that's one over my limit for one day...
1. The misuse of words by us and our political masters lead to false expectations. I for one used to get somewhat irate when anyone called me a Warrior -- I contend that a warrior is an undisciplined fighter who may be quite competent personally but in unable to impose his will on anyone other than by presence and direct action. Simplistic, yes but essentially correct. I was a soldier, not a warrior. Dumb term IMO. Same thing goes with the word 'victory.' Note that even you couch victory in Desert Storm as a "reasonable case." That implies that you have questions. Joe and Mary Ann Sixpack may not question that connection. I'd submit it was not a victory but we gave away the farm (that's another topic). Point is that in any COIN op, an acceptable outcome is all that is likely to be achieved. The political trend since WW II is to accept partial 'victories' and draws. The word may need to be buried (along with 'shock and awe' a real loser...). Mellifluous verbosity is unmilitary, he bloviated...
2. The Army has adopted the spin techniques of politicians. They don't work. We need to be more blunt, honest and cautious in pronouncements and should not let the politicians bulldoze us into spinning -- and we certainly shouldn't let ourselves fall into the coverup trap.
Both those above fit into the expectations and public confidence arenas, both absolutely as important in a democratic society to the pursuit of any military goal as the basic strategy and operational plan. To paraphrase Clemenceau with respect to the rationale and expectations issues; War is much too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.
3. The US Army needs to adapt its thought processes to the fact that warfighting is more than firepower, mass and force protection. Seems to be all that's considered. Planning, equipping and training emphasizing those factors has led us down a bad road. Demonstrations and deterrence can sometimes work; stealth, surprise, sensible audacity, agility and innovation most always will...
5. Re: FM 3-24. Interesting read. Way, way too long and way too much philosophizing. Soldier scholars will love it, soldiers who are not scholars will not. Most soldiers are not soldier scholars. Leaves out some things but it'll broadly work. As to its pro- or pre - scriptiveness, I am reminded of the immortals words of Bull Halsey; "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded."
Well, having provided a bit of the philosophy in 3-24 myself, *I* like it. But, have you seen the exchange between Petraeus and Peters on "soldier scholars" in the July/August issue of The American Interest? My copy just came yesterday so I haven't read the articles yet.
The American Interest
Beyond the Cloister - David Petraeus
Learning to Lose - Ralph Peters
A parasitic enemy
Al Qaeda is basically a parasitic entity that does not aspire to control countries so much as it aspires to have people in control of countries that will let them operate and plan and practice for attacking others. In Iraq it is basically using a chaos strategy in the hopes that an entity favorable to it will take over.
This is basically what happened in Afghanistan when the Taliban came in to control the chaos. You saw a similar attempt in Somalia where the Islamic Courts were perceived as someone who could control the chaos that al Qaeda helped to create.
That is why the "sectarian civil war" which they have created in Iraq fits so well into their chaos strategy for Iraq. I think they are helped when we get bogged down in semantics and Steve is right to be against those arguments.
The parasite analogy would also cover much of their logistics and their day to day operations. I have compared them to cockroaches in the past where they hope to make such a mess that you will want to leave rather than eradicate them.
The recent revelation that they created a phony group with which to ally themselves with Iraq is probably a reflection of how much they have alienated everyone in Iraq.
Last edited by Merv Benson; 07-19-2007 at 04:26 PM.
I have no complaints at all about the philosophy,
I agree with almost all of it; what I'm questioning is where it is being stated. Questioning is not correct; what I'm suggesting is a look at what's where.
Let me caveat what follows with the fact that I know 3-24 was produced to fulfill a need that the senior leadership of the Army had wrongfully neglected. As such it is good and it needed to incorporate all that it does. I also understand it is to be an overarching document to quickly address a need. It does that well.
What I think is now required is to selectively incorporate the 'what' and 'how' with a minimum of why into a CI chapter in the next editions of FMs 3-21.10/11. More detail and more why should be in the new 3-21.20 and even more why in the next 3-90.6 (and 3-0). IMO a Field Manual should be designed for the ease and utility of the designed end user. Who is the end user for 3-24? A Company Commander or Platoon Leader. He needs the 'how' and 'what' the 'why' should be available to him elsewhere. Folks at Battalion have more need for the why and so on up the chain.
I have now read the articles SWJEd linked. I agree with both of them!
Seriously. I strongly agree with both and I'll explain that by pointing out that while we can certainly insist on or desire advanced degrees for all Officers or all Field Grades, everyone does not truly need -- and some would gleefully not obtain one if they had the option and could remain competitive -- an advanced degree. Do we really need all officers to possess one?
I see a need for a healthy percentage of Officers with varied degrees but I do not see that it is necessary for all. I think that a part of why we do what we do today is for ease of the personnel managers, it is easier to manage a single class of people than it is to manage two classes.
I'll also note that the younger generation of Officers may be more inclined to want advanced degrees and that can be a great incentive and I certainly don't object to that -- but I still think some without advanced degrees (or even a bachelors degree...) are or should be perfectly acceptable.
Both authors have good points; I think graduate education for officers should be encouraged but not mandated (other than for specific positions where a need is identified) and I do not doubt that we need many with advanced degrees. I do not think it necessary or even desirable that all officers obtain at least one. Having said that, if I just had to choose one or the other, I'd reluctantly go with Petraeus.
Halsey also came from the Navy, which has a singular disinterest in actually publishing doctrine or certain formal procedures. One of the many interesting service cultural differences.As to its pro- or pre - scriptiveness, I am reminded of the immortals words of Bull Halsey; "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded."
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Steve,
Yes for the surface warriors, the SOF guys, and aviators.
No for the submariners for whom if it is not written, it cannot be done. Then again they do live in a different world.
Best
Tom
I think looking at the insurgency as fighting state versus stateless is also a limiting factor in the equation of war and total war which hampers the understanding of motivation and solution. The insurgents are interested in "harming" corporations like Shell Oil, Halliburton, and others. The concept of "harming" versus winning I think (a rare occurrence) is endemic of the difference of expected outcome in the current conflicts of Iraq. Winning isn't the end goal state that the insurgents are looking to reach. They want to strike out and have us expend our resources without an expectation of winning anything of strategic or state value. That value may be the simple act of revenge in a "Hatfield and McCoy" response in perceived injustice.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
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