Green on Blue: causes and responses (merged thread)

[JMA]

You don't have to look for scapegoats. The risks are known, and yes, even junior troops are taught to acertain then. How far they go after being taught is a different matter, but at some point you cannot guard against all possible green-on-blue opportunities ... every moment. Nothing would get done.

It's totally acceptable that there are occupational hazards.

There is a mission with inherent risks to it, thus part of the nature of war.

There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

[carl]

The sheer volume of training they are attempting probably means that anything vaguely approaching decent training is quite impossible when it appears some of the participating ISAF countries have training problems of their own.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

So we have people like Stephen Green and members of the "Kill Team" doing training. And who have been doing it for months and months. We have dug a pretty deep hole.

[jcustis]

There are acceptable risks, unacceptable risks and pure gambles.

Looking at the stats for this years and noting that NATO halts routine joint patrols with Afghan forces that more than just me believes it has reached the "unacceptable risk" level.

It is also as much about the causes than just the actual risk itself.

You can teach "junior troops" as much as you like but - to be brutally honest - how many of them - as opposed to officers and SNCOs - are capable of diplomacy/courtesy/discretion/and all those good things when interacting with the ANA?

Is this not where the friction point is?

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

[carl]

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

I am not trying to be argumentative but your comment prompts two questions.

Even if statistically the risk of being killed by an ANSF person is low, how much would these killings raise the level of suspicion and would that level of suspicion hinder good training and cooperation? You know guys there. Has this had an effect?

Also having the right temperment (sic) and character is not solely confined to officers and SNCOs, but are the units doing the training picking and choosing who will do the training depending on who is suited for it? Again you know people who would know.

[JMA]

They are all capable, and that is statistical fact. Being a decent, restrained person is not the sole domain of the SNCO or officer.

I know a lot of officers and SNCOs who would not have been suited to mentoring and cross-cultural military training. Then lower down the scale I would suggest that the limitation would be in finding junior soldiers who are course qualified for such training and from tat group those who have the disposition to cooperate across cultural/religious/ethnic/racial lines in the stress of combat while operating effectively.

Across the hundreds and thousands of patrols conducted, the number of troops killed is significant relative to the beholder. I do not think we have reached any unacceptable level, but it would seem some handlers somewhere believe so, and that is risk-averse IMO.

As an officer you would need to decide on - and live with the consequences of - what IYO constitutes an acceptable and what an unacceptable risk to your troops. This may involve a career affecting act of moral courage to just say no. I also suggest that it is fair for senior commanders to assist those operating at the coal face in terms of making such decisions and not leave them hanging out there on their own.

Shrinking away from the issue is not the answer, not in 2005 or 2012. It merely seems so due to the decent interval we have chosen to pursue.

Maybe this matter has been allowed to slip and as such it needs a major correction right now.

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