The Afghanistan National Police (ANP)

[Jedburgh]

Recently published by the OIGs of State & Defense:

Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness

Key Judgments
• The U.S.-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) is generally well conceived and well executed. However, long-term U.S. assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program.

• The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for policy guidance; the Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) executes the police program through the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together well to administer and improve the police program.

• Building the Afghan National Police (ANP) requires a comprehensive, integrated approach that encompasses leadership training, sustaining institutions and organizations, and oversight and internal control mechanisms. As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior.

• Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional ANP are formidable. Among them are: no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.

• The mentoring program is a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force. To reach its full potential, the mentoring program should be expanded and better managed to achieve program objectives.

• Management of the police training contract is problematic and requires more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and CSTC-A, which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.

• The procurement pipeline to Afghanistan for ANP equipment is slow, but is improving. There is inadequate accountability for equipment after it is turned over to the ANP, because the ANP logistics system is not yet effective. The ANP needs to establish and implement an effective end-to-end internal controls process.

• Until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.

• The U.S. and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.

• Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners. Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the U.S. goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.

The full report makes for an interesting read.

[tequila]

Cops or Robbers: The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police (pdf file) - Andrew Wilder, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit

...
If police reform is to succeed in Afghanistan, and the big increase in resources to reform the ANP is not to be wasted, the major actors —

especially the government, the US, and the EUPOL mission — will need to address five key issues.

1. Develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP

The most fundamental issue that must be resolved
for police reform efforts to succeed in Afghanistan is the need for a shared vision of the role of the ANP, and a shared strategy on
how to achieve that vision. In particular, there is a need to reconcile the “German vision” of the police as a civilian law and order force, and
the “US vision” of the police as a security force with a major counter-insurgency role ...

2. Replace SSR pillars with an integrated and comprehensive rule of law strategy.

The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective strategy for reforming and strengthening
the judicial sector is a potentially crippling flaw of current police reform efforts. A civilian police force, no matter how well trained and
equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote the rule of law in the absence of a functioning judicial system ...

3. Make donor assistance conditional on comprehensive MoI reform.

The most consistent theme that emerged in interviews for this paper was that without comprehensive reform of the MoI, police reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be wasted. The MoI is notoriously corrupt, factionalised, and an increasingly important actor in Afghanistan's illegal drug economy ...

4. Prioritise quality of police over quantity.

There has been a damaging tendency to let immediate issues, such as the presidential elections and the growing Taliban insurgency, result in “quick fix” solutions that prioritise the quantity of police over the quality. A recent example was the 2006 decision to create the ANAP to assist
in counter-insurgency operations. Such measures to quickly increase police numbers are undermining the longer-term objective of creating
an effective police force ...

5. Prioritise fiscal sustainability of the security sector.

It is widely recognised that in the foreseeable future Afghanistan will not have the resources to independently sustain the security sector institutions that are currently being developed. Despite this knowledge, few concrete measures are being taken to address the problem, and
few decisions are being made to bring security sector costs more in line with what Afghanistan can afford ...

A massive amount of info about the Afghan police in this document. Very interesting reading, whether you agree with the recommendations or not.

[Jedburgh]

ISN Security Watch, 30 Jul 07: Afghanistan's Embryonic Police

In what is becoming a dolefully familiar pattern in the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan, the Taliban are increasingly targeting the fledgling Afghan police force. According to Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, around 350 Afghan police officers have been killed since the beginning of 2007, the highest police death toll they have seen since the Taliban were routed out of Kabul in 2001....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 30 Aug 07: Reforming Afghanistan's Police

Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy. However Afghanistan’s citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security. Instead of emphasising their coercive powers, reform should focus on accountability, ethnic representation and professionalism, along with an urgent need to depoliticise and institutionalise appointments and procedures. It is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. Afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.

The state of the Afghan National Police (ANP) nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban reflects the international community’s failure to grasp early on the centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors, despite similar hard-learned lessons in other countries attempting to emerge from years of armed conflict. President Karzai’s government still lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and to end political interference in appointments and operations. Attempts to shortcut institution building are compounded by an exploding narcotics trade – partly symptomatic of the state of policing but even more clearly a major corrupting influence on attempted reforms. At the same time, the challenges of a growing insurgency are pushing quick fixes to the fore....

Full 35 page report at the link.

[Jedburgh]

...I'm posting this here rather than in the dedicated Afghan Drug thread because of the focus on the Police:

Transcripts from the 4 Oct 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan, Thomas A. Schweich, Acting Assistant Secretary, DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics Strategy and Police Training in Afghanistan, Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis Group.

[tequila]

Death rate for Afghan police force 'staggering' - Ottawa Star, 1 Oct.

KANDAHAR–In rural Panjwaii and Zhari districts, Afghan cops are being killed faster than they can be replaced, says one of their Canadian mentors.

That terrifying fact stands as a huge roadblock to Canada's efforts to turn over security in these troubled regions to the fledgling police force.
"The rate at which they're losing policemen can never be replenished, unfortunately," RCMP Cpl. Barry Pitcher said.

In Panjwaii district alone – an insurgent hotbed west of Kandahar – police officers recently had six trucks destroyed in a 20-day period through roadside bombs and ambushes.

In July, 71 police officers were killed in regional command south, a territory that includes Kandahar province. Nationwide, 650 officers were killed from March 2006 to March 2007. Government officials say another 500 have been killed since then ...

[Jim Rodgers]

A long, and fairly interesting, article in the WaPo today - it's below, and linked from the 6 Aug roundup as well. Not detailed enough to really assess how things are going, but it does seem to illustrate the challenges\frustrations.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...080503531&pos=

[DaveDoyle]

Only had time to read the first 16 pages of the Wilder paper and the Washington Post article. Haven’t scanned the posts on our government’s approach to the problem. I do suspect that what we (the U.S. government) expect, as a standard for police work may be divorced from what is necessary and effective. That definition will certainly change over time as well.

Getting to the point –

If Taliban are targeting police, and they are, it is because they see the immediate threat. Police, not military, have the ability to effectively limit the Taliban control over the population. Establishing the “profession” of police work is going to be the biggest challenge to a society that distrusts authority. Young Afghans may aspire to be in the military, but at this point not many aspire to protect and serve as a member of the police force, local or national. How does one build on the idea of the importance of the police? Seems like it is going to take a lot of local work first. Work in the districts and villages like the Post article describes.

Thoughts?

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 18 Nov 08: Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy

Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to statebuilding and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.......

[Old Eagle]

In an insurgency, police are caught in the middle. How they are trained and equipped, who controls them, what their missions are, etc. pose massive problems for the counterinsurgent.

Ordinary crime and corruption are problems in Afghanistan (as is traffic control), so traditional police would have their hands full under any circumstances. In fact, the German training program was initially targeted on this mission set.

Then come the organized drug bosses and quickly overwhelm traditional police.

Then come the Taliban, AQ, whoever else and realy overwhelm the police. Remember -- the insurgent is not the counter-soldier, he is the counter-policeman. He doesn't want to win battles, he wants to impose control.

So now the police tend to become something that they didn't start out to be -- paramilitary forces, and in the process, lose the ability to do traditional policing functions.

Well, of course the army can fight insurgents, but there's also a problem with that: we don't want the military to be domestic enforcers. Posse commitatus and all that.

Now my head is starting to hurt.

But wait there's more. When I was working in the Afghan MOD, the senior leadership came in and started the "gotcha" round --
"didn't you say that unity of command is a principle of war?"
"yes..."
"so we need command and control of the police, not the MOI."
'now wait -- the ANA will eventually be an externally directed traditional military force, and police are not part of the military function"
"Are you nuts? We have a huge insurgency inside our borders...(gotcha!)"

Well, you get the idea.

In short, there are not clean cut solutions. Wish there were.

[Surferbeetle]

From the 12/22/08 Weekly Standard an Article by Ann Marlowe entitled Policing Afghanistan.

Again, the casualty numbers tell the story. As of mid-November, only 88 U.S. troops had been killed in action in all of Afghanistan this year, but 464 Afghan soldiers had been slain and a whopping 1,215 police. That last is an increase of 47 percent over the 2007 total. Add to that an estimated 2,600 police wounded or missing in action so far this year. Given a total Afghan National Police force of 77,000, that means 1 out of 20 cops was killed or wounded in 2008. By way of comparison, just 181 cops were killed in the line of duty in the United States in 2007, and our population is 10 to 12 times larger than Afghanistan's. If the United States were as dangerous for police as Afghanistan, we would have lost at least
12,000 cops this year.

The terms 'only' and 'just' are inappropriately associated with casualty numbers, however the article provides some insights into FID/ANP training that I do not see reported in the MSM.

[Bill Moore]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081227/...LkrP_pf7qs0NUE

As Taliban nears Kabul, shadow gov't takes hold

AP – This June 26, 2008 file frame grab from television footage reportedly shows Afghan militants holding … WARDAK PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Two months ago, Mohammad Anwar recalls, the Taliban paraded accused thieves through his village, tarred their faces with oil and threw them in jail.

The public punishment was a clear sign to villagers that the Taliban are now in charge. And the province they took over lies just 30 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, right on the main highway.

The Taliban has long operated its own shadow government in the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but its power is now spreading north to the doorstep of Kabul, according to Associated Press interviews with a dozen government officials, analysts, Taliban commanders and Afghan villagers. More than seven years after the U.S.-led invasion, the Islamic militia is attempting — at least in name — to reconstitute the government by which it ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

Whoever controls the populace is winning, we can continue to conduct raids, chase HVTs, use UAVs with hellfire missiles to conduct deep attacks, but if we can't control the populace it is all for naught. This principle of COIN seems to have simply been ignored in OEF-A.

In a Western society the police would be the primary force for controlling the populace, and it appears we're trying to force that model on the Afghanis based on the number of police killed in Surferbettles' post. That should be an indicator that the Taliban sees the Afghani police as their greatest threat, thus they are aggressively targeted.

I'm sure our response will be more Afghani Commandos and a bigger ANA. It is the American way, if a little stupid doesn't work, try "more" stupid, because we're obviously not applying enough stupid to the problem. I wonder what metrics our EBO bubbas are using to paint a rosey picture?

Pardon my frustration. Must be a post Christmas hangover. If you haven't had chilled lemonchillo, then I highly recommend it, but in moderation.

[Surferbeetle]

If we do not follow the proposed police-model for Afghanistan what other models are available which will meet the need/desire to reduce the disruptive components of Taliban influence in Afghanistan? I am going to look to Latin America for answers, conduct a DIME based analysis for a couple of hours, and share what I find with the group.

Paramilitary Groups (1) have been used by various actors in Latin America in the countries of Colombia (2), El Salvador (3), Guatemala (4), Nicaragua (5), and Mexico (6). Paramilitary groups have been used for such varying needs as Land Reform (7) and what is termed Corporate Counterinsurgency (8). The effectiveness or appropriateness of Paramilitary Groups in supporting legal governments has been questioned by a variety of sources. (9) It is noteworthy, however, that Paramilitary Groups have been/are widespread in Latin America.

The D in DIME stands for Diplomacy. The US has had diplomatic relations with Colombia for over one hundred years (10). El Salvador sought admission to the US after the break up of the United Provinces of Central America in 1838 and later declared independence in 1841. (11) (12). The US-DOS describes US relations with Guatemala as close though on occasion strained. (13) Rafael Carrera was the Guatemala’s first dictator in 1838. (14) Mexico’s relationship with the US has characterized as a ‘love-hate’ one since it’s independence in 1810. (15) US-Nicaragua relations since it’s independence in 1821 have been turbulent. (16) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs for Paramilitary Groups appear to have a deeper history in Africa than they do in Latin America. (17) (18) (19) (20). Our diplomatic efforts in the region have been characterized as uneven and this may in part be due to Latin America accounting for less than 6 percent of US trade. (21)

The I in DIME stands for Information/Intelligence. As can be seen from my list of references there seems to be no shortage of information on Paramilitary Groups in Latin America and so I will leave it at that.

The M in DIME stands for Military and I will limit my analysis to a partial catalog of Paramilitary Groups in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico. Colombia is home to the FARC, ELN, and AUC. (22) (23) El Salvador was home to the FMLN, FDR, ERP, RN and PRTC during the 1970’s and the FMLN participates in the Government today. (24) (25) Guatemala was home to the ESA (Secret Anti-communist Army), La Mano Blanco, URNG (comprised of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and PGT). (26) Nicaragua was home to the Contras (a group which included the FDN) and the FSLN both of which participate(d) in the countries government. (27) (28) (29) Mexico is home to the EZLN and it can be argued that the countries Paramilitary Drug Cartels desire some level of political control of the country. (30) (31) (32)

The E in DIME stands for Economics. Since I am running out of steam on this two-hour sprint tonight I will limit my analysis to the statement that Paramilitary Groups require money to function. Consider that the CRS reports “In the United States, wholesale illicit drug sale earnings estimates range from $13.6 to $48.4 billion annually.” This same report goes on to state that Mexico “…is the main foreign supplier of marijuana and a major supplier of methamphetamine to the United States.” (33)

Paramilitary Groups have an extensive and checkered history in Latin America. Perhaps Paramilitary Groups are an answer to the problems in Afghanistan(34), but their use will certainly result in a bumpy ride. It is my hope that Agricultural Development and Security Development (in particular that of the ANP and their derivatives), will be the main effort in Afghanistan. Time will tell.

(1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitary
(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitarism_in_Colombia
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(5) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(7) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(8) http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...horizon08.html
(9) Chomsky, N. (2000). Rogue States, The Rule of Force in World Affairs Cambridge MA: South End Press
(10) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/97.htm
(11) http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/5.htm
(12) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(13) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm
(14) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(15) http://countrystudies.us/mexico/93.htm
(16) Buckman, R.T. (2003). Latin America 2003 (37th ed.) Harper’s Ferry, W.V:
Stryker-Post Publications.
(17) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarma..._Reintegration
(18) http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php
(19) http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_l...=17&search.y=3
(20) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3582160.stm
(21) http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl895.cfm
(22) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4528631.stm
(23) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...bia/links.html
(24) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvadorian_Civil_War
(25) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabun...beration_Front
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_Civil_War
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FSLN
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...nd_the_Contras
(29) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicarag...mocratic_Force
(30) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapatis...nal_Liberation
(31) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_Drug_War
(32) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(33) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf
(34) http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...fghanistan604/


And now for the hunt for the scotch...

[Surferbeetle]

From the SWJ Reference Library-Afghanistan website

The Sarandoy served as a national police force, but their armaments surpassed the traditional police arms of pistol, baton and shotgun. The Sarandoy constituted a third ground force within the DRA. They had heavy armaments, armored personnel carriers and a separate command and control system. The DRA Army, KHAD and Sarandoy often worked together out of necessity, but they were separate, rival systems designed to counterbalance one another and prevent regime ouster. It was not an efficient, or particularly effective design, but the DRA was designed for regime survival, not efficiency or effectiveness. Furthermore, the DRA leadership saw their chief threat as internal subversion within the communist party instead of the rural Mujahideen.

From the Illinois Institute of Technology website

The general ineffectiveness and unreliability of the Afghan army led the Kabul regime to organize a number of paramilitary internal security forces. Probably the most important of these in the mid-1980s was the Sarandoy (Defenders of the Revolution), an armed body under the control of the Khalqidominated Ministry of Interior. It was an outgrowth of the Daoud-era Gendarmerie that before 1978 had comprised about 20,000 men. The November 1985 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly gave approximately the same figure for the size of the Sarandoy in 1985. It was organized into six brigades or regiments, numbering around 6,000 men and based in Qandahar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Parvan provinces and in Kabul, which had two Sarandoy units; there were also 20 operational and mountain battalions, with an additional 6,000 men; personnel attached to the national and 28 provincial headquarters of the Sarandoy, numbering around 3,000 men; and other personnel attached to the Sarandoy Academy and to administrative, construction, and maintenance units. These totaled a further 4,000 men. Established in early 1981, the force played an active role in offensives against the mujahidiin, though its effectiveness was hampered by the rivalry between Parchamis and Khalqis. Sarandoy relations with Parcham-dominated KHAD were tense.

From wikipedia

There was a bitter rivalry between Najibullah and Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi. Gulabzoi, a Khalq sympathizer, was Minister of the Interior and commander of Sarandoy ("Defenders of the Revolution"), the national gendarmerie. Gulabzoi was one of the few prominent Khalqis remaining in office in a Parcham-dominated regime.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 1st Qtr 09: Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan National Police

.....While most Afghan governing institutions had long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police were especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers served as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis. So in keeping with the basic tenets of our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies administering them—as a critical step toward convincing the people to support the popularly elected government instead of the Taliban alternative. This article describes the scope and challenges of these major stability operations missions, while highlighting relevant elements of our new COIN doctrine—central to the IW concept—as they relate to operationalization, or using the COIN doctrine as the basis for specific action plans.....

[huskerguy7]

As we all have seen, the Afghan National Police (ANP) has undergone several issues and is not as effective as ISAF wants it to be. Issues include corruption, unwilling to fight, lack of proper training, and many others.

With the Taliban insurgency still at large, ISAF has primarily been training the ANP in paramilitary skills. This has resulted with military advisers showing ANP units how to patrol, how to detect roadside bombs, how to maneuver in firefights, and so on. There is no doubt that these skills are needed; the Taliban are a very skilled enemy. By obtaining this kind of training, the ANP are more capable of fulfilling the "hold" section in ISAF's "clear, hold, and build." Essentially, they possess the capacity to conduct minimal military operations, which is useful.

However, paramilitary training leaves out basic law enforcement skills. These include handling evidence, conducting an investigation properly, enforcing the law properly, and building the right ties with the community. If these skills are obtained and used properly, then in the long term, the judicial situation in Afghanistan is likely to be better. But, ANP that are more focused towards enforcing the law are more prone to attacks from insurgents.

Clearly, there is no right answer. Heck, trying to straighten up such a large police force is already a large enough task. What approach should the ANP take? Or is there another one that I missed?

[slapout9]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

[huskerguy7]

Huskerguy,
Just exactly what Law do they enforce? How is a population that is reported to be 80% illiterate become informed of the Law to be enforced? What do they use for a Criminal Code?

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:

We need to get more innovative and creative about the ways we train these guys...These guys aren’t stupid, they just can’t read

The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.

[slapout9]

I am no expert in law, but I'm sure some form of "custom" law exists. Custom law never gets complex, but its "strong" enough to identify theft, trespassing, murder, etc; basically main "popular" crimes. I am sure that the Afghans understand some of this, so the police could possibly enforce some of these basic laws.

I also used to get hung up on the fact that many Afghans can't read; it makes the job difficult for us. However, I had a conversation with Dr. Kilcullen and my thinking change. Here's what he said:



The last sentence is the biggest part: Afghan's aren't stupid, they just can't read. Therefore, it isn't impossible to teach them, but we just need to approach it a different way.

I see in your Bio you are a High School student and you took the trouble to talk to Dr. Killcullen about the ANP. For someone your age to even know who Killcullen is, is a major achievement. Keep up the good work, you will figure it out for all us someday.

[jcustis]

Amen.