Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

General Philip Sheridan summed it up well in the 1870s when he noted with respect to the recent Prussian victory and a fascination in the US with them "We will make a mistake if we adopt the mechanics of the Prussian system rather than its intent."

True. One studies broadly to learn as much as one can in order to draw on that research for the benefit of one's own environment. Not to look for a solution which can be replicated exactly into one's own environment.

This is why the apparent search for an exact COIN doctrine to follow to the letter (as seen around here too often) is such a poor reflection of the officer corps of today.

Von Schell's book provides a good intelligent look in the US system by an outsider with no malicious intent. In fact he clearly states:

Let us take several actual examples from war and see what we can learn from them. In studying these examples it should be borne in mind that they do not constitute a universal formula; they deal only with German soldiers, moreover, they deal only with particular German soldiers in certain definite situations.

[Ken White]

Von Schell's book provides a good intelligent look in the US system by an outsider with no malicious intent.

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

[JMA]

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

One can hope for no more.

[JMA]

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

Went to look for this to compliment what to you posted:

Battle Drill.--The teaching of battle drill undoubtedly proved to be of the greatest value in instilling dash and determination into troops and junior leaders. The best results have been obtained from battle drills on a platoon level, but training in the drills up to company level proved useful.
It is important, however, that junior leaders should not regard battle drill as a universal panacea to be applied in toto in every situation. Battle drill training aims at teaching the basic "strokes," and thus represents only the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be intelligently applied in accordance with the nature of the ground and the particular tactical situation. There were many occasions when unnecessary casualties resulted from poor leadership because junior leaders blindly followed a set drill and failed to apply it with common sense. - Notes From Theatres of War, No. 16, North Africa November 1942-May 1943; The War Office, October, 1943