Applying the lessons of late 19th/early 20th century asymmetrical warfare

[William F. Owen]

I feel late 19th/early 20th Century conflicts like the Boer Wars that occured in South Africa, the Philippine–American War, or even some aspects of the First World War would offer comparisons and lessons also due to many of the dynamics of those conflicts and the way they were fought in some ways by all sides involved.

So I was wondering if these wars hold lessons that can be applied to modern day small wars and if so what are they?

Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.

[UrsaMaior]

I think the title says it all. Think about how national liberation wars (say 1946-1975), Declaration of human rights /1948/, Weapons of mass destruction, the holocaust, and globalisítion etc. has changed our views on warfare, on combatants and non-combatants on casualties and so on.

Edit
One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.

[Steve Blair]

Edit
One more thing. The 'white men's' technology was so superior (and was used with such ruthlessness) that the natives did not see a chance for succesful resistance. In the west it is an often overlooked fact that the japanese victories in 1941-42 shattered the myth of the 'white men's' superiority. It was the first time (THE precedent) that ingenious forces can prevail on the long run (ie not in 1-2 battles).

IMHO This is the main difference between victorian and postbipolar world.

It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.

[Dayuhan]

It's important to note that this technological advantage only occurred in certain conflicts and locations. What often made the difference wasn't technology so much as it was training. This is especially true of small wars waged after about 1860.

In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.

[Steve Blair]

In many ways the Second World War started a permanent alteration in the Small Wars balance of power, and the Cold War cemented that change. In Asia in particular WW2, as mentioned above, permanently destroyed the myth of the white man's invincibility. On a more practical level, the widespread assistance given to local resistance movements fighting the Axis, even in very small numbers, made a huge difference: the natives learned to shoot, and learned the rudiments of irregular tactics. Once introduced to the basics they proved quite adept at improvising on their own and at spreading the knowledge.

During the Cold War both parties made extensive use of proxies, and in the process discovered an incentive to provide their proxies with arms and training, often discovering that neither arms nor training would necessarily be applied only to the goals originally pursued by those who provided them. The genie ain't going back in the bottle.

I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle. What I was pointing out was that the "white man's invincibility" had been a myth for some years prior to World War II and that there were small wars prior to the Boer War. Artificially starting the "small wars clock" at that point risks missing everything that came before, as does focusing the examination on European colonial possessions in the Pacific region.

There's nothing wrong, obviously, with giving those conflicts careful and thoughtful study. But there are other regions and periods that would repay examination.

[wm]

I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle. What I was pointing out was that the "white man's invincibility" had been a myth for some years prior to World War II and that there were small wars prior to the Boer War. Artificially starting the "small wars clock" at that point risks missing everything that came before, as does focusing the examination on European colonial possessions in the Pacific region.

There's nothing wrong, obviously, with giving those conflicts careful and thoughtful study. But there are other regions and periods that would repay examination.

I suspect that much of the West's experience with small wars (notably European nations to include UK, France, Portugal, and Germany) is more closely tied to the occupation of Africa during the latter half of the 19th Century. Efforts on the Pacific rim gain importance for Americans because that's pretty much the only place US troops fought (Boxer Rebellion, Phillippine Insurrection) outside our own continent prior to the World Wars.

I also have trouble calling the 2nd Boer War a small war (400k+ Brit troops was an enormous commitment for those days) and think that Pakenham may not be the best source for that war as well (largely a British perspective in his presentation). Others' mileage may vary.

[Dayuhan]

I never contended that the genie was going back in the bottle.

I didn't mean to suggest that you had. I wished to point out that our antagonists in today's small wars have access to infinitely greater resources and capabilities than those in the small wars of old, which might limit the value of the lessons to be learned from those conflicts. It's also worth noting that many of the methods used in early small wars such as the Philippine-American War (not an insurrection) or the wars against the native Americans would today be regarded as illegal, politically unacceptable, and in some cases genocidal, and would hardly be applicable to today's conflicts.

I'm not saying these conflicts do not deserve study, but any lessons deduced need to be taken with several grains of salt.

[Kevin23]

Sure they do. I and a few others here have been saying so for quite some time. The lessons have to be understood within some very specific contexts, but yes, military history is the main key to strategic success - not silly concepts and "new ideas."

What I really want to ask, is why the COIN-oil salesmen and the agenda monkeys keep pedalling bad history and history free ideas.

I couldn't agree more,

As I think conflicts like the Boer Wars hold lessons for COIN both in terms of how to defeat an insurgency and how not to defeat an insurgency.

[davidbfpo]

Kevin23,

You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8499.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

My view is here

[Kevin23]

The other thing you might want to do is get rid of the silly term "asymmetric" - it simply does not work. The 1st Boer War saw the Boers as well trained and well equipped as the British. Supposing that there are two distinct things called "COIN" and "War fighting" is not smart.

My view is here

Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

[William F. Owen]

Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

Almost. Irregular Warfare is warfare conduct by or against irregulars. It WHO fights, not how or why. Small Wars is a very good description, taken on the Victorian/Edwardian context. - but note: The difference between Warfare, and Wars. Small Wars does not mean small Warfare. Small wars generally means irregular warfare.

Obvious so far?

[Kevin23]

Almost. Irregular Warfare is warfare conduct by or against irregulars. It WHO fights, not how or why. Small Wars is a very good description, taken on the Victorian/Edwardian context. - but note: The difference between Warfare, and Wars. Small Wars does not mean small Warfare. Small wars generally means irregular warfare.

Obvious so far?

Yes!

I guess small wars would be better description for the colonial conflicts of the 19th/early 20th century Century?

[slapout9]

Ok lets just call it guerrilla warfare or even small wars then if that term works better?

Nothing wrong with Guerrilla Warfare(armed civilians fighting for a cause). 95% of the world will understand what mean, the only people who don't are in the military.

[Kevin23]

Kevin23,

You will need to be careful at the sources for your research. The lessons learnt I expect change over time. Using the Boer War(s) as the example, what did the contemporary histories / foriegn mission reports etc say and what later works like Pakenham and others said?

Secondly, IIRC John Fishel made a comment here on El Salvador, a successful COIN campaign, but thirty years later the main opponent is elected to power. That makes the earlier campaign look different: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8499.

davidbfpo

Sorry for the late reply Davidbfpo,

I really wasn't planning any extensive research paper or anything else on this subject at current time, as I mainly started this thread as topic of discussion. However to answer your post, haven't really had a chance to read anything by Pakenham or about the Boer War recently. Although I did read the illustrated edition of his book on the Boer War a very long time ago. Also I have read Martin Meredith's book on the war, Diamond's Gold, and War. So overall throughout the years I've always thought as the Boer War as mainly a guerillia war and I have seen it presented in that way when reading history.